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<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>* [[Der Geldkrieg: Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg]]<br /> * [[The Money War: Democracy, Taxes and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War]]<br /> * [[Letter Mail from Portugal to USA]]<br /> * [[Postvertrag mit Additionals ab 15.Dez 1848]]</div>

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<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar History Faculty Publications History 3-2023 The Mone The Money War: <br /> Democr ar: <br /> Democracy, Taxes and Inflation in the U.S. Civil es and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War <br /> Ariel Ron aron@smu.edu <br /> Sofia Valeonti American University of Paris, svaleonti@aup.edu Follow this and additional works at: <br /> https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_history_research Recommended Citation Ron, Ariel, and Sofia Valeonti. 2023. <br /> “The Money War: Democracy, Taxes and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 47: 263–88. doi:10.1093/cje/bead006. <br /> This document is brought to you for free and open access by the History at SMU Scholar.<br /> It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. <br /> For more information, please visit <br /> http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.<br /> <br />  <br /> THE MONEY WAR <br /> Democracy, Taxes, and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War <br /> (accepted version) <br /> <br /> <br /> Ariel Ron / Southern Methodist University / aron@smu.edu <br /> Sofia Valeonti / The American University of Paris &amp; Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University / svaleonti@aup.edu (corresponding author) <br /> <br /> <br /> Abstract <br /> Both sides in the U.S. Civil War financed military spending by issuing new fiat currencies. The Union “greenback” underwent moderate inflation (by wartime standards), but the Confederate “grayback” suffered hyperinflation. Existing explanations for these price movements typically treat only one of the two cases and adopt either a quantity-theory or rational-expectations approach. We compare Union and Confederate policies directly and highlight the importance of taxation for assuring the value of inconvertible money. Combining monetary and fiscal history literatures, we find that tax policies were determined by long-term development of democratic governing institutions. Higher levels of democracy in the North, as compared to the slaveholding South, meant greater tax policy legitimacy and administrative competence. The Union drew on this legacy to back its money effectively, while the Confederacy failed to do so. We contribute to credit-money theories by drawing attention to the political determinants of effective fiscal policy. <br /> Keywords hyperinflation, fiat currency, Confederate States of America, U.S. Civil War, taxation <br /> JEL Classifications B52, E52, N110 <br /> <br /> Acknowledgments <br /> We wish to thank the participants of the 2019 European Historical Economics Society Conference, the Early American Money Symposium at Brown University, the Colorado State PhD seminar, the H2M seminar of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, and the Paris School of Economics Economic History Seminar, as well as Jeff Althouse, Nicolas Barreyre, Ghislain Deleplace, Claire Federspiel, Laurent Le Maux, Noam Magor, John Majewski, and Romain Svartzman for their comments and suggestions. All errors remaining are our responsibility.<br /> <br />  <br /> 1. INTRODUCTION In the spring of 1864, the U.S. Civil War still had a year of hard fighting ahead, but the outcome already seemed clear to some observers. The situation was expressed by a political cartoon l (figure 1) showing the Union president, Abraham Lincoln, and his Confederate counterpart, Jefferson Davis, slugging it out with sacks of cash. “Better give in Jeff,” Lincoln boasts, “you haven’t a chance! don’t you see I’ve the LONGEST PURSE.” Piled boxes lie at the feet of the combatants, the ones beside Lincoln marked “gold bars,” the ones beside Davis, “uncurrent money.” The caption declares a “Final Issue of the War”—a double entendre that evokes Union victory and the last emission of worthless Confederate paper. But the cartoon goes awry in suggesting that the health of the Union’s treasury notes rested on its gold inventories, for both sides had abandoned gold-backed currencies early in the conflict. Something else, then, supported the Union’s monetary superiority, which enabled it to convert a substantial advantage in raw economic capacity at the start of the war into the much larger edge in the mobilization of real resources needed to conquer the vast geographic expanse of Confederate America. The Union and the Confederacy each issued huge quantities of inconvertible paper money to pay for unprecedented wartime expenses. Both experienced price changes, but in completely different proportions (figures 2 and 3). Whether measured in gold, wholesale or consumer indices, Union prices rose by roughly a factor of two over the course of the war. This was a rate of inflation similar to the American experience in the First and Second World Wars and one wholly adequate to sustaining a relatively booming wartime economy (McPherson, 1988, p. 447; David and Solar, 1977, pp. 16-17; Warren et al.1932, pp. 6-10; Mitchell 1908, p. 279). The Confederacy, however, suffered hyperinflation, with both wholesale and gold prices rising nearly sixtyfold by the start of 1865, a situation that left its economy in chaos (Lerner,<br />  <br /> <br /> 1955, p. 24; Todd, 1954, p. 189). If the cartoon is wrong to suggest that gold accounted for the difference, what did? Most scholars attribute Civil War price movements either to the amount of money issued (the quantity theory, or QT) or to rational expectations regarding money’s future value (RE). For the Confederate case, Lerner (1954, 1955, 1956) emphasizes the rise in the stock and velocity of money, as well as the southern economy’s declining output. Godfrey (1978) similarly highlights the importance of changes in the money supply. By contrast, several scholars adopt the rational-expectations approach and correlate price movements with news items. Burdekin and Langdana (1993), McCadless (1996), and Weidenmier (2002) each adopt the rational expectations approach and show that price movements tracked news about military, fiscal and monetary events. 1 The Union’s price history is also typically explained within the QT and RE traditions. For Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 59, ft. 1964), and Studenski and Krooss (1963, p. 147), the determining factor was the quantity of money in circulation. They argue that inflation would have been limited if a greater part of the war had been funded with taxes rather than money issues. Alternatively, Calomiris (1988B) demonstrates that the Union’s price level was not determined by the current money supply but rather by rational expectations about its future supply, which, in turn, depended on fiscal news.2 For Calomiris, any policy concerning the political will to resume specie payments in the future was a form of fiscal news. Two other approaches of note, though distinct, can be grouped together as especially concerned with historically specific interactions between policies and institutions. Wray (1998, pp. 65-69) deploys modern monetary theory (MMT) to attribute the Confederacy’s hyperinflation to insufficient taxation, which caused a shortfall of demand for its note issues. From an older institutionalist perspective, Mitchell (1903, p. 198) argues that the value of the greenbacks “depended upon the credit of the issuer,” which refersto the confidence that holders<br />  <br /> <br /> of greenbacks accorded to the “government’s ability to ultimately redeem its notes.” Confidence in the government’s ability depended on both structural and contingent factors, including the quantity of paper money issued (the more money, the more difficult the repayment) and the occurrence of “financial, military, political, and diplomatic events” (p. 201), such as reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and news about the government’s ability to borrow or the military’s battlefield advances and reverses. Each of these accounts has its merits, yet while all accord fiscal policy a prominent role in controlling either the current or expected money supply, none consider how fiscal policy was actually made and implemented. Nor do any of these accounts attempt a consistent comparison of the Union and Confederate cases. We aim to remedy these deficiencies by arguing for systemic differences between Union and Confederate fiscal capacities that resulted from larger historical divergences in governing philosophy and practice. We differ from QT and RE scholars not only in method but in what we seek to explain. Rather than examine precise price movements, we ask why the Union currency succeeded where the Confederate currency failed. It is surely instructive to ascertain the reasons for short-term price changes, but it is at least as important to understand why one policy achieved its basic aims—facilitating a winning war strategy—while the other did not. Our approach is closer to Mitchell’s and Wray’s, each of which regards state action as decisive. Yet we pay far more attention to the actual taxation measures that in one case reinforced monetary design and in the other case undermined it. A comparative investigation of Union and Confederate money creation requires a theoretical framework that can account for the political and administrative capacities of the state. We begin with Christine Desan’s “constitutional approach to money.” Contrary to the standard economic interpretation of money that sees it as the spontaneous result of private exchange, Desan regards money as a “governance project” (Desan 2014, p. 1, 7, 12; see also Desan, 2017). Money, in her view, is a product of institutions and state designs that make it<br />  <br /> <br /> possible for certain materialized practices—the coining of silver, the printing of paper notes, the coding of magnetic strips mounted on plastic cards—to take on the attributes of money. The successful implementation of such projects depends on the state’s fiscal actions and legal norms. The state creates money, in the first instance, by making purchases with designated tokens that it will subsequently accept for the discharge of the tax obligations it imposes. This “fiat loop,” by which the state issues payments and takes them back, confers on money what Desan calls “fiscal value.” In other words, tax obligations generate the demand for state monies that endow them with worth. The state can also make its designated tokens transferable among private parties by agreeing to accept them from anyone (not just the original payee) and by enforcing a legal order that recognizes money as lawful clearance of private contractual obligations (legal tender). Monetary tokens’ resulting general acceptance—“the capacity to travel from hand to hand as carriers of value recognized by all participants”—adds what Desan calls a “cash premium,” enhancing their value further.3 These basic criteria can be operationalized in many ways, each with its own social and political implications. The constitutional approach to money is particularly apposite for comparing the Union and the Confederate monetary experiences. Public acceptability of the new currencies could not be taken for granted, for while Americans were well acquainted with paper money in the form of bank notes, which were backed in principle by gold convertibility, they had little experience with inconvertible government notes. The essential difference in monetary designs lay in diverging tax capacities: the Union was able to implement an operative taxing system, while the Confederacy largely failed to do so. In Desan’s terms, the Confederacy failed to close the fiat loop. It was therefore unable to confer fiscal value on its paper emissions, nor a cash premium, leaving its citizens without adequate means to carry on ordinary business transactions. The result was a badly malfunctioning economy even in the vast areas of the South<br />  <br /> <br /> where Union armies remained distant and the slave system continued to function relatively undisturbed. As a practical matter, it is easier for governments to put money out than to call it back in (e.g. Rockoff, 2015, p. 8). The taxing part of Desan’s equation requires not only a willingness to impose obligations but an ability to collect on them. This ability cannot be realized overnight. At one level, there is the administrative challenge of setting up a competent taxing authority. At a deeper level, there is the political challenge of fostering a reasonable degree of popular compliance. Because, therefore, designing a sound monetary system in theory is not the same thing as implementing a functional one in reality, we argue that Union and Confederate monetary experiences were strongly conditioned by their respective prior taxing capacities. The Union’s antebellum legacy allowed it to massively scale up and significantly transform its revenue system; the Confederacy’s did not. It is here that the constitutional approach proves its relevance, because it expands the study of price movements to encompass the underlying monetary architecture within which QT and RE factors took shape. This draws our attention to the long-term institutional trajectories revealed by Einhorn’s (2006) comparative study of northern and southern tax regimes from the colonial era to the antebellum periods. Einhorn’s conception of taxing capacity can be decomposed into two distinct but correlated competencies: skilled tax administration and deliberative tax politics. This means that, at least in the United States, more democracy has tended to generate better taxation for public purposes desired by the electorate.4 Conversely, slaveholders’ distrust of democratic institutions—engendered by their philosophical commitment to social hierarchy and their pragmatic fear that ordinary voters might want to tax slavery out of existence—led to colonial and state governments that were “more aristocratic, weaker, and less competent where slavery was a major institution in the economy and society,” as compared to their freer northern peers (Einhorn 2006, p. 7).5<br />  <br /> <br /> Taking the joint perspective of Desan and Einhorn, Civil War monetary and tax policies appear intrinsically linked, forming distinctive Union and Confederate fiscal regimes fundamentally reflective of their respective state-making projects. These fiscal regimes profoundly structured the manner in which the state made claims on its society and even on how society’s members made binding claims upon one another in their private interactions. It is little surprise, then, that a slave society should differ substantially, perhaps inevitably, from a relatively free and democratic one even in its money. Because the Civil War split a polity and society that shared many things in common— an English Protestant cultural heritage, common law and constitutionalist legal tradition, capitalist and settler-colonial ethos, and more—it offers something like a natural experiment able to contribute broader insights to credit theories of money.6 We stress the long-run significance of state formation and the institutional history of taxing capacity to provide statebacked credit-money theories with a more realistic conception of how states operate and develop. While it is often useful and appropriate to make analytical distinctions between the legal, political, and economic spheres, in the case of credit theories of money such categorical boundaries are artificial and misleading. For the chartalist approach, money is tax-driven and thus inextricably bound up with the historically determined capacities of the state. Consequently, it is necessary to account for the capacities and debilities of the fiscal authority, that is, the determinants of fiscal policy horizons, if one is to give a convincing account of transformation in the monetary architecture, such as occurred during the US Civil War. In this paper, we sketch our proposed argument by way of a synthesis and critique of the existing literatures on American fiscal and monetary regimes before and during the Civil War. Our approach is necessarily narrative in order to capture the essential dynamics of the problem. In future, we may subject elements of the argument to more rigorous testing with additional archival research and empirical detail.<br />  <br /> <br /> 2. THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY LEGACIES The Union’s policy of paper money issuance coupled with robust tax increases harked back to the “currency finance” practices of the British North American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Spaulding, 1869, pp. 39-40). In these earlier episodes, colonial governments financed wartime expenditures by issuing paper money on a temporary basis and simultaneously passing commensurate tax increases that would eventually call the notes back. This combination endowed the notes with fiscal value, giving the government purchasing power that effectively anticipated future tax receipts. Given the chronic scarcity of specie associated with the colonies’ structural trade deficits, the public also tended to demand notes for ordinary business transactions. Desan’s two key elements, fiscal value and the cash premium, were thus firmly in place (Ferguson, 1961; Perkins, 1997; Newell, 1998; Grubb, 2006; Goldberg, 2014). At the outbreak of the Civil War, both northern and southern policymakers proposed something similar. Interestingly, their primary point of reference seems not to have been the colonial legacy but rather the British use of inconvertible bills of credit during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which they saw as a successful means for preserving England’s “imperilled existence” (Spaulding, 1869, p. 39).7 The reason for this amnesia was probably the disastrous experience with paper note issues, known as “continentals,” during the American Revolution. The continentals’ rapid depreciation resulted from the national state’s inability to tax. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress lacked this crucial fiscal power, but even had it been granted such a power, it could scarcely have executed it in practice, because the creation of a continental taxing authority was beyond both the political and administrative capacities of a nascent postcolonial state (Einhorn, 2008, pp. 127- 28). Consequently, there was no mechanism to generate demand for the continentals or to retire<br />  <br /> <br /> them (Calomiris, 1988A; Grubb, 2006, pp. 46-47; Goldberg, 2014, p. 481). Instead of taxing directly, Congress depended on the individual states to do so in compliance with requests for funds, known as requisitions. But the states preferred to save revenues for their own needs, including support for their own paper issues, which nevertheless suffered depreciation because of wartime disruptions to their fiscal apparatuses. The general fiasco led subsequent US officials to repudiate the policy of currency finance and virtually to erase it from public memory.8 The Revolutionary story underscores the fact that successful implementation of currency finance depended not only on calibrating money issues to tax increases, but also on executing tax collections. In the Civil War, the Union was able to do both while the Confederacy was able to do neither. Although most of the fighting occurred on southern soil and the Union’s naval blockade prevented the Confederacy from receiving significant customs duties, the slaveholders’ problem was not fundamentally about wartime disruptions. Union armies did not penetrate the enormous southern interior until late in the war and large areas remained undisturbed when hostilities concluded (Downs, 2015). Moreover, the Confederacy inherited the existing federal governmental presence in the South, including buildings and personnel, basically intact. The American revolutionaries, by contrast, comprised a tenuous alliance of colonial legislatures and ad hoc committees that struggled to govern their backcountry populations and take hold of administrative functions previously handled by royal governors. The difference between Union and Confederate taxing policies is therefore best understood as an outgrowth of long-term institutional developments that bequeathed to the northern free states robust taxing capacity absent from the southern slave states. Here we turn to Einhorn’s comparative study of northern and southern taxing traditions stretching back to the colonial period. Einhorn’s finding that taxing capacity in early America was closely related to democratic institutions—that more democracy meant more taxing<br />  <br /> <br /> power—might seem counterintuitive. The relationship is often thought to be the reverse. People dislike taxes, the thinking goes, so if they obtain a voice in government they will seek to reduce their burdens as much as possible. Was not the American Revolution, after all, a great tax revolt? Not exactly. The revolutionary slogan “no taxation without representation” did not oppose taxes per se but rather conditioned them on political voice. In point of fact, once Americans gained the ability to govern themselves they sometimes asked for more rather than less taxes, when they believed those taxes served a public purpose. As Lincoln famously put it, “the legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and individual capacities” (Lincoln, 1953, 2:220-222, emphasis in original). Indeed, some Confederates played on the revolutionary slogan to criticize Confederate fiscal debility by objecting to “representation without taxation” (quoted in Todd, 1954, p. 138). There were major differences in the amount of democracy that antebellum Americans enjoyed. Gender- and race-based exclusions were national, but wherever slavery was dominant, democratic institutions suffered more. Slaveholders were powerful people schooled in what Thomas Jefferson called “the most unremitting despotism” (Jefferson, 1998, p. 168).9 By contrast, the northern colonies and later states tended to be more egalitarian and more democratic than their southern neighbors. They also tended to tax themselves more for things like roads and schools. The disparity between North and South is instantly evident, for example, by looking at the antebellum canal network, which was built largely with state funds (Larson, 2001; Taylor, 1951, p. 35). Comparative measures of public education and scientific funding display a similar sectional skew, even when soil type and other environmental conditions were indistinguishable (Majewski, 2016; Ron, 2020). This kind of pattern—linking more democratic governments with greater taxation and, sometimes, lower inequality—has been observed for the Americas generally and for Europe, modern and ancient (Sokoloff and<br />  <br /> <br /> Zolt, 2007; Tilly, 2009; Van Zanden and Prak, 2006; Tan 2017). As Findlay and O’Rourke put it, “states based on citizenship rather than coercion could actually levy more taxes, not fewer” (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007, p. 350). The northern free states thus had a substantially greater taxing capacity than their southern slave counterparts. This capacity can be regarded in two aspects: administration and politics. Administratively, northern states implemented more complex tax systems that addressed both revenue and equity issues. In particular, northern states had much greater ability to assess property values at market rates, to equalize values across locales lest tax officials try to under-assess their friends and neighbors, and to levy taxes in relatively fair proportion to taxpayers’ means and benefits. This ability, in turn, derived from the habits of a democratic society accustomed to “local decision making” and “ongoing, everyday political negotiation between taxpayers and elected local officials” (Einhorn, 2006, p. 29; 2008, p. 202). The significance of democratic practice for state capacity was that it generated legitimacy and compliance that allowed tax administrators to do their jobs. It also tended to generate more responsive and broadly conceived economic development policies that grew the taxable pie (Brownlee 2016, pp. 54-57). Democracy meant figurative and literal buy-in. Southern state governments eventually learned from their northern counterparts and began to close the taxation gap in the 1840s and 1850s (Thornton, 1982). They also innovated by introducing “uniformity clauses” requiring all forms of property to be assessed and taxed at the same rate (Einhorn, 2006, pp. 201-202). With the nonslaveholding white majority thus restrained from imposing discriminatory taxes on enslaved wealth, slaveholders favored new revenues to finance railroad construction and even public education (for whites). Yet on the eve of the Civil War southern states still lagged northern states in taxes per capita and per unit of GDP (Figure 4).<br />  <br /> <br /> 3. TAXES AND MONEY IN THE UNION Union and Confederate fiscal regimes took shape when long-term institutional trajectories intersected with wartime exigencies. Both sides initially intended to rely on bond issues, as the US had done in earlier major wars (Edling, 2014). However, the scale of military needs quickly overwhelmed both governments’ ability to borrow. The Confederacy never surmounted this difficulty, whereas the Union eventually created new and very successful borrowing channels. According to one conservative measure, the Confederate States financed only 21,3% of their war effort via bond issues, while the Union’s corresponding figure was 64,5% (Godfrey, 1978, p. 14). In the short term, however, the Union, too, required other means. Both governments turned to emissions of paper treasury notes. The resulting policies shared some broad similarities. Both the Union “greenbacks” and the Confederate “graybacks,” as the notes came to be known, were exchangeable for interestbearing bonds of their respective issuing governments, a policy intended to encourage lending and public acceptance of the notes.10 Both currencies were also accompanied by promises to raise taxes in order to uphold their values. But only the Union was able to implement new taxes effectively (Brownlee, 2016, pp. 60-68; Edling, 2014, pp. 206-212; Bank et al., 2008, pp. 23-47).11 “In its financial mobilization for war,” writes the tax historian, W. Elliot Brownlee, “the Union had an advantage over the Confederacy because of the extended fiscal experimentation by Northern state governments” in the antebellum era (Brownlee, 2016, p. 65). In addition to raising tariff rates, Union officials began planning for heavy internal taxation as early as July 1861 and a month later imposed the nation’s first-ever income tax. They subsequently invested great effort in elaborating a system remarkable for its breadth and reach. The result, in July 1862, was a law “running hundreds of pages” that “taxed almost everything but the air northerners breathed” (Edling, 2014, p. 206; McPherson, 1988, p. 447). Additional rounds of legislation expanded the tax base and raised<br />  <br /> <br /> rates further. Yet “Republican leaders did not face significant resistance to the huge new taxes or need to rely on coercion for their collection,” Brownlee (2016, p. 60) observes, thanks to their “broad electoral popularity.” Max Edling (2014, p. 208) adds, in his recent study of early American war finance, that congressional debates over the first major internal revenue act are “noteworthy most of all for the willingness of the lawmakers to support the war.” The London Times opined that “one tenth of these taxes would bring any American community to the resistance point in a month,” but historians and contemporaries alike have repeatedly marveled at ordinary northerners’ eagerness to bear their share of the joint burden (cited in Ball, 1991, p. 221). “I have never before seen a country where the people were clamorous for taxation,” remarked one incredulous foreign observer in 1862 (Bank et al., 2008, p. 37).12 If this was a fiscal system that enjoyed democratic legitimacy, it was one that also enjoyed adroit political and administrative management. The House Ways and Means Committee took its time drafting legislation, but Congress publicly committed itself six months earlier to raising taxes as “a statement of intent meant to reassure public creditors” (Edling, 2014, p. 205). The July 1862 law raised the rates and progressivity of the income tax and added a first-ever federal inheritance tax to balance the regressivity of stepped-up customs and excises. Congress also selectively took lessons from abroad. It adopted the British administrative innovation of tax withholding (“stoppage at the source”) for collecting income taxes on corporate dividends and government employee salaries (Brownlee, 2016, p. 67). But “rather than impose high duties on a few items, like Britain did, the Ways and Means Committee opted for low duties on a wide range of manufactures” to spread the burden around (Edling, 2014, p. 206). Congress also stayed away from property taxes, leaving the states their traditional revenue base. In these ways, it addressed both the administrative and political requirements of an effective and sustainable tax regime. To be sure, there were problems. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase initially took no direct action to collect income and revenue<br />  <br /> <br /> taxes (Studenski and Krooss, 1963, p. 141) and, later, evasion of liquor and income taxes proved significant (p. 151). Yet notwithstanding these trouble spots, the Union’s taxing system benefited from a high degree of legitimacy and compliance—especially when compared with the Confederacy, as we show in the next section. Thus, by most accounts, federal tax collection proceeded remarkably smoothly and turned out a revenue juggernaut. By the end of 1863, it was providing the government with “substantial income,” directly funding a third or more of spending. By 1865, internal taxes were dominating a federal revenue haul that, each quarter, exceeded and even doubled prewar collections for entire years (Edling, 2014, pp. 183, 195, 210-212; Brownlee, 2016, p. 68). From the outset, the connection between taxation and the maintenance of a federal fiat currency was evident to all. It was repeatedly stressed in policymakers’ private correspondence, on the floors of Congress, and in the press. “Now, then, put on a war tax of $200,000,000, issue $150,0000,000 demand notes,” wrote one correspondent to Elbridge Spaulding, the primary author of the greenback legislation. “The tax bill will create a general demand for the Treasury notes and keep them at or near par,” wrote another. The Treasury Secretary likewise pointed out that “a judicious system of adequate taxation” would “create a demand for the notes” (Spaulding, 1869, pp. 23-25, p. 46). When, later in the war, it became necessary to issue additional notes, the New York Times demanded “to be taxed to a degree which shall fairly correspond with the vast amount of promissory money afloat” (cited in Bank et al., 2008, p. 40). Congress responded by augmenting the internal revenue system yet again. These brief statements may seem vague about the mechanics of the fiat loop. But a look at the pre-war writing of one influential greenback advocate suggests what many others may have been thinking. In a comprehensive survey of money, credit, and banking published just two years before the war, the well-connected Philadelphia attorney and ironmaster, Stephen Colwell, concluded that what mattered for maintaining the value of paper money was ist<br />  <br /> <br /> acceptability, not specie convertibility (Colwell, 1859, p. 235, p. 244). Acceptability, in turn, depended on people’s confidence that the currency would reliably allow them to meet their obligations. Colwell therefore recommended that governments pay “the entire national expenditure” with legal-tender notes acceptable “in payment of all dues at their public treasuries.” The only limitation was to “issue only so much as will return in the regular course of the business.” This implied a method for calculating a safe issuance quantity: start with a fraction of expected tax receipts and gradually increase the amount over time. “By the experience gained,” Colwell believed, “the officers entrusted with this duty could manage such emission without danger of over-issue” (Colwell, 1859, p. 22). This reasoning illuminates the briefer statements by Colwell’s fellow greenback-supporters. When, for instance, the New York Republican Moses Grinnell wrote, “Go a direct tax for one hundred and fifty or two hundred millions, and then issue one hundred and fifty millions Treasury notes legal tender” (Spaulding, 1869, p. 23), he seems to have been invoking a logic similar to Colwell’s.13 The point here is not that such views were universal—there were plenty of greenback skeptics before, during, and after the notes were issued—but rather that the mechanism of their operation was well understood and straightforward to articulate. Spaulding presented the case fully when he spoke before the House in late January 1862 in favor of the first emissions. The new tax law was still several months away at this point, the actual revenue still further in the future, but Congress had already declared its intent and a subcommittee of Ways and Means was hard at work. Spaulding therefore asserted that his proposed treasury notes would be supported by “adequate taxation, to be imposed by new bills.” He then pressed the importance of following through. “This is what the people . . . want to know,” he insisted. “If they take these notes, they want to know positively whether you will enforce the claim of the Government upon the property of the country, to the full extent necessary to redeem the Treasury notes” (Spaulding, 1869, pp. 33-34). The greenbacks were thus issued on the strength<br />  <br /> <br /> of a general understanding that heavy taxes would follow. And they did. As Hugh Rockoff observes, “the Republicans were serious about taxes” (Rockoff, 2015, p. 26). That Congress could make a credible promise “to enforce the claim of the Government upon the property of the country” nicely illustrates the utility of our “constitutional approach.” At issue here was not whether taxes would be perfectly proportioned to absorb the whole quantity of greenbacks issued. Spaulding’s call for a commitment “to redeem the Treasury notes” did not mean this. Indeed, Dror Goldberg points out that “a government that issues too much paper money can get away with it” for some time, “because money has a grip on everyone’s daily activities” (Goldberg, 2014, p. 472). The essential question was whether the government enjoyed the legitimacy to make good on its promises to the extent necessary to retain that grip. 14 Effective fiscal and monetary capacity serves here as a proxy for political legitimacy and provides a measure of citizen confidence in the Union’s relatively democratic “governance project.” The “fiat loop” is not, therefore, a matter of mechanically controlling the quantity of money, or even expectations about the quantity of money, but of establishing broad public confidence that can generate the “cash premium” to maintain the value of the unit of account. This was precisely where the Confederacy failed. Its monetary grip on the southern public loosened, slipped and ultimately gave way entirely. 4. TAXES AND MONEY IN THE CONFEDERACY The Confederacy hoped to manage the war on the basis of loans and it put off serious taxation until it was too late. Confederate fiscal policy was a mass of incongruities, beginning with the absurdity of its plans to rely on taxing international trade in the face of a Union naval blockade. The Confederate Congress’s first move, bizarrely, was to order costs reduced by “at least fifty percent” at the federal customs houses it had seized (Todd, 1954, p. 121). This meant layoffs, potentially crippling the revenue service it intended to count on. The plan seems not to<br />  <br /> <br /> have been carried through, but it hardly mattered because the tightening blockade let few cargoes in. Although the Confederate Treasury Secretary, Christopher H. Memminger, predicted in mid-1861 that customs duties would raise $25 million within a year, returns for the entire war fell short of $3.5 million. The Confederacy next looked to export taxes, apparently still unable to comprehend the effects of the blockade. Memminger believed that bond issues secured by export taxes sustained their market value better than other loans, but it is hard to imagine how this could have been the case when export tax collections were utterly marginal, totaling less than $40,000 for the war (Todd, 1954, pp. 121-127; Ball, 1991, pp. 203- 10; for measures of blockade effectiveness, see Thornton and Ekelund, 2004, pp. 35-36). The Confederate Congress next passed a “war tax” in August 1861, levying a flat halfpercent rate on real and personal property. Valuing property was precisely what the southern states had little experience doing, particularly when it came to slavery. In the antebellum era, some states did move from the simpler poll-based slave taxes (a flat rate per capita) to more administratively demanding ad valorem taxes (based on assessed values). These moves always came in the face of immense planter resistance and the result was often not a true valuation but rather a simpler enumeration of tranches defined by age and sex, following common practice on the part of slave traders (Einhorn 2006; Thornton 1982; Rosenthal, 2018). Consequently, during the Civil War, varying assessments of slave values in the different states generated major delays in the overall property assessment. The existing scholarship does not specify the precise problems but it is possible that incompatible slave schedules made equalization across the states difficult or contentious (Todd, 1954, p. 133; Ball, 1991, p. 220, 224).15 At any rate, after the assessment was done, collections were left almost entirely to the states, most of which proceeded to collect no taxes and instead paid their quotas by borrowing graybacks financed with their own inconvertible paper issuances. Almost three-quarters of the $17 million raised by the end of 1862 was not really tax revenue at all (Todd 1954, p. 133-136; see Table 2).16<br />  <br /> <br /> According to Burdekin and Langdana (1993, p. 357) “not until 1864 did the War Tax account for even 10% of total revenue. In 1862, its first year of implementation, less than 5% of revenues were realized from this tax.” The graybacks received less support than they otherwise might have gotten and the southern monetary system was made further complicated and uncertain. Nearly two years of “disastrous inertia” followed, with no additional taxation as the currency and the government’s credit deteriorated (Ball, 1991, p. 227). Finally, in April 1863, the Confederate Congress passed a serious tax law that was nevertheless fundamentally inadequate on several counts. Although it included an income tax, duties on profits from trade in major commodities, numerous professional licensing fees, and a tax-in-kind on agriculture, the law omitted a “direct tax” on property, including enslaved property. 17 Hence, although earnings on slave-grown crops were in principle subject to the income tax, for the most part “slaveholders were enabled to evade contributing to a new nation established for their special benefit” (ibid., p. 234). Indeed, evasion seems to have been rampant because “numerous obstacles blocked the satisfactory operation of the tax machinery” (Todd 1954, p. 145). For instance, income assessment began with an estimate made by the tax payer themself which, if challenged by the assessor, would be adjudicated by a panel of referees that the tax payer helped to appoint (Mathews, 1863, p. 121-122). Such a procedure presumably favored slaveholders, who exercised tremendous power at the local level. 18 But the deeper problem with the tax law was that the money tax was simply insufficient to meet rising expenses and spiraling prices. The tax-in-kind worked better. “In the first 9 months of 1863 . . . [it] accounted for more than half of the average monthly tax revenues,” but it provoked sharp protest (Burdekin and Langdana, 1993, pp. 357-8). At ten percent of agricultural output after deductions sufficient to feed farmers’ families, it “looked large and discriminatory in comparison with the 2% currency tax on salaries over $1,500” (Todd, 1954, p. 142; also see Bank et al., 2008, p. 33; Hurt 2015,<br />  <br /> <br /> pp. 132-134, 160). And since a tax-in-kind did not enhance the graybacks’ cash premium, it made them no more desirable and inflation continued to spiral out of control. Unable to grasp the causes of inflation, some southerners lashed out at greedy merchants and manufacturers (McPherson, 1988, p. 441; Wilson, 2002, p. 60; Rockoff, 2015, p. 8). But other well-placed Confederates understood exactly what was happening and said so. The Richmond Enquirer pointed out repeatedly that a fiat currency without adequate fiscal measures would suffer the same fate as the Revolutionary continentals and for the same reason: lack of taxation to uphold their value. The editor of the South’s leading economic journal, J. D. B. DeBow, reiterated the warning, as did the powerful Georgia politician, Robert Toombs (cited in Phillips, 1913, pp. 622-27). No less a figure than John C. Calhoun had explained the mechanics in painstaking detail as early as the 1810s and again after the Panic of 1837, observing that the federal government’s “fiscal action pervades the whole community . . . and it must, of course, create a general demand for whatever it receives and disburses as money” (Calhoun 1959, vol. 14, p. 299; Todd, 1954, p. 138; Ball, 1991, pp. 37-39, 50-51, 222-23). The Confederacy’s fundamental problem, in the words of Memminger’s biographer, was simply an “aversion to internal taxation” (Capers, 1893, p. 341). According to McPherson, “the Confederate government possessed no machinery for levying internal taxes and its constituents had no tradition of paying them” (McPherson, 1988, p. 38). The most comprehensive history of the matter, Ball’s aptly titled, Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat, stresses both the administrative and political weaknesses implied by these judgments. Ball (1991, p. 32, 42) notes that “southern colonies shunned direct taxes as much as possible, even at the cost of a lamentable level of public services,” and he blames a lack of “effective democratic government” for the Confederacy’s sclerotic wartime politics. “To mobilize a staff of collectors and assessors capable of appraising and levying direct taxes,” he concludes, “required far more will and, to a lesser degree, more skill than the Confederacy possessed”<br />  <br /> <br /> (ibid., p. 226). Robert Toombs apparently agreed, writing to a colleague in June 1863 that “the Yankee Congress have certainly beat us badly in finance” (quoted in Phillips, 1913, pp. 619- 20). A full accounting for Confederate fiscal policy may never be possible because many of Congress’s key deliberations were conducted in secret session. This, in itself, signals its democracy deficit relative to the Union. In the North, Spaulding sent the very first draft of his fiat currency measure to the New York Tribune for public dissemination and comment (Spaulding, 1869, p.13). In response to this and daily reporting on congressional financial deliberations in the press, he and others members of the House Ways and Means Committee fielded a range of views expressed in both private correspondence and public print. Confederate policymakers held their cards much closer to the vest. They failed to “take the people into their confidence,” in Ball’s words, because they did not have much confidence in the people (Ball, 1991, p. 209). As Drew Faust and Stephanie McCurry have shown, the Confederate project was profoundly anti-democratic, including attempts to reintroduce property qualifications for the franchise (Faust, 1988, pp. 33-39; McCurry, 2010, pp. 11-37). Some southerners complained specifically about the undemocratic conduct of fiscal policy. A public meeting in North Carolina declared the tax-in-kind “unjust and tyrannical” because it was passed “in secret session . . . taking from the hard laborers of the Confederacy one-tenth of the people’s living, instead of taking back their own currency in tax” (quoted in Schwab, 1901, p. 295). Also revealing is the fact that whereas in the Confederacy it was the Treasury Secretary rather than Congress that pushed for taxes, in the Union it was the House, the most democratic element of the federal government, that advanced the conjoined money-and-tax agenda. In this case, at least, Einhorn’s positive correlation between democracy and taxation seems to hold. Confederate fiscal incapacity should not be mistaken for states’ rights fanaticism or a lack of statist ambition. In fact, antebellum southern state legislatures were much more likely<br />  <br /> <br /> to charter banks and railroads as state-run enterprises and, at least in some cases, to apply the profits to expanding governmental services with the goal of establishing tax-free government (Wallenstein, 1987; Murphy, 2017, pp. 115-16; Quintana, 2018; Hall, 2019). This kind of policy was only possible because southern state governments were dominated by slave-owning planters. As long as the state invested in businesses that served the plantation economy instead of competing with it, government ownership was an attractive option. The experience was put to good effect during the war in the Confederacy’s vast takeover of industry, which, among other things, allowed it to manage some remarkable feats of bootstrap industrialization (Morgan, 2005). Before the war, however, planters proved decisively uninterested in backing state investment of benefit to manufacturers, such as construction of transportation access to Virginia’s coal beds (Adams, 2004; Majewski, 2000). The inability to discipline the wartime agricultural sector, which continued to devote inordinate acreage to tobacco and cotton in the face of urban food shortages, underscores the Confederacy’s commitment to the planter class (e.g., Hurt, 2015, pp. 118-125; Schwab, 1901, pp. 278-279). 5. COMPARISONS Without a solid fiscal base, Confederate statism proved chaotic and, to a large extent, self-cannibalizing. This must be kept in mind when comparing the Confederacy and the Union on measures of state capacity. In one of the most influential accounts of Confederate statism, Richard Franklin Bensel argues that, “measured by statutory rates, coverage, and revenues collected the Confederate internal revenue system extracted more wealth from that erected by the Union” (Bensel, 1990, pp. 170-71). The former, he shows, collected $82 million plus $40 million worth of in-kind goods in the first year of operation of its major tax law (the 1863 Act), while the latter collected $39 million during its first year. Citing the Union’s earlier start and the graybacks’ depreciation, he ultimately concludes that the two sides were “approximately<br />  <br /> <br /> equivalent” in the matter of internal revenue (Bensel, 1990, p. 172). Adjusting the figures for inflation, however, shows that Bensel seriously underestimates the severity of Confederate difficulties. When the Confederate tax bill was passed in April 1863, the wholesale price index was already about 1,100 and by January 1864 it was at nearly 2,800 (as compared to a base of the first four months of 1861; Lerner, 1955, p. 24, 29). It continued to rise in the opening months of 1864, when most of the new taxes were collected (Todd, 1954, p. 145; Godfrey, 1978, p. 23; Ransom, 2001). It is reasonably conservative to suppose that the average price index during tax collections stood at about 2,500, which means that the $82 million that Bensel highlights was only worth about $3.3 million in real terms. By contrast, a conservative average for the Union wholesale price index in the first year of its internal tax system would be 150, meaning its $39 million equaled $26 million in real terms, a nearly eightfold advantage compared to the CSA. A more realistic price index of 130, per Mitchell, would raise the Union takings to $30 million (Mitchell, 1908, p. 279). Even adding the tax-in-kind to the Confederate total (at $40 million nominal = $1.7 million real), the ratio is 6:1 in favor of the Union and a full year earlier, when crucial battlefield operations and materiél purchases had to be financed. In addition, the tax-in-kind did nothing to support the currency and, in fact, made the situation worse by reducing salable goods (Lerner, 1954, p. 513). The overall situation is indicated by Figure 5, which shows Union and Confederate tax revenues over time, adjusted for inflation. Irregular Confederate reporting makes this kind of visualization helpful. The magnitude of Confederate fiscal ineptitude now comes into clear view. The first three quarters of 1863 particularly stand out, a period of key battlefield turning points when the Union’s revenue machine was fully in gear while its opponent collected essentially nothing. It thus appears that Confederate statism lacked the fundamental attribute of a modern state: the capacity to tax in a manner compatible with waging a total war.19<br />  <br /> <br /> The picture is ultimately similar when taxes and note issues are measured against government expenditures. The Confederate Treasury’s irregular reporting makes it again difficult to compare its position with the Union’s, but reporting periods line up at the end of 1862, providing a comparative budgetary snapshot at a key point in the war. As shown in Table 3, total expenditures for the years 1861 and 1862 were nominally similar, but in real terms Union spending was nearly twice that of the Confederacy. Union GDP was similarly something like 2.5 to 3.5 times larger. 20 These ratios roughly correspond with common ideas about the war’s tactical realties, in which attackers (usually the Union) are thought to have required a two- or three-to-one superiority in manpower to overcome defenders’ advantages (e.g., Freehling 2001, p. 14; Knudsen 2022, p. 142). Indeed, the Union enrolled approximately 2.2 million soldiers to the Confederacy’s 800-900,000 over the course of the war (Gallagher and Waugh 2015, p. 30), a ratio of 2.6:1.21 Altogether, then, it seems reasonable to suppose that by the close of 1862 each government had made roughly proportional demands on its respective economy. Each government had also financed about three quarters of its spending with note issues, although the Union made up the difference primarily with taxation, the Confederacy with borrowing. What might a rational observer have concluded at this point? The war situation was equivocal. In September of 1862, the Union blunted a largescale Confederate raid into its territory at the Battle of Antietam. Though far from a resounding Union victory, it was enough for Lincoln to issue the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, a policy that transformed a war of national reunification into a struggle over the existence of slavery. Yet the Union’s prospects looked doubtful by the end of the year, as its eastern army suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg and its western army, bogged down in the Mississippi mud, was forced to call off an assault on the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg. “These were dark days in Washington,” writes McPherson (1988, p. 574). The military disappointments<br />  <br /> <br /> combined with the politically controversial shift toward emancipation policy strengthened the position of so-called “Peace Democrats,” who favored a negotiated end to the war. Such a scenario would have seriously hampered Union finances, because an independent Confederacy would have pursued free trade, probably siphoning commercial traffic from New York to New Orleans and thereby cutting sharply into the Union’s customs revenues, a key source of gold. Moreover, the Union’s budget deficit (expenditures minus tax revenues only) had exploded during the year, rising from $25 million at end of 1861 to $423 million at the end of 1862, an increase of nearly 1,588 percent (see figure 6). In short, while the Union’s larger economy gave it greater war spending capacity, its greater needs as the attacker in a war that favored defense, its important budget deficit financed largely with fiat notes (see table 3), and its uncertain battlefield position might have given pause to financial observers. And yet, with uncertain and distant prospects for a return to convertibility, greenback prices held out quite well. The Warren-Pearson wholesale price index for January of 1863 shows that the greenback had lost 36,9% of the value of a prewar gold dollar as compared to January 1861. By contrast, Lerner’s general Confederate price index shows that the grayback had depreciated 654% by this point as compared to January 1861 (Lerner, 1955, p. 24). If we compare the Union’s and Confederacy’s gold prices, the picture is similar. The average price of gold in greenbacks increased by 41,5% as compared to January 1862, while the grayback note price of a gold dollar in Richmond increased by 136,4% as compared to January 1862 (Mitchell, 1908, p. 5; Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2001, p. 1629). These figures suggest that the Union’s commitments to dramatically raise internal tax collections were perceived to be credible, a circumstance plainly lacking in the Confederacy. This credibility gap, in turn, stemmed from a more general gap in democratic legitimacy. The picture may be clarified by reference to hyperinflationary dynamics in other contexts. In a survey of hyperinflationary episodes that followed the First World War, Velde<br />  <br /> <br /> (2016) highlights that the end of those episodes depended on the capacity of each state to balance governmental budgets via, in part, sufficient taxation or credible announcements of future revenue collections. If we transpose Velde’s analysis to the Civil War, we would expect the Union to experience similar levels of inflation to the Confederacy because, at the end of 1862, its budget deficit was slightly greater (figure 6 and table 3). Yet, at this point the Confederacy’s level of inflation was eighteen times higher (see figures 2 and 3). If, on the other hand, we transpose the Civil War analysis we conduct here to the case of interwar Europe, we would want to point out that each of the five countries discussed —Austria, Hungary, Germany, Poland and Russia—were characterized by revolutionary or near-revolutionary situations. Such circumstances are likely to interrupt state functions and thereby to weaker or break the fiat loop. Velde’s own recognition of the French revolutionary assignats and the American revolutionary continentals as comparable cases further attests that hyperinflation is as much a consequence of social breakdown as its cause. What may be measured by those governments’ budget deficits then turns on the prior breakdown of state legitimacy. The Confederacy’s situation was historically specific. Its secession was deeply conservative, a distinctly counterrevolutionary movement. It preserved the US Constitution almost intact, merely strengthening protections for slavery. The enslaved population certainly harbored revolutionary impulses, but could not act en masse except in the near vicinity of Union troops. The Confederacy was capable of being self-sufficient in food and resources and found adequate funds to purchase weapons abroad. The Confederate failure originated instead with a state apparatus whose administrative and political capacities were too archaic to the needs of a modern war. It could not forge the fiscal machinery to mobilize real resources on the necessary scale. In this regard, the significance of the lengthy delay in implementing the Confederate internal tax system cannot be overstated. It testifies to the limited legitimacy of the<br />  <br /> <br /> Confederacy’s governance project, which, by failing to undertake an obvious imperative, allowed inevitable wartime inflation to turn into hyperinflation, leading to a cascade of problems whose impact grew wider at each downward step. All of them stemmed from the circumstance that, having failed to calibrate note issues to tax increases in a reasonable degree, Confederate leaders had upended money’s ability to distribute social claims in a manner generally perceived as fair. This fatally weakened money’s “grip on everyone’s daily activities” (Goldberg, 2014, p. 472). Inflation stoked popular discontent that manifested most clearly in the many food riots of 1863, which were met by a combination of suppression and ineffective price controls (Hurt 2015; Cashin 2011; figure 4). In some places, hyperinflation resulted in a barter economy or the use of wheat or bullion as means of payment, implying a complete loss of value for the grayback (Schwab, 1901, pp. 163-64; Pecquet 1987; Hurt 2015, pp. 134, 138; Carpenter, 2020, pp. 170-175; Seward, 1863). Indeed, enemy currency, Union greenbacks, were preferred even in “leading centers of the Confederacy” (Schwab, 1901, p. 161). Hyperinflation also disrupted production so that when the tax system was finally implemented, there was less to tax. It disincentivized production further when the government resorted to impressing what it needed at below-market rates (Hurt, 2015, pp. 120-127, 161- 162; Schwab, 1901, pp. 203-205). “After suffering under impressment,” several scholars report, “farmers simply stopped planting new crops” (Bank et al., 2008, pp. 29-30). Confederate delay further undermined fiscal capacity by missing the opportunity to tax in areas that would be occupied by Union armies. In short, it is difficult to see how Confederate revenue policy can possibly be put on a par with the Union’s as a measure of state capacity. It is potentially misleading, in this context, to speak of “extracting” taxes, a locution that comes from the “bellicist” or “fiscal-military model” of state development.22 Bensel’s view is perhaps closest to Charles Tilly’s generalized version of the model, which regards state power as crucially dependent not only on raw fiscal capacity but on the level of economic<br />  <br /> <br /> development of the society from which it draws (Tilly, 1992). The problem with such a formulation is that it distinguishes too sharply between the state and society/economy, so that the former seems entirely outside the latter and therefore engaged in a perpetual effort to “extract” wealth. But if, as Desan argues, an economy operating on the basis of money does not simply emerge spontaneously from market exchanges, but is rather a form of governance implemented by state officials, then one would have to acknowledge that money and taxes are ways in which the state cultivates the economy rather than merely extracts from it—that, in fact, state and economy are significantly endogenous to one another and cannot be easily disentangled even for analytic purposes. 6. CONCLUSION For political leaders charged with managing a war—or any existential threat requiring near total social mobilization—the standards by which to judge financial policy are narrowed to the stark options of success or failure. The actual mix of fiscal and monetary policies require a careful “balancing act,” as Rockoff puts it, attuned to both political and economic implications. Institutional endowments will make a big difference in deciding how such a balancing act can be managed and what it can achieve. This is the lesson we draw from our comparison of Union and Confederate financial mobilizations during the US Civil War. Synthesizing the existing scholarship with the help of Desan’s and Einhorn’s insights, we show that differential taxing policies explain differential currency outcomes. Whereas the Union greenbacks experienced only moderate and manageable inflation, the Confederate graybacks suffered catastrophic hyperinflation. In 1864 the Confederate government was even obliged to partially repudiate its own paper money. We further show that taxing policies were determined by institutional capacities resulting from long-run historical developments. In particular, we highlight the way that democratic<br />  <br /> <br /> governance enhanced two essential facets of taxing capacity: political legitimacy and administrative competence. Our analysis suggests that historical state capacity must form an integral part of any credit theory of money. It is not at all obvious that a government will be able to effectively sustain a currency via the “fiat loop,” even if its officials understand the mechanism perfectly clearly. This may also imply that a successful fiat loop is contingent on people’s broader range of commitments to the state’s “governance project.” Although we have highlighted the importance of relatively democratic governance in the northern colonies of British North America and, later, the free states of the United States, it is likely that other arrangements can function effectively so long as they link the state with key classes of social actors. In other words, both money and taxes, which together establish a pervasive structure for ordering social claims and obligations, depend on a still broader set of governing arrangements and practices. 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Wholesale price indexes, by commodity group: 1749–1890 [Warren and Pearson].” Table Cc113-124 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R., and Wright, G. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earlier Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Cc66-204 Hurt, R. D. 2015. Agriculture and the Confederacy: Policy, Productivity, and Power in the Civil War South, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press. Huston, J. L. 2015. The British Gentry, the Southern Planter, and the Northern Family Farmer: Agriculture and Sectional Antagonism in North America, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press. Jefferson, T. 1998. Notes on the State of Virginia, Shuffelton, F (ed.), New York, Penguin Classics. Kindahl, J. K. 1961. Economic Factors in Specie Resumption the United States, 1865-79, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 69, no. 1, 30–48. Knudsen, Harold M. 2022. James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War. Savas Publishing. Larson, J. L. 2001. Internal Improvement: National Public Works and the Promise of Popular Government in the Early United States, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. Lerner, E. M. 1954. The Monetary and Fiscal Programs of the Confederate Government, 1861-65, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 62, no. 6, 506-522. Lerner, E. M. 1955. Money, Prices, and Wages in the Confederacy, 1861-65, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 63, no. 1, 20-40.<br />  <br /> <br /> Lerner, E. M. 1956. Inflation in the Confederacy, 1861-65, in Friedman, M. (ed.), Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Lincoln, A. 1953. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Abraham Lincoln Association, vol. 2, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln. Lindert, P. H. and Sutch, R. 2006. Consumer price indexes, for all items: 1774–2003. Table Cc1-2 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R., and Wright, G. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earlier Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Cc1-65 Lindert, P. H. and Williamson, J. G. 2016. Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality Since 1700, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Maier, C. S. 2014. Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press. Majewski, J. D. 2000. A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the Civil War, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Majewski, J. D. 2016. Why Did Northerners Oppose the Expansion of Slavery? Economic Development and Education in the Limestone South, pp. 277–98 in Beckert, S. and Rockman, S. (eds.), Slavery’s Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. Margo, R. A. 2006. Rent indexes for dwelling units in five large cities: 1860–1880, Table Cc60 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R., and Wright, G. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earlier Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press.<br />  <br /> <br /> Matthews, J. M., ed. 1863. The Statutes at Large of the Confederate States of America, Passed at the Third Session of the First Congress; 1863. Electronic Edition. Richmond, VA: R.M. Smith. https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/22conf/1863stat.html. McCandless, G. T. 1996. Money, Expectations, and the U.S. Civil War, The American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 3, 661–671. McCurry, S. 2010. Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. McPherson, J. M.1988. Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, New York, Oxford University Press. Mitchell, W. C. 1903. 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American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815, Columbus, Ohio State University Press. Phillips, U. B. (ed). 1913. Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Vol. II: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, Washington, Government Printing Office. Quintana, R. A. 2018. Making a Slave State: Political Development in Early South Carolina, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press. Ransom, R. L. 2001. “Economics of the Civil War,” in EH.Net Encyclopedia, ed. Roger Whaples, 24/8/2001, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economics-of-the-civil-war/. Ransom, R. L. 2006A. Confederate government revenues and expenditures: 1861– 1864. Table Eh194-215 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R. and Wright, R. 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Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=Letter_Mail_from_Portugal_to_USA&diff=114 2026-06-26T14:38:36Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Study on Postal Agreements, Rates and Routes 1853-75<br /> <br /> von Luis Rocha<br /> <br /> RPSL Study Papers<br /> Study Papers are produced by The Royal Philatelie Society London for pieces of work that are too long<br /> to be an article in The London Philatelist but are shorter than a regulär full-size book. Previously, the<br /> RPSL has published numerous Supplements to The London Philatelist, but for specialised studies it<br /> seems appropriate to produce such works äs A4 softback booklets which will be available at a low cost<br /> to all interested philatelists. There is no fixed publication schedule for this series.<br /> <br /> <br /> Preface<br /> <br /> The study of transatlantic mail between Portugal and the United States, mediated by the British<br /> postal System between 1853 and 1875 (when the General Postal Union was established), reveals a<br /> complex web of international relations. While the North Atlantic routes and conventions of this era<br /> have been masterfully documented by legendary scholars, most notably Richard Winter, the specific<br /> intersection of Portuguese domestic legislation with these international treaties continues to offer a<br /> rieh field for new discovery. My primary motivation for this work arose when I first began studying<br /> these covers and realised that no one could provide the in-depth explanations they deserved. I found<br /> it nearly impossible to find a Consolidated resource that clearly defined the rate periods or the specific<br /> conventions applicable to each case. This study was born from the need to bridge that gap between<br /> official decrees and surviving physical evidence, creating a definitive reference for a period defined<br /> by shifting treaties and evolving rates, routes and means.<br /> <br /> My good old friend Acacio Luz once told nie that the only way to truly understand these covers is to<br /> follow a strict &quot;Chain of Logic.&quot; To explain a single letter, one must master Portuguese legislation to<br /> understand the domestic requirements, the Portugal-United Kingdom conventions to understand<br /> the transit through the British hüb, and finally the United Kingdom-United States conventions<br /> to account for the leg across the Atlantic. As Acacio wisely told me, without the original texts of<br /> these conventions, the additional articles, regulations and the specific shipping timetables, &quot;there<br /> is no chance of getting the Job done.&quot; This study is the result of years spent gathering these primary<br /> sources, including contemporary newspapers, official gazettes, post office notices, and internal postal<br /> documentation, to ensure that every rate and route described is backed by official fact.<br /> <br /> By combining these records with a comprehensive census of 104 surviving covers compiled from<br /> more than 1100 auction catalogues, many collections and private holdings over a large number of<br /> years, I have attempted to verify theoretical regulations against empirical postal practice. This datadriven<br /> approach allows us to see how the broad conventions were applied specifically to the mail<br /> departing from Portuguese ports. Beyond the technical analysis, these letters are valuable witnesses<br /> to 19th-century life. The names of senders and recipients, äs well äs the internal annotations serve äs<br /> a vital complementary record. These elements help situate each letter historically and commercially,<br /> offering a complete interpretation even when official postmarks are faint or absent.<br /> <br /> This study is intended for the specialised collector of Portugal's &quot;Classic&quot; issues, the Student of<br /> transatlantic history, and the postal historian. It is my hope that this work provides collectors with<br /> the tools to &quot;read&quot; their own pieces. Through this study, corroborated by primary sources, it is my<br /> intention to contribute to a deeper understanding of the postal history of this period, enabling<br /> collectors to further explore this subject and fully appreciate every element present in the covers in<br /> their own collection.<br /> <br /> Note for readers<br /> <br /> The accountancy calculations shown for prepaid letters presented in this work represent the debit<br /> owed by Portugal to the other postal authorities (USA and/or UK). The total amount that was prepaid<br /> differs from the accounting total äs it includes an element that was retained by Portugal to cover its<br /> own domestic handling and in some cases the transit fee due to Spain. Note that depending if the<br /> letter was sent to the UK by ship, packet or via Spain/France the values retained are different.<br /> <br /> Acknowledgements<br /> <br /> This study owes an immense debt of gratitude to Acacio Luz, whose contributions were indispensable<br /> to its completion. Sincere thanks are also due to Colin Tabeart for his generous assistance and<br /> invaluable insights, and to Fernando Bernardo for his unwavering encouragement throughout this<br /> project. The author also gratefully acknowledges the support of Steve Washburne, äs well äs the<br /> following individuals and institutions: Barry Attoe of The Postal Museum in London; lsabel Beato of<br /> the Arquivo Histörico da Marinha (Historical Archive of the Navy); and Ana Sabido of the Biblioteca<br /> Nacional de Portugal (National Library of Portugal).<br /> Special thanks are due to Luis Barreiros and Eduarde Barreiros for their diligent peer review of this<br /> paper, and to Paul Farrimond for his exceptional work in typesetting and bringing this study to life.<br /> Finally, the author wishes to express sincere appreciation for the work of the late Richard F. Winter,<br /> whose masterful postal history publications not only informed this study but also ignited a passion<br /> for this fascinating field.<br /> <br /> Units and Abbreviations<br /> s. d. Shillings and pence (UK) 1s = 12d<br /> c cents (US)<br /> oz ounce l oz = 28.35 grams<br /> g grams<br /> <br /> <br /> Contents<br /> <br /> *1. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848 7<br /> *2. Portugal: Postal Regulations of 1853 12<br /> *3. Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1859 15<br /> *4. Portugal: Entry into Force of the Decimal Metric System, 1860 18<br /> *5. Cancellation of the Peninsular Line, 1862 19<br /> *6. Currency Devaluation and the Impact on Unpaid Mail Received in the USA, 1863 20<br /> *7. Additional Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1866 21<br /> *8. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1867 27<br /> *9. Reduction of Postage for Mail Sent from Portugal in Transit through the United<br /> *Kingdom, 1868 29<br /> *10. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1868 31<br /> *11. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1869 35<br /> *12. Interruption of Postal Relations between France and the USA, 1870 36<br /> *13. Additional Routes Due to the Armed Conflict between France and Prussia 40<br /> *14. Reduction of Postage for Mail Sent from Portugal in Transit through the United<br /> *Kingdom, 1872 42<br /> *15. General Postal Union (G.P.U.) and Consequent Standardisation of Rates, 1875 47<br /> *16. Concluding Remarks 49<br /> <br /> Prior to the standardisation of international postal rates, there was never a formal postal agreement<br /> between Portugal and the United States. This standardisation arose with the Treaty of Bern, concluded<br /> on 9 October 18741&gt;2, which established the General Postal Union and introduced unified rates.<br /> Consequently, until Portugal and the United States joined the General Postal Union, the sending or<br /> receipt of mail between these two nations depended entirely on a complex web of postal agreements<br /> with and between intermediary countries.<br /> <br /> This study analyses postal regulations and procedures to facilitate the study of mail sent from<br /> Continental Portugal and the islands of Madeira and the Azores to the USA. By examining these<br /> regulations and procedures, we can interpret the various markings and elements found on mail from<br /> this period. This analysis includes a thorough examination of the different conventions and postal<br /> arrangements in place, with a focus on understanding the complex accounting Systems and diverse<br /> postage rates that were applied.<br /> <br /> The timeframe under consideration Spans from l July 1853 to l July 1875, bracketing the era between<br /> the introduction of the first adhesive stamps in Portugal and the nations entry into the General<br /> Postal Union. In July 1853, and within the context of the study, it is relevant to mention that Portugal<br /> already had formalised3 bilateral postal agreements with England (1705 and 1810)4, Spain (1850)5,<br /> and Belgium (1853)6. Furthermore, the Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848 was already in<br /> effect, laying the groundwork for the United Kingdoms crucial role äs an intermediary in handling<br /> mail sent from Portugal to the USA. The various Anglo-American Conventions that followed are<br /> central to understanding the complexities of this transatlantic mail System.<br /> <br /> Furthermore, this research concentrates specifically on outbound mail from Portugal to the USA,<br /> with a particular focus on letters7 sent via the British postal System. While alternative routes to the<br /> USA existed through France, Belgium, and Prussia, these fall outside the scope of this study. The 1865<br /> Portuguese-French Convention, for instance, enabled mail to be routed through France to the USA.<br /> Similarly, agreements with Belgium and Prussia provided for mail transit via Antwerp and Hamburg<br /> or Bremen, respectively. However, by excluding these alternative routes, this study provides a more<br /> focused analysis of the dominant role played by the British postal System in facilitating transatlantic<br /> mail transit during this period.<br /> <br /> 1. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848<br /> On l July 1853, when the first adhesive stamps were introduced in Portugal, the Anglo-American<br /> postal treaty was already in force. This treaty was signed in London on 15 December 1848 and came<br /> into effect on 15 February 18498. According to Article XXI ofthe Convention, the regulations with<br /> their inherent specificities were to be defined by both postal administrations at a later date. This postal<br /> framework introduced an improvement in transatlantic postal Communications and standardised<br /> postal rates between the two countries. Among other things, it allowed for the prepayment of postage<br /> to the destination. Below are some ofthe relevant articles from the perspective of this study:<br /> <br /> ARTICLE I - (Rate of postage on letters conveyed either by United States or British packets.) - There<br /> shall be charged upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight, conveyed either by United<br /> States or by British packets, between a port in the United States and a port in the United Kingdom,<br /> a uniform sea rate ofeight pence, or sixteen cents; and such sea rate postage shall belang to the<br /> country by which the packet conveying the letters isfurnished<br /> <br /> ARTICLE II - (Inlandpostage chargeable by the post-office ofGreat Britain) - There shall be charged<br /> by the Post-Office ofthe United Kingdom, upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight,<br /> posted in the United Kingdom, andforwarded to the United States or broughtfrom the United<br /> States and delivered in the United Kingdom, whether, such letters shall be conveyed by British or<br /> by United States packets, an Inland postage rate of one penny half penny.<br /> <br /> (Inland postage chargeable in the U. States) - There shall be charged by the Post-Office ofthe<br /> United States, upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight, posted in the United States<br /> andforwarded to the United Kingdom, or broughtfrom the United Kingdom, and delivered in the<br /> United States, either such letters shall be conveyed by United States or by British packets, an Inland<br /> postage rate offive cents.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE III - (Sea and inland postage combined into one rate, and on which payment may be<br /> made in advance) - Upon all letters posted in one country and delivered into the other, these rates of<br /> postage, both sea and inland, shall be combined into one rate, of which payment in advance shall be<br /> Option in either country. It shall, however, not bepermitted topay less than the whole combined rate<br /> <br /> ARTICLE VIII - (Transit ofclosed mails) - Her Britannic Majesty engages, on herpart, to grant to<br /> the United States the transit in closed mails, through the United Kingdom, or through any country<br /> where thepost communication may be under the control or management ofthe United Kingdom, of<br /> letters and newspapersforwardedfrom the United States, their colonies orpossession ofthe United<br /> States, or to anyforeign country, and from anyforeign country, orfrom any colony orpossession<br /> ofthe United States, to the United States, their colonies or possessions<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XI - (Transit letters to be delivered to the post-offices of either country free of postage)<br /> - (..) and letters from foreign countries addressed to the United States, passing in transit through<br /> the United Kingdom, shall be delivered to the United States post-office free of all British postage,<br /> whether packet or inland.<br /> <br /> (Transit letters on which postage must beprepaid) - In the case ofthose countries to which letters<br /> cannot beforwarded unless the British postage be paid in advance, such British postage shall be<br /> collected in the United States, in addition to the United States rates of postage and accountedfor<br /> the British post-office. (..)<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XVI - (Rates of postage on newspapers passing in transit through either country) - The<br /> rate of postage to be charged in the United Kingdom upon newspapers to and from the United<br /> States, passing in transit through the United Kingdom, shall be one penny for each newspaper, except<br /> where a lower rate isprovided by any treaty between the United Kingdom and a foreign country;<br /> and the rate of postage to be charged in the United States upon newspapers to and from the United<br /> Kingdom, passing in transit through the United States, shall be two cents for each newspaper<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XIX - (Difference between the U. States and British currency to be accounted for) - In<br /> consideration oftwo cents United States currency not beingprecisely equivalent to one penny Sterling,<br /> the British post-office shall account to the United States post-office at the rate offour hundred and<br /> eighty-four cents to thepound Sterling; and the United States post office shall account to the British<br /> post-office at the rate offour hundred and eighty cents to thepound Sterling.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XXI - (Forms in which accounts between the respective post-offices shall be made out,<br /> with other details to be settled öfter exchange of ratifications) - Theforms in which the accounts<br /> between the respective post-offices for the transmission and conveyance ofletters are to be made<br /> out, the time and mode in which payment shall be made by either post-office to the other, together<br /> with all other measures ofdetail arising out ofthe stipulations ofthe present convention, shall be<br /> settled between the post-office ofthe United States and the British post-office, äs soon äs possible<br /> after the exchange ofthe ratifications ofthe present convention.<br /> <br /> The resolution with the regulations and specific details, written in 24 articles, relating to the postal<br /> treaty between the USA and the United Kingdom, according to Article XXI ofthe Convention, were<br /> approved on 14 May 18499&gt;1°, ratified on 31 May11, and put into effect on l July ofthe same year. On<br /> 19 June 184912, and after the resolution ofthe regulations had been approved by the British postal<br /> administration, US Postmaster General J Collamer sent the instructions and postage tables to the<br /> postmasters. Some ofthe regulation articles relevant to this study are transcribed below:<br /> <br /> ARTICLE I - (Exchange of Mails) - The following shall be the regulations for the exchange ofmails<br /> between the United Kingdom and the United States. There shall be an exchange ofmails between<br /> the following offices:<br /> 1. Between London and Boston, by way of Liverpool and Boston direct, and also by way of Liverpool<br /> and New York.<br /> 2. Between London and New York, by way of Liverpool and New York direct, and also by way of<br /> Liverpool and Boston.<br /> 3. Between Liverpool and Boston direct, and also by way ofNew York.<br /> 4. Between Liverpool and New York direct, and also by way of Boston.<br /> 5. Between London and New York, by way of Southampton.<br /> 6. Between Southampton and New York direct.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE IX - (Progressive rates of postage) - With respect to letters above the weight of a single<br /> letter which isßxed at half an ounce in either country, the respective offices, in accounting to each<br /> other, shall employ the following scale ofprogressions:<br /> • For every letter not exceeding, half an ounce in weight, one single rate.<br /> • Above half an ounce, but not exceeding one ounce, two rates.<br /> • Above one ounce, but not exceeding two ounces, four rates.<br /> • And so on, two rates being addedfor every ounce orfraction ofan ounce.<br /> <br /> Some ofthe instructions and postage rates relevant to this study are transcribed below:<br /> <br /> • Between any office in the United States (Oregon and California excepted) and any office in Great<br /> Britain and Ireland, the entire postage is 24 cents the single letter, which may beprepaid or sent<br /> unpaid. Ofthis amount, the British post office, when it conveys the letter by its own packet and<br /> collects the postage, accounts to the United States for 5 cents; when itcollects the postage without<br /> conveying the letter, it accounts for 21 cents. The United States post office accounts to the British<br /> for 3 cents the letter when it carries and collects, and for 19 when it collects only. Payment by<br /> theparty ofanything less than the entire postage goes for nothing. The offices ofexchange will<br /> treat such letters äs wholly unpaid.<br /> <br /> • Between the offices of California and Oregon and those of Great Britain andlreland, the entire<br /> postage is 59 cents the single letter, which may be prepaid or sent unpaid, and ofwhich the<br /> British share is 3 or 19 cents, depending on the circumstance whether conveyed by the United<br /> States or British packet; and the United States share is 56 cents or 40 cents, depending on the<br /> same circumstances.<br /> <br /> • On all correspondence between the United States (Oregon and California excepted) and the<br /> following named countries through the United Kingdom, and by the routes here specified, there<br /> must be prepaid when sent, and collected when received, the following rates (ofwhich the United<br /> States post offi.ce will account to the British for all butßve cents the single letter, unless a United<br /> States packet conveys it to orfrom England, and thenfor all but twenty-one cents):<br /> ° (••)<br /> o Azores, Islands, via Southampton and Lisbon - 63 cents for single letter<br /> o Madeira, Island of, via Southampton - 65 cents for single letter<br /> o Portugal, via Southampton - 63 cents for single letter.<br /> ° (••)<br /> <br /> • The exchange offices ofthe two countries, in mailing to each other, are to postmark the letter, not<br /> with the entire postage, but with the credit and debit portions ofit only; ifapaid letter, with the<br /> credit amount infavor ofthe other country, in red ink, and with a &quot;paid&quot;stamp in same color; if<br /> unpaid, with the debit amount against the other country, in black ink. But before the exchange<br /> office receiving such letter delivers it, or mails it to the interior, it is to re-stamp the letter with<br /> its own office stamp, in all cases, and with the &quot;paid&quot; stamp in red ink, ifpaid; if unpaid, with<br /> the amount, in black, ofthe entire postage to be collected.<br /> <br /> Table 1. Postage rates (effective from 1 July 1849) relating to the fees to be paid by the USA to the British postal<br /> administration for letters received from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores, not including the US inland rate of 5 cents<br /> <br /> Bild Siete 10<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the postal changes introduced by the Convention were legalised in the<br /> Treasury Warrant of 8 March 1849, and published in The London Gazette No. 20955 on 9 March of<br /> the same year.<br /> <br /> In summary, the payment of postage could be made by the sender. When sending mail from the<br /> USA to continental Portugal and the Islands of Madeira and the Azores, prepayment of postage was<br /> mandatory. The transatlantic component of a letter between the two countries, weighing up to %<br /> ounce, was 24 cents (12 pence)13, which corresponded to:<br /> <br /> • Transatlantic sea rate - 16 cents or 8 pence to be paid to the country that had contracted the<br /> steamship Company to perform the Service<br /> • Transit rate in the United Kingdom - 3 cents or P/2 pence<br /> • Inland rate in the United States - 5 cents or 2l/2 pence.<br /> <br /> The Exchange Offices were, on the one hand, in the cities of Boston and New York in the USA and,<br /> on the other hand, in the cities of Liverpool, Southampton, and London in the United Kingdom.<br /> Accounting between the countries was facilitated by the use of a two-colour marking System. Red<br /> marks indicated credit; black marks indicated debit. In practical terms, for mail sent from Portugal,<br /> red indicated the amount to be received by the USA, and black indicated the postage to be received<br /> by the respective country. This transatlantic rate was in effect until 31 December 1867(14).<br /> <br /> Furthermore, to accurately determine the complete postage rates from Portugal to the USA, it is<br /> essential to consider the existing postal rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom. These<br /> rates, established on 10 January 1840 1S, formed a basis for subsequent calculations. Mail conveyed<br /> by packet from Portugal and the Azores to the United Kingdom was fixed at l Shilling 9 pence.<br /> Mail from Madeira was slightly higher at l Shilling 10 pence. Ship letters, however, were charged a<br /> lower rate of 8 pence. Understanding these baseline charges is crucial for interpreting the complex<br /> accounting procedures and final postage costs.<br /> <br /> Based on the information provided, it is possible to determine that the recipient of a letter sent from<br /> continental Portugal16 to the USA (except California and Oregon) would have to pay, for the first rate:<br /> <br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by packet: 63 cents (2s 7J/2d)<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by ship: 37 cents (1s<br /> <br /> For the first case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by a British packet:<br /> o 58 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> - 42 cents (1s 9d) was related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> o 5 cents US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office<br /> a Total 42 + 16 + 5 = 63 cents.<br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by an American packet:<br /> a 42 cents (1s 9d) to be received by the British Post Office related to sending from Portugal<br /> to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> o 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office, where:<br /> <br /> For the second case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by a British packet:<br /> o 32 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> - 16 cents (8d) was related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by merchant ship<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> o 5 cents US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office D Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by an American packet:<br /> o 16 cents (8d) to be received by the British Post Office related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by merchant ship a 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office where:<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate<br /> - 5 cents US inland postage<br /> o Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate<br /> - 5 cents US inland postage<br /> o Total = 42 + 16 + 5 = 63 cents.<br /> <br /> 2. Portugal: Postal Regulations of 1853<br /> <br /> In Portugal, the Postal Reform of 185217 introduced profound changes in the Organisation of the<br /> Postal Service. Its implementation came into effect in 185318 and, with regard to postage to and<br /> from abroad, the inland postage on mail received from abroad ceased to be charged. The postage<br /> to be paid for letters received from abroad from beyond the Pyrenees coming through Spain was<br /> 240 Reis up to 2/s ounce inclusively, increasing by 240 Reis for each 2/s ounce or fraction thereof.<br /> Foreign letters arriving on ships other than packets (Cartas Estrangeiras vindas em navios que näo<br /> sejam paquetes) paid 160 Reis up to 4/s ounce inclusively, increasing by 80 Reis for every 2/s ounce.<br /> For postage to foreign countries, except Spain, when the mail had to transit through the Kingdom<br /> of Portugal or to its port of embarkation, or another point on the border, in addition to the postage<br /> to be paid in cash, it was mandatory to pay the inland postage by means of stamps: 25 Reis up to<br /> % ounce exclusively, 50 Reis up to % ounce, and so on, increasing by 25 Reis for every % ounce19.<br /> The means of sending mail from Portugal to other countries at this time was diverse20, and could<br /> be sent by sea through merchant ships, packets of the Mediterranean line, the West African Coast<br /> line, or transatlantic ships including those to Brazil and Argentina, and by land through Spain, or<br /> even by Aux Soins de TExpediteur21<br /> <br /> My census database records seven letters sent from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores between l July<br /> 1853 and 30 June 1859. Figure l shows the earliest stamped letter.<br /> <br /> Figure l shows an envelope originating in Säo Miguel, Azores and addressed to Boston, Massachusetts<br /> in 1856 with only the inland postage paid. The envelope was included in the mailbags placed onboard<br /> the Portuguese schooner Rainha dos Azores towards Lisbon where it arrived on 9 November22,<br /> confirmed by a rounded-corner boxed datestamp applied on the back. The next day the mail was<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 12<br /> <br /> placed onboard the schooner Emilia towards Liverpool23. In Liverpool it was placed onboard the<br /> steamship Anglo-Saxon of the transatlantic Allan Line on 26 November 185624. It arrived in Portland<br /> on the morning of 10 December 185625 and proceeded to Boston, where it arrived on the same day<br /> and a circular datestamp was applied to the back: &quot;BOSTON/10 DEC/A.M- PKT&quot;.<br /> <br /> Prepaid mail to the USA was not possible at the time. At Ponta Delgada the sender paid only the<br /> inland postage up to % ounce with a D. Pedro V stamp of 25 Reis, double lines, type I, cancelled<br /> with a circular barred numeral &quot;50&quot;. A manuscript accountancy mark of &quot;8&quot; (pence) was applied<br /> in black ink, representing the debit against the Portuguese administration for the ship-letter fee to<br /> the United Kingdom.<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the value of &quot;16&quot; was handwritten, relating to the transatlantic rate to be<br /> credited to the USA for having been transported by a steamer under contract with the US government.<br /> Upon arriving in Boston, the handwritten &quot;16&quot; was canceled and the amount of &quot;37&quot; cents was<br /> handwritten indicating the value to be paid by the recipient. The accounting of the &quot;37&quot; cents is<br /> broken down into the following items:<br /> <br /> • 8d (16 cents) for the British postal System for a letter sent from Portugal by merchant ship to the United Kingdom<br /> • 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office where:<br /> o 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the US Post Office (A.M- PKT)<br /> o 5 cents US inland fee<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 8 pence<br /> • Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Figure 2 illustrates an envelope with an enclosed letter written by Dr. George Clymer to his wife<br /> in Washington, D.C. The letter is datelined &quot;San Antonio da Serra, Madeira, Sunday, July 13,1856&quot;.<br /> <br /> Bild Anfangs Seite 14<br /> <br /> Dr. George Clymer, who held the post of fleet surgeon on the West Africa Squadron's flagship, the<br /> USS Jamestown, authored this letter and following his Standard practice for organising family correspondence,<br /> he marked the upper left corner with '32' to signify its place in his sequence of letters26.<br /> <br /> The cover bears a manuscript endorsement by the sender: 'By steamer to Plymouth, the Niger,' signifying<br /> his chosen route. Bypassing the local Portuguese postal System entirely, the letter was handed<br /> directly to the British postal agent, George Stoddart, in Madeira. On 23 July 1856, the agent applied<br /> a black, double-circular &quot;MADEIRA / JY 23 /1856&quot; datestamp to the reverse before dispatching the<br /> letter onboard the African Steam Ship Company's SS Niger later that day 27.<br /> <br /> The Niger was then on its return voyage from the west coast of Africa, calling at Madeira for mail<br /> before reaching Plymouth on 29 July 1856. Because the ship arrived late28, the mailbags were not<br /> processed until the following day, when a red-brown &quot;PLYMOUTH / JY 30 1856 B / PACKET<br /> LETTER&quot; datestamp was applied. The mail was then forwarded by train to London for transit<br /> processing — marked by the orange &quot;BA / 31 JY 31 /1856&quot; circular datestamp on the reverse — before<br /> being transferred to the Cunard Line steamship Canada, which departed Liverpool on 2 August29.<br /> The Canada arrived in Boston at five o'clock on the morning of 13 August30; this arrival is confirmed<br /> by the black &quot;BOSTON /13 ÄUG / BR- PKT&quot; datestamp on the reverse. From there, the mail was<br /> dispatched by early train to Washington.<br /> <br /> The cover was sent unpaid. At the British postal administration, a handwritten debit of &quot;1.20&quot; was<br /> applied to the cover, representing the amount the British postal administration charged the United<br /> States for a double-weight unpaid letter sent from Portugal via British Packet. Upon reaching Boston,<br /> this &quot;1.20&quot; mark was cancelled and replaced by a handwritten &quot;1.40&quot;, indicating the total postage<br /> due from the recipient in cents. The discrepancy in the Boston arrival mark is notable. A doublerate<br /> letter from Madeira with transatlantic crossing to the USA via British Packet should have been<br /> calculated äs follows:<br /> <br /> • 120 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> o 88 cents (2 x 1s lOd) was related to sending from Madeira to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> o 32 cents (2 x 16c) transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> • 10 cents (2 x 5c) US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office<br /> <br /> While the sum of these components is 130 cents, the Boston clerk's manuscript &quot;1.40&quot; suggests a 10-cent overcharge.<br /> <br /> 3. Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1859<br /> <br /> On 8 June 1859, the Portuguese Post Office announced the impending Implementation of a new<br /> postal convention with the United Kingdom. This Convention (Figure 3), formalised on 6 April<br /> and approved by law on 23 May of the same year, was set to take effect on l July 1859. The Diärio do<br /> Governo (No. 140,16 June 1859) published the associated table of postal rates for mail exchanged<br /> directly or in transit between the two countries. This table also covered mail carried by British packets<br /> to overseas destinations without passing through the United Kingdom.<br /> <br /> For the current study, &quot;Table I&quot; (annexed<br /> to the Convention; reproduced äs Table (i;<br /> 2 here) is the most relevant äs it details<br /> the specific rates for mail sent in transit<br /> through the United Kingdom. Between<br /> Portugal (including the Islands of Madeira<br /> and the Azores) and the United Kingdom,<br /> mail could be sent by British packets<br /> (transatlantic route, peninsular route<br /> and the African coast route via Madeira).<br /> Alternatively, mail could be sent by land,<br /> through Spain and France, or by merchant<br /> ships. <br /> <br /> Bild Postal Convention Seite 15<br /> <br /> In Portugal, postage stamps served a<br /> specific purpose: the payment of inland<br /> postage for ordinary or registered mail. For<br /> mail that was sent by packet or ship, the<br /> inland rate only applied when the letter<br /> was posted outside of the port of embarkation.<br /> The inland rate was 25 Reis up to<br /> 1/8 ounce exclusive. <br /> <br /> In the case of sending ordinary mail via<br /> Spain and France, a mandatory postage of<br /> 40 Reis was charged, by means of stamps,<br /> for each % ounce. Prepaid letters were sent by packets or private ships. Leiters sent via Spain with a<br /> lack of postage, äs long äs it was not less than that of a first rate letter, could be sent, but were subject<br /> to a fine, and the value of the fine was marked in black ink in English money. Letters to England could<br /> also be sent registered and, if so, they had to pay 100 Reis, by means of stamps, for the registration.<br /> This rate was in effect until 31 July 1866.<br /> <br /> Mail sent in transit through the United Kingdom was regulated by Articles XVI and XVII of the<br /> Convention. Article XXVII mentions that for accounting purposes the conversion between Portuguese<br /> and British currency was carried out at the rate of 20 Reis per l penny. Article III, in turn, states<br /> that the exchange could be carried out in Portugal through the exchange offices of Lisbon, Porto,<br /> Funchal and S. Vicente (Cape Verde), and in the United Kingdom, in the exchange offices of London,<br /> Southampton and Liverpool.<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the postal changes introduced by the Convention were legalised in the<br /> Treasury Warrant of 14 June 1859, and published in The London Gazette No. 22275 on 17 June of the<br /> same year.<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 2 Seite 16<br /> <br /> Understanding the accounting procedures for mail between Portugal and the USA requires examining<br /> the applicable postal rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom. These rates, detailed in the<br /> accompanying table (Table 3), governed mail flow in both directions and formed the basis for<br /> calculating transit charges for mail destined for the USA.<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 3 Seite 16<br /> <br /> It is also important to highlight the designated offices for mail exchange. These offices, listed in Table<br /> 431, played a crucial role in facilitating mail transit between the two countries. Mail routed through<br /> Spain and France should be endorsed with the directives &quot;Via Spain&quot; or &quot;Via France,&quot; respectively<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 4 Seite 16<br /> <br /> Considering the data presented, it is possible to determine that the Portuguese postal administration<br /> charged, for the first rate, for a letter sent from Portugal to the USA, the following:<br /> <br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by packet: 320 Reis, paid in cash, up to % ounce<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by ship: 320 Reis, paid in cash, up to 4/s ounce<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom overland by Spain and France: 280 Reis paid in cash plus 40 Reis by means of stamps, up to 2/s ounce.<br /> <br /> For the first case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • 160 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the country that supported the transatlantic packet<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> For the second case, the accounting was broken down in the same way äs the previous one, but the letter could weigh up to 4/8 ounce.<br /> <br /> <br /> For the third case, the accounting was broken down as follows:<br /> <br /> • 40 Reis of Portuguese postage for sending by land via Spain and France<br /> • 120 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, of transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the country that supported the transatlantic packet<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> This rate remained in effect until 31 Jury 1866. During this period, from l July 1859 to 31 July 1866,<br /> my census database records fifteen letters sent from Portugal or Madeira. Figure 4 illustrates one of<br /> only three recorded letters originating from Madeira.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 17 unten<br /> <br /> This folded letter (Figure 4) was written by George Welsh and addressed to his brother John George<br /> Welsh32. It was sent from Funchal, Madeira, to New York. Posted on 20 June 1865, it bears a blue<br /> double circular datestamp and an endorsement by the sender, &quot;p. Str. Maria Pia via Lisbon &amp; France,&quot;<br /> indicating the desired steamship route.<br /> The letter s journey began onboard the ship Maria Pia, arriving in Lisbon on 23 June33, followed by<br /> a transfer to the ship Douro34 that left on the same day to Liverpool35. Upon arrival in Liverpool on<br /> 29 June36, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot; datestamp. On l July37, it was put<br /> on the Cunard Line steamship Persia, reaching New York on 12 July38.<br /> In Funchal, the sender prepaid the inland postage with a 25 Reis carmine stamp of the D. Luis I<br /> issue, cancelled with a circular barred numeral &quot;51&quot;. This covered the cost of transport to the port of<br /> embarkation for a letter up to 15 grams. Additionally, the sender paid 320 Reis in cash, covering the<br /> cost of a letter up to 2/s of an ounce to the US. This payment is confirmed by the handwritten &quot;1/4&quot;<br /> in English currency and the oval &quot;PAGO/OPORTE&quot; mark.<br /> The 320 Reis postage paid by the sender was all credited to the British and can be broken down äs<br /> follows:<br /> <br /> • 160 Reis equivalent to 8 pence to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by sea. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom (BR-PKT)<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> 4. Portugal: Entry into Force of the Decimal Metric System, 1860<br /> <br /> <br /> Shortly after the Portuguese-British Postal Convention took effect, the Ministry of Public Works,<br /> Commerce and Industry decreed on 20 June 185939, that the decimal metric System would be<br /> implemented in Lisbon on l January 1860. The rest of the Kingdom and adjacent islands would follow<br /> suit on l March of the same year. This shift necessitated a revision of postal rates. By Letter of Law<br /> on 20 August 186l40, a new table of rates for mail and printed matter was established, harmonising<br /> charges with the new System of weights. These revised rates came into effect on 20 September 186l 41.<br /> <br /> <br /> The adoption of the decimal metric System brought about specific changes to postal rates. Letters from<br /> beyond the Pyrenees arriving via Spain were charged 240 Reis for up to 7.5 grams, with an increase<br /> of 240 Reis for each additional 7.5 grams or fraction thereof. Foreign letters arriving on non-packet<br /> ships followed a different rate: 160 Reis for up to 15 grams, increasing by 80 Reis for every 7.5 grams.<br /> <br /> <br /> For mail sent to foreign countries (except Spain) that transited through Portugal, inland postage<br /> was mandatory and payable with stamps. This inland rate was structured äs follows: 25 Reis for up<br /> to 15 grams, 50 Reis for up to 22.5 grams, and so on, with a 25 Reis increase for every 7.5 grams.<br /> <br /> <br /> Importantly, mail covered by existing conventions — such äs those with England, Spain, and Belgium,<br /> äs well as mail sent on transatlantic and Mediterranean routes — remained subject to the provisions<br /> ofthose agreements 42.<br /> <br /> Subsequently, on 21 January 1863, the Sub-Inspeccäo Geral dos Correios (Sub-Inspectorate General<br /> of Posts and Mails) announced in the Diärio de Lisboa No. 18 of 24 January 1863, that from l February<br /> of the same year, letters and printed matter other than newspapers, addressed to, or in transit via<br /> the United Kingdom of Great Britain, äs well äs letters and said printed matter received or sent by<br /> the English and French steamers of the transatlantic route, began to be weighed in grams, where<br /> the weight of 7% grams replaced that of % ounce for letters and the weight of 30 grams replaced<br /> that of l ounce for printed matter.<br /> <br /> <br /> 5. Cancellation of the Peninsular Line, 1862<br /> <br /> Enhanced communication routes between Portugal and the United Kingdom led to the cancellation<br /> of the Peninsular Line in 1862. As noted in the Ninth Report ofthe Postmaster General on The Post<br /> Office, 1863, existing Services, including the transatlantic route to South America, merchant ships, and<br /> a daily exchange via France and Spain, were deemed sufficient for maintaining postal Connectivity<br /> with Portugal. Consequently, the Peninsular Service, which incurred an annual cost of £5,000, was<br /> discontinued.<br /> <br /> <br /> The Portuguese General Post Office announced the termination ofthe Peninsular Line in the Diärio<br /> de Lisboa (No. 136,18 June 1862). This announcement followed notification from the British Post<br /> Office regarding the discontinuation of this packet service between Southampton and Lisbon. Despite<br /> this change, mail continued to be sent to Great Britain daily via Spain and France, and existing<br /> transatlantic routes and merchant ship Services remained operational. With the cancellation ofthe<br /> Peninsular Line, the overland route through France and Spain became the preferred method43 for<br /> postal transit between Portugal and the United Kingdom (Figure 5).<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 19<br /> <br /> Figure 6 shows an envelope sent from Lisbon addressed to Miss Lizzie Huber care of Jas. S Huber Esq,<br /> Philadelphia, postmarked on 16 September 1865 with a black double circular datestamp. This envelope<br /> was transported to Liverpool onboard the ship Braganza, departing Lisbon on 17 September 44 and <br /> <br /> <br /> Bild Seite 20<br /> <br /> <br /> arriving on 23 September45. Upon arrival, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot;<br /> datestamp and promptly placed on the Cunard Line steamship Persza, that left on the same day46,<br /> reaching New York on the night of 3 October47. Next morning a postal clerk applied the black circular<br /> datestamp &quot;5/OCT/4/N.YORK BR. PKT.&quot; showing that 5 cents was still due for the US inland postage.<br /> <br /> <br /> The sender prepaid 320 Reis, covering the cost of sending a letter up to 2/s of an ounce to the US port<br /> of disembarkation via packet Service to England. This prepayment is confirmed by the oval mark<br /> &quot;PAGOU DE FRANQUIA PELO PAQUETE&quot; (Paid Postage by Packet) and the handwritten amount<br /> of &quot;1/4&quot; in English currency. The handwritten &quot;Sets&quot; denotes the inland postage fee in the US.<br /> <br /> <br /> The 320 Reis postage paid by the sender can be broken down äs follows:<br /> • 160 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by sea. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom (BR.pKT.)<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> <br /> 6. Currency Devaluation and the Impact on Unpaid Mail Received in the USA, 1863<br /> <br /> During the American Civil War, currency devaluation posed a significant challenge to international<br /> postal agreements. While many countries had arrangements with the USA to settle accounts in coinage<br /> (gold or silver), recipients typically paid unpaid mail with US Notes48. However, wartime Inflation<br /> led to a devaluation of these notes, negatively impacting the postal administration's financial balance.<br /> <br /> <br /> To address this issue, the US Congress passed a resolution on 3 March 186349, allowing for the payment<br /> of unpaid letters from certain countries (the United Kingdom, France, Prussia, Hamburg, Bremen,<br /> and Belgium) with silver or gold coin. Alternatively, recipients could still use US Notes but with an<br /> added premium to compensate for the devaluation. This premium, calculated daily at international<br /> mail offices, ensured that the postal administration received the correct value in coinage equivalent<br /> Postmaster General Montgomery Blair announced this resolution in a circular to postal agents in<br /> April 186350, with implementation beginning in May.<br /> <br /> 7. Additional Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1866<br /> <br /> A new postal convention between Portugal and the United Kingdom, effective l August 186651,<br /> mandated prepayment of postage for mail to the USA with the use of stamps. The Portuguese<br /> General Post Office announced the new rates in the Diärio de Lisboa (No. 160,19 July 1866), detailing<br /> the charges for prepaid mail originating from Continental Portugal, the islands of Madeira and the<br /> Azores, and other overseas provinces on the west coast of Africa, sent in transit through the United<br /> Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The United Kingdom formalised these changes through a<br /> Treasury Warrant issued on 23 July 1866, and subsequently published in The London Gazette (No.<br /> 23145, 27 July 1866).<br /> <br /> In the context of this study, Table 5 shows the postage rates to the USA.<br /> <br /> Table 5 Postage Rates<br /> <br /> In order to be able to Interpret the accounting, which is often revealed in handwritten elements,<br /> it is also necessary to present the table of rates for prepaid mail to the United Kingdom (Table 6).<br /> <br /> Table 6 Postage Rates<br /> <br /> Furthermore, it is essential to partially transcribe Articles 3 and 4 of the Portuguese-British<br /> Convention, which refers to the accounting rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom:<br /> <br /> Artide 3 - In exception to the stipulation made in article Ist preceding, it is mutually agreed that<br /> international ordinary letters which may beposted either wholly unpaid or insufficiently prepaid<br /> by means of Postage Stamps, shall beforwarded to their destination. For these letters there shall be<br /> charged, on delivery, thefollowing increased rotes of postage, viz: In the United Kingdom a postage<br /> ofeightpencefor euch single letter originating in Portugal, Madeira, the Azores, and the Portuguese<br /> possessions on the west coast ofAfrica. (..) Insufficiently prepaid letters shall be considered äs unpaid<br /> and charged accordingly after deducting the value ofthe Postage Stamps affixed to them.<br /> Artide 4 - (...) The Portuguese Post Office administration shallpay to the British Post Office administrationfor<br /> each single prepaid letter sent from Portugal, Madeira, Azores and overseas provinces<br /> on the west coast ofAfrica, addressed to the United Kingdom:<br /> • The amount of90 Reisfor those sent by land via Spain and France or by French packets, via<br /> Bordeaux;<br /> • The amount oflOO Reisfor those sent by British packets;<br /> • The amount of60 Reisfor those sent by private ships.<br /> (...)<br /> <br /> Finally, it is essential to address the regulations with the specific arrangements52 ofthe additional<br /> Convention of 1866 that were signed in London and Lisbon on 8 June and 30 June 1866, respectively.<br /> Below are some ofthe relevant articles from the perspective of this study:<br /> <br /> Artide I - Thefollowing shall be the regulations for the exchange ofmails between the British and Portuguese Post Offices:<br /> <br /> 1st. The office of London shall exchange mails with the offices of Lisbon, Funchal, and St Vincent<br /> by British packet, with the office of Lisbon by French packet via Bordeaux, and with the offices<br /> of Lisbon and Oporto by the route of France and Spain, äs well äs by private ship.<br /> <br /> 2nd. The office of Southampton shall exchange mails with the offices of Lisbon and St. Vincent<br /> by British packet, and with the offices of Lisbon and Oporto by private ship.<br /> <br /> 3rd. The office of Liverpool shall exchange mails with the office of Funchal by British packet,<br /> and with the offices of Lisbon and Oporto by private ships.<br /> <br /> Artide VI (...) In Portugal 20 Reis shall be taken äs the equivalent ofeach penny.<br /> <br /> Artide VIII - In addition to the local and date stamp with which all ordinary or registered letters<br /> exchanged between the respective offices must be marked, such ofthose letters äs have beenpaid<br /> to the destination shall bearplainly impressed on the address another stamp with the initials PD.<br /> <br /> Table 7 Auswechslung über<br /> <br /> Tabelle 8 Account rates<br /> <br /> This rate remained in effect until 31 December 1867. Between l August 1866 and 31 December 1867,<br /> my census database records only six letters sent from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores. The only<br /> recorded examples from the Azores and Madeira during this period are shown below.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 23<br /> <br /> Figure 7 illustrates a paid letter from Ponta Delgada, Azores. It was postmarked on l November 1866,<br /> and was addressed to Guilherme Vieira Chibante, Boston. The envelope was included in the mailbags<br /> placed onboard the ship Leal towards Lisbon where it arrived on 7 November53. In Lisbon it was sent<br /> overland via Spain and France in a closed bag. In London the mailbag was opened and the envelope<br /> received a circular datestamp from the London postal administration indicating that the letter had<br /> been paid. It was then forwarded to Southampton where it was placed onboard the ship Germania<br /> of the transatlantic line HAPAG (Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft) on 14<br /> November54. Upon arrival in New York, on the night of 25 November 186655, the mailbags addressed<br /> to Boston were forwarded, where they arrived the next day, corroborated by the circular datestamp<br /> &quot;BOSTON AM. PKT./NOV/26/5&quot;.<br /> <br /> <br /> In the Azores it was prepaid with two 20 Reis bistre stamps plus two 120 Reis blue stamps of the<br /> D. Luis I issue, curved ribbon, imperforate, totaling 280 Reis. This amount paid a letter of up to<br /> 7.5 grams from Portugal to the USA via Spain and France. The postage was valid up to the port of<br /> disembarkation in the USA. Handwritten in black, the accounting value of &quot;1s Vid&quot; (250 Reis) was<br /> to be paid by the Portuguese postal administration to the United Kingdom. A &quot;16 CENTS&quot; mark in<br /> red indicated the transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the USA by the British postal administration<br /> due to being transported by a ship under contract with the American government. In Boston the<br /> cover was postmarked with the value of &quot;5&quot; cents relating to the US inland fee, to be paid by the<br /> recipient, with an indication that it had been transported by an American ship (AM. PKT.). Of the<br /> transatlantic fee of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained 3 cents and the USA 21 cents (16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 4^d (90 Reis) for the British postal System for a letter sent via Spain and France up to 7.5 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the US<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 4^d (90 Reis)<br /> • Total = 1s Vad (4Vtd + 8d) = 250 Reis, the remaining 30 Reis retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient was still responsible for 5 cents inland postage äs the letter was only prepaid to the port of entry.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 24<br /> <br /> The envelope shown in Figure 8 is a paid letter from Madeira, postmarked on 30 November 1867<br /> and addressed to New York. In Funchal it was placed onboard the packet Ethiope of the African<br /> Steam Ship Co. returning from the west coast of Africa to Liverpool56-57. The voyage was affected<br /> by bad weather58 and the mailbags must have been delivered before reaching Liverpool, probably<br /> in Falmouth, and forwarded to London in order to reduce the delay. In London the mailbag was<br /> opened and the envelope received a circular datestamp (17 December) from the London postal<br /> administration indicating that the letter had been paid. It was then forwarded to Southampton where<br /> it was put onboard the ship Deutschland of the transatlantic line NGL (North German Lloyd) on 17<br /> December59. It arrived in New York on the morning of 30 December 60<br /> <br /> The letter was prepaid in Funchal with a pair of 80 Reis orange plus a 120 Reis darkblue stamp of the<br /> D. Luis I issue, curved ribbon, imperforate, totaling 280 Reis. This amount paid a letter of up to 15<br /> grams from Portugal to the USA by British packet or merchant ship. The postage was valid up to the<br /> port of disembarkation in the USA. Handwritten in red, the accounting value of &quot;1s Id&quot; (260 Reis) was<br /> to be paid by the Portuguese postal administration to the United Kingdom. A &quot;16 CENTS&quot; mark in<br /> red showed the transatlantic rate to be credited to the USA by the British postal administration due<br /> to being transported by a ship under contract with the US government. In New York the cover was<br /> postmarked showing value of &quot;5&quot; cents due for the US transit fee, to be paid by the recipient, with<br /> an indication that it had been transported by an American ship (AM. PKT.). Of the transatlantic<br /> postage of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained 3 cents and the USA 21 cents (16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 5d (100 Reis) to be credited to Britain for a letter sent by British packet to England up to 15 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the US<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 5d (100 Reis)<br /> • Total = 1s Id (5d + 8d) = 260 Reis, the remaining 20 Reis retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for postage from the port of entry.<br /> <br /> Figure 9 Seite 25<br /> <br /> Figure 9 illustrates another envelope but this time sent via ship to England. This envelope originated<br /> in Lisbon and was addressed to Miss Eliza Ramsden, Easton (Glendon Iron Works), Northampton<br /> Co., Pennsylvania. At the top, an endorsement by the sender, &quot;by steamer&quot;, indicated the desired<br /> route. It was postmarked on 17 September 1866 and received a black double circular datestamp of<br /> the Lisbon post office. The envelope was placed onboard the Lamport &amp; Holt ship Kepler, returning<br /> from South America, that left Lisbon on 18 September61, arriving in Liverpool on 24 September62.<br /> Upon arrival, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot; datestamp. In Liverpool it was<br /> placed in the mailbag for the Inman Line steamship City ofNew York on 26 September63, reaching<br /> New York on 10 October.<br /> <br /> In Lisbon the sender prepaid the envelope with two 100 Reis lilac stamps, a 10 Reis yellow, and a<br /> 50 Reis green of the D. Luis issue, plus a 20 Reis bistre, curved label issue, totaling 280 Reis. This<br /> amount paid for a letter of up to 15 grams from Portugal to the port of disembarkation in the USA by<br /> British packet or ship. Handwritten in black is an accounting value of &quot;lld&quot; (220 Reis) to be paid by<br /> the Portuguese postal administration to the United Kingdom. The handwritten value of &quot;16&quot; in red<br /> showed the transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the USA by the British postal administration due<br /> to being transported by a ship under contract with the US government. In New York, a postal clerk<br /> wrote &quot;Due Sets&quot;, indicating the US fee to be paid by the recipient, alongside the circular datestamp<br /> &quot;5/OCT/10/N. YORK AM- PKT&quot;. Of the transatlantic postage of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained<br /> 3 cents and the USA 21 cents (16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 3d (60 Reis) to be credited to the British for a letter sent by ship to England up to 15 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the US<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 3d (60 Reis)<br /> • Total = lld (3d + 8d) = 220 Reis, the remaining 60 Reis retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient was still responsible for the 5-cent inland fee äs the letter was only prepaid to the port of entry.<br /> <br /> Figure 10<br /> <br /> <br /> Figure 10 shows another paid letter, this time from Lisbon and addressed to Milesburg, Pennsylvania.<br /> Postmarked on 26 November 1866, the letter was included in a closed mailbag sent via the North &amp;<br /> East railway line to Badajoz, then through Spain and France.<br /> <br /> <br /> Upon reaching London, the mailbag was opened and the envelope received a red circular datestamp<br /> (l December 1866) indicating that the postage had been satisfied. That same day, it was forwarded to<br /> the Cunard steamer CubaM. The steamship arrived in New York on the morning of 13 December65<br /> where a postal clerk applied the black circular datestamp &quot;N. YORK BR- PKT7DEC/13/5&quot; before the<br /> letter proceeded to Pennsylvania.<br /> <br /> <br /> In Lisbon, the sender prepaid the 280 Reis rate, covering a letter up to 7.5 grams carried via Spain<br /> and France, using two lilac-mauve 100 Reis stamps of the D. Luis I issue and an imperforate orange<br /> 80 Reis curved ribbon stamp. This postage paid for carriage to the US port of entry. Handwritten<br /> in black, the accounting value of &quot;1s Vid&quot; (250 Reis) shows the amount to be paid by the Portuguese<br /> <br /> postal administration to the United Kingdom. The transatlantic sea rate is not visible, perhaps due<br /> to aging or wear. In New York the envelope was postmarked showing the value of &quot;5&quot; cents due for<br /> the US inland fee, to be paid by the recipient, with an indication that it had been transported by a<br /> British ship: &quot;BR- PKT&quot;. Of the transatlantic fee of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained 16 cents<br /> and the USA 5 cents.<br /> <br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 4Vid (90 Reis) for the British postal System for a letter sent via Spain and France up to 7.5 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 4%d (90 Reis)<br /> • Total = 1s %d (4J/2d + 8d) = 250 Reis, the remaining 30 Reis was retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents inland postage from the port of entry.<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Kapital 8 seite 27</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=Letter_Mail_from_Portugal_to_USA&diff=113 2026-06-26T14:38:19Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Study on Postal Agreements, Rates and Routes 1853-75<br /> <br /> von Luis Rocha<br /> <br /> RPSL Study Papers<br /> Study Papers are produced by The Royal Philatelie Society London for pieces of work that are too long<br /> to be an article in The London Philatelist but are shorter than a regulär full-size book. Previously, the<br /> RPSL has published numerous Supplements to The London Philatelist, but for specialised studies it<br /> seems appropriate to produce such works äs A4 softback booklets which will be available at a low cost<br /> to all interested philatelists. There is no fixed publication schedule for this series.<br /> <br /> <br /> Preface<br /> <br /> The study of transatlantic mail between Portugal and the United States, mediated by the British<br /> postal System between 1853 and 1875 (when the General Postal Union was established), reveals a<br /> complex web of international relations. While the North Atlantic routes and conventions of this era<br /> have been masterfully documented by legendary scholars, most notably Richard Winter, the specific<br /> intersection of Portuguese domestic legislation with these international treaties continues to offer a<br /> rieh field for new discovery. My primary motivation for this work arose when I first began studying<br /> these covers and realised that no one could provide the in-depth explanations they deserved. I found<br /> it nearly impossible to find a Consolidated resource that clearly defined the rate periods or the specific<br /> conventions applicable to each case. This study was born from the need to bridge that gap between<br /> official decrees and surviving physical evidence, creating a definitive reference for a period defined<br /> by shifting treaties and evolving rates, routes and means.<br /> <br /> My good old friend Acacio Luz once told nie that the only way to truly understand these covers is to<br /> follow a strict &quot;Chain of Logic.&quot; To explain a single letter, one must master Portuguese legislation to<br /> understand the domestic requirements, the Portugal-United Kingdom conventions to understand<br /> the transit through the British hüb, and finally the United Kingdom-United States conventions<br /> to account for the leg across the Atlantic. As Acacio wisely told me, without the original texts of<br /> these conventions, the additional articles, regulations and the specific shipping timetables, &quot;there<br /> is no chance of getting the Job done.&quot; This study is the result of years spent gathering these primary<br /> sources, including contemporary newspapers, official gazettes, post office notices, and internal postal<br /> documentation, to ensure that every rate and route described is backed by official fact.<br /> <br /> By combining these records with a comprehensive census of 104 surviving covers compiled from<br /> more than 1100 auction catalogues, many collections and private holdings over a large number of<br /> years, I have attempted to verify theoretical regulations against empirical postal practice. This datadriven<br /> approach allows us to see how the broad conventions were applied specifically to the mail<br /> departing from Portuguese ports. Beyond the technical analysis, these letters are valuable witnesses<br /> to 19th-century life. The names of senders and recipients, äs well äs the internal annotations serve äs<br /> a vital complementary record. These elements help situate each letter historically and commercially,<br /> offering a complete interpretation even when official postmarks are faint or absent.<br /> <br /> This study is intended for the specialised collector of Portugal's &quot;Classic&quot; issues, the Student of<br /> transatlantic history, and the postal historian. It is my hope that this work provides collectors with<br /> the tools to &quot;read&quot; their own pieces. Through this study, corroborated by primary sources, it is my<br /> intention to contribute to a deeper understanding of the postal history of this period, enabling<br /> collectors to further explore this subject and fully appreciate every element present in the covers in<br /> their own collection.<br /> <br /> Note for readers<br /> <br /> The accountancy calculations shown for prepaid letters presented in this work represent the debit<br /> owed by Portugal to the other postal authorities (USA and/or UK). The total amount that was prepaid<br /> differs from the accounting total äs it includes an element that was retained by Portugal to cover its<br /> own domestic handling and in some cases the transit fee due to Spain. Note that depending if the<br /> letter was sent to the UK by ship, packet or via Spain/France the values retained are different.<br /> <br /> Acknowledgements<br /> <br /> This study owes an immense debt of gratitude to Acacio Luz, whose contributions were indispensable<br /> to its completion. Sincere thanks are also due to Colin Tabeart for his generous assistance and<br /> invaluable insights, and to Fernando Bernardo for his unwavering encouragement throughout this<br /> project. The author also gratefully acknowledges the support of Steve Washburne, äs well äs the<br /> following individuals and institutions: Barry Attoe of The Postal Museum in London; lsabel Beato of<br /> the Arquivo Histörico da Marinha (Historical Archive of the Navy); and Ana Sabido of the Biblioteca<br /> Nacional de Portugal (National Library of Portugal).<br /> Special thanks are due to Luis Barreiros and Eduarde Barreiros for their diligent peer review of this<br /> paper, and to Paul Farrimond for his exceptional work in typesetting and bringing this study to life.<br /> Finally, the author wishes to express sincere appreciation for the work of the late Richard F. Winter,<br /> whose masterful postal history publications not only informed this study but also ignited a passion<br /> for this fascinating field.<br /> <br /> Units and Abbreviations<br /> s. d. Shillings and pence (UK) 1s = 12d<br /> c cents (US)<br /> oz ounce l oz = 28.35 grams<br /> g grams<br /> <br /> <br /> Contents<br /> <br /> *1. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848 7<br /> *2. Portugal: Postal Regulations of 1853 12<br /> *3. Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1859 15<br /> *4. Portugal: Entry into Force of the Decimal Metric System, 1860 18<br /> *5. Cancellation of the Peninsular Line, 1862 19<br /> *6. Currency Devaluation and the Impact on Unpaid Mail Received in the USA, 1863 20<br /> *7. Additional Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1866 21<br /> *8. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1867 27<br /> *9. Reduction of Postage for Mail Sent from Portugal in Transit through the United<br /> *Kingdom, 1868 29<br /> *10. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1868 31<br /> *11. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1869 35<br /> *12. Interruption of Postal Relations between France and the USA, 1870 36<br /> *13. Additional Routes Due to the Armed Conflict between France and Prussia 40<br /> *14. Reduction of Postage for Mail Sent from Portugal in Transit through the United<br /> *Kingdom, 1872 42<br /> *15. General Postal Union (G.P.U.) and Consequent Standardisation of Rates, 1875 47<br /> *16. Concluding Remarks 49<br /> <br /> Prior to the standardisation of international postal rates, there was never a formal postal agreement<br /> between Portugal and the United States. This standardisation arose with the Treaty of Bern, concluded<br /> on 9 October 18741&gt;2, which established the General Postal Union and introduced unified rates.<br /> Consequently, until Portugal and the United States joined the General Postal Union, the sending or<br /> receipt of mail between these two nations depended entirely on a complex web of postal agreements<br /> with and between intermediary countries.<br /> <br /> This study analyses postal regulations and procedures to facilitate the study of mail sent from<br /> Continental Portugal and the islands of Madeira and the Azores to the USA. By examining these<br /> regulations and procedures, we can interpret the various markings and elements found on mail from<br /> this period. This analysis includes a thorough examination of the different conventions and postal<br /> arrangements in place, with a focus on understanding the complex accounting Systems and diverse<br /> postage rates that were applied.<br /> <br /> The timeframe under consideration Spans from l July 1853 to l July 1875, bracketing the era between<br /> the introduction of the first adhesive stamps in Portugal and the nations entry into the General<br /> Postal Union. In July 1853, and within the context of the study, it is relevant to mention that Portugal<br /> already had formalised3 bilateral postal agreements with England (1705 and 1810)4, Spain (1850)5,<br /> and Belgium (1853)6. Furthermore, the Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848 was already in<br /> effect, laying the groundwork for the United Kingdoms crucial role äs an intermediary in handling<br /> mail sent from Portugal to the USA. The various Anglo-American Conventions that followed are<br /> central to understanding the complexities of this transatlantic mail System.<br /> <br /> Furthermore, this research concentrates specifically on outbound mail from Portugal to the USA,<br /> with a particular focus on letters7 sent via the British postal System. While alternative routes to the<br /> USA existed through France, Belgium, and Prussia, these fall outside the scope of this study. The 1865<br /> Portuguese-French Convention, for instance, enabled mail to be routed through France to the USA.<br /> Similarly, agreements with Belgium and Prussia provided for mail transit via Antwerp and Hamburg<br /> or Bremen, respectively. However, by excluding these alternative routes, this study provides a more<br /> focused analysis of the dominant role played by the British postal System in facilitating transatlantic<br /> mail transit during this period.<br /> <br /> 1. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848<br /> On l July 1853, when the first adhesive stamps were introduced in Portugal, the Anglo-American<br /> postal treaty was already in force. This treaty was signed in London on 15 December 1848 and came<br /> into effect on 15 February 18498. According to Article XXI ofthe Convention, the regulations with<br /> their inherent specificities were to be defined by both postal administrations at a later date. This postal<br /> framework introduced an improvement in transatlantic postal Communications and standardised<br /> postal rates between the two countries. Among other things, it allowed for the prepayment of postage<br /> to the destination. Below are some ofthe relevant articles from the perspective of this study:<br /> <br /> ARTICLE I - (Rate of postage on letters conveyed either by United States or British packets.) - There<br /> shall be charged upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight, conveyed either by United<br /> States or by British packets, between a port in the United States and a port in the United Kingdom,<br /> a uniform sea rate ofeight pence, or sixteen cents; and such sea rate postage shall belang to the<br /> country by which the packet conveying the letters isfurnished<br /> <br /> ARTICLE II - (Inlandpostage chargeable by the post-office ofGreat Britain) - There shall be charged<br /> by the Post-Office ofthe United Kingdom, upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight,<br /> posted in the United Kingdom, andforwarded to the United States or broughtfrom the United<br /> States and delivered in the United Kingdom, whether, such letters shall be conveyed by British or<br /> by United States packets, an Inland postage rate of one penny half penny.<br /> <br /> (Inland postage chargeable in the U. States) - There shall be charged by the Post-Office ofthe<br /> United States, upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight, posted in the United States<br /> andforwarded to the United Kingdom, or broughtfrom the United Kingdom, and delivered in the<br /> United States, either such letters shall be conveyed by United States or by British packets, an Inland<br /> postage rate offive cents.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE III - (Sea and inland postage combined into one rate, and on which payment may be<br /> made in advance) - Upon all letters posted in one country and delivered into the other, these rates of<br /> postage, both sea and inland, shall be combined into one rate, of which payment in advance shall be<br /> Option in either country. It shall, however, not bepermitted topay less than the whole combined rate<br /> <br /> ARTICLE VIII - (Transit ofclosed mails) - Her Britannic Majesty engages, on herpart, to grant to<br /> the United States the transit in closed mails, through the United Kingdom, or through any country<br /> where thepost communication may be under the control or management ofthe United Kingdom, of<br /> letters and newspapersforwardedfrom the United States, their colonies orpossession ofthe United<br /> States, or to anyforeign country, and from anyforeign country, orfrom any colony orpossession<br /> ofthe United States, to the United States, their colonies or possessions<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XI - (Transit letters to be delivered to the post-offices of either country free of postage)<br /> - (..) and letters from foreign countries addressed to the United States, passing in transit through<br /> the United Kingdom, shall be delivered to the United States post-office free of all British postage,<br /> whether packet or inland.<br /> <br /> (Transit letters on which postage must beprepaid) - In the case ofthose countries to which letters<br /> cannot beforwarded unless the British postage be paid in advance, such British postage shall be<br /> collected in the United States, in addition to the United States rates of postage and accountedfor<br /> the British post-office. (..)<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XVI - (Rates of postage on newspapers passing in transit through either country) - The<br /> rate of postage to be charged in the United Kingdom upon newspapers to and from the United<br /> States, passing in transit through the United Kingdom, shall be one penny for each newspaper, except<br /> where a lower rate isprovided by any treaty between the United Kingdom and a foreign country;<br /> and the rate of postage to be charged in the United States upon newspapers to and from the United<br /> Kingdom, passing in transit through the United States, shall be two cents for each newspaper<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XIX - (Difference between the U. States and British currency to be accounted for) - In<br /> consideration oftwo cents United States currency not beingprecisely equivalent to one penny Sterling,<br /> the British post-office shall account to the United States post-office at the rate offour hundred and<br /> eighty-four cents to thepound Sterling; and the United States post office shall account to the British<br /> post-office at the rate offour hundred and eighty cents to thepound Sterling.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XXI - (Forms in which accounts between the respective post-offices shall be made out,<br /> with other details to be settled öfter exchange of ratifications) - Theforms in which the accounts<br /> between the respective post-offices for the transmission and conveyance ofletters are to be made<br /> out, the time and mode in which payment shall be made by either post-office to the other, together<br /> with all other measures ofdetail arising out ofthe stipulations ofthe present convention, shall be<br /> settled between the post-office ofthe United States and the British post-office, äs soon äs possible<br /> after the exchange ofthe ratifications ofthe present convention.<br /> <br /> The resolution with the regulations and specific details, written in 24 articles, relating to the postal<br /> treaty between the USA and the United Kingdom, according to Article XXI ofthe Convention, were<br /> approved on 14 May 18499&gt;1°, ratified on 31 May11, and put into effect on l July ofthe same year. On<br /> 19 June 184912, and after the resolution ofthe regulations had been approved by the British postal<br /> administration, US Postmaster General J Collamer sent the instructions and postage tables to the<br /> postmasters. Some ofthe regulation articles relevant to this study are transcribed below:<br /> <br /> ARTICLE I - (Exchange of Mails) - The following shall be the regulations for the exchange ofmails<br /> between the United Kingdom and the United States. There shall be an exchange ofmails between<br /> the following offices:<br /> 1. Between London and Boston, by way of Liverpool and Boston direct, and also by way of Liverpool<br /> and New York.<br /> 2. Between London and New York, by way of Liverpool and New York direct, and also by way of<br /> Liverpool and Boston.<br /> 3. Between Liverpool and Boston direct, and also by way ofNew York.<br /> 4. Between Liverpool and New York direct, and also by way of Boston.<br /> 5. Between London and New York, by way of Southampton.<br /> 6. Between Southampton and New York direct.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE IX - (Progressive rates of postage) - With respect to letters above the weight of a single<br /> letter which isßxed at half an ounce in either country, the respective offices, in accounting to each<br /> other, shall employ the following scale ofprogressions:<br /> • For every letter not exceeding, half an ounce in weight, one single rate.<br /> • Above half an ounce, but not exceeding one ounce, two rates.<br /> • Above one ounce, but not exceeding two ounces, four rates.<br /> • And so on, two rates being addedfor every ounce orfraction ofan ounce.<br /> <br /> Some ofthe instructions and postage rates relevant to this study are transcribed below:<br /> <br /> • Between any office in the United States (Oregon and California excepted) and any office in Great<br /> Britain and Ireland, the entire postage is 24 cents the single letter, which may beprepaid or sent<br /> unpaid. Ofthis amount, the British post office, when it conveys the letter by its own packet and<br /> collects the postage, accounts to the United States for 5 cents; when itcollects the postage without<br /> conveying the letter, it accounts for 21 cents. The United States post office accounts to the British<br /> for 3 cents the letter when it carries and collects, and for 19 when it collects only. Payment by<br /> theparty ofanything less than the entire postage goes for nothing. The offices ofexchange will<br /> treat such letters äs wholly unpaid.<br /> <br /> • Between the offices of California and Oregon and those of Great Britain andlreland, the entire<br /> postage is 59 cents the single letter, which may be prepaid or sent unpaid, and ofwhich the<br /> British share is 3 or 19 cents, depending on the circumstance whether conveyed by the United<br /> States or British packet; and the United States share is 56 cents or 40 cents, depending on the<br /> same circumstances.<br /> <br /> • On all correspondence between the United States (Oregon and California excepted) and the<br /> following named countries through the United Kingdom, and by the routes here specified, there<br /> must be prepaid when sent, and collected when received, the following rates (ofwhich the United<br /> States post offi.ce will account to the British for all butßve cents the single letter, unless a United<br /> States packet conveys it to orfrom England, and thenfor all but twenty-one cents):<br /> ° (••)<br /> o Azores, Islands, via Southampton and Lisbon - 63 cents for single letter<br /> o Madeira, Island of, via Southampton - 65 cents for single letter<br /> o Portugal, via Southampton - 63 cents for single letter.<br /> ° (••)<br /> <br /> • The exchange offices ofthe two countries, in mailing to each other, are to postmark the letter, not<br /> with the entire postage, but with the credit and debit portions ofit only; ifapaid letter, with the<br /> credit amount infavor ofthe other country, in red ink, and with a &quot;paid&quot;stamp in same color; if<br /> unpaid, with the debit amount against the other country, in black ink. But before the exchange<br /> office receiving such letter delivers it, or mails it to the interior, it is to re-stamp the letter with<br /> its own office stamp, in all cases, and with the &quot;paid&quot; stamp in red ink, ifpaid; if unpaid, with<br /> the amount, in black, ofthe entire postage to be collected.<br /> <br /> Table 1. Postage rates (effective from 1 July 1849) relating to the fees to be paid by the USA to the British postal<br /> administration for letters received from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores, not including the US inland rate of 5 cents<br /> <br /> Bild Siete 10<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the postal changes introduced by the Convention were legalised in the<br /> Treasury Warrant of 8 March 1849, and published in The London Gazette No. 20955 on 9 March of<br /> the same year.<br /> <br /> In summary, the payment of postage could be made by the sender. When sending mail from the<br /> USA to continental Portugal and the Islands of Madeira and the Azores, prepayment of postage was<br /> mandatory. The transatlantic component of a letter between the two countries, weighing up to %<br /> ounce, was 24 cents (12 pence)13, which corresponded to:<br /> <br /> • Transatlantic sea rate - 16 cents or 8 pence to be paid to the country that had contracted the<br /> steamship Company to perform the Service<br /> • Transit rate in the United Kingdom - 3 cents or P/2 pence<br /> • Inland rate in the United States - 5 cents or 2l/2 pence.<br /> <br /> The Exchange Offices were, on the one hand, in the cities of Boston and New York in the USA and,<br /> on the other hand, in the cities of Liverpool, Southampton, and London in the United Kingdom.<br /> Accounting between the countries was facilitated by the use of a two-colour marking System. Red<br /> marks indicated credit; black marks indicated debit. In practical terms, for mail sent from Portugal,<br /> red indicated the amount to be received by the USA, and black indicated the postage to be received<br /> by the respective country. This transatlantic rate was in effect until 31 December 1867(14).<br /> <br /> Furthermore, to accurately determine the complete postage rates from Portugal to the USA, it is<br /> essential to consider the existing postal rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom. These<br /> rates, established on 10 January 1840 1S, formed a basis for subsequent calculations. Mail conveyed<br /> by packet from Portugal and the Azores to the United Kingdom was fixed at l Shilling 9 pence.<br /> Mail from Madeira was slightly higher at l Shilling 10 pence. Ship letters, however, were charged a<br /> lower rate of 8 pence. Understanding these baseline charges is crucial for interpreting the complex<br /> accounting procedures and final postage costs.<br /> <br /> Based on the information provided, it is possible to determine that the recipient of a letter sent from<br /> continental Portugal16 to the USA (except California and Oregon) would have to pay, for the first rate:<br /> <br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by packet: 63 cents (2s 7J/2d)<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by ship: 37 cents (1s<br /> <br /> For the first case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by a British packet:<br /> o 58 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> - 42 cents (1s 9d) was related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> o 5 cents US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office<br /> a Total 42 + 16 + 5 = 63 cents.<br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by an American packet:<br /> a 42 cents (1s 9d) to be received by the British Post Office related to sending from Portugal<br /> to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> o 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office, where:<br /> <br /> For the second case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by a British packet:<br /> o 32 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> - 16 cents (8d) was related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by merchant ship<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> o 5 cents US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office D Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by an American packet:<br /> o 16 cents (8d) to be received by the British Post Office related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by merchant ship a 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office where:<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate<br /> - 5 cents US inland postage<br /> o Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate<br /> - 5 cents US inland postage<br /> o Total = 42 + 16 + 5 = 63 cents.<br /> <br /> 2. Portugal: Postal Regulations of 1853<br /> <br /> In Portugal, the Postal Reform of 185217 introduced profound changes in the Organisation of the<br /> Postal Service. Its implementation came into effect in 185318 and, with regard to postage to and<br /> from abroad, the inland postage on mail received from abroad ceased to be charged. The postage<br /> to be paid for letters received from abroad from beyond the Pyrenees coming through Spain was<br /> 240 Reis up to 2/s ounce inclusively, increasing by 240 Reis for each 2/s ounce or fraction thereof.<br /> Foreign letters arriving on ships other than packets (Cartas Estrangeiras vindas em navios que näo<br /> sejam paquetes) paid 160 Reis up to 4/s ounce inclusively, increasing by 80 Reis for every 2/s ounce.<br /> For postage to foreign countries, except Spain, when the mail had to transit through the Kingdom<br /> of Portugal or to its port of embarkation, or another point on the border, in addition to the postage<br /> to be paid in cash, it was mandatory to pay the inland postage by means of stamps: 25 Reis up to<br /> % ounce exclusively, 50 Reis up to % ounce, and so on, increasing by 25 Reis for every % ounce19.<br /> The means of sending mail from Portugal to other countries at this time was diverse20, and could<br /> be sent by sea through merchant ships, packets of the Mediterranean line, the West African Coast<br /> line, or transatlantic ships including those to Brazil and Argentina, and by land through Spain, or<br /> even by Aux Soins de TExpediteur21<br /> <br /> My census database records seven letters sent from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores between l July<br /> 1853 and 30 June 1859. Figure l shows the earliest stamped letter.<br /> <br /> Figure l shows an envelope originating in Säo Miguel, Azores and addressed to Boston, Massachusetts<br /> in 1856 with only the inland postage paid. The envelope was included in the mailbags placed onboard<br /> the Portuguese schooner Rainha dos Azores towards Lisbon where it arrived on 9 November22,<br /> confirmed by a rounded-corner boxed datestamp applied on the back. The next day the mail was<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 12<br /> <br /> placed onboard the schooner Emilia towards Liverpool23. In Liverpool it was placed onboard the<br /> steamship Anglo-Saxon of the transatlantic Allan Line on 26 November 185624. It arrived in Portland<br /> on the morning of 10 December 185625 and proceeded to Boston, where it arrived on the same day<br /> and a circular datestamp was applied to the back: &quot;BOSTON/10 DEC/A.M- PKT&quot;.<br /> <br /> Prepaid mail to the USA was not possible at the time. At Ponta Delgada the sender paid only the<br /> inland postage up to % ounce with a D. Pedro V stamp of 25 Reis, double lines, type I, cancelled<br /> with a circular barred numeral &quot;50&quot;. A manuscript accountancy mark of &quot;8&quot; (pence) was applied<br /> in black ink, representing the debit against the Portuguese administration for the ship-letter fee to<br /> the United Kingdom.<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the value of &quot;16&quot; was handwritten, relating to the transatlantic rate to be<br /> credited to the USA for having been transported by a steamer under contract with the US government.<br /> Upon arriving in Boston, the handwritten &quot;16&quot; was canceled and the amount of &quot;37&quot; cents was<br /> handwritten indicating the value to be paid by the recipient. The accounting of the &quot;37&quot; cents is<br /> broken down into the following items:<br /> <br /> • 8d (16 cents) for the British postal System for a letter sent from Portugal by merchant ship to the United Kingdom<br /> • 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office where:<br /> o 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the US Post Office (A.M- PKT)<br /> o 5 cents US inland fee<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 8 pence<br /> • Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Figure 2 illustrates an envelope with an enclosed letter written by Dr. George Clymer to his wife<br /> in Washington, D.C. The letter is datelined &quot;San Antonio da Serra, Madeira, Sunday, July 13,1856&quot;.<br /> <br /> Bild Anfangs Seite 14<br /> <br /> Dr. George Clymer, who held the post of fleet surgeon on the West Africa Squadron's flagship, the<br /> USS Jamestown, authored this letter and following his Standard practice for organising family correspondence,<br /> he marked the upper left corner with '32' to signify its place in his sequence of letters26.<br /> <br /> The cover bears a manuscript endorsement by the sender: 'By steamer to Plymouth, the Niger,' signifying<br /> his chosen route. Bypassing the local Portuguese postal System entirely, the letter was handed<br /> directly to the British postal agent, George Stoddart, in Madeira. On 23 July 1856, the agent applied<br /> a black, double-circular &quot;MADEIRA / JY 23 /1856&quot; datestamp to the reverse before dispatching the<br /> letter onboard the African Steam Ship Company's SS Niger later that day 27.<br /> <br /> The Niger was then on its return voyage from the west coast of Africa, calling at Madeira for mail<br /> before reaching Plymouth on 29 July 1856. Because the ship arrived late28, the mailbags were not<br /> processed until the following day, when a red-brown &quot;PLYMOUTH / JY 30 1856 B / PACKET<br /> LETTER&quot; datestamp was applied. The mail was then forwarded by train to London for transit<br /> processing — marked by the orange &quot;BA / 31 JY 31 /1856&quot; circular datestamp on the reverse — before<br /> being transferred to the Cunard Line steamship Canada, which departed Liverpool on 2 August29.<br /> The Canada arrived in Boston at five o'clock on the morning of 13 August30; this arrival is confirmed<br /> by the black &quot;BOSTON /13 ÄUG / BR- PKT&quot; datestamp on the reverse. From there, the mail was<br /> dispatched by early train to Washington.<br /> <br /> The cover was sent unpaid. At the British postal administration, a handwritten debit of &quot;1.20&quot; was<br /> applied to the cover, representing the amount the British postal administration charged the United<br /> States for a double-weight unpaid letter sent from Portugal via British Packet. Upon reaching Boston,<br /> this &quot;1.20&quot; mark was cancelled and replaced by a handwritten &quot;1.40&quot;, indicating the total postage<br /> due from the recipient in cents. The discrepancy in the Boston arrival mark is notable. A doublerate<br /> letter from Madeira with transatlantic crossing to the USA via British Packet should have been<br /> calculated äs follows:<br /> <br /> • 120 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> o 88 cents (2 x 1s lOd) was related to sending from Madeira to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> o 32 cents (2 x 16c) transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> • 10 cents (2 x 5c) US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office<br /> <br /> While the sum of these components is 130 cents, the Boston clerk's manuscript &quot;1.40&quot; suggests a 10-cent overcharge.<br /> <br /> 3. Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1859<br /> <br /> On 8 June 1859, the Portuguese Post Office announced the impending Implementation of a new<br /> postal convention with the United Kingdom. This Convention (Figure 3), formalised on 6 April<br /> and approved by law on 23 May of the same year, was set to take effect on l July 1859. The Diärio do<br /> Governo (No. 140,16 June 1859) published the associated table of postal rates for mail exchanged<br /> directly or in transit between the two countries. This table also covered mail carried by British packets<br /> to overseas destinations without passing through the United Kingdom.<br /> <br /> For the current study, &quot;Table I&quot; (annexed<br /> to the Convention; reproduced äs Table (i;<br /> 2 here) is the most relevant äs it details<br /> the specific rates for mail sent in transit<br /> through the United Kingdom. Between<br /> Portugal (including the Islands of Madeira<br /> and the Azores) and the United Kingdom,<br /> mail could be sent by British packets<br /> (transatlantic route, peninsular route<br /> and the African coast route via Madeira).<br /> Alternatively, mail could be sent by land,<br /> through Spain and France, or by merchant<br /> ships. <br /> <br /> Bild Postal Convention Seite 15<br /> <br /> In Portugal, postage stamps served a<br /> specific purpose: the payment of inland<br /> postage for ordinary or registered mail. For<br /> mail that was sent by packet or ship, the<br /> inland rate only applied when the letter<br /> was posted outside of the port of embarkation.<br /> The inland rate was 25 Reis up to<br /> 1/8 ounce exclusive. <br /> <br /> In the case of sending ordinary mail via<br /> Spain and France, a mandatory postage of<br /> 40 Reis was charged, by means of stamps,<br /> for each % ounce. Prepaid letters were sent by packets or private ships. Leiters sent via Spain with a<br /> lack of postage, äs long äs it was not less than that of a first rate letter, could be sent, but were subject<br /> to a fine, and the value of the fine was marked in black ink in English money. Letters to England could<br /> also be sent registered and, if so, they had to pay 100 Reis, by means of stamps, for the registration.<br /> This rate was in effect until 31 July 1866.<br /> <br /> Mail sent in transit through the United Kingdom was regulated by Articles XVI and XVII of the<br /> Convention. Article XXVII mentions that for accounting purposes the conversion between Portuguese<br /> and British currency was carried out at the rate of 20 Reis per l penny. Article III, in turn, states<br /> that the exchange could be carried out in Portugal through the exchange offices of Lisbon, Porto,<br /> Funchal and S. Vicente (Cape Verde), and in the United Kingdom, in the exchange offices of London,<br /> Southampton and Liverpool.<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the postal changes introduced by the Convention were legalised in the<br /> Treasury Warrant of 14 June 1859, and published in The London Gazette No. 22275 on 17 June of the<br /> same year.<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 2 Seite 16<br /> <br /> Understanding the accounting procedures for mail between Portugal and the USA requires examining<br /> the applicable postal rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom. These rates, detailed in the<br /> accompanying table (Table 3), governed mail flow in both directions and formed the basis for<br /> calculating transit charges for mail destined for the USA.<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 3 Seite 16<br /> <br /> It is also important to highlight the designated offices for mail exchange. These offices, listed in Table<br /> 431, played a crucial role in facilitating mail transit between the two countries. Mail routed through<br /> Spain and France should be endorsed with the directives &quot;Via Spain&quot; or &quot;Via France,&quot; respectively<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 4 Seite 16<br /> <br /> Considering the data presented, it is possible to determine that the Portuguese postal administration<br /> charged, for the first rate, for a letter sent from Portugal to the USA, the following:<br /> <br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by packet: 320 Reis, paid in cash, up to % ounce<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by ship: 320 Reis, paid in cash, up to 4/s ounce<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom overland by Spain and France: 280 Reis paid in cash plus 40 Reis by means of stamps, up to 2/s ounce.<br /> <br /> For the first case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • 160 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the country that supported the transatlantic packet<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> For the second case, the accounting was broken down in the same way äs the previous one, but the letter could weigh up to 4/8 ounce.<br /> <br /> <br /> For the third case, the accounting was broken down as follows:<br /> <br /> • 40 Reis of Portuguese postage for sending by land via Spain and France<br /> • 120 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, of transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the country that supported the transatlantic packet<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> This rate remained in effect until 31 Jury 1866. During this period, from l July 1859 to 31 July 1866,<br /> my census database records fifteen letters sent from Portugal or Madeira. Figure 4 illustrates one of<br /> only three recorded letters originating from Madeira.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 17 unten<br /> <br /> This folded letter (Figure 4) was written by George Welsh and addressed to his brother John George<br /> Welsh32. It was sent from Funchal, Madeira, to New York. Posted on 20 June 1865, it bears a blue<br /> double circular datestamp and an endorsement by the sender, &quot;p. Str. Maria Pia via Lisbon &amp; France,&quot;<br /> indicating the desired steamship route.<br /> The letter s journey began onboard the ship Maria Pia, arriving in Lisbon on 23 June33, followed by<br /> a transfer to the ship Douro34 that left on the same day to Liverpool35. Upon arrival in Liverpool on<br /> 29 June36, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot; datestamp. On l July37, it was put<br /> on the Cunard Line steamship Persia, reaching New York on 12 July38.<br /> In Funchal, the sender prepaid the inland postage with a 25 Reis carmine stamp of the D. Luis I<br /> issue, cancelled with a circular barred numeral &quot;51&quot;. This covered the cost of transport to the port of<br /> embarkation for a letter up to 15 grams. Additionally, the sender paid 320 Reis in cash, covering the<br /> cost of a letter up to 2/s of an ounce to the US. This payment is confirmed by the handwritten &quot;1/4&quot;<br /> in English currency and the oval &quot;PAGO/OPORTE&quot; mark.<br /> The 320 Reis postage paid by the sender was all credited to the British and can be broken down äs<br /> follows:<br /> <br /> • 160 Reis equivalent to 8 pence to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by sea. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom (BR-PKT)<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> 4. Portugal: Entry into Force of the Decimal Metric System, 1860<br /> <br /> <br /> Shortly after the Portuguese-British Postal Convention took effect, the Ministry of Public Works,<br /> Commerce and Industry decreed on 20 June 185939, that the decimal metric System would be<br /> implemented in Lisbon on l January 1860. The rest of the Kingdom and adjacent islands would follow<br /> suit on l March of the same year. This shift necessitated a revision of postal rates. By Letter of Law<br /> on 20 August 186l40, a new table of rates for mail and printed matter was established, harmonising<br /> charges with the new System of weights. These revised rates came into effect on 20 September 186l 41.<br /> <br /> <br /> The adoption of the decimal metric System brought about specific changes to postal rates. Letters from<br /> beyond the Pyrenees arriving via Spain were charged 240 Reis for up to 7.5 grams, with an increase<br /> of 240 Reis for each additional 7.5 grams or fraction thereof. Foreign letters arriving on non-packet<br /> ships followed a different rate: 160 Reis for up to 15 grams, increasing by 80 Reis for every 7.5 grams.<br /> <br /> <br /> For mail sent to foreign countries (except Spain) that transited through Portugal, inland postage<br /> was mandatory and payable with stamps. This inland rate was structured äs follows: 25 Reis for up<br /> to 15 grams, 50 Reis for up to 22.5 grams, and so on, with a 25 Reis increase for every 7.5 grams.<br /> <br /> <br /> Importantly, mail covered by existing conventions — such äs those with England, Spain, and Belgium,<br /> äs well as mail sent on transatlantic and Mediterranean routes — remained subject to the provisions<br /> ofthose agreements 42.<br /> <br /> Subsequently, on 21 January 1863, the Sub-Inspeccäo Geral dos Correios (Sub-Inspectorate General<br /> of Posts and Mails) announced in the Diärio de Lisboa No. 18 of 24 January 1863, that from l February<br /> of the same year, letters and printed matter other than newspapers, addressed to, or in transit via<br /> the United Kingdom of Great Britain, äs well äs letters and said printed matter received or sent by<br /> the English and French steamers of the transatlantic route, began to be weighed in grams, where<br /> the weight of 7% grams replaced that of % ounce for letters and the weight of 30 grams replaced<br /> that of l ounce for printed matter.<br /> <br /> <br /> 5. Cancellation of the Peninsular Line, 1862<br /> <br /> Enhanced communication routes between Portugal and the United Kingdom led to the cancellation<br /> of the Peninsular Line in 1862. As noted in the Ninth Report ofthe Postmaster General on The Post<br /> Office, 1863, existing Services, including the transatlantic route to South America, merchant ships, and<br /> a daily exchange via France and Spain, were deemed sufficient for maintaining postal Connectivity<br /> with Portugal. Consequently, the Peninsular Service, which incurred an annual cost of £5,000, was<br /> discontinued.<br /> <br /> <br /> The Portuguese General Post Office announced the termination ofthe Peninsular Line in the Diärio<br /> de Lisboa (No. 136,18 June 1862). This announcement followed notification from the British Post<br /> Office regarding the discontinuation of this packet service between Southampton and Lisbon. Despite<br /> this change, mail continued to be sent to Great Britain daily via Spain and France, and existing<br /> transatlantic routes and merchant ship Services remained operational. With the cancellation ofthe<br /> Peninsular Line, the overland route through France and Spain became the preferred method43 for<br /> postal transit between Portugal and the United Kingdom (Figure 5).<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 19<br /> <br /> Figure 6 shows an envelope sent from Lisbon addressed to Miss Lizzie Huber care of Jas. S Huber Esq,<br /> Philadelphia, postmarked on 16 September 1865 with a black double circular datestamp. This envelope<br /> was transported to Liverpool onboard the ship Braganza, departing Lisbon on 17 September 44 and <br /> <br /> <br /> Bild Seite 20<br /> <br /> <br /> arriving on 23 September45. Upon arrival, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot;<br /> datestamp and promptly placed on the Cunard Line steamship Persza, that left on the same day46,<br /> reaching New York on the night of 3 October47. Next morning a postal clerk applied the black circular<br /> datestamp &quot;5/OCT/4/N.YORK BR. PKT.&quot; showing that 5 cents was still due for the US inland postage.<br /> <br /> <br /> The sender prepaid 320 Reis, covering the cost of sending a letter up to 2/s of an ounce to the US port<br /> of disembarkation via packet Service to England. This prepayment is confirmed by the oval mark<br /> &quot;PAGOU DE FRANQUIA PELO PAQUETE&quot; (Paid Postage by Packet) and the handwritten amount<br /> of &quot;1/4&quot; in English currency. The handwritten &quot;Sets&quot; denotes the inland postage fee in the US.<br /> <br /> <br /> The 320 Reis postage paid by the sender can be broken down äs follows:<br /> • 160 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by sea. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom (BR.pKT.)<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> <br /> 6. Currency Devaluation and the Impact on Unpaid Mail Received in the USA, 1863<br /> <br /> During the American Civil War, currency devaluation posed a significant challenge to international<br /> postal agreements. While many countries had arrangements with the USA to settle accounts in coinage<br /> (gold or silver), recipients typically paid unpaid mail with US Notes48. However, wartime Inflation<br /> led to a devaluation of these notes, negatively impacting the postal administration's financial balance.<br /> <br /> <br /> To address this issue, the US Congress passed a resolution on 3 March 186349, allowing for the payment<br /> of unpaid letters from certain countries (the United Kingdom, France, Prussia, Hamburg, Bremen,<br /> and Belgium) with silver or gold coin. Alternatively, recipients could still use US Notes but with an<br /> added premium to compensate for the devaluation. This premium, calculated daily at international<br /> mail offices, ensured that the postal administration received the correct value in coinage equivalent<br /> Postmaster General Montgomery Blair announced this resolution in a circular to postal agents in<br /> April 186350, with implementation beginning in May.<br /> <br /> 7. Additional Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1866<br /> <br /> A new postal convention between Portugal and the United Kingdom, effective l August 186651,<br /> mandated prepayment of postage for mail to the USA with the use of stamps. The Portuguese<br /> General Post Office announced the new rates in the Diärio de Lisboa (No. 160,19 July 1866), detailing<br /> the charges for prepaid mail originating from Continental Portugal, the islands of Madeira and the<br /> Azores, and other overseas provinces on the west coast of Africa, sent in transit through the United<br /> Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The United Kingdom formalised these changes through a<br /> Treasury Warrant issued on 23 July 1866, and subsequently published in The London Gazette (No.<br /> 23145, 27 July 1866).<br /> <br /> In the context of this study, Table 5 shows the postage rates to the USA.<br /> <br /> Table 5 Postage Rates<br /> <br /> In order to be able to Interpret the accounting, which is often revealed in handwritten elements,<br /> it is also necessary to present the table of rates for prepaid mail to the United Kingdom (Table 6).<br /> <br /> Table 6 Postage Rates<br /> <br /> Furthermore, it is essential to partially transcribe Articles 3 and 4 of the Portuguese-British<br /> Convention, which refers to the accounting rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom:<br /> <br /> Artide 3 - In exception to the stipulation made in article Ist preceding, it is mutually agreed that<br /> international ordinary letters which may beposted either wholly unpaid or insufficiently prepaid<br /> by means of Postage Stamps, shall beforwarded to their destination. For these letters there shall be<br /> charged, on delivery, thefollowing increased rotes of postage, viz: In the United Kingdom a postage<br /> ofeightpencefor euch single letter originating in Portugal, Madeira, the Azores, and the Portuguese<br /> possessions on the west coast ofAfrica. (..) Insufficiently prepaid letters shall be considered äs unpaid<br /> and charged accordingly after deducting the value ofthe Postage Stamps affixed to them.<br /> Artide 4 - (...) The Portuguese Post Office administration shallpay to the British Post Office administrationfor<br /> each single prepaid letter sent from Portugal, Madeira, Azores and overseas provinces<br /> on the west coast ofAfrica, addressed to the United Kingdom:<br /> • The amount of90 Reisfor those sent by land via Spain and France or by French packets, via<br /> Bordeaux;<br /> • The amount oflOO Reisfor those sent by British packets;<br /> • The amount of60 Reisfor those sent by private ships.<br /> (...)<br /> <br /> Finally, it is essential to address the regulations with the specific arrangements52 ofthe additional<br /> Convention of 1866 that were signed in London and Lisbon on 8 June and 30 June 1866, respectively.<br /> Below are some ofthe relevant articles from the perspective of this study:<br /> <br /> Artide I - Thefollowing shall be the regulations for the exchange ofmails between the British and Portuguese Post Offices:<br /> <br /> 1st. The office of London shall exchange mails with the offices of Lisbon, Funchal, and St Vincent<br /> by British packet, with the office of Lisbon by French packet via Bordeaux, and with the offices<br /> of Lisbon and Oporto by the route of France and Spain, äs well äs by private ship.<br /> <br /> 2nd. The office of Southampton shall exchange mails with the offices of Lisbon and St. Vincent<br /> by British packet, and with the offices of Lisbon and Oporto by private ship.<br /> <br /> 3rd. The office of Liverpool shall exchange mails with the office of Funchal by British packet,<br /> and with the offices of Lisbon and Oporto by private ships.<br /> <br /> Artide VI (...) In Portugal 20 Reis shall be taken äs the equivalent ofeach penny.<br /> <br /> Artide VIII - In addition to the local and date stamp with which all ordinary or registered letters<br /> exchanged between the respective offices must be marked, such ofthose letters äs have beenpaid<br /> to the destination shall bearplainly impressed on the address another stamp with the initials PD.<br /> <br /> Table 7 Auswechslung über<br /> <br /> Tabelle 8 Account rates<br /> <br /> This rate remained in effect until 31 December 1867. Between l August 1866 and 31 December 1867,<br /> my census database records only six letters sent from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores. The only<br /> recorded examples from the Azores and Madeira during this period are shown below.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 23<br /> <br /> Figure 7 illustrates a paid letter from Ponta Delgada, Azores. It was postmarked on l November 1866,<br /> and was addressed to Guilherme Vieira Chibante, Boston. The envelope was included in the mailbags<br /> placed onboard the ship Leal towards Lisbon where it arrived on 7 November53. In Lisbon it was sent<br /> overland via Spain and France in a closed bag. In London the mailbag was opened and the envelope<br /> received a circular datestamp from the London postal administration indicating that the letter had<br /> been paid. It was then forwarded to Southampton where it was placed onboard the ship Germania<br /> of the transatlantic line HAPAG (Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktien Gesellschaft) on 14<br /> November54. Upon arrival in New York, on the night of 25 November 186655, the mailbags addressed<br /> to Boston were forwarded, where they arrived the next day, corroborated by the circular datestamp<br /> &quot;BOSTON AM. PKT./NOV/26/5&quot;.<br /> <br /> <br /> In the Azores it was prepaid with two 20 Reis bistre stamps plus two 120 Reis blue stamps of the<br /> D. Luis I issue, curved ribbon, imperforate, totaling 280 Reis. This amount paid a letter of up to<br /> 7.5 grams from Portugal to the USA via Spain and France. The postage was valid up to the port of<br /> disembarkation in the USA. Handwritten in black, the accounting value of &quot;1s Vid&quot; (250 Reis) was<br /> to be paid by the Portuguese postal administration to the United Kingdom. A &quot;16 CENTS&quot; mark in<br /> red indicated the transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the USA by the British postal administration<br /> due to being transported by a ship under contract with the American government. In Boston the<br /> cover was postmarked with the value of &quot;5&quot; cents relating to the US inland fee, to be paid by the<br /> recipient, with an indication that it had been transported by an American ship (AM. PKT.). Of the<br /> transatlantic fee of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained 3 cents and the USA 21 cents (16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 4^d (90 Reis) for the British postal System for a letter sent via Spain and France up to 7.5 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the US<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 4^d (90 Reis)<br /> • Total = 1s Vad (4Vtd + 8d) = 250 Reis, the remaining 30 Reis retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient was still responsible for 5 cents inland postage äs the letter was only prepaid to the port of entry.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 24<br /> <br /> The envelope shown in Figure 8 is a paid letter from Madeira, postmarked on 30 November 1867<br /> and addressed to New York. In Funchal it was placed onboard the packet Ethiope of the African<br /> Steam Ship Co. returning from the west coast of Africa to Liverpool56-57. The voyage was affected<br /> by bad weather58 and the mailbags must have been delivered before reaching Liverpool, probably<br /> in Falmouth, and forwarded to London in order to reduce the delay. In London the mailbag was<br /> opened and the envelope received a circular datestamp (17 December) from the London postal<br /> administration indicating that the letter had been paid. It was then forwarded to Southampton where<br /> it was put onboard the ship Deutschland of the transatlantic line NGL (North German Lloyd) on 17<br /> December59. It arrived in New York on the morning of 30 December 60<br /> <br /> The letter was prepaid in Funchal with a pair of 80 Reis orange plus a 120 Reis darkblue stamp of the<br /> D. Luis I issue, curved ribbon, imperforate, totaling 280 Reis. This amount paid a letter of up to 15<br /> grams from Portugal to the USA by British packet or merchant ship. The postage was valid up to the<br /> port of disembarkation in the USA. Handwritten in red, the accounting value of &quot;1s Id&quot; (260 Reis) was<br /> to be paid by the Portuguese postal administration to the United Kingdom. A &quot;16 CENTS&quot; mark in<br /> red showed the transatlantic rate to be credited to the USA by the British postal administration due<br /> to being transported by a ship under contract with the US government. In New York the cover was<br /> postmarked showing value of &quot;5&quot; cents due for the US transit fee, to be paid by the recipient, with<br /> an indication that it had been transported by an American ship (AM. PKT.). Of the transatlantic<br /> postage of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained 3 cents and the USA 21 cents (16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 5d (100 Reis) to be credited to Britain for a letter sent by British packet to England up to 15 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the US<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 5d (100 Reis)<br /> • Total = 1s Id (5d + 8d) = 260 Reis, the remaining 20 Reis retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for postage from the port of entry.<br /> <br /> Figure 9 Seite 25<br /> <br /> Figure 9 illustrates another envelope but this time sent via ship to England. This envelope originated<br /> in Lisbon and was addressed to Miss Eliza Ramsden, Easton (Glendon Iron Works), Northampton<br /> Co., Pennsylvania. At the top, an endorsement by the sender, &quot;by steamer&quot;, indicated the desired<br /> route. It was postmarked on 17 September 1866 and received a black double circular datestamp of<br /> the Lisbon post office. The envelope was placed onboard the Lamport &amp; Holt ship Kepler, returning<br /> from South America, that left Lisbon on 18 September61, arriving in Liverpool on 24 September62.<br /> Upon arrival, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot; datestamp. In Liverpool it was<br /> placed in the mailbag for the Inman Line steamship City ofNew York on 26 September63, reaching<br /> New York on 10 October.<br /> <br /> In Lisbon the sender prepaid the envelope with two 100 Reis lilac stamps, a 10 Reis yellow, and a<br /> 50 Reis green of the D. Luis issue, plus a 20 Reis bistre, curved label issue, totaling 280 Reis. This<br /> amount paid for a letter of up to 15 grams from Portugal to the port of disembarkation in the USA by<br /> British packet or ship. Handwritten in black is an accounting value of &quot;lld&quot; (220 Reis) to be paid by<br /> the Portuguese postal administration to the United Kingdom. The handwritten value of &quot;16&quot; in red<br /> showed the transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the USA by the British postal administration due<br /> to being transported by a ship under contract with the US government. In New York, a postal clerk<br /> wrote &quot;Due Sets&quot;, indicating the US fee to be paid by the recipient, alongside the circular datestamp<br /> &quot;5/OCT/10/N. YORK AM- PKT&quot;. Of the transatlantic postage of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained<br /> 3 cents and the USA 21 cents (16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 3d (60 Reis) to be credited to the British for a letter sent by ship to England up to 15 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the US<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 3d (60 Reis)<br /> • Total = lld (3d + 8d) = 220 Reis, the remaining 60 Reis retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient was still responsible for the 5-cent inland fee äs the letter was only prepaid to the port of entry.<br /> <br /> Figure 10<br /> <br /> <br /> Figure 10 shows another paid letter, this time from Lisbon and addressed to Milesburg, Pennsylvania.<br /> Postmarked on 26 November 1866, the letter was included in a closed mailbag sent via the North &amp;<br /> East railway line to Badajoz, then through Spain and France.<br /> <br /> <br /> Upon reaching London, the mailbag was opened and the envelope received a red circular datestamp<br /> (l December 1866) indicating that the postage had been satisfied. That same day, it was forwarded to<br /> the Cunard steamer CubaM. The steamship arrived in New York on the morning of 13 December65<br /> where a postal clerk applied the black circular datestamp &quot;N. YORK BR- PKT7DEC/13/5&quot; before the<br /> letter proceeded to Pennsylvania.<br /> <br /> <br /> In Lisbon, the sender prepaid the 280 Reis rate, covering a letter up to 7.5 grams carried via Spain<br /> and France, using two lilac-mauve 100 Reis stamps of the D. Luis I issue and an imperforate orange<br /> 80 Reis curved ribbon stamp. This postage paid for carriage to the US port of entry. Handwritten<br /> in black, the accounting value of &quot;1s Vid&quot; (250 Reis) shows the amount to be paid by the Portuguese<br /> <br /> postal administration to the United Kingdom. The transatlantic sea rate is not visible, perhaps due<br /> to aging or wear. In New York the envelope was postmarked showing the value of &quot;5&quot; cents due for<br /> the US inland fee, to be paid by the recipient, with an indication that it had been transported by a<br /> British ship: &quot;BR- PKT&quot;. Of the transatlantic fee of 24 cents, the United Kingdom retained 16 cents<br /> and the USA 5 cents.<br /> <br /> <br /> Regarding the 280 Reis postage, the accounting rates are broken down into the following items:<br /> • 4Vid (90 Reis) for the British postal System for a letter sent via Spain and France up to 7.5 grams<br /> • 16 cents / 8d (160 Reis) transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 4%d (90 Reis)<br /> • Total = 1s %d (4J/2d + 8d) = 250 Reis, the remaining 30 Reis was retained by Portugal<br /> • In the US, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents inland postage from the port of entry.<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> Kapital 8</div>

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<p>Administrator: Die Seite wurde neu angelegt: „Study on Postal Agreements, Rates and Routes 1853-75 von Luis Rocha RPSL Study Papers Study Papers are produced by The Royal Philatelie Society London for pieces of work that are too long to be an article in The London Philatelist but are shorter than a regulär full-size book. Previously, the RPSL has published numerous Supplements to The London Philatelist, but for specialised studies it seems appropriate to produce such works äs A4 softback booklets…“</p> <hr /> <div>Study on Postal Agreements, Rates and Routes 1853-75<br /> <br /> von Luis Rocha<br /> <br /> RPSL Study Papers<br /> Study Papers are produced by The Royal Philatelie Society London for pieces of work that are too long<br /> to be an article in The London Philatelist but are shorter than a regulär full-size book. Previously, the<br /> RPSL has published numerous Supplements to The London Philatelist, but for specialised studies it<br /> seems appropriate to produce such works äs A4 softback booklets which will be available at a low cost<br /> to all interested philatelists. There is no fixed publication schedule for this series.<br /> <br /> <br /> Preface<br /> <br /> The study of transatlantic mail between Portugal and the United States, mediated by the British<br /> postal System between 1853 and 1875 (when the General Postal Union was established), reveals a<br /> complex web of international relations. While the North Atlantic routes and conventions of this era<br /> have been masterfully documented by legendary scholars, most notably Richard Winter, the specific<br /> intersection of Portuguese domestic legislation with these international treaties continues to offer a<br /> rieh field for new discovery. My primary motivation for this work arose when I first began studying<br /> these covers and realised that no one could provide the in-depth explanations they deserved. I found<br /> it nearly impossible to find a Consolidated resource that clearly defined the rate periods or the specific<br /> conventions applicable to each case. This study was born from the need to bridge that gap between<br /> official decrees and surviving physical evidence, creating a definitive reference for a period defined<br /> by shifting treaties and evolving rates, routes and means.<br /> <br /> My good old friend Acacio Luz once told nie that the only way to truly understand these covers is to<br /> follow a strict &quot;Chain of Logic.&quot; To explain a single letter, one must master Portuguese legislation to<br /> understand the domestic requirements, the Portugal-United Kingdom conventions to understand<br /> the transit through the British hüb, and finally the United Kingdom-United States conventions<br /> to account for the leg across the Atlantic. As Acacio wisely told me, without the original texts of<br /> these conventions, the additional articles, regulations and the specific shipping timetables, &quot;there<br /> is no chance of getting the Job done.&quot; This study is the result of years spent gathering these primary<br /> sources, including contemporary newspapers, official gazettes, post office notices, and internal postal<br /> documentation, to ensure that every rate and route described is backed by official fact.<br /> <br /> By combining these records with a comprehensive census of 104 surviving covers compiled from<br /> more than 1100 auction catalogues, many collections and private holdings over a large number of<br /> years, I have attempted to verify theoretical regulations against empirical postal practice. This datadriven<br /> approach allows us to see how the broad conventions were applied specifically to the mail<br /> departing from Portuguese ports. Beyond the technical analysis, these letters are valuable witnesses<br /> to 19th-century life. The names of senders and recipients, äs well äs the internal annotations serve äs<br /> a vital complementary record. These elements help situate each letter historically and commercially,<br /> offering a complete interpretation even when official postmarks are faint or absent.<br /> <br /> This study is intended for the specialised collector of Portugal's &quot;Classic&quot; issues, the Student of<br /> transatlantic history, and the postal historian. It is my hope that this work provides collectors with<br /> the tools to &quot;read&quot; their own pieces. Through this study, corroborated by primary sources, it is my<br /> intention to contribute to a deeper understanding of the postal history of this period, enabling<br /> collectors to further explore this subject and fully appreciate every element present in the covers in<br /> their own collection.<br /> <br /> Note for readers<br /> <br /> The accountancy calculations shown for prepaid letters presented in this work represent the debit<br /> owed by Portugal to the other postal authorities (USA and/or UK). The total amount that was prepaid<br /> differs from the accounting total äs it includes an element that was retained by Portugal to cover its<br /> own domestic handling and in some cases the transit fee due to Spain. Note that depending if the<br /> letter was sent to the UK by ship, packet or via Spain/France the values retained are different.<br /> <br /> Acknowledgements<br /> <br /> This study owes an immense debt of gratitude to Acacio Luz, whose contributions were indispensable<br /> to its completion. Sincere thanks are also due to Colin Tabeart for his generous assistance and<br /> invaluable insights, and to Fernando Bernardo for his unwavering encouragement throughout this<br /> project. The author also gratefully acknowledges the support of Steve Washburne, äs well äs the<br /> following individuals and institutions: Barry Attoe of The Postal Museum in London; lsabel Beato of<br /> the Arquivo Histörico da Marinha (Historical Archive of the Navy); and Ana Sabido of the Biblioteca<br /> Nacional de Portugal (National Library of Portugal).<br /> Special thanks are due to Luis Barreiros and Eduarde Barreiros for their diligent peer review of this<br /> paper, and to Paul Farrimond for his exceptional work in typesetting and bringing this study to life.<br /> Finally, the author wishes to express sincere appreciation for the work of the late Richard F. Winter,<br /> whose masterful postal history publications not only informed this study but also ignited a passion<br /> for this fascinating field.<br /> <br /> Units and Abbreviations<br /> s. d. Shillings and pence (UK) 1s = 12d<br /> c cents (US)<br /> oz ounce l oz = 28.35 grams<br /> g grams<br /> <br /> <br /> Contents<br /> <br /> *1. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848 7<br /> *2. Portugal: Postal Regulations of 1853 12<br /> *3. Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1859 15<br /> *4. Portugal: Entry into Force of the Decimal Metric System, 1860 18<br /> *5. Cancellation of the Peninsular Line, 1862 19<br /> *6. Currency Devaluation and the Impact on Unpaid Mail Received in the USA, 1863 20<br /> *7. Additional Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1866 21<br /> *8. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1867 27<br /> *9. Reduction of Postage for Mail Sent from Portugal in Transit through the United<br /> *Kingdom, 1868 29<br /> *10. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1868 31<br /> *11. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1869 35<br /> *12. Interruption of Postal Relations between France and the USA, 1870 36<br /> *13. Additional Routes Due to the Armed Conflict between France and Prussia 40<br /> *14. Reduction of Postage for Mail Sent from Portugal in Transit through the United<br /> *Kingdom, 1872 42<br /> *15. General Postal Union (G.P.U.) and Consequent Standardisation of Rates, 1875 47<br /> *16. Concluding Remarks 49<br /> <br /> Prior to the standardisation of international postal rates, there was never a formal postal agreement<br /> between Portugal and the United States. This standardisation arose with the Treaty of Bern, concluded<br /> on 9 October 18741&gt;2, which established the General Postal Union and introduced unified rates.<br /> Consequently, until Portugal and the United States joined the General Postal Union, the sending or<br /> receipt of mail between these two nations depended entirely on a complex web of postal agreements<br /> with and between intermediary countries.<br /> <br /> This study analyses postal regulations and procedures to facilitate the study of mail sent from<br /> Continental Portugal and the islands of Madeira and the Azores to the USA. By examining these<br /> regulations and procedures, we can interpret the various markings and elements found on mail from<br /> this period. This analysis includes a thorough examination of the different conventions and postal<br /> arrangements in place, with a focus on understanding the complex accounting Systems and diverse<br /> postage rates that were applied.<br /> <br /> The timeframe under consideration Spans from l July 1853 to l July 1875, bracketing the era between<br /> the introduction of the first adhesive stamps in Portugal and the nations entry into the General<br /> Postal Union. In July 1853, and within the context of the study, it is relevant to mention that Portugal<br /> already had formalised3 bilateral postal agreements with England (1705 and 1810)4, Spain (1850)5,<br /> and Belgium (1853)6. Furthermore, the Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848 was already in<br /> effect, laying the groundwork for the United Kingdoms crucial role äs an intermediary in handling<br /> mail sent from Portugal to the USA. The various Anglo-American Conventions that followed are<br /> central to understanding the complexities of this transatlantic mail System.<br /> <br /> Furthermore, this research concentrates specifically on outbound mail from Portugal to the USA,<br /> with a particular focus on letters7 sent via the British postal System. While alternative routes to the<br /> USA existed through France, Belgium, and Prussia, these fall outside the scope of this study. The 1865<br /> Portuguese-French Convention, for instance, enabled mail to be routed through France to the USA.<br /> Similarly, agreements with Belgium and Prussia provided for mail transit via Antwerp and Hamburg<br /> or Bremen, respectively. However, by excluding these alternative routes, this study provides a more<br /> focused analysis of the dominant role played by the British postal System in facilitating transatlantic<br /> mail transit during this period.<br /> <br /> 1. Anglo-American Postal Convention of 1848<br /> On l July 1853, when the first adhesive stamps were introduced in Portugal, the Anglo-American<br /> postal treaty was already in force. This treaty was signed in London on 15 December 1848 and came<br /> into effect on 15 February 18498. According to Article XXI ofthe Convention, the regulations with<br /> their inherent specificities were to be defined by both postal administrations at a later date. This postal<br /> framework introduced an improvement in transatlantic postal Communications and standardised<br /> postal rates between the two countries. Among other things, it allowed for the prepayment of postage<br /> to the destination. Below are some ofthe relevant articles from the perspective of this study:<br /> <br /> ARTICLE I - (Rate of postage on letters conveyed either by United States or British packets.) - There<br /> shall be charged upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight, conveyed either by United<br /> States or by British packets, between a port in the United States and a port in the United Kingdom,<br /> a uniform sea rate ofeight pence, or sixteen cents; and such sea rate postage shall belang to the<br /> country by which the packet conveying the letters isfurnished<br /> <br /> ARTICLE II - (Inlandpostage chargeable by the post-office ofGreat Britain) - There shall be charged<br /> by the Post-Office ofthe United Kingdom, upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight,<br /> posted in the United Kingdom, andforwarded to the United States or broughtfrom the United<br /> States and delivered in the United Kingdom, whether, such letters shall be conveyed by British or<br /> by United States packets, an Inland postage rate of one penny half penny.<br /> <br /> (Inland postage chargeable in the U. States) - There shall be charged by the Post-Office ofthe<br /> United States, upon all letters not exceeding half an ounce in weight, posted in the United States<br /> andforwarded to the United Kingdom, or broughtfrom the United Kingdom, and delivered in the<br /> United States, either such letters shall be conveyed by United States or by British packets, an Inland<br /> postage rate offive cents.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE III - (Sea and inland postage combined into one rate, and on which payment may be<br /> made in advance) - Upon all letters posted in one country and delivered into the other, these rates of<br /> postage, both sea and inland, shall be combined into one rate, of which payment in advance shall be<br /> Option in either country. It shall, however, not bepermitted topay less than the whole combined rate<br /> <br /> ARTICLE VIII - (Transit ofclosed mails) - Her Britannic Majesty engages, on herpart, to grant to<br /> the United States the transit in closed mails, through the United Kingdom, or through any country<br /> where thepost communication may be under the control or management ofthe United Kingdom, of<br /> letters and newspapersforwardedfrom the United States, their colonies orpossession ofthe United<br /> States, or to anyforeign country, and from anyforeign country, orfrom any colony orpossession<br /> ofthe United States, to the United States, their colonies or possessions<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XI - (Transit letters to be delivered to the post-offices of either country free of postage)<br /> - (..) and letters from foreign countries addressed to the United States, passing in transit through<br /> the United Kingdom, shall be delivered to the United States post-office free of all British postage,<br /> whether packet or inland.<br /> <br /> (Transit letters on which postage must beprepaid) - In the case ofthose countries to which letters<br /> cannot beforwarded unless the British postage be paid in advance, such British postage shall be<br /> collected in the United States, in addition to the United States rates of postage and accountedfor<br /> the British post-office. (..)<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XVI - (Rates of postage on newspapers passing in transit through either country) - The<br /> rate of postage to be charged in the United Kingdom upon newspapers to and from the United<br /> States, passing in transit through the United Kingdom, shall be one penny for each newspaper, except<br /> where a lower rate isprovided by any treaty between the United Kingdom and a foreign country;<br /> and the rate of postage to be charged in the United States upon newspapers to and from the United<br /> Kingdom, passing in transit through the United States, shall be two cents for each newspaper<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XIX - (Difference between the U. States and British currency to be accounted for) - In<br /> consideration oftwo cents United States currency not beingprecisely equivalent to one penny Sterling,<br /> the British post-office shall account to the United States post-office at the rate offour hundred and<br /> eighty-four cents to thepound Sterling; and the United States post office shall account to the British<br /> post-office at the rate offour hundred and eighty cents to thepound Sterling.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE XXI - (Forms in which accounts between the respective post-offices shall be made out,<br /> with other details to be settled öfter exchange of ratifications) - Theforms in which the accounts<br /> between the respective post-offices for the transmission and conveyance ofletters are to be made<br /> out, the time and mode in which payment shall be made by either post-office to the other, together<br /> with all other measures ofdetail arising out ofthe stipulations ofthe present convention, shall be<br /> settled between the post-office ofthe United States and the British post-office, äs soon äs possible<br /> after the exchange ofthe ratifications ofthe present convention.<br /> <br /> The resolution with the regulations and specific details, written in 24 articles, relating to the postal<br /> treaty between the USA and the United Kingdom, according to Article XXI ofthe Convention, were<br /> approved on 14 May 18499&gt;1°, ratified on 31 May11, and put into effect on l July ofthe same year. On<br /> 19 June 184912, and after the resolution ofthe regulations had been approved by the British postal<br /> administration, US Postmaster General J Collamer sent the instructions and postage tables to the<br /> postmasters. Some ofthe regulation articles relevant to this study are transcribed below:<br /> <br /> ARTICLE I - (Exchange of Mails) - The following shall be the regulations for the exchange ofmails<br /> between the United Kingdom and the United States. There shall be an exchange ofmails between<br /> the following offices:<br /> 1. Between London and Boston, by way of Liverpool and Boston direct, and also by way of Liverpool<br /> and New York.<br /> 2. Between London and New York, by way of Liverpool and New York direct, and also by way of<br /> Liverpool and Boston.<br /> 3. Between Liverpool and Boston direct, and also by way ofNew York.<br /> 4. Between Liverpool and New York direct, and also by way of Boston.<br /> 5. Between London and New York, by way of Southampton.<br /> 6. Between Southampton and New York direct.<br /> <br /> ARTICLE IX - (Progressive rates of postage) - With respect to letters above the weight of a single<br /> letter which isßxed at half an ounce in either country, the respective offices, in accounting to each<br /> other, shall employ the following scale ofprogressions:<br /> • For every letter not exceeding, half an ounce in weight, one single rate.<br /> • Above half an ounce, but not exceeding one ounce, two rates.<br /> • Above one ounce, but not exceeding two ounces, four rates.<br /> • And so on, two rates being addedfor every ounce orfraction ofan ounce.<br /> <br /> Some ofthe instructions and postage rates relevant to this study are transcribed below:<br /> <br /> • Between any office in the United States (Oregon and California excepted) and any office in Great<br /> Britain and Ireland, the entire postage is 24 cents the single letter, which may beprepaid or sent<br /> unpaid. Ofthis amount, the British post office, when it conveys the letter by its own packet and<br /> collects the postage, accounts to the United States for 5 cents; when itcollects the postage without<br /> conveying the letter, it accounts for 21 cents. The United States post office accounts to the British<br /> for 3 cents the letter when it carries and collects, and for 19 when it collects only. Payment by<br /> theparty ofanything less than the entire postage goes for nothing. The offices ofexchange will<br /> treat such letters äs wholly unpaid.<br /> <br /> • Between the offices of California and Oregon and those of Great Britain andlreland, the entire<br /> postage is 59 cents the single letter, which may be prepaid or sent unpaid, and ofwhich the<br /> British share is 3 or 19 cents, depending on the circumstance whether conveyed by the United<br /> States or British packet; and the United States share is 56 cents or 40 cents, depending on the<br /> same circumstances.<br /> <br /> • On all correspondence between the United States (Oregon and California excepted) and the<br /> following named countries through the United Kingdom, and by the routes here specified, there<br /> must be prepaid when sent, and collected when received, the following rates (ofwhich the United<br /> States post offi.ce will account to the British for all butßve cents the single letter, unless a United<br /> States packet conveys it to orfrom England, and thenfor all but twenty-one cents):<br /> ° (••)<br /> o Azores, Islands, via Southampton and Lisbon - 63 cents for single letter<br /> o Madeira, Island of, via Southampton - 65 cents for single letter<br /> o Portugal, via Southampton - 63 cents for single letter.<br /> ° (••)<br /> <br /> • The exchange offices ofthe two countries, in mailing to each other, are to postmark the letter, not<br /> with the entire postage, but with the credit and debit portions ofit only; ifapaid letter, with the<br /> credit amount infavor ofthe other country, in red ink, and with a &quot;paid&quot;stamp in same color; if<br /> unpaid, with the debit amount against the other country, in black ink. But before the exchange<br /> office receiving such letter delivers it, or mails it to the interior, it is to re-stamp the letter with<br /> its own office stamp, in all cases, and with the &quot;paid&quot; stamp in red ink, ifpaid; if unpaid, with<br /> the amount, in black, ofthe entire postage to be collected.<br /> <br /> Table 1. Postage rates (effective from 1 July 1849) relating to the fees to be paid by the USA to the British postal<br /> administration for letters received from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores, not including the US inland rate of 5 cents<br /> <br /> Bild Siete 10<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the postal changes introduced by the Convention were legalised in the<br /> Treasury Warrant of 8 March 1849, and published in The London Gazette No. 20955 on 9 March of<br /> the same year.<br /> <br /> In summary, the payment of postage could be made by the sender. When sending mail from the<br /> USA to continental Portugal and the Islands of Madeira and the Azores, prepayment of postage was<br /> mandatory. The transatlantic component of a letter between the two countries, weighing up to %<br /> ounce, was 24 cents (12 pence)13, which corresponded to:<br /> <br /> • Transatlantic sea rate - 16 cents or 8 pence to be paid to the country that had contracted the<br /> steamship Company to perform the Service<br /> • Transit rate in the United Kingdom - 3 cents or P/2 pence<br /> • Inland rate in the United States - 5 cents or 2l/2 pence.<br /> <br /> The Exchange Offices were, on the one hand, in the cities of Boston and New York in the USA and,<br /> on the other hand, in the cities of Liverpool, Southampton, and London in the United Kingdom.<br /> Accounting between the countries was facilitated by the use of a two-colour marking System. Red<br /> marks indicated credit; black marks indicated debit. In practical terms, for mail sent from Portugal,<br /> red indicated the amount to be received by the USA, and black indicated the postage to be received<br /> by the respective country. This transatlantic rate was in effect until 31 December 1867(14).<br /> <br /> Furthermore, to accurately determine the complete postage rates from Portugal to the USA, it is<br /> essential to consider the existing postal rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom. These<br /> rates, established on 10 January 1840 1S, formed a basis for subsequent calculations. Mail conveyed<br /> by packet from Portugal and the Azores to the United Kingdom was fixed at l Shilling 9 pence.<br /> Mail from Madeira was slightly higher at l Shilling 10 pence. Ship letters, however, were charged a<br /> lower rate of 8 pence. Understanding these baseline charges is crucial for interpreting the complex<br /> accounting procedures and final postage costs.<br /> <br /> Based on the information provided, it is possible to determine that the recipient of a letter sent from<br /> continental Portugal16 to the USA (except California and Oregon) would have to pay, for the first rate:<br /> <br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by packet: 63 cents (2s 7J/2d)<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by ship: 37 cents (1s<br /> <br /> For the first case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by a British packet:<br /> o 58 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> - 42 cents (1s 9d) was related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> o 5 cents US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office<br /> a Total 42 + 16 + 5 = 63 cents.<br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by an American packet:<br /> a 42 cents (1s 9d) to be received by the British Post Office related to sending from Portugal<br /> to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> o 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office, where:<br /> <br /> For the second case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by a British packet:<br /> o 32 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> - 16 cents (8d) was related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by merchant ship<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> o 5 cents US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office D Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> • If the transatlantic crossing to the USA was carried out by an American packet:<br /> o 16 cents (8d) to be received by the British Post Office related to sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by merchant ship a 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office where:<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate<br /> - 5 cents US inland postage<br /> o Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> - 16 cents transatlantic rate<br /> - 5 cents US inland postage<br /> o Total = 42 + 16 + 5 = 63 cents.<br /> <br /> 2. Portugal: Postal Regulations of 1853<br /> <br /> In Portugal, the Postal Reform of 185217 introduced profound changes in the Organisation of the<br /> Postal Service. Its implementation came into effect in 185318 and, with regard to postage to and<br /> from abroad, the inland postage on mail received from abroad ceased to be charged. The postage<br /> to be paid for letters received from abroad from beyond the Pyrenees coming through Spain was<br /> 240 Reis up to 2/s ounce inclusively, increasing by 240 Reis for each 2/s ounce or fraction thereof.<br /> Foreign letters arriving on ships other than packets (Cartas Estrangeiras vindas em navios que näo<br /> sejam paquetes) paid 160 Reis up to 4/s ounce inclusively, increasing by 80 Reis for every 2/s ounce.<br /> For postage to foreign countries, except Spain, when the mail had to transit through the Kingdom<br /> of Portugal or to its port of embarkation, or another point on the border, in addition to the postage<br /> to be paid in cash, it was mandatory to pay the inland postage by means of stamps: 25 Reis up to<br /> % ounce exclusively, 50 Reis up to % ounce, and so on, increasing by 25 Reis for every % ounce19.<br /> The means of sending mail from Portugal to other countries at this time was diverse20, and could<br /> be sent by sea through merchant ships, packets of the Mediterranean line, the West African Coast<br /> line, or transatlantic ships including those to Brazil and Argentina, and by land through Spain, or<br /> even by Aux Soins de TExpediteur21<br /> <br /> My census database records seven letters sent from Portugal, Madeira, or the Azores between l July<br /> 1853 and 30 June 1859. Figure l shows the earliest stamped letter.<br /> <br /> Figure l shows an envelope originating in Säo Miguel, Azores and addressed to Boston, Massachusetts<br /> in 1856 with only the inland postage paid. The envelope was included in the mailbags placed onboard<br /> the Portuguese schooner Rainha dos Azores towards Lisbon where it arrived on 9 November22,<br /> confirmed by a rounded-corner boxed datestamp applied on the back. The next day the mail was<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 12<br /> <br /> placed onboard the schooner Emilia towards Liverpool23. In Liverpool it was placed onboard the<br /> steamship Anglo-Saxon of the transatlantic Allan Line on 26 November 185624. It arrived in Portland<br /> on the morning of 10 December 185625 and proceeded to Boston, where it arrived on the same day<br /> and a circular datestamp was applied to the back: &quot;BOSTON/10 DEC/A.M- PKT&quot;.<br /> <br /> Prepaid mail to the USA was not possible at the time. At Ponta Delgada the sender paid only the<br /> inland postage up to % ounce with a D. Pedro V stamp of 25 Reis, double lines, type I, cancelled<br /> with a circular barred numeral &quot;50&quot;. A manuscript accountancy mark of &quot;8&quot; (pence) was applied<br /> in black ink, representing the debit against the Portuguese administration for the ship-letter fee to<br /> the United Kingdom.<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the value of &quot;16&quot; was handwritten, relating to the transatlantic rate to be<br /> credited to the USA for having been transported by a steamer under contract with the US government.<br /> Upon arriving in Boston, the handwritten &quot;16&quot; was canceled and the amount of &quot;37&quot; cents was<br /> handwritten indicating the value to be paid by the recipient. The accounting of the &quot;37&quot; cents is<br /> broken down into the following items:<br /> <br /> • 8d (16 cents) for the British postal System for a letter sent from Portugal by merchant ship to the United Kingdom<br /> • 21 cents to be received by the US Post Office where:<br /> o 16 cents transatlantic rate to be received by the US Post Office (A.M- PKT)<br /> o 5 cents US inland fee<br /> • United Kingdom inland transit fee not charged twice and already included in the 8 pence<br /> • Total = 37 cents (16c + 16c + 5c).<br /> <br /> Figure 2 illustrates an envelope with an enclosed letter written by Dr. George Clymer to his wife<br /> in Washington, D.C. The letter is datelined &quot;San Antonio da Serra, Madeira, Sunday, July 13,1856&quot;.<br /> <br /> Bild Anfangs Seite 14<br /> <br /> Dr. George Clymer, who held the post of fleet surgeon on the West Africa Squadron's flagship, the<br /> USS Jamestown, authored this letter and following his Standard practice for organising family correspondence,<br /> he marked the upper left corner with '32' to signify its place in his sequence of letters26.<br /> <br /> The cover bears a manuscript endorsement by the sender: 'By steamer to Plymouth, the Niger,' signifying<br /> his chosen route. Bypassing the local Portuguese postal System entirely, the letter was handed<br /> directly to the British postal agent, George Stoddart, in Madeira. On 23 July 1856, the agent applied<br /> a black, double-circular &quot;MADEIRA / JY 23 /1856&quot; datestamp to the reverse before dispatching the<br /> letter onboard the African Steam Ship Company's SS Niger later that day 27.<br /> <br /> The Niger was then on its return voyage from the west coast of Africa, calling at Madeira for mail<br /> before reaching Plymouth on 29 July 1856. Because the ship arrived late28, the mailbags were not<br /> processed until the following day, when a red-brown &quot;PLYMOUTH / JY 30 1856 B / PACKET<br /> LETTER&quot; datestamp was applied. The mail was then forwarded by train to London for transit<br /> processing — marked by the orange &quot;BA / 31 JY 31 /1856&quot; circular datestamp on the reverse — before<br /> being transferred to the Cunard Line steamship Canada, which departed Liverpool on 2 August29.<br /> The Canada arrived in Boston at five o'clock on the morning of 13 August30; this arrival is confirmed<br /> by the black &quot;BOSTON /13 ÄUG / BR- PKT&quot; datestamp on the reverse. From there, the mail was<br /> dispatched by early train to Washington.<br /> <br /> The cover was sent unpaid. At the British postal administration, a handwritten debit of &quot;1.20&quot; was<br /> applied to the cover, representing the amount the British postal administration charged the United<br /> States for a double-weight unpaid letter sent from Portugal via British Packet. Upon reaching Boston,<br /> this &quot;1.20&quot; mark was cancelled and replaced by a handwritten &quot;1.40&quot;, indicating the total postage<br /> due from the recipient in cents. The discrepancy in the Boston arrival mark is notable. A doublerate<br /> letter from Madeira with transatlantic crossing to the USA via British Packet should have been<br /> calculated äs follows:<br /> <br /> • 120 cents to be received by the British Post Office, where:<br /> o 88 cents (2 x 1s lOd) was related to sending from Madeira to the United Kingdom by packet<br /> o 32 cents (2 x 16c) transatlantic rate to be received by the British Post Office<br /> • 10 cents (2 x 5c) US inland postage to be received by the US Post Office<br /> <br /> While the sum of these components is 130 cents, the Boston clerk's manuscript &quot;1.40&quot; suggests a 10-cent overcharge.<br /> <br /> 3. Portuguese-British Postal Convention of 1859<br /> <br /> On 8 June 1859, the Portuguese Post Office announced the impending Implementation of a new<br /> postal convention with the United Kingdom. This Convention (Figure 3), formalised on 6 April<br /> and approved by law on 23 May of the same year, was set to take effect on l July 1859. The Diärio do<br /> Governo (No. 140,16 June 1859) published the associated table of postal rates for mail exchanged<br /> directly or in transit between the two countries. This table also covered mail carried by British packets<br /> to overseas destinations without passing through the United Kingdom.<br /> <br /> For the current study, &quot;Table I&quot; (annexed<br /> to the Convention; reproduced äs Table (i;<br /> 2 here) is the most relevant äs it details<br /> the specific rates for mail sent in transit<br /> through the United Kingdom. Between<br /> Portugal (including the Islands of Madeira<br /> and the Azores) and the United Kingdom,<br /> mail could be sent by British packets<br /> (transatlantic route, peninsular route<br /> and the African coast route via Madeira).<br /> Alternatively, mail could be sent by land,<br /> through Spain and France, or by merchant<br /> ships. <br /> <br /> Bild Postal Convention Seite 15<br /> <br /> In Portugal, postage stamps served a<br /> specific purpose: the payment of inland<br /> postage for ordinary or registered mail. For<br /> mail that was sent by packet or ship, the<br /> inland rate only applied when the letter<br /> was posted outside of the port of embarkation.<br /> The inland rate was 25 Reis up to<br /> 1/8 ounce exclusive. <br /> <br /> In the case of sending ordinary mail via<br /> Spain and France, a mandatory postage of<br /> 40 Reis was charged, by means of stamps,<br /> for each % ounce. Prepaid letters were sent by packets or private ships. Leiters sent via Spain with a<br /> lack of postage, äs long äs it was not less than that of a first rate letter, could be sent, but were subject<br /> to a fine, and the value of the fine was marked in black ink in English money. Letters to England could<br /> also be sent registered and, if so, they had to pay 100 Reis, by means of stamps, for the registration.<br /> This rate was in effect until 31 July 1866.<br /> <br /> Mail sent in transit through the United Kingdom was regulated by Articles XVI and XVII of the<br /> Convention. Article XXVII mentions that for accounting purposes the conversion between Portuguese<br /> and British currency was carried out at the rate of 20 Reis per l penny. Article III, in turn, states<br /> that the exchange could be carried out in Portugal through the exchange offices of Lisbon, Porto,<br /> Funchal and S. Vicente (Cape Verde), and in the United Kingdom, in the exchange offices of London,<br /> Southampton and Liverpool.<br /> <br /> In the United Kingdom, the postal changes introduced by the Convention were legalised in the<br /> Treasury Warrant of 14 June 1859, and published in The London Gazette No. 22275 on 17 June of the<br /> same year.<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 2 Seite 16<br /> <br /> Understanding the accounting procedures for mail between Portugal and the USA requires examining<br /> the applicable postal rates between Portugal and the United Kingdom. These rates, detailed in the<br /> accompanying table (Table 3), governed mail flow in both directions and formed the basis for<br /> calculating transit charges for mail destined for the USA.<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 3 Seite 16<br /> <br /> It is also important to highlight the designated offices for mail exchange. These offices, listed in Table<br /> 431, played a crucial role in facilitating mail transit between the two countries. Mail routed through<br /> Spain and France should be endorsed with the directives &quot;Via Spain&quot; or &quot;Via France,&quot; respectively<br /> <br /> Bild und Titel Postal Rates 4 Seite 16<br /> <br /> Considering the data presented, it is possible to determine that the Portuguese postal administration<br /> charged, for the first rate, for a letter sent from Portugal to the USA, the following:<br /> <br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by packet: 320 Reis, paid in cash, up to % ounce<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom by ship: 320 Reis, paid in cash, up to 4/s ounce<br /> • When conveyed between Portugal and the United Kingdom overland by Spain and France: 280 Reis paid in cash plus 40 Reis by means of stamps, up to 2/s ounce.<br /> <br /> For the first case, the accounting was broken down äs follows:<br /> <br /> • 160 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the country that supported the transatlantic packet<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> For the second case, the accounting was broken down in the same way äs the previous one, but the letter could weigh up to 4/8 ounce.<br /> <br /> <br /> For the third case, the accounting was broken down as follows:<br /> <br /> • 40 Reis of Portuguese postage for sending by land via Spain and France<br /> • 120 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, of transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the country that supported the transatlantic packet<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> This rate remained in effect until 31 Jury 1866. During this period, from l July 1859 to 31 July 1866,<br /> my census database records fifteen letters sent from Portugal or Madeira. Figure 4 illustrates one of<br /> only three recorded letters originating from Madeira.<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 17 unten<br /> <br /> This folded letter (Figure 4) was written by George Welsh and addressed to his brother John George<br /> Welsh32. It was sent from Funchal, Madeira, to New York. Posted on 20 June 1865, it bears a blue<br /> double circular datestamp and an endorsement by the sender, &quot;p. Str. Maria Pia via Lisbon &amp; France,&quot;<br /> indicating the desired steamship route.<br /> The letter s journey began onboard the ship Maria Pia, arriving in Lisbon on 23 June33, followed by<br /> a transfer to the ship Douro34 that left on the same day to Liverpool35. Upon arrival in Liverpool on<br /> 29 June36, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot; datestamp. On l July37, it was put<br /> on the Cunard Line steamship Persia, reaching New York on 12 July38.<br /> In Funchal, the sender prepaid the inland postage with a 25 Reis carmine stamp of the D. Luis I<br /> issue, cancelled with a circular barred numeral &quot;51&quot;. This covered the cost of transport to the port of<br /> embarkation for a letter up to 15 grams. Additionally, the sender paid 320 Reis in cash, covering the<br /> cost of a letter up to 2/s of an ounce to the US. This payment is confirmed by the handwritten &quot;1/4&quot;<br /> in English currency and the oval &quot;PAGO/OPORTE&quot; mark.<br /> The 320 Reis postage paid by the sender was all credited to the British and can be broken down äs<br /> follows:<br /> <br /> • 160 Reis equivalent to 8 pence to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United Kingdom by sea. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom (BR-PKT)<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.<br /> <br /> 4. Portugal: Entry into Force of the Decimal Metric System, 1860<br /> <br /> <br /> Shortly after the Portuguese-British Postal Convention took effect, the Ministry of Public Works,<br /> Commerce and Industry decreed on 20 June 185939, that the decimal metric System would be<br /> implemented in Lisbon on l January 1860. The rest of the Kingdom and adjacent islands would follow<br /> suit on l March of the same year. This shift necessitated a revision of postal rates. By Letter of Law<br /> on 20 August 186l40, a new table of rates for mail and printed matter was established, harmonising<br /> charges with the new System of weights. These revised rates came into effect on 20 September 186l 41.<br /> <br /> <br /> The adoption of the decimal metric System brought about specific changes to postal rates. Letters from<br /> beyond the Pyrenees arriving via Spain were charged 240 Reis for up to 7.5 grams, with an increase<br /> of 240 Reis for each additional 7.5 grams or fraction thereof. Foreign letters arriving on non-packet<br /> ships followed a different rate: 160 Reis for up to 15 grams, increasing by 80 Reis for every 7.5 grams.<br /> <br /> <br /> For mail sent to foreign countries (except Spain) that transited through Portugal, inland postage<br /> was mandatory and payable with stamps. This inland rate was structured äs follows: 25 Reis for up<br /> to 15 grams, 50 Reis for up to 22.5 grams, and so on, with a 25 Reis increase for every 7.5 grams.<br /> <br /> <br /> Importantly, mail covered by existing conventions — such äs those with England, Spain, and Belgium,<br /> äs well as mail sent on transatlantic and Mediterranean routes — remained subject to the provisions<br /> ofthose agreements 42.<br /> <br /> Subsequently, on 21 January 1863, the Sub-Inspeccäo Geral dos Correios (Sub-Inspectorate General<br /> of Posts and Mails) announced in the Diärio de Lisboa No. 18 of 24 January 1863, that from l February<br /> of the same year, letters and printed matter other than newspapers, addressed to, or in transit via<br /> the United Kingdom of Great Britain, äs well äs letters and said printed matter received or sent by<br /> the English and French steamers of the transatlantic route, began to be weighed in grams, where<br /> the weight of 7% grams replaced that of % ounce for letters and the weight of 30 grams replaced<br /> that of l ounce for printed matter.<br /> <br /> <br /> 5. Cancellation of the Peninsular Line, 1862<br /> <br /> Enhanced communication routes between Portugal and the United Kingdom led to the cancellation<br /> of the Peninsular Line in 1862. As noted in the Ninth Report ofthe Postmaster General on The Post<br /> Office, 1863, existing Services, including the transatlantic route to South America, merchant ships, and<br /> a daily exchange via France and Spain, were deemed sufficient for maintaining postal Connectivity<br /> with Portugal. Consequently, the Peninsular Service, which incurred an annual cost of £5,000, was<br /> discontinued.<br /> <br /> <br /> The Portuguese General Post Office announced the termination ofthe Peninsular Line in the Diärio<br /> de Lisboa (No. 136,18 June 1862). This announcement followed notification from the British Post<br /> Office regarding the discontinuation of this packet service between Southampton and Lisbon. Despite<br /> this change, mail continued to be sent to Great Britain daily via Spain and France, and existing<br /> transatlantic routes and merchant ship Services remained operational. With the cancellation ofthe<br /> Peninsular Line, the overland route through France and Spain became the preferred method43 for<br /> postal transit between Portugal and the United Kingdom (Figure 5).<br /> <br /> Bild Seite 19<br /> <br /> Figure 6 shows an envelope sent from Lisbon addressed to Miss Lizzie Huber care of Jas. S Huber Esq,<br /> Philadelphia, postmarked on 16 September 1865 with a black double circular datestamp. This envelope<br /> was transported to Liverpool onboard the ship Braganza, departing Lisbon on 17 September 44 and <br /> <br /> <br /> Bild Seite 20<br /> <br /> <br /> arriving on 23 September45. Upon arrival, it was marked äs fully paid with an orange &quot;tombstone&quot;<br /> datestamp and promptly placed on the Cunard Line steamship Persza, that left on the same day46,<br /> reaching New York on the night of 3 October47. Next morning a postal clerk applied the black circular<br /> datestamp &quot;5/OCT/4/N.YORK BR. PKT.&quot; showing that 5 cents was still due for the US inland postage.<br /> <br /> <br /> The sender prepaid 320 Reis, covering the cost of sending a letter up to 2/s of an ounce to the US port<br /> of disembarkation via packet Service to England. This prepayment is confirmed by the oval mark<br /> &quot;PAGOU DE FRANQUIA PELO PAQUETE&quot; (Paid Postage by Packet) and the handwritten amount<br /> of &quot;1/4&quot; in English currency. The handwritten &quot;Sets&quot; denotes the inland postage fee in the US.<br /> <br /> <br /> The 320 Reis postage paid by the sender can be broken down äs follows:<br /> • 160 Reis to be received by the British Post Office for sending from Portugal to the United<br /> <br /> Kingdom by sea. Postage already included the British inland rate<br /> • 160 Reis, equivalent to 16 cents, transatlantic sea rate to be credited to the United Kingdom (BR.pKT.)<br /> • In the USA, the recipient would still have to pay 5 cents for US inland postage.</div>

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<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar – Publikationen der Geschichtsfakultät – Geschichte 3-2023 – Der Geldkrieg: Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-Bürgerkrieg – Ariel Ron, aron@smu.edu; Sofia Valeonti, American University of Paris, svaleonti@aup.edu. Weitere Informationen zu diesem und anderen Werken finden Sie unter: https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_history_research. Empfohlene Zitierweise: Ron, Ariel und Sofia Valeonti. 2023. „Der Geldkrieg: Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-Bürgerkrieg.“ Cambridge Journal of Economics 47: 263–88. doi:10.1093/cje/bead006. Dieses Dokument wird Ihnen von SMU Scholar kostenlos und frei zugänglich zur Verfügung gestellt. Es wurde von einem autorisierten Administrator von SMU Scholar für die Aufnahme in die Publikationen der Geschichtsfakultät akzeptiert. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter http://digitalrepository.smu.edu . DER GELDKRIEG Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg (akzeptierte Fassung)<br /> <br /> Ariel Ron / Southern Methodist University / aron@smu.edu Sofia Valeonti / The American University of Paris &amp; Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University / svaleonti@aup.edu (Korrespondenzautorin)<br /> <br /> Zusammenfassung: <br /> Beide Seiten im US-amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg finanzierten ihre Militärausgaben durch die Ausgabe neuer Fiatwährungen. Der „Greenback“ der Union erlebte eine moderate Inflation (für Kriegsverhältnisse), während der „Grayback“ der Konföderation unter Hyperinflation litt. Bisherige Erklärungen für diese Preisbewegungen betrachten in der Regel nur einen der beiden Fälle und verfolgen entweder einen quantitätstheoretischen oder einen rationalen Erwartungsansatz. Wir vergleichen die Politik der Union und der Konföderation direkt und heben die Bedeutung der Besteuerung für die Wertsicherung des nicht konvertierbaren Geldes hervor. Durch die Kombination von Literatur zur Geld- und Fiskalgeschichte stellen wir fest, dass die Steuerpolitik durch die langfristige Entwicklung demokratischer Regierungsinstitutionen bestimmt wurde. Ein höherer Grad an Demokratie im Norden im Vergleich zum sklavenhaltenden Süden bedeutete eine größere Legitimität der Steuerpolitik und höhere Verwaltungskompetenz. Die Union nutzte dieses Erbe, um ihr Geld effektiv abzusichern, während die Konföderation dies nicht tat. Wir leisten einen Beitrag zu den Theorien des Kreditgeldes, indem wir die politischen Determinanten einer effektiven Fiskalpolitik beleuchten. Schlüsselwörter: Hyperinflation, Fiatgeld, Konföderierte Staaten von Amerika, Amerikanischer Bürgerkrieg, Besteuerung JEL-Klassifikation: B52, E52, N110 Danksagung Wir danken den Teilnehmern der Konferenz der European Historical Economics Society 2019, des Early American Money Symposiums an der Brown University, des Doktorandenseminars der Colorado State University, des H2M-Seminars der Universität Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne und des Seminars für Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Paris School of Economics sowie Jeff Althouse, Nicolas Barreyre, Ghislain Deleplace, Claire Federspiel, Laurent Le Maux, Noam Magor, John Majewski und Romain Svartzman für ihre Kommentare und Anregungen. Für verbleibende Fehler übernehmen wir die Verantwortung. <br /> <br /> 1. EINLEITUNG <br /> Im Frühjahr 1864 stand dem amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg noch ein Jahr harter Kämpfe bevor, doch für einige Beobachter schien der Ausgang bereits festzustehen. Die Situation wurde in einer politischen Karikatur (Abbildung 1) dargestellt, die den Präsidenten der Union, Abraham Lincoln, und seinen konföderierten Gegenpart, Jefferson Davis, beim Kampf mit Geldsäcken zeigt. „Gib besser auf, Jeff“, prahlt Lincoln, „du hast keine Chance! Siehst du nicht, dass ich den längsten Geldbeutel habe?“ Zu Füßen der Kämpfer liegen gestapelte Kisten, die neben Lincoln mit „Goldbarren“, die neben Davis mit „ungültiges Geld“ beschriftet. Die Bildunterschrift verkündet: „Letzte Ausgabe des Krieges“ – ein Wortspiel, das sowohl den Sieg der Union als auch die letzte Ausgabe wertloser konföderierter Banknoten suggeriert. Die Karikatur irrt sich jedoch, wenn sie suggeriert, die Stabilität der Unionsgelder habe von ihren Goldreserven abgehangen, denn beide Seiten hatten zu Beginn des Konflikts goldgedeckte Währungen aufgegeben. Etwas anderes stützte also die monetäre Überlegenheit der Union, die es ihr ermöglichte, einen beträchtlichen Vorteil in Bezug auf die reinen wirtschaftlichen Kapazitäten zu Beginn des Krieges in den viel größeren Vorsprung bei der Mobilisierung realer Ressourcen umzuwandeln, die zur Eroberung der riesigen geografischen Ausdehnung des konföderierten Amerikas erforderlich waren.<br /> <br /> Sowohl die Union als auch die Konföderation gaben große Mengen an nicht konvertierbarem Papiergeld aus, um die beispiellosen Kriegsausgaben zu decken. <br /> Beide erlebten Preisänderungen, jedoch in völlig unterschiedlichem Ausmaß (Abbildungen 2 und 3). <br /> Unabhängig davon, ob man Gold-, Großhandels- oder Verbraucherpreise betrachtete, verdoppelten sich die Preise in der Union im Laufe des Krieges etwa. <br /> <br /> Diese Inflationsrate ähnelte der amerikanischen Erfahrung im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg und war völlig ausreichend, um eine relativ florierende Kriegswirtschaft aufrechtzuerhalten <br /> (McPherson, 1988, S. 447; <br /> David und Solar, 1977, S. 16–17; Warren et al., 1932, S. 6–10; Mitchell, 1908, S. 279). <br /> <br /> Die Konföderation litt jedoch unter Hyperinflation, wobei sowohl die Großhandels- als auch die Goldpreise bis Anfang 1865 um fast das Sechzigfache stiegen – eine Situation, die ihre Wirtschaft ins Chaos stürzte (Lerner, 1955, S. 24; Todd, 1954, S. 189). <br /> <br /> Wenn die Karikatur fälschlicherweise suggeriert, dass Gold für die Preisdifferenz verantwortlich war, was dann? <br /> <br /> Die meisten Wissenschaftler führen die Preisbewegungen während des Bürgerkriegs entweder auf die Geldmenge (Quantitätstheorie, QT) oder auf rationale Erwartungen hinsichtlich des zukünftigen Geldwertes (RE) zurück. <br /> <br /> Im Fall der Konföderation betont Lerner (1954, 1955, 1956) den Anstieg der Geldmenge und der Umlaufgeschwindigkeit sowie die sinkende Wirtschaftsleistung der Südstaaten. Godfrey (1978) hebt ebenfalls die Bedeutung von Veränderungen der Geldmenge hervor. Im Gegensatz dazu verfolgen einige Wissenschaftler den Ansatz der rationalen Erwartungen und setzen Preisbewegungen mit Nachrichten in Zusammenhang. Burdekin und Langdana (1993), McCadless (1996) und Weidenmier (2002) wenden jeweils den Ansatz rationaler Erwartungen an und zeigen, dass Preisbewegungen Nachrichten über militärische, fiskalische und geldpolitische Ereignisse folgten.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; Die Preisentwicklung der Union wird typischerweise auch im Rahmen der Theorien der quantitativen Theorems (QT) und der Theorie rationaler Erwartungen (RE) erklärt. Für Friedman und Schwartz (1963, S. 59, vgl. 1964) sowie Studenski und Krooss (1963, S. 147) war die Geldmenge im Umlauf der entscheidende Faktor. Sie argumentieren, dass die Inflation begrenzt gewesen wäre, wenn ein größerer Teil des Krieges durch Steuern statt durch Geldemissionen finanziert worden wäre. Alternativ zeigt Calomiris (1988B), dass das Preisniveau der Union nicht durch die aktuelle Geldmenge, sondern durch rationale Erwartungen hinsichtlich ihrer zukünftigen Geldmenge bestimmt wurde, welche wiederum von fiskalpolitischen Nachrichten abhing.&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; Für Calomiris war jede Politik, die den politischen Willen zur Wiederaufnahme von Barzahlungen in der Zukunft betraf, eine Form fiskalpolitischer Nachrichten. Zwei weitere bemerkenswerte Ansätze, die sich zwar unterscheiden, lassen sich zusammenfassen, da sie sich insbesondere mit historisch spezifischen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Politik und Institutionen befassen. Wray (1998, S. 65–69) wendet die moderne Geldtheorie (MMT) an, um die Hyperinflation der Konföderation auf unzureichende Besteuerung zurückzuführen, die zu einer geringeren Nachfrage nach den ausgegebenen Banknoten führte. <br /> <br /> Aus einer älteren institutionalistischen Perspektive argumentiert Mitchell (1903, S. 198), dass der Wert der Greenbacks „von der Kreditwürdigkeit des Emittenten abhing“.„was sich auf das Vertrauen bezieht, das die Inhaber von US-Dollar-Scheinen in die Fähigkeit der Regierung setzten, ihre Schuldverschreibungen letztendlich einzulösen.“ <br /> <br /> Das Vertrauen in die Leistungsfähigkeit der Regierung hing sowohl von strukturellen als auch von situationsbedingten Faktoren ab, darunter die Menge des ausgegebenen Papiergeldes (je mehr Geld, desto schwieriger die Rückzahlung) und das Eintreten „finanzieller, militärischer, politischer und diplomatischer Ereignisse“ (S. 201), wie etwa Berichte des Finanzministers und Nachrichten über die Kreditaufnahmefähigkeit der Regierung oder militärische Erfolge und Rückschläge. Jede dieser Darstellungen hat ihre Berechtigung, doch obwohl sie alle der Fiskalpolitik eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Steuerung der aktuellen oder erwarteten Geldmenge zuschreiben, untersucht keine, wie Fiskalpolitik tatsächlich gestaltet und umgesetzt wurde. Auch versucht keine dieser Darstellungen einen konsistenten Vergleich zwischen Union und Konföderation. <br /> <br /> Wir wollen diese Defizite beheben, indem wir für systemische Unterschiede in den fiskalischen Kapazitäten von Union und Konföderation argumentieren, die auf größere historische Divergenzen in Regierungsphilosophie und -praxis zurückzuführen sind. Wir unterscheiden uns von Vertretern der Quantitativen Theorie (QT) und der Regressiven Theorie (RE) nicht nur in der Methode, sondern auch in dem, was wir erklären wollen. Anstatt präzise Preisbewegungen zu untersuchen, fragen wir, warum die Währung der Union dort erfolgreich war, wo die Währung der Konföderation versagte. <br /> <br /> Es ist aufschlussreich, die Gründe für kurzfristige Preisänderungen zu ermitteln, doch mindestens ebenso wichtig ist es zu verstehen, warum die eine Politik ihre grundlegenden Ziele – die Förderung einer erfolgreichen Kriegsstrategie – erreichte, die andere jedoch nicht. Unser Ansatz ähnelt dem von Mitchell und Wray, die beide staatliches Handeln als entscheidend betrachten. Wir legen jedoch weitaus mehr Wert auf die konkreten Steuermaßnahmen, die im einen Fall die Geldpolitik stärkten und im anderen Fall untergruben. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Geldschöpfung der Union und der Konföderation erfordert einen theoretischen Rahmen, der die politischen und administrativen Kapazitäten des Staates berücksichtigt. Wir beginnen mit Christine Desans „verfassungsrechtlichem Ansatz zum Thema Geld“. Anders als die gängige ökonomische Interpretation von Geld, die es als spontanes Ergebnis privaten Austauschs betrachtet, sieht Desan Geld als ein „Governance-Projekt“ (Desan 2014, S. 1, 7, 12; siehe auch Desan, 2017). Geld ist ihrer Ansicht nach ein Produkt von Institutionen und staatlichen Maßnahmen, die es bestimmten materialisierten Praktiken – der Prägung von Silbermünzen, dem Druck von Banknoten, der Codierung von Magnetstreifen auf Plastikkarten – ermöglichen, die Eigenschaften von Geld anzunehmen. Die erfolgreiche Umsetzung solcher Projekte hängt von den fiskalischen Maßnahmen und Rechtsnormen des Staates ab. Der Staat schafft Geld zunächst, indem er mit dafür vorgesehenen Token einkauft, die er anschließend zur Begleichung der von ihm auferlegten Steuerverpflichtungen akzeptiert. Dieser „Fiat-Kreislauf“, in dem der Staat Zahlungen ausgibt und wieder einzieht, verleiht dem Geld das, was Desan als „fiskalischen Wert“ bezeichnet. Mit anderen Worten: Steuerverpflichtungen erzeugen die Nachfrage nach staatlichem Geld, das diesem Wert verleiht.Der Staat kann die Übertragbarkeit seiner Zahlungsmittel zwischen Privatpersonen gewährleisten, indem er sich verpflichtet, diese von jedermann anzunehmen (nicht nur vom ursprünglichen Zahlungsempfänger) und eine Rechtsordnung durchsetzt, die Geld als rechtmäßiges Zahlungsmittel zur Erfüllung privater vertraglicher Verpflichtungen anerkennt (gesetzliches Zahlungsmittel). Die daraus resultierende allgemeine Akzeptanz der Zahlungsmittel – „die Fähigkeit, als Wertträger von allen Beteiligten anerkannt zu werden“ – führt zu einer von Desan als „Bargeldprämie“ bezeichneten Wertsteigerung.&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt; Diese grundlegenden Kriterien lassen sich auf vielfältige Weise operationalisieren, jede mit ihren eigenen sozialen und politischen Implikationen. Der verfassungsrechtliche Ansatz zum Thema Geld eignet sich besonders gut für den Vergleich der Währungserfahrungen der Union und der Konföderation. Die Akzeptanz der neuen Währungen in der Bevölkerung war nicht selbstverständlich, denn während die Amerikaner mit Papiergeld in Form von Banknoten, die prinzipiell durch Golddeckung gedeckt waren, gut vertraut waren, hatten sie wenig Erfahrung mit nicht konvertierbaren staatlichen Banknoten. Der wesentliche Unterschied in den Währungskonzepten lag in den unterschiedlichen Steuerkapazitäten: Die Union konnte ein funktionierendes Steuersystem einführen, während die Konföderation dies weitgehend versäumte. Desans Argumentation zufolge gelang es der Konföderation nicht, den Fiatgeldkreislauf zu schließen. Sie konnte ihren Papiergeldausgaben weder einen fiskalischen Wert noch eine Barprämie verleihen, wodurch ihren Bürgern die Mittel für alltägliche Geschäftstransaktionen fehlten. Die Folge war eine stark beeinträchtigte Wirtschaft, selbst in den weitläufigen Gebieten des Südens, wo die Unionstruppen fern blieben und das Sklavensystem relativ ungestört fortbestand. Praktisch gesehen ist es für Regierungen einfacher, Geld auszugeben als es wieder einzutreiben (z. B. Rockoff, 2015, S. 8). Der Steueraspekt in Desans Gleichung erfordert nicht nur die Bereitschaft, Verpflichtungen aufzuerlegen, sondern auch die Fähigkeit, diese einzutreiben. Diese Fähigkeit lässt sich nicht über Nacht erlangen. Zum einen besteht die administrative Herausforderung, eine kompetente Steuerbehörde einzurichten. Zum anderen besteht die politische Herausforderung, eine angemessene Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung zu erreichen. Da die Entwicklung eines soliden Währungssystems in der Theorie nicht dasselbe ist wie dessen praktische Umsetzung, argumentieren wir, dass die Währungserfahrungen der Union und der Konföderation stark von ihren jeweiligen vorherigen Steuerkapazitäten geprägt waren. Das Erbe der Union aus der Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg ermöglichte ihr einen massiven Ausbau und eine tiefgreifende Umgestaltung ihres Steuersystems; die Konföderation hingegen nicht. Hier erweist sich der verfassungsrechtliche Ansatz als relevant, da er die Untersuchung von Preisbewegungen auf die zugrundeliegende monetäre Architektur ausweitet, in der sich die Faktoren der quantitativen Steuerung (QT) und der relativen Ausgaben (RE) herausbildeten. Dies lenkt unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die langfristigen institutionellen Entwicklungen, die Einhorns (2006) vergleichende Studie der Steuersysteme des Nordens und Südens von der Kolonialzeit bis zur Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg aufzeigt.Einhorns Konzeption der Steuerkapazität lässt sich in zwei unterschiedliche, aber miteinander verbundene Kompetenzen unterteilen: eine sachkundige Steuerverwaltung und eine deliberative Steuerpolitik. Dies bedeutet, dass zumindest in den Vereinigten Staaten mehr Demokratie tendenziell zu einer besseren Besteuerung öffentlicher Zwecke geführt hat, die den Wünschen der Wähler entsprach.⁴ Umgekehrt führte das Misstrauen der Sklavenhalter gegenüber demokratischen Institutionen – genährt durch ihr philosophisches Festhalten an der sozialen Hierarchie und ihre pragmatische Befürchtung, die Wähler könnten die Sklaverei durch Steuern abschaffen wollen – zu Kolonial- und Staatsregierungen, die „aristokratischer, schwächer und weniger kompetent waren, wo die Sklaverei eine zentrale Institution in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft darstellte“, verglichen mit ihren freieren nördlichen Pendants (Einhorn 2006, S. 7).⁵ Aus der gemeinsamen Perspektive von Desan und Einhorn erscheinen die Geld- und Steuerpolitik des Bürgerkriegs untrennbar miteinander verbunden und prägten die jeweiligen Finanzsysteme der Union und der Konföderation, die grundlegend ihre jeweiligen Staatsbildungsprojekte widerspiegelten. Diese Finanzsysteme prägten maßgeblich die Art und Weise, wie der Staat Ansprüche an die Gesellschaft erhob und wie deren Mitglieder in ihren privaten Interaktionen bindende Ansprüche untereinander geltend machten. Es überrascht daher kaum, dass sich eine Sklavenhaltergesellschaft selbst in ihrem Geldwesen wesentlich, vielleicht sogar zwangsläufig, von einer relativ freien und demokratischen Gesellschaft unterschied. Da der Bürgerkrieg ein Gemeinwesen und eine Gesellschaft spaltete, die vieles gemeinsam hatten – ein englisch-protestantisches Kulturerbe, Common Law und eine konstitutionelle Rechtstradition, ein kapitalistisches und siedlerkoloniales Ethos und vieles mehr –, bietet er gewissermaßen ein natürliches Experiment, das zu umfassenderen Erkenntnissen über Kredittheorien des Geldes beitragen kann.⁶ Wir betonen die langfristige Bedeutung der Staatsbildung und der institutionellen Geschichte der Steuerhoheit, um staatlich gestützten Kredittheorien des Geldes ein realistischeres Verständnis der Funktionsweise und Entwicklung von Staaten zu vermitteln. Obwohl es oft sinnvoll und angemessen ist, analytische Unterscheidungen zwischen dem rechtlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bereich zu treffen, sind solche Kategoriengrenzen im Falle von Kredittheorien des Geldes künstlich und irreführend. Im chartalistischen Ansatz ist Geld steuergetrieben und somit untrennbar mit den historisch bedingten Kapazitäten des Staates verbunden. Folglich müssen die Kapazitäten und Schwächen der Finanzbehörden, d. h. die Determinanten fiskalpolitischer Zeithorizonte, berücksichtigt werden, um die Transformation der Währungsarchitektur, wie sie während des US-amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs stattfand, überzeugend darzustellen. In diesem Beitrag skizzieren wir unsere Argumentation anhand einer Synthese und Kritik der bestehenden Literatur zu den amerikanischen Fiskal- und Währungssystemen vor und während des Bürgerkriegs. Unser Ansatz ist notwendigerweise narrativ, um die wesentliche Dynamik des Problems zu erfassen. Zukünftig werden wir Elemente der Argumentation möglicherweise durch zusätzliche Archivrecherchen und empirische Daten einer strengeren Überprüfung unterziehen.DAS ERBE DER KOLONIALEN UND REVOLUTIONÄREN ZEIT Die Politik der Union, Papiergeld auszugeben und gleichzeitig die Steuern deutlich zu erhöhen, knüpfte an die Praxis der „Währungsfinanzierung“ der britischen Kolonien in Nordamerika im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert an (Spaulding, 1869, S. 39–40). In diesen früheren Phasen finanzierten die Kolonialregierungen Kriegsausgaben, indem sie vorübergehend Papiergeld ausgaben und gleichzeitig entsprechende Steuererhöhungen beschlossen, die die Banknoten später einlösen sollten. Diese Kombination verlieh den Banknoten einen fiskalischen Wert und verschaffte der Regierung Kaufkraft, die zukünftige Steuereinnahmen effektiv antizipierte. Angesichts der chronischen Knappheit an Edelmetallen aufgrund der strukturellen Handelsdefizite der Kolonien neigte die Bevölkerung auch dazu, Banknoten für alltägliche Geschäftstransaktionen zu verlangen. Desans zwei Schlüsselelemente, der fiskalische Wert und die Barprämie, waren somit fest etabliert (Ferguson, 1961; Perkins, 1997; Newell, 1998; Grubb, 2006; Goldberg, 2014). Zu Beginn des Bürgerkriegs schlugen sowohl die politischen Entscheidungsträger des Nordens als auch des Südens etwas Ähnliches vor. Interessanterweise scheint ihr Hauptbezugspunkt nicht das koloniale Erbe gewesen zu sein, sondern vielmehr die britische Verwendung nicht konvertierbarer Kreditbriefe während der Französischen Revolutions- und Napoleonischen Kriege, die sie als erfolgreiches Mittel zur Erhaltung von Englands „gefährdeter Existenz“ ansahen (Spaulding, 1869, S. 39).&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt; Der Grund für dieses Vergessen lag vermutlich in den verheerenden Erfahrungen mit den sogenannten „Continentals“ (Banknoten) während der Amerikanischen Revolution. Der rasche Wertverfall der Continentals resultierte aus der Unfähigkeit des Nationalstaats, Steuern zu erheben. Unter den Konföderationsartikeln fehlte dem Kontinentalkongress diese entscheidende Finanzhoheit, doch selbst wenn ihm eine solche Befugnis eingeräumt worden wäre, hätte er sie in der Praxis kaum ausüben können, da die Schaffung einer kontinentalen Steuerbehörde die politischen und administrativen Kapazitäten eines jungen postkolonialen Staates überstieg (Einhorn, 2008, S. 127–128). Folglich gab es keinen Mechanismus, um die Nachfrage nach den Kontinentalanleihen zu steigern oder sie außer Kurs zu setzen (Calomiris, 1988A; Grubb, 2006, S. 46–47; Goldberg, 2014, S. 481). Anstatt direkt Steuern zu erheben, verließ sich der Kongress darauf, dass die einzelnen Bundesstaaten den ihnen zustehenden Mittelanforderungen, den sogenannten Requisitionen, nachkamen. Die Bundesstaaten zogen es jedoch vor, die Einnahmen für ihre eigenen Bedürfnisse zu sparen, darunter auch zur Unterstützung ihrer eigenen Geldscheine, die aufgrund der kriegsbedingten Störungen ihrer Finanzsysteme dennoch an Wert verloren. Das allgemeine Fiasko veranlasste nachfolgende US-Beamte, die Währungsfinanzierungspolitik abzulehnen und sie praktisch aus dem öffentlichen Gedächtnis zu tilgen.&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt; Die Geschichte der Revolution unterstreicht, dass die erfolgreiche Umsetzung der Währungsfinanzierung nicht nur von der Abstimmung der Geldausgaben auf Steuererhöhungen, sondern auch von der Durchführung der Steuereintreibung abhing. Im Bürgerkrieg gelang es der Union, beides zu leisten, während die Konföderation keines von beidem schaffte.Obwohl die Kämpfe größtenteils auf südlichem Boden stattfanden und die Seeblockade der Union die Konföderation daran hinderte, nennenswerte Zolleinnahmen zu erzielen, lag das Problem der Sklavenhalter nicht primär in den kriegsbedingten Umwälzungen. Die Unionstruppen drangen erst spät im Krieg in das riesige südliche Hinterland vor, und große Gebiete blieben nach Kriegsende unberührt (Downs, 2015). Zudem übernahm die Konföderation die bestehende bundesstaatliche Präsenz im Süden, einschließlich Gebäude und Personal, im Wesentlichen unverändert. Die amerikanischen Revolutionäre hingegen bildeten ein fragiles Bündnis aus Kolonialparlamenten und Ad-hoc-Komitees, die darum kämpften, die Bevölkerung im Hinterland zu regieren und die zuvor von königlichen Gouverneuren wahrgenommenen Verwaltungsfunktionen zu übernehmen. Der Unterschied zwischen der Steuerpolitik der Union und der Konföderation lässt sich daher am besten als Ergebnis langfristiger institutioneller Entwicklungen verstehen, die den nördlichen Freistaaten eine starke Steuerhoheit verliehen, die den südlichen Sklavenstaaten fehlte. An dieser Stelle wenden wir uns Einhorns vergleichender Studie zu den Steuertraditionen des Nordens und Südens zu, die bis in die Kolonialzeit zurückreicht. Einhorns Erkenntnis, dass die Steuerhoheit im frühen Amerika eng mit demokratischen Institutionen verknüpft war – mehr Demokratie bedeutete mehr Steuerhoheit –, mag zunächst kontraintuitiv erscheinen. Man geht oft vom umgekehrten Verhältnis aus. Die Menschen mögen keine Steuern, so die gängige Annahme. Wenn sie also ein Mitspracherecht in der Regierung erhalten, werden sie versuchen, ihre Belastungen so weit wie möglich zu reduzieren. War die Amerikanische Revolution nicht letztendlich ein großer Steueraufstand? Nicht ganz. Der revolutionäre Slogan „Keine Besteuerung ohne Vertretung“ wandte sich nicht gegen Steuern an sich, sondern knüpfte sie an politische Mitbestimmung. Tatsächlich forderten die Amerikaner, nachdem sie die Möglichkeit zur Selbstverwaltung erlangt hatten, mitunter höhere statt niedrigere Steuern, wenn sie der Ansicht waren, dass diese einem öffentlichen Zweck dienten. Wie Lincoln es bekanntlich formulierte: „Die legitime Aufgabe der Regierung ist es, für eine Gemeinschaft von Menschen das zu tun, was sie tun müssen, aber nicht oder nicht so gut selbst tun können – in ihrer individuellen und getrennten Fähigkeit“ (Lincoln, 1953, 2:220–222, Hervorhebung im Original). Tatsächlich nutzten einige Konföderierte den Revolutionsslogan, um die finanzielle Schwäche der Konföderation zu kritisieren, indem sie gegen „Repräsentation ohne Besteuerung“ protestierten (zitiert in Todd, 1954, S. 138). Es gab erhebliche Unterschiede im Ausmaß der Demokratie, die die Amerikaner vor dem Bürgerkrieg genossen. Geschlechts- und rassenbasierte Ausgrenzung war landesweit verbreitet, doch überall dort, wo die Sklaverei vorherrschte, litten die demokratischen Institutionen am stärksten. Sklavenhalter waren mächtige Menschen, die in dem geschult waren, was Thomas Jefferson als „unerbittlichsten Despotismus“ bezeichnete (Jefferson, 1998, S. 168).&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt; Im Gegensatz dazu waren die nördlichen Kolonien und späteren Staaten tendenziell egalitärer und demokratischer als ihre südlichen Nachbarn. Sie neigten auch dazu, sich selbst stärker zu besteuern, beispielsweise für Straßen und Schulen.Die Ungleichheit zwischen Nord und Süd wird beispielsweise beim Blick auf das Kanalnetz der Vorkriegszeit deutlich, das größtenteils mit staatlichen Mitteln errichtet wurde (Larson, 2001; Taylor, 1951, S. 35). Vergleichende Messungen der öffentlichen Bildung und der Forschungsförderung zeigen eine ähnliche regionale Ungleichverteilung, selbst wenn Bodentyp und andere Umweltbedingungen identisch waren (Majewski, 2016; Ron, 2020). Dieses Muster – das demokratischere Regierungen mit höheren Steuern und mitunter geringerer Ungleichheit in Verbindung bringt – wurde allgemein für Amerika sowie für das moderne und antike Europa beobachtet (Sokoloff und Zolt, 2007; Tilly, 2009; Van Zanden und Prak, 2006; Tan, 2017). Wie Findlay und O’Rourke es formulierten, „konnten Staaten, die auf Staatsbürgerschaft statt auf Zwang basierten, tatsächlich mehr, nicht weniger Steuern erheben“ (Findlay und O’Rourke 2007, S. 350). Die nördlichen Freistaaten verfügten somit über eine deutlich höhere Steuerkapazität als ihre südlichen Pendants mit Sklaverei. Diese Kapazität lässt sich unter zwei Aspekten betrachten: Verwaltung und Politik. Administrativ setzten die nördlichen Staaten komplexere Steuersysteme ein, die sowohl Einnahmen- als auch Gerechtigkeitsfragen berücksichtigten. Insbesondere waren die nördlichen Staaten wesentlich besser in der Lage, Immobilienwerte zu Marktpreisen zu bewerten, die Werte standortübergreifend anzugleichen, um zu verhindern, dass Steuerbeamte ihre Freunde und Nachbarn unterbesteuerten, und Steuern in einem relativ fairen Verhältnis zu den Mitteln und dem Nutzen der Steuerzahler zu erheben. Diese Fähigkeit wiederum leitete sich von den Gewohnheiten einer demokratischen Gesellschaft ab, die an „lokale Entscheidungsfindung“ und „fortlaufende, alltägliche politische Verhandlungen zwischen Steuerzahlern und gewählten lokalen Beamten“ gewöhnt war (Einhorn, 2006, S. 29; 2008, S. 202). Die Bedeutung demokratischer Praxis für die Leistungsfähigkeit des Staates lag darin, dass sie Legitimität und die Einhaltung von Vorschriften schuf, wodurch die Steuerbehörden ihre Aufgaben erfüllen konnten. Sie führte tendenziell auch zu reaktionsfähigeren und umfassender angelegten Wirtschaftsförderungsmaßnahmen, die das Steueraufkommen erhöhten (Brownlee 2016, S. 54–57). Demokratie bedeutete sowohl sinnbildliche als auch tatsächliche Zustimmung. Die Regierungen der Südstaaten lernten schließlich von ihren nördlichen Pendants und begannen in den 1840er und 1850er Jahren, die Steuerlücke zu schließen (Thornton, 1982). Sie führten außerdem sogenannte „Uniformitätsklauseln“ ein, die vorschrieben, dass alle Arten von Eigentum zum gleichen Satz bewertet und besteuert werden mussten (Einhorn, 2006, S. 201–202). Da die weiße Mehrheit der nicht sklavenhaltenden Bevölkerung dadurch daran gehindert wurde, diskriminierende Steuern auf das Vermögen der Sklaven zu erheben, bevorzugten Sklavenhalter neue Einnahmen zur Finanzierung des Eisenbahnbaus und sogar der öffentlichen Bildung (für Weiße). Doch am Vorabend des Bürgerkriegs lagen die Südstaaten bei den Pro-Kopf-Steuern und den Steuern pro BIP-Einheit immer noch hinter den Nordstaaten zurück (Abbildung 4). 3. STEUERN UND GELD IN DER UNION Die Finanzsysteme der Union und der Konföderation nahmen Gestalt an, als langfristige institutionelle Entwicklungen auf die Erfordernisse des Krieges trafen. Beide Seiten beabsichtigten zunächst, sich auf Anleihen zu stützen, wie die USA es bereits in früheren großen Kriegen getan hatten (Edling, 2014).Der immense Militärbedarf überstieg rasch die Kreditaufnahmemöglichkeiten beider Regierungen. Die Konföderation konnte diese Schwierigkeit nie überwinden, während die Union schließlich neue und sehr erfolgreiche Finanzierungsquellen erschloss. Laut einer konservativen Schätzung finanzierten die Konföderierten Staaten lediglich 21,3 % ihrer Kriegsanstrengungen über Anleihen, während der entsprechende Wert der Union bei 64,5 % lag (Godfrey, 1978, S. 14). Kurzfristig benötigte jedoch auch die Union andere Mittel. Beide Regierungen griffen auf die Ausgabe von Staatsanleihen zurück. Die daraus resultierenden Maßnahmen wiesen einige wesentliche Ähnlichkeiten auf. Sowohl die Union-„Greenbacks“ als auch die Konföderations-„Graybacks“, wie die Banknoten später genannt wurden, waren gegen verzinsliche Anleihen ihrer jeweiligen ausstellenden Regierungen einlösbar – eine Maßnahme, die die Kreditvergabe und die Akzeptanz der Banknoten in der Bevölkerung fördern sollte.&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt; Beide Währungen waren zudem mit dem Versprechen verbunden, die Steuern zu erhöhen, um ihren Wert zu erhalten. Doch nur die Union war in der Lage, neue Steuern effektiv einzuführen (Brownlee, 2016, S. 60–68; Edling, 2014, S. 206–212; Bank et al., 2008, S. 23–47).¹¹ „Bei ihrer finanziellen Mobilisierung für den Krieg“, schreibt der Steuerhistoriker W. Elliot Brownlee, „hatte die Union gegenüber der Konföderation einen Vorteil aufgrund der umfangreichen fiskalischen Experimente der Nordstaaten“ in der Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg (Brownlee, 2016, S. 65). Zusätzlich zur Erhöhung der Zölle begannen die Beamten der Union bereits im Juli 1861 mit der Planung einer hohen Binnenbesteuerung und führten einen Monat später die erste Einkommensteuer des Landes ein. Anschließend investierten sie große Anstrengungen in die Ausarbeitung eines Systems, das sich durch seine Breite und Reichweite auszeichnete. Das Ergebnis war im Juli 1862 ein „hunderte Seiten langes“ Gesetz, das „fast alles besteuerte, außer der Luft, die die Nordstaatler atmeten“ (Edling, 2014, S. 206; McPherson, 1988, S. 447). Weitere Gesetzesrunden erweiterten die Steuerbasis und erhöhten die Steuersätze weiter. Dennoch, so Brownlee (2016, S. 60), „sahen die republikanischen Führer keinen nennenswerten Widerstand gegen die enormen neuen Steuern auf und mussten bei deren Eintreibung nicht auf Zwang zurückgreifen“. Dies sei ihrer „breiten Wählerpopularität“ zu verdanken. Max Edling (2014, S. 208) ergänzt in seiner jüngsten Studie zur frühen amerikanischen Kriegsfinanzierung, dass die Debatten im Kongress über das erste große Steuergesetz „vor allem wegen der Bereitschaft der Abgeordneten, den Krieg zu unterstützen, bemerkenswert“ seien. Die London Times meinte, „ein Zehntel dieser Steuern würde jede amerikanische Gemeinde innerhalb eines Monats an den Rand des Zusammenbruchs bringen“, doch Historiker wie Zeitgenossen staunten immer wieder über die Bereitschaft der einfachen Nordstaatler, ihren Teil der gemeinsamen Last zu tragen (zitiert in Ball, 1991, S. 221). „Ich habe noch nie ein Land gesehen, in dem die Bevölkerung so lautstark nach Steuern verlangte“, bemerkte ein ungläubiger ausländischer Beobachter 1862 (Bank et al., 2008, S. 37).¹² Wenn dieses Steuersystem demokratische Legitimität genoss, so zeichnete es sich auch durch geschicktes politisches und administratives Management aus.Der Finanzausschuss des Repräsentantenhauses ließ sich bei der Ausarbeitung des Gesetzesentwurfs Zeit, doch der Kongress hatte sich bereits sechs Monate zuvor öffentlich zu Steuererhöhungen verpflichtet, um „die Gläubiger der Öffentlichkeit zu beruhigen“ (Edling, 2014, S. 205). Das Gesetz vom Juli 1862 erhöhte die Steuersätze und die Progressivität der Einkommensteuer und führte erstmals eine bundesweite Erbschaftsteuer ein, um die Regressivität der erhöhten Zölle und Verbrauchssteuern auszugleichen. Der Kongress übernahm auch gezielt Erfahrungen aus dem Ausland. So führte er die britische Verwaltungspraxis des Steuerabzugs („Steuerstopp an der Quelle“) zur Erhebung von Einkommensteuern auf Unternehmensdividenden und Gehälter von Staatsbediensteten ein (Brownlee, 2016, S. 67). Doch „anstatt wie Großbritannien hohe Zölle auf wenige Güter zu erheben, entschied sich der Finanzausschuss für niedrige Zölle auf eine breite Palette von Produkten“, um die Steuerlast zu verteilen (Edling, 2014, S. 206). Auch auf Grundsteuern verzichtete der Kongress und beließ die traditionelle Einnahmequelle der Bundesstaaten. Auf diese Weise wurden sowohl die administrativen als auch die politischen Anforderungen eines effektiven und nachhaltigen Steuersystems erfüllt. Natürlich gab es Probleme. Finanzminister Salmon Chase ergriff zunächst keine direkten Maßnahmen zur Eintreibung von Einkommen- und Umsatzsteuern (Studenski und Krooss, 1963, S. 141), und später erwies sich die Steuerhinterziehung bei Alkohol- und Einkommensteuern als erheblich (S. 151). Trotz dieser Schwierigkeiten genoss das Steuersystem der Union jedoch ein hohes Maß an Legitimität und Steuerehrlichkeit – insbesondere im Vergleich zur Konföderation, wie wir im nächsten Abschnitt zeigen werden. Demnach verlief die Erhebung der Bundessteuern nach den meisten Berichten bemerkenswert reibungslos und entwickelte sich zu einer wahren Einnahmequelle. Ende 1863 generierte sie für die Regierung „erhebliche Einnahmen“ und finanzierte direkt ein Drittel oder mehr der Ausgaben. Bis 1865 dominierten die Binnensteuern die Bundeseinnahmen, die jedes Quartal die Vorkriegseinnahmen ganzer Jahre übertrafen und sogar verdoppelten (Edling, 2014, S. 183, 195, 210–212; Brownlee, 2016, S. 68). Von Anfang an war der Zusammenhang zwischen Besteuerung und der Aufrechterhaltung einer staatlichen Fiatwährung offensichtlich. Er wurde in der privaten Korrespondenz der politischen Entscheidungsträger, im Kongress und in der Presse immer wieder betont. „Nun also, erheben Sie eine Kriegssteuer von 200.000.000 Dollar und geben Sie 150.000.000 Dollar in Form von Demand Notes aus“, schrieb ein Korrespondent an Elbridge Spaulding, den Hauptautor des Greenback-Gesetzes. „Das Steuergesetz wird eine allgemeine Nachfrage nach den Treasury Notes schaffen und ihren Kurs auf oder nahe dem Nennwert halten“, schrieb ein anderer. Der Finanzminister wies ebenfalls darauf hin, dass ein „umsichtiges System angemessener Besteuerung“ eine Nachfrage nach den Banknoten schaffen würde (Spaulding, 1869, S. 23–25, S. 46). Als später im Krieg die Ausgabe weiterer Banknoten notwendig wurde, forderte die New York Times, „in einem Umfang besteuert zu werden, der dem enormen Volumen des im Umlauf befindlichen Schuldscheins angemessen entspricht“ (zitiert in Bank et al., 2008, S. 40). Der Kongress reagierte darauf mit einer erneuten Aufstockung des Steuersystems.Diese kurzen Ausführungen mögen die Funktionsweise des Fiatgeldkreislaufs vage erscheinen lassen. Doch ein Blick auf die Schriften eines einflussreichen Befürworters des US-Dollars aus der Vorkriegszeit lässt erahnen, was viele andere wohl dachten. In einer umfassenden Studie über Geld, Kredit und Bankwesen, die nur zwei Jahre vor dem Krieg veröffentlicht wurde, kam der gut vernetzte Anwalt und Eisenfabrikant Stephen Colwell aus Philadelphia zu dem Schluss, dass für den Werterhalt des Papiergeldes dessen Akzeptanz, nicht die Konvertierbarkeit in Edelmetalle, entscheidend war (Colwell, 1859, S. 235, S. 244). Die Akzeptanz wiederum hing vom Vertrauen der Bevölkerung ab, dass die Währung es ihnen zuverlässig ermöglichen würde, ihren Verpflichtungen nachzukommen. Colwell empfahl daher, dass die Regierungen „die gesamten Staatsausgaben“ mit gesetzlichen Zahlungsmitteln begleichen sollten, die „zur Begleichung aller Abgaben in ihren Staatskassen“ akzeptiert würden. Die einzige Einschränkung bestand darin, „nur so viel auszugeben, wie im normalen Geschäftsverlauf wieder eingeht“. Dies implizierte eine Methode zur Berechnung einer sicheren Ausgabemenge: Man begann mit einem Bruchteil der erwarteten Steuereinnahmen und erhöhte den Betrag schrittweise im Laufe der Zeit. „Aufgrund der gesammelten Erfahrungen“, so Colwells Überzeugung, „könnten die mit dieser Aufgabe betrauten Beamten eine solche Ausgabe ohne Gefahr einer Überproduktion bewältigen“ (Colwell, 1859, S. 22). Diese Argumentation erklärt auch die kürzeren Äußerungen von Colwells Mitstreitern, die sich für die Einführung der Greenbacks einsetzten. Als beispielsweise der New Yorker Republikaner Moses Grinnell schrieb: „Erhebt eine direkte Steuer von 150 oder 200 Millionen und gebt dann 150 Millionen Schatzanweisungen als gesetzliches Zahlungsmittel aus“ (Spaulding, 1869, S. 23), scheint er eine ähnliche Logik wie Colwell angewendet zu haben.&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt; Es geht hier nicht darum, dass solche Ansichten allgemein verbreitet waren – es gab vor, während und nach der Ausgabe der Greenbacks zahlreiche Skeptiker –, sondern vielmehr darum, dass deren Funktionsweise gut verstanden und leicht zu erklären war. Spaulding legte die Argumente ausführlich dar, als er Ende Januar 1862 vor dem Repräsentantenhaus für die ersten Emissionen plädierte. Das neue Steuergesetz lag zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch einige Monate in der Zukunft, die tatsächlichen Einnahmen noch weiter entfernt, doch der Kongress hatte seine Absicht bereits erklärt, und ein Unterausschuss des Finanzausschusses arbeitete intensiv daran. Spaulding versicherte daher, dass seine vorgeschlagenen Schatzanweisungen durch „angemessene Steuern, die durch neue Gesetze erhoben werden sollten“, gedeckt würden. Er betonte anschließend die Wichtigkeit der Umsetzung. „Das ist es, was die Bevölkerung wissen will“, beharrte er. „Wenn sie diese Schuldscheine annehmen, wollen sie die Gewissheit haben, ob Sie den Anspruch der Regierung auf das Eigentum des Landes in vollem Umfang durchsetzen werden, um die Schatzanweisungen einzulösen“ (Spaulding, 1869, S. 33–34). Die Greenbacks wurden somit in der allgemeinen Annahme ausgegeben, dass hohe Steuern folgen würden. Und so kam es auch. Wie Hugh Rockoff bemerkt: „Die Republikaner meinten es ernst mit den Steuern“ (Rockoff, 2015, S. 26).Dass der Kongress ein glaubwürdiges Versprechen abgeben konnte, „den Anspruch der Regierung auf das Eigentum des Landes durchzusetzen“, verdeutlicht den Nutzen unseres „verfassungsrechtlichen Ansatzes“. Es ging hier nicht darum, ob die Steuern perfekt auf die gesamte Menge der ausgegebenen Dollar-Scheine abgestimmt wären. Spauldings Forderung nach einer Verpflichtung zur „Einlösung der Schatzanweisungen“ meinte dies nicht. Dror Goldberg weist darauf hin, dass „eine Regierung, die zu viel Papiergeld ausgibt, damit eine Zeit lang durchkommt“, „weil Geld den Alltag aller Menschen bestimmt“ (Goldberg, 2014, S. 472). Die entscheidende Frage war, ob die Regierung die Legitimität besaß, ihre Versprechen in dem Maße einzulösen, wie es nötig war, um diese Kontrolle zu erhalten. 14 Eine effektive fiskalische und monetäre Leistungsfähigkeit dient hier als Indikator für politische Legitimität und gibt Aufschluss über das Vertrauen der Bürger in das vergleichsweise demokratische „Regierungsprojekt“ der Union. Der „Fiat-Kreislauf“ ist daher keine Frage der mechanischen Kontrolle der Geldmenge oder gar der Erwartungen an die Geldmenge, sondern der Schaffung eines breiten öffentlichen Vertrauens, das die „Geldprämie“ generieren kann, um den Wert der Recheneinheit zu erhalten. Genau hier scheiterte die Konföderation. Ihr monetärer Einfluss auf die Bevölkerung des Südens lockerte sich, schwand und brach schließlich vollständig zusammen. 4. STEUERN UND GELD IN DER KONFÖDERATION Die Konföderation hoffte, den Krieg mit Krediten finanzieren zu können, und schob ernsthafte Steuererhöhungen so lange hinaus, bis es zu spät war. Die Finanzpolitik der Konföderation war voller Widersprüche, angefangen bei der Absurdität ihrer Pläne, sich angesichts einer Seeblockade der Union auf die Besteuerung des internationalen Handels zu stützen. Der erste Schritt des Konföderationskongresses bestand kurioserweise darin, die Kosten der beschlagnahmten Bundeszollämter um „mindestens fünfzig Prozent“ zu senken (Todd, 1954, S. 121). Dies bedeutete Entlassungen und gefährdete potenziell die Einnahmen, auf die man sich verlassen wollte. Der Plan scheint nicht umgesetzt worden zu sein, doch das spielte kaum eine Rolle, da die verschärfte Blockade nur wenige Waren ins Land ließ. Obwohl der konföderierte Finanzminister Christopher H. Memminger Mitte 1861 prognostizierte, dass die Zolleinnahmen innerhalb eines Jahres 25 Millionen Dollar betragen würden, blieben die Einnahmen für den gesamten Krieg bei lediglich 3,5 Millionen Dollar. Die Konföderation erwog daraufhin Exportsteuern, offenbar immer noch unfähig, die Auswirkungen der Blockade zu begreifen. Memminger glaubte, dass durch Exportsteuern besicherte Anleihen ihren Marktwert besser hielten als andere Kredite. Es ist jedoch schwer vorstellbar, wie dies der Fall gewesen sein soll, da die Einnahmen aus Exportsteuern mit weniger als 40.000 Dollar für den Krieg äußerst gering waren (Todd, 1954, S. 121–127; Ball, 1991, S. 203–210; zu Kennzahlen der Blockadeeffektivität siehe Thornton und Ekelund, 2004, S. 35–36). Der Konföderiertenkongress verabschiedete im August 1861 eine „Kriegssteuer“, die einen pauschalen Steuersatz von einem halben Prozent auf Immobilien und bewegliches Vermögen erhob. Die Bewertung von Eigentum war genau das, womit die Südstaaten wenig Erfahrung hatten.Insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Sklaverei. In der Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg stellten einige Staaten von den einfacheren, auf der Kopfzahl basierenden Sklavensteuern (einem Pauschalbetrag pro Kopf) auf die administrativ aufwändigeren Wertsteuern (basierend auf dem geschätzten Wert) um. Diese Umstellungen stießen stets auf immensen Widerstand der Plantagenbesitzer, und das Ergebnis war oft keine tatsächliche Bewertung, sondern lediglich eine vereinfachte Zählung von Gruppen nach Alter und Geschlecht, entsprechend der gängigen Praxis der Sklavenhändler (Einhorn 2006; Thornton 1982; Rosenthal 2018). Infolgedessen führten die unterschiedlichen Bewertungsmethoden für Sklaven in den einzelnen Staaten während des Bürgerkriegs zu erheblichen Verzögerungen bei der Gesamtbewertung des Eigentums. Die vorliegende Forschung geht nicht näher auf die genauen Probleme ein, doch ist es möglich, dass inkompatible Sklavenlisten den Ausgleich zwischen den Bundesstaaten erschwerten oder zu Streitigkeiten führten (Todd, 1954, S. 133; Ball, 1991, S. 220, 224).15 Jedenfalls oblag die Erhebung der Steuern nach der Festsetzung fast ausschließlich den Bundesstaaten, von denen die meisten keine Steuern erhoben, sondern ihre Quoten durch die Aufnahme von Krediten (sogenannten „Graybacks“) beglichen, die mit ihren eigenen, nicht konvertierbaren Papiergeldemissionen finanziert wurden. Fast drei Viertel der bis Ende 1862 eingenommenen 17 Millionen Dollar waren in Wirklichkeit gar keine Steuereinnahmen (Todd 1954, S. 133–136; siehe Tabelle 2).¹⁶ Laut Burdekin und Langdana (1993, S. 357) „machte die Kriegssteuer erst 1864 auch nur 10 % der Gesamteinnahmen aus. Im ersten Jahr ihrer Einführung, 1862, stammten weniger als 5 % der Einnahmen aus dieser Steuer.“ Die „Graybacks“ erhielten weniger Unterstützung, als ihnen sonst zugestanden hätte, und das Währungssystem des Südens wurde weiter verkompliziert und unsicher. Es folgten fast zwei Jahre „verhängnisvoller Untätigkeit“, in denen keine zusätzlichen Steuern erhoben wurden, während sich die Währung und die Kreditwürdigkeit der Regierung verschlechterten (Ball, 1991, S. 227). Schließlich verabschiedete der Konföderiertenkongress im April 1863 ein wichtiges Steuergesetz, das jedoch in vielerlei Hinsicht grundlegend unzureichend war. Obwohl das Gesetz eine Einkommensteuer, Zölle auf Gewinne aus dem Handel mit wichtigen Rohstoffen, zahlreiche Gebühren für Berufslizenzen und eine Naturalsteuer auf Landwirtschaft umfasste, fehlte eine „direkte Steuer“ auf Eigentum, einschließlich des Eigentums von Sklaven.&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt; Obwohl die Erträge aus dem Anbau von Sklavenprodukten grundsätzlich der Einkommensteuer unterlagen, konnten Sklavenhalter größtenteils „ihre Beiträge zu einer neuen, eigens zu ihrem Vorteil gegründeten Nation umgehen“ (ebd., S. 234). Tatsächlich scheint Steuerhinterziehung weit verbreitet gewesen zu sein, da „zahlreiche Hindernisse das reibungslose Funktionieren des Steuersystems behinderten“ (Todd 1954, S. 145). So begann die Einkommensveranlagung beispielsweise mit einer Schätzung des Steuerzahlers selbst, die, falls vom Finanzamt angefochten, von einem Schiedsrichtergremium entschieden wurde, dessen Zusammensetzung der Steuerzahler mitbestimmt hatte (Mathews, 1863, S. 121–122). Ein solches Vorgehen begünstigte vermutlich die Sklavenhalter, die auf lokaler Ebene enorme Macht ausübten.18 Das eigentliche Problem des Steuergesetzes bestand jedoch darin, dass die Geldsteuer schlichtweg nicht ausreichte, um die steigenden Ausgaben und die rasant steigenden Preise zu decken. Die Sachsteuer funktionierte besser. „In den ersten neun Monaten des Jahres 1863 … machte sie mehr als die Hälfte der durchschnittlichen monatlichen Steuereinnahmen aus“, rief aber heftige Proteste hervor (Burdekin und Langdana, 1993, S. 357–358). Mit zehn Prozent der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion nach Abzug der Kosten, die ausreichten, um die Familien der Bauern zu ernähren, „erscheinte sie im Vergleich zur zweiprozentigen Währungssteuer auf Gehälter über 1.500 Dollar hoch und diskriminierend“ (Todd, 1954, S. 142; siehe auch Bank et al., 2008, S. 33; Hurt 2015, S. 132–134, 160). Da eine Naturalsteuer den Barwert der alten Veteranen nicht erhöhte, wurden diese dadurch nicht attraktiver, und die Inflation geriet immer weiter außer Kontrolle. Einige Südstaatler, die die Ursachen der Inflation nicht verstanden, wetterten gegen gierige Händler und Fabrikanten (McPherson, 1988, S. 441; Wilson, 2002, S. 60; Rockoff, 2015, S. 8). Andere einflussreiche Konföderierte hingegen durchschauten die Situation und äußerten ihre Meinung. Der „Richmond Enquirer“ wies wiederholt darauf hin, dass eine Fiatwährung ohne angemessene fiskalische Maßnahmen dasselbe Schicksal erleiden würde wie die Kontinentalwährungen der Revolutionszeit – und zwar aus demselben Grund: fehlende Besteuerung zur Werterhaltung. Der Herausgeber der führenden Wirtschaftszeitschrift des Südens, J. D. B. DeBow, bekräftigte diese Warnung, ebenso wie der einflussreiche Politiker Robert Toombs aus Georgia (zitiert in Phillips, 1913, S. 622–627). Kein Geringerer als John C. Calhoun hatte die Mechanismen bereits in den 1810er Jahren und erneut nach der Panik von 1837 akribisch erläutert und festgestellt, dass die Finanzpolitik der Bundesregierung „die gesamte Gesellschaft durchdringt … und natürlich eine allgemeine Nachfrage nach allem erzeugt, was sie als Geld einnimmt und ausgibt“ (Calhoun 1959, Bd. 14, S. 299; Todd 1954, S. 138; Ball 1991, S. 37–39, 50–51, 222–223). Das grundlegende Problem der Konföderation war, in den Worten von Memmingers Biografen, schlichtweg eine „Abneigung gegen interne Besteuerung“ (Capers 1893, S. 341). Laut McPherson verfügte die Konföderation über keine Mechanismen zur Erhebung interner Steuern, und ihre Bürger hatten keine Tradition, diese zu zahlen (McPherson, 1988, S. 38). Die umfassendste Darstellung dieses Sachverhalts, Balls treffend betiteltes Werk „Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat“, betont sowohl die administrativen als auch die politischen Schwächen, die diesen Einschätzungen zugrunde liegen. Ball (1991, S. 32, 42) merkt an, dass die südlichen Kolonien direkte Steuern so weit wie möglich mieden, selbst auf Kosten eines beklagenswerten Niveaus öffentlicher Dienstleistungen, und er macht den Mangel an einer effektiven demokratischen Regierung für die erstarrte Kriegspolitik der Konföderation verantwortlich. „Um ein Personal von Steuereinnehmern und -bewertern zu mobilisieren, das in der Lage war, direkte Steuern zu schätzen und zu erheben“, schlussfolgert er, „erforderte weit mehr Willen und, in geringerem Maße, mehr Geschick, als die Konföderation besaß“ (ebd., S. 226). Robert Toombs stimmte dem offenbar zu.In einem Brief an einen Kollegen vom Juni 1863 schrieb er: „Der Yankee-Kongress hat uns in Finanzfragen eindeutig schwer geschlagen“ (zitiert in Phillips, 1913, S. 619–20). Eine vollständige Aufklärung der Finanzpolitik der Konföderation wird wohl nie möglich sein, da viele der wichtigsten Beratungen des Kongresses in geheimer Sitzung stattfanden. Dies allein deutet auf ein Demokratiedefizit im Vergleich zur Union hin. Im Norden sandte Spaulding den ersten Entwurf seiner Fiatgeld-Initiative zur Veröffentlichung und Kommentierung an die New York Tribune (Spaulding, 1869, S. 13). Angesichts dessen und der täglichen Berichterstattung über die Finanzberatungen des Kongresses in der Presse mussten er und andere Mitglieder des Haushaltsausschusses des Repräsentantenhauses eine Reihe von Meinungen in privater Korrespondenz und in der Öffentlichkeit äußern. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger der Konföderation hielten ihre Karten deutlich geheimer. Sie schafften es nicht, „das Vertrauen des Volkes zu gewinnen“, wie Ball es ausdrückte, weil sie wenig Vertrauen in das Volk hatten (Ball, 1991, S. 209). Wie Drew Faust und Stephanie McCurry gezeigt haben, war das Projekt der Konföderation zutiefst antidemokratisch, einschließlich der Versuche, den Besitz als Voraussetzung für das Wahlrecht wieder einzuführen (Faust, 1988, S. 33–39; McCurry, 2010, S. 11–37). Einige Südstaatler beklagten sich insbesondere über die undemokratische Finanzpolitik. Eine öffentliche Versammlung in North Carolina erklärte die Naturalsteuer für „ungerecht und tyrannisch“, da sie „in geheimer Sitzung verabschiedet wurde … und den hart arbeitenden Menschen der Konföderation ein Zehntel ihres Lebensunterhalts nahm, anstatt ihnen ihre eigene Währung in Form von Steuern zurückzugeben“ (zitiert nach Schwab, 1901, S. 295). Aufschlussreich ist auch die Tatsache, dass in der Konföderation nicht der Kongress, sondern der Finanzminister die Steuern vorantrieb, während in der Union das Repräsentantenhaus – das demokratischste Organ der Bundesregierung – die gemeinsame Geld- und Steueragenda vorantrieb. Zumindest in diesem Fall scheint Einhorns positive Korrelation zwischen Demokratie und Besteuerung zuzutreffen. Die finanzielle Unfähigkeit der Konföderation sollte nicht mit fanatischem Einsatz für die Rechte der Einzelstaaten oder mangelndem Etatismus verwechselt werden. Tatsächlich gründeten die Parlamente der Südstaaten vor dem Bürgerkrieg viel häufiger Banken und Eisenbahnen als staatliche Unternehmen und verwendeten die Gewinne, zumindest teilweise, für den Ausbau staatlicher Dienstleistungen mit dem Ziel einer steuerfreien Regierung (Wallenstein, 1987; Murphy, 2017, S. 115–116; Quintana, 2018; Hall, 2019). Diese Politik war nur möglich, weil die Regierungen der Südstaaten von sklavenhaltenden Plantagenbesitzern dominiert wurden. Solange der Staat in Unternehmen investierte, die der Plantagenwirtschaft dienten, anstatt mit ihr zu konkurrieren, war staatliches Eigentum eine attraktive Option. Diese Erfahrung kam während des Krieges bei der umfassenden Übernahme der Industrie durch die Konföderation zum Tragen, was ihr unter anderem bemerkenswerte Erfolge im Bereich der Industrialisierung aus eigener Kraft ermöglichte (Morgan, 2005). Vor dem Krieg jedoch…Die Pflanzer zeigten sich entschieden uninteressiert an staatlichen Investitionen, die den Herstellern zugutekamen, wie etwa dem Bau von Transportwegen zu den Kohlevorkommen Virginias (Adams, 2004; Majewski, 2000). Die Unfähigkeit, den Agrarsektor während des Krieges zu disziplinieren, der trotz städtischer Nahrungsmittelknappheit weiterhin unverhältnismäßig große Flächen für Tabak und Baumwolle nutzte, unterstreicht die Bindung der Konföderation an die Pflanzerklasse (z. B. Hurt, 2015, S. 118–125; Schwab, 1901, S. 278–279). 5. VERGLEICHE Ohne eine solide Finanzbasis erwies sich der konföderierte Etatismus als chaotisch und weitgehend selbstzerstörerisch. Dies muss beim Vergleich der Konföderation und der Union hinsichtlich der Leistungsfähigkeit der Bundesstaaten berücksichtigt werden. In einer der einflussreichsten Darstellungen des konföderierten Staatsapparats argumentiert Richard Franklin Bensel, dass das konföderierte Steuersystem, gemessen an den gesetzlichen Steuersätzen, der Abdeckung und den erzielten Einnahmen, mehr Reichtum abschöpfte als das von der Union errichtete (Bensel, 1990, S. 170–171). Bensel zeigt, dass die Konföderation im ersten Jahr ihres wichtigsten Steuergesetzes (des Gesetzes von 1863) 82 Millionen Dollar sowie Sachleistungen im Wert von 40 Millionen Dollar einnahm, während die Union im selben Zeitraum lediglich 39 Millionen Dollar vereinnahmte. Unter Verweis auf den früheren Start der Union und die Abwertung der Steuergelder kommt er letztlich zu dem Schluss, dass die beiden Seiten in Bezug auf die Steuereinnahmen „annähernd gleichwertig“ waren (Bensel, 1990, S. 172). Bereinigt man die Zahlen jedoch um die Inflation, zeigt sich, dass Bensel die Schwere der Schwierigkeiten der Konföderation deutlich unterschätzt. Als das Steuergesetz der Konföderierten im April 1863 verabschiedet wurde, lag der Großhandelspreisindex bereits bei etwa 1.100 und erreichte im Januar 1864 fast 2.800 (im Vergleich zu den ersten vier Monaten des Jahres 1861; Lerner, 1955, S. 24, 29). Er stieg in den ersten Monaten des Jahres 1864 weiter an, als der Großteil der neuen Steuern eingenommen wurde (Todd, 1954, S. 145; Godfrey, 1978, S. 23; Ransom, 2001). Es ist durchaus sinnvoll anzunehmen, dass der durchschnittliche Preisindex während der Steuererhebung bei etwa 2.500 lag. Das bedeutet, dass die von Bensel erwähnten 82 Millionen Dollar real nur etwa 3,3 Millionen Dollar wert waren. Im Gegensatz dazu läge der konservative Durchschnittswert des Großhandelspreisindex der Union im ersten Jahr ihres internen Steuersystems bei 150. Dies entspräche real 26 Millionen US-Dollar, was einem fast achtfachen Vorteil gegenüber den Konföderierten Staaten von Amerika (CSA) entspräche. Ein realistischerer Preisindex von 130, so Mitchell, würde die Einnahmen der Union auf 30 Millionen US-Dollar erhöhen (Mitchell, 1908, S. 279). Selbst wenn man die Sachsteuer zu den Gesamteinnahmen der Konföderierten hinzurechnet (40 Millionen US-Dollar nominal = 1,7 Millionen US-Dollar real), ergibt sich ein Verhältnis von 6:1 zugunsten der Union – und das ein ganzes Jahr früher, als wichtige Schlachtfeldoperationen und Materialkäufe finanziert werden mussten. Zudem trug die Sachsteuer nicht zur Stützung der Währung bei, sondern verschärfte die Lage sogar, indem sie die Menge der verkaufbaren Güter verringerte (Lerner, 1954, S. 513). Die Gesamtsituation wird in Abbildung 5 dargestellt.Die Grafik zeigt die inflationsbereinigten Steuereinnahmen der Union und der Konföderation im Zeitverlauf. Die unregelmäßige Berichterstattung der Konföderation macht diese Visualisierung hilfreich. Das Ausmaß der fiskalischen Inkompetenz der Konföderation wird nun deutlich. Besonders die ersten drei Quartale des Jahres 1863 stechen hervor – eine Phase entscheidender Wendepunkte auf dem Schlachtfeld, in der die Einnahmenmaschinerie der Union auf Hochtouren lief, während der Gegner praktisch nichts einnahm. Es scheint daher, dass dem konföderierten Staatsapparat die grundlegende Eigenschaft eines modernen Staates fehlte: die Fähigkeit, Steuern in einer Weise zu erheben, die mit der Führung eines totalen Krieges vereinbar ist.&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt; Das Bild ist letztlich ähnlich, wenn Steuern und Banknotenausgaben den Staatsausgaben gegenübergestellt werden. Die unregelmäßige Berichterstattung des konföderierten Finanzministeriums erschwert erneut einen Vergleich mit der der Union, doch die Berichtszeiträume decken sich Ende 1862 und ermöglichen so eine vergleichende Momentaufnahme des Haushalts zu einem entscheidenden Zeitpunkt des Krieges. Wie Tabelle 3 zeigt, waren die Gesamtausgaben für die Jahre 1861 und 1862 nominell ähnlich, doch real waren die Ausgaben der Union fast doppelt so hoch wie die der Konföderation. Das BIP der Union war ähnlich hoch, etwa 2,5- bis 3,5-mal so hoch.&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt; Diese Verhältnisse decken sich weitgehend mit gängigen Vorstellungen über die taktischen Gegebenheiten des Krieges, wonach Angreifer (in der Regel die Union) eine zwei- bis dreifach überlegene Mannstärke benötigten, um die Vorteile der Verteidiger auszugleichen (z. B. Freehling 2001, S. 14; Knudsen 2022, S. 142). Tatsächlich rekrutierte die Union im Laufe des Krieges etwa 2,2 Millionen Soldaten, verglichen mit 800.000 bis 900.000 der Konföderation (Gallagher und Waugh 2015, S. 30), ein Verhältnis von 2,6:1,21. Insgesamt erscheint es daher plausibel anzunehmen, dass beide Regierungen bis Ende 1862 annähernd proportionale Forderungen an ihre jeweilige Wirtschaft gestellt hatten. Beide Regierungen finanzierten etwa drei Viertel ihrer Ausgaben durch die Ausgabe von Banknoten, wobei die Union die Differenz hauptsächlich durch Steuern, die Konföderation hingegen durch Kredite ausgleichte. Was hätte ein rationaler Beobachter zu diesem Zeitpunkt schließen können? Die Kriegslage war uneindeutig. Im September 1862 wehrte die Union in der Schlacht von Antietam einen großangelegten Angriff der Konföderierten auf ihr Territorium ab. Obwohl dies kein überwältigender Sieg der Union war, reichte er Lincoln, um die Vorläufige Emanzipationsproklamation zu erlassen – eine Maßnahme, die einen Krieg der nationalen Wiedervereinigung in einen Kampf um die Existenz der Sklaverei verwandelte. Doch die Aussichten der Union schienen Ende des Jahres zweifelhaft, da ihre Ostarmee in der Schlacht von Fredericksburg eine verheerende Niederlage erlitt und ihre Westarmee, im Schlamm des Mississippi festgefahren, gezwungen war, einen Angriff auf die Konföderiertenfestung Vicksburg abzubrechen. „Dies waren dunkle Tage in Washington“, schreibt McPherson (1988, S. 574). Die militärischen Enttäuschungen in Verbindung mit der politisch umstrittenen Hinwendung zur Emanzipationspolitik stärkten die Position der sogenannten „Friedensdemokraten“, die ein Verhandlungsende des Krieges befürworteten.Ein solches Szenario hätte die Finanzen der Union schwer belastet, da eine unabhängige Konföderation Freihandel betrieben und vermutlich den Handelsverkehr von New York nach New Orleans umgeleitet hätte. Dies hätte die Zolleinnahmen der Union, eine wichtige Goldquelle, erheblich geschmälert. Zudem war das Haushaltsdefizit der Union (Ausgaben abzüglich Steuereinnahmen) im Laufe des Jahres sprunghaft angestiegen, von 25 Millionen Dollar Ende 1861 auf 423 Millionen Dollar Ende 1862 – ein Anstieg um fast 1.588 Prozent (siehe Abbildung 6). Kurz gesagt: Obwohl die größere Wirtschaftskraft der Union ihr höhere Kriegsausgaben ermöglichte, hätten ihr größerer Bedarf als Angreifer in einem Krieg, der die Verteidigung begünstigte, ihr beträchtliches Haushaltsdefizit, das größtenteils durch Fiatgeld finanziert wurde (siehe Tabelle 3), und ihre unsichere Kriegslage Finanzexperten Anlass zur Sorge geben können. Angesichts der ungewissen und fernen Aussichten auf eine Rückkehr zur Konvertibilität des US-Dollars hielten sich die Kurse jedoch recht gut. Der Warren-Pearson-Großhandelspreisindex für Januar 1863 zeigt, dass der Greenback im Vergleich zum Januar 1861 36,9 % des Wertes eines Vorkriegs-Golddollars verloren hatte. Demgegenüber weist Lerners allgemeiner Preisindex der Konföderation einen Wertverlust des Graybacks von 654 % bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt im Vergleich zum Januar 1861 aus (Lerner, 1955, S. 24). Ein ähnlicher Vergleich der Goldpreise der Union und der Konföderation ergibt ein vergleichbares Bild. Der durchschnittliche Goldpreis in Greenbacks stieg im Vergleich zum Januar 1862 um 41,5 %, während der Preis eines Golddollars in Richmond im gleichen Zeitraum um 136,4 % zunahm (Mitchell, 1908, S. 5; Burdekin und Weidenmier, 2001, S. 1629). Diese Zahlen legen nahe, dass die Zusagen der Union zur drastischen Erhöhung der internen Steuereinnahmen als glaubwürdig wahrgenommen wurden – ein Umstand, der der Konföderation eindeutig fehlte. Diese Glaubwürdigkeitslücke wiederum rührte von einem allgemeineren Mangel an demokratischer Legitimität her. Das Bild lässt sich anhand der Dynamik von Hyperinflation in anderen Kontexten verdeutlichen. In einer Untersuchung von Hyperinflationsphasen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg hebt Velde (2016) hervor, dass deren Ende von der Fähigkeit der einzelnen Staaten abhing, ihre Staatshaushalte auszugleichen, unter anderem durch ausreichende Steuern oder glaubwürdige Ankündigungen zukünftiger Einnahmen. Überträgt man Veldes Analyse auf den Bürgerkrieg, so wäre zu erwarten, dass die Union ein ähnliches Inflationsniveau wie die Konföderation aufweisen würde, da ihr Haushaltsdefizit Ende 1862 etwas höher war (Abbildung 6 und Tabelle 3). Doch zu diesem Zeitpunkt war die Inflation in der Konföderation achtzehnmal höher (siehe Abbildungen 2 und 3). Übertragen wir hingegen die hier durchgeführte Analyse des Bürgerkriegs auf das Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit, so möchten wir darauf hinweisen, dass alle fünf untersuchten Länder – Österreich, Ungarn, Deutschland, Polen und Russland – von revolutionären oder beinahe revolutionären Situationen geprägt waren. Solche Umstände können die staatlichen Funktionen unterbrechen und dadurch den Kreislauf der Dekrete schwächen oder gar durchbrechen.Veldes eigene Anerkennung der französischen Revolutionsassaztaten und der amerikanischen Revolutionskontinentalstaaten als vergleichbare Fälle belegt zudem, dass Hyperinflation ebenso sehr Folge wie Ursache des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenbruchs ist. Was sich an den Haushaltsdefiziten dieser Regierungen messen lässt, hängt somit vom vorangegangenen Zusammenbruch der staatlichen Legitimität ab. Die Situation der Konföderation war historisch spezifisch. Ihre Sezession war zutiefst konservativ, eine dezidiert konterrevolutionäre Bewegung. Sie bewahrte die US-Verfassung nahezu intakt und stärkte lediglich den Schutz der Sklaverei. Die versklavte Bevölkerung hegte zweifellos revolutionäre Bestrebungen, konnte aber nur in unmittelbarer Nähe von Unionstruppen massenhaft agieren. Die Konföderation war in der Lage, sich selbst mit Nahrungsmitteln und Ressourcen zu versorgen und fand ausreichend Mittel, um Waffen im Ausland zu kaufen. Das Scheitern der Konföderation wurzelte vielmehr in einem Staatsapparat, dessen administrative und politische Kapazitäten für die Bedürfnisse eines modernen Krieges zu archaisch waren. Er war nicht in der Lage, die notwendigen Finanzmechanismen aufzubauen, um reale Ressourcen in dem erforderlichen Umfang zu mobilisieren. In diesem Zusammenhang kann die Bedeutung der langen Verzögerung bei der Einführung des internen Steuersystems der Konföderation nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden. Dies belegt die begrenzte Legitimität des Regierungsprojekts der Konföderation, das durch das Versäumnis, eine offensichtliche Notwendigkeit zu erfüllen, die unvermeidliche Inflation der Kriegszeit in eine Hyperinflation umschlagen ließ. Dies führte zu einer Kaskade von Problemen, deren Auswirkungen mit jedem Schritt nach unten zunahmen. All diese Probleme rührten daher, dass die konföderierten Führer, indem sie die Geldausgabe nicht in angemessenem Maße an die Steuererhöhungen anpassten, die Fähigkeit des Geldes, soziale Ansprüche auf allgemein als gerecht empfundene Weise zu verteilen, zunichtemachten. Dies schwächte den Einfluss des Geldes auf das tägliche Leben der Bevölkerung fatal (Goldberg, 2014, S. 472). Die Inflation schürte die Unzufriedenheit in der Bevölkerung, die sich am deutlichsten in den zahlreichen Lebensmittelunruhen von 1863 manifestierte. Diese wurden mit einer Kombination aus Unterdrückung und ineffektiver Preiskontrolle bekämpft (Hurt 2015; Cashin 2011; Abb. 4). In manchen Regionen führte die Hyperinflation zu einer Tauschwirtschaft oder zur Verwendung von Weizen oder Goldbarren als Zahlungsmittel, was einen vollständigen Wertverlust für die Greenbacks bedeutete (Schwab, 1901, S. 163–164; Pecquet, 1987; Hurt, 2015, S. 134, 138; Carpenter, 2020, S. 170–175; Seward, 1863). Tatsächlich wurden die Greenbacks der Union, die Währung des Feindes, selbst in den „führenden Zentren der Konföderation“ bevorzugt (Schwab, 1901, S. 161). Die Hyperinflation beeinträchtigte zudem die Produktion, sodass nach der Einführung des Steuersystems weniger zu besteuern war. Die Produktion wurde zusätzlich gehemmt, als die Regierung auf Zwangsrekrutierung zu unter dem Marktpreis liegenden Preisen zurückgriff (Hurt, 2015, S. 120–127, 161–162; Schwab, 1901, S. 203–205). „Nachdem sie unter der Zwangsrekrutierung gelitten hatten“, berichten mehrere Wissenschaftler, „stellten die Bauern den Anbau neuer Feldfrüchte einfach ein“ (Bank et al., 2008, S. 29–30).Die Verzögerung der Konföderation schwächte die Finanzkraft zusätzlich, da sie die Möglichkeit verpasste, in Gebieten Steuern zu erheben, die von Unionstruppen besetzt werden sollten. Kurz gesagt, es ist schwer nachzuvollziehen, wie die Einnahmenpolitik der Konföderation als Maßstab für staatliche Leistungsfähigkeit mit der der Union gleichgesetzt werden kann. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es potenziell irreführend, von der „Abschöpfung“ von Steuern zu sprechen – ein Ausdruck, der dem „kriegerischen“ oder „fiskalisch-militärischen Modell“ der Staatsentwicklung entstammt.&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt; Bensels Ansicht kommt vielleicht Charles Tillys verallgemeinerter Version dieses Modells am nächsten, die die Staatsmacht nicht nur von der reinen Finanzkraft, sondern auch vom Entwicklungsstand der Gesellschaft abhängig macht, aus der sie stammt (Tilly, 1992). Das Problem einer solchen Formulierung besteht darin, dass sie zu scharf zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft/Wirtschaft unterscheidet, sodass der Staat völlig außerhalb der Gesellschaft/Wirtschaft zu stehen scheint und daher in einem permanenten Bestreben nach „Abschöpfung“ von Reichtum gefangen ist. Wenn aber, wie Desan argumentiert, eine auf Geld basierende Wirtschaft nicht einfach spontan aus Markttransaktionen entsteht, sondern vielmehr eine von Staatsbeamten implementierte Form der Steuerung darstellt, dann mhttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2983672Atack, J. 2016. Historischer Transport auf schiffbaren Flüssen, Kanälen und Eisenbahnen in den Vereinigten Staaten, Ann Arbor, MI, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Ball, DB 1991. Finanzielles Versagen und die Niederlage der Konföderierten, Urbana, University of Illinois Press. Bank, SA, Stark, KJ und Thorndike, JJ 2008. Krieg und Steuern, Washington, DC, Urban Institute Press. Bensel, RF 1990. Yankee Leviathan: Die Ursprünge der zentralen Staatsgewalt in Amerika, 1859-1877, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Bordo, MD und White, EN 1991. Eine Geschichte zweier Währungen: Britische und französische Finanzen während der Napoleonischen Kriege, The Journal of Economic History, Bd. 51, Nr. 2, 303–316. 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<p>Administrator: Die Seite wurde neu angelegt: „Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar – Publikationen der Geschichtsfakultät – Geschichte 3-2023 – Der Geldkrieg: Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-Bürgerkrieg – Ariel Ron, aron@smu.edu; Sofia Valeonti, American University of Paris, svaleonti@aup.edu. Weitere Informationen zu diesem und anderen Werken finden Sie unter: https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_history_research. Empfohlene Zitierweise: Ron, Ariel und Sofia Valeonti. 2023. „Der…“</p> <hr /> <div>Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar – Publikationen der Geschichtsfakultät – Geschichte 3-2023 – Der Geldkrieg: Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-Bürgerkrieg – Ariel Ron, aron@smu.edu; Sofia Valeonti, American University of Paris, svaleonti@aup.edu. Weitere Informationen zu diesem und anderen Werken finden Sie unter: https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_history_research. Empfohlene Zitierweise: Ron, Ariel und Sofia Valeonti. 2023. „Der Geldkrieg: Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-Bürgerkrieg.“ Cambridge Journal of Economics 47: 263–88. doi:10.1093/cje/bead006. Dieses Dokument wird Ihnen von SMU Scholar kostenlos und frei zugänglich zur Verfügung gestellt. Es wurde von einem autorisierten Administrator von SMU Scholar für die Aufnahme in die Publikationen der Geschichtsfakultät akzeptiert. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter http://digitalrepository.smu.edu . DER GELDKRIEG Demokratie, Steuern und Inflation im US-amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg (akzeptierte Fassung)<br /> <br /> Ariel Ron / Southern Methodist University / aron@smu.edu Sofia Valeonti / The American University of Paris &amp; Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University / svaleonti@aup.edu (Korrespondenzautorin)<br /> <br /> Zusammenfassung: Beide Seiten im US-amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg finanzierten ihre Militärausgaben durch die Ausgabe neuer Fiatwährungen. Der „Greenback“ der Union erlebte eine moderate Inflation (für Kriegsverhältnisse), während der „Grayback“ der Konföderation unter Hyperinflation litt. Bisherige Erklärungen für diese Preisbewegungen betrachten in der Regel nur einen der beiden Fälle und verfolgen entweder einen quantitätstheoretischen oder einen rationalen Erwartungsansatz. Wir vergleichen die Politik der Union und der Konföderation direkt und heben die Bedeutung der Besteuerung für die Wertsicherung des nicht konvertierbaren Geldes hervor. Durch die Kombination von Literatur zur Geld- und Fiskalgeschichte stellen wir fest, dass die Steuerpolitik durch die langfristige Entwicklung demokratischer Regierungsinstitutionen bestimmt wurde. Ein höherer Grad an Demokratie im Norden im Vergleich zum sklavenhaltenden Süden bedeutete eine größere Legitimität der Steuerpolitik und höhere Verwaltungskompetenz. Die Union nutzte dieses Erbe, um ihr Geld effektiv abzusichern, während die Konföderation dies nicht tat. Wir leisten einen Beitrag zu den Theorien des Kreditgeldes, indem wir die politischen Determinanten einer effektiven Fiskalpolitik beleuchten. Schlüsselwörter: Hyperinflation, Fiatgeld, Konföderierte Staaten von Amerika, Amerikanischer Bürgerkrieg, Besteuerung JEL-Klassifikation: B52, E52, N110 Danksagung Wir danken den Teilnehmern der Konferenz der European Historical Economics Society 2019, des Early American Money Symposiums an der Brown University, des Doktorandenseminars der Colorado State University, des H2M-Seminars der Universität Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne und des Seminars für Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Paris School of Economics sowie Jeff Althouse, Nicolas Barreyre, Ghislain Deleplace, Claire Federspiel, Laurent Le Maux, Noam Magor, John Majewski und Romain Svartzman für ihre Kommentare und Anregungen. Für verbleibende Fehler übernehmen wir die Verantwortung. 1. EINLEITUNG Im Frühjahr 1864 stand dem amerikanischen Bürgerkrieg noch ein Jahr harter Kämpfe bevor, doch für einige Beobachter schien der Ausgang bereits festzustehen. Die Situation wurde in einer politischen Karikatur (Abbildung 1) dargestellt, die den Präsidenten der Union, Abraham Lincoln, und seinen konföderierten Gegenpart, Jefferson Davis, beim Kampf mit Geldsäcken zeigt. „Gib besser auf, Jeff“, prahlt Lincoln, „du hast keine Chance! Siehst du nicht, dass ich den längsten Geldbeutel habe?“ Zu Füßen der Kämpfer liegen gestapelte Kisten, die neben Lincoln mit „Goldbarren“, die neben Davis mit „ungültiges Geld“ beschriftet. Die Bildunterschrift verkündet: „Letzte Ausgabe des Krieges“ – ein Wortspiel, das sowohl den Sieg der Union als auch die letzte Ausgabe wertloser konföderierter Banknoten suggeriert. Die Karikatur irrt sich jedoch, wenn sie suggeriert, die Stabilität der Unionsgelder habe von ihren Goldreserven abgehangen, denn beide Seiten hatten zu Beginn des Konflikts goldgedeckte Währungen aufgegeben. Etwas anderes stützte also die monetäre Überlegenheit der Union, die es ihr ermöglichte, einen beträchtlichen Vorteil in Bezug auf die reinen wirtschaftlichen Kapazitäten zu Beginn des Krieges in den viel größeren Vorsprung bei der Mobilisierung realer Ressourcen umzuwandeln, die zur Eroberung der riesigen geografischen Ausdehnung des konföderierten Amerikas erforderlich waren.Sowohl die Union als auch die Konföderation gaben große Mengen an nicht konvertierbarem Papiergeld aus, um die beispiellosen Kriegsausgaben zu decken. Beide erlebten Preisänderungen, jedoch in völlig unterschiedlichem Ausmaß (Abbildungen 2 und 3). Unabhängig davon, ob man Gold-, Großhandels- oder Verbraucherpreise betrachtete, verdoppelten sich die Preise in der Union im Laufe des Krieges etwa. Diese Inflationsrate ähnelte der amerikanischen Erfahrung im Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieg und war völlig ausreichend, um eine relativ florierende Kriegswirtschaft aufrechtzuerhalten (McPherson, 1988, S. 447; David und Solar, 1977, S. 16–17; Warren et al., 1932, S. 6–10; Mitchell, 1908, S. 279). Die Konföderation litt jedoch unter Hyperinflation, wobei sowohl die Großhandels- als auch die Goldpreise bis Anfang 1865 um fast das Sechzigfache stiegen – eine Situation, die ihre Wirtschaft ins Chaos stürzte (Lerner, 1955, S. 24; Todd, 1954, S. 189). Wenn die Karikatur fälschlicherweise suggeriert, dass Gold für die Preisdifferenz verantwortlich war, was dann? Die meisten Wissenschaftler führen die Preisbewegungen während des Bürgerkriegs entweder auf die Geldmenge (Quantitätstheorie, QT) oder auf rationale Erwartungen hinsichtlich des zukünftigen Geldwertes (RE) zurück. Im Fall der Konföderation betont Lerner (1954, 1955, 1956) den Anstieg der Geldmenge und der Umlaufgeschwindigkeit sowie die sinkende Wirtschaftsleistung der Südstaaten. Godfrey (1978) hebt ebenfalls die Bedeutung von Veränderungen der Geldmenge hervor. Im Gegensatz dazu verfolgen einige Wissenschaftler den Ansatz der rationalen Erwartungen und setzen Preisbewegungen mit Nachrichten in Zusammenhang. Burdekin und Langdana (1993), McCadless (1996) und Weidenmier (2002) wenden jeweils den Ansatz rationaler Erwartungen an und zeigen, dass Preisbewegungen Nachrichten über militärische, fiskalische und geldpolitische Ereignisse folgten.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt; Die Preisentwicklung der Union wird typischerweise auch im Rahmen der Theorien der quantitativen Theorems (QT) und der Theorie rationaler Erwartungen (RE) erklärt. Für Friedman und Schwartz (1963, S. 59, vgl. 1964) sowie Studenski und Krooss (1963, S. 147) war die Geldmenge im Umlauf der entscheidende Faktor. Sie argumentieren, dass die Inflation begrenzt gewesen wäre, wenn ein größerer Teil des Krieges durch Steuern statt durch Geldemissionen finanziert worden wäre. Alternativ zeigt Calomiris (1988B), dass das Preisniveau der Union nicht durch die aktuelle Geldmenge, sondern durch rationale Erwartungen hinsichtlich ihrer zukünftigen Geldmenge bestimmt wurde, welche wiederum von fiskalpolitischen Nachrichten abhing.&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt; Für Calomiris war jede Politik, die den politischen Willen zur Wiederaufnahme von Barzahlungen in der Zukunft betraf, eine Form fiskalpolitischer Nachrichten. Zwei weitere bemerkenswerte Ansätze, die sich zwar unterscheiden, lassen sich zusammenfassen, da sie sich insbesondere mit historisch spezifischen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Politik und Institutionen befassen. Wray (1998, S. 65–69) wendet die moderne Geldtheorie (MMT) an, um die Hyperinflation der Konföderation auf unzureichende Besteuerung zurückzuführen, die zu einer geringeren Nachfrage nach den ausgegebenen Banknoten führte. Aus einer älteren institutionalistischen Perspektive argumentiert Mitchell (1903, S. 198), dass der Wert der Greenbacks „von der Kreditwürdigkeit des Emittenten abhing“.„was sich auf das Vertrauen bezieht, das die Inhaber von US-Dollar-Scheinen in die Fähigkeit der Regierung setzten, ihre Schuldverschreibungen letztendlich einzulösen.“ Das Vertrauen in die Leistungsfähigkeit der Regierung hing sowohl von strukturellen als auch von situationsbedingten Faktoren ab, darunter die Menge des ausgegebenen Papiergeldes (je mehr Geld, desto schwieriger die Rückzahlung) und das Eintreten „finanzieller, militärischer, politischer und diplomatischer Ereignisse“ (S. 201), wie etwa Berichte des Finanzministers und Nachrichten über die Kreditaufnahmefähigkeit der Regierung oder militärische Erfolge und Rückschläge. Jede dieser Darstellungen hat ihre Berechtigung, doch obwohl sie alle der Fiskalpolitik eine bedeutende Rolle bei der Steuerung der aktuellen oder erwarteten Geldmenge zuschreiben, untersucht keine, wie Fiskalpolitik tatsächlich gestaltet und umgesetzt wurde. Auch versucht keine dieser Darstellungen einen konsistenten Vergleich zwischen Union und Konföderation. Wir wollen diese Defizite beheben, indem wir für systemische Unterschiede in den fiskalischen Kapazitäten von Union und Konföderation argumentieren, die auf größere historische Divergenzen in Regierungsphilosophie und -praxis zurückzuführen sind. Wir unterscheiden uns von Vertretern der Quantitativen Theorie (QT) und der Regressiven Theorie (RE) nicht nur in der Methode, sondern auch in dem, was wir erklären wollen. Anstatt präzise Preisbewegungen zu untersuchen, fragen wir, warum die Währung der Union dort erfolgreich war, wo die Währung der Konföderation versagte. Es ist aufschlussreich, die Gründe für kurzfristige Preisänderungen zu ermitteln, doch mindestens ebenso wichtig ist es zu verstehen, warum die eine Politik ihre grundlegenden Ziele – die Förderung einer erfolgreichen Kriegsstrategie – erreichte, die andere jedoch nicht. Unser Ansatz ähnelt dem von Mitchell und Wray, die beide staatliches Handeln als entscheidend betrachten. Wir legen jedoch weitaus mehr Wert auf die konkreten Steuermaßnahmen, die im einen Fall die Geldpolitik stärkten und im anderen Fall untergruben. Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der Geldschöpfung der Union und der Konföderation erfordert einen theoretischen Rahmen, der die politischen und administrativen Kapazitäten des Staates berücksichtigt. Wir beginnen mit Christine Desans „verfassungsrechtlichem Ansatz zum Thema Geld“. Anders als die gängige ökonomische Interpretation von Geld, die es als spontanes Ergebnis privaten Austauschs betrachtet, sieht Desan Geld als ein „Governance-Projekt“ (Desan 2014, S. 1, 7, 12; siehe auch Desan, 2017). Geld ist ihrer Ansicht nach ein Produkt von Institutionen und staatlichen Maßnahmen, die es bestimmten materialisierten Praktiken – der Prägung von Silbermünzen, dem Druck von Banknoten, der Codierung von Magnetstreifen auf Plastikkarten – ermöglichen, die Eigenschaften von Geld anzunehmen. Die erfolgreiche Umsetzung solcher Projekte hängt von den fiskalischen Maßnahmen und Rechtsnormen des Staates ab. Der Staat schafft Geld zunächst, indem er mit dafür vorgesehenen Token einkauft, die er anschließend zur Begleichung der von ihm auferlegten Steuerverpflichtungen akzeptiert. Dieser „Fiat-Kreislauf“, in dem der Staat Zahlungen ausgibt und wieder einzieht, verleiht dem Geld das, was Desan als „fiskalischen Wert“ bezeichnet. Mit anderen Worten: Steuerverpflichtungen erzeugen die Nachfrage nach staatlichem Geld, das diesem Wert verleiht.Der Staat kann die Übertragbarkeit seiner Zahlungsmittel zwischen Privatpersonen gewährleisten, indem er sich verpflichtet, diese von jedermann anzunehmen (nicht nur vom ursprünglichen Zahlungsempfänger) und eine Rechtsordnung durchsetzt, die Geld als rechtmäßiges Zahlungsmittel zur Erfüllung privater vertraglicher Verpflichtungen anerkennt (gesetzliches Zahlungsmittel). Die daraus resultierende allgemeine Akzeptanz der Zahlungsmittel – „die Fähigkeit, als Wertträger von allen Beteiligten anerkannt zu werden“ – führt zu einer von Desan als „Bargeldprämie“ bezeichneten Wertsteigerung.&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt; Diese grundlegenden Kriterien lassen sich auf vielfältige Weise operationalisieren, jede mit ihren eigenen sozialen und politischen Implikationen. Der verfassungsrechtliche Ansatz zum Thema Geld eignet sich besonders gut für den Vergleich der Währungserfahrungen der Union und der Konföderation. Die Akzeptanz der neuen Währungen in der Bevölkerung war nicht selbstverständlich, denn während die Amerikaner mit Papiergeld in Form von Banknoten, die prinzipiell durch Golddeckung gedeckt waren, gut vertraut waren, hatten sie wenig Erfahrung mit nicht konvertierbaren staatlichen Banknoten. Der wesentliche Unterschied in den Währungskonzepten lag in den unterschiedlichen Steuerkapazitäten: Die Union konnte ein funktionierendes Steuersystem einführen, während die Konföderation dies weitgehend versäumte. Desans Argumentation zufolge gelang es der Konföderation nicht, den Fiatgeldkreislauf zu schließen. Sie konnte ihren Papiergeldausgaben weder einen fiskalischen Wert noch eine Barprämie verleihen, wodurch ihren Bürgern die Mittel für alltägliche Geschäftstransaktionen fehlten. Die Folge war eine stark beeinträchtigte Wirtschaft, selbst in den weitläufigen Gebieten des Südens, wo die Unionstruppen fern blieben und das Sklavensystem relativ ungestört fortbestand. Praktisch gesehen ist es für Regierungen einfacher, Geld auszugeben als es wieder einzutreiben (z. B. Rockoff, 2015, S. 8). Der Steueraspekt in Desans Gleichung erfordert nicht nur die Bereitschaft, Verpflichtungen aufzuerlegen, sondern auch die Fähigkeit, diese einzutreiben. Diese Fähigkeit lässt sich nicht über Nacht erlangen. Zum einen besteht die administrative Herausforderung, eine kompetente Steuerbehörde einzurichten. Zum anderen besteht die politische Herausforderung, eine angemessene Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung zu erreichen. Da die Entwicklung eines soliden Währungssystems in der Theorie nicht dasselbe ist wie dessen praktische Umsetzung, argumentieren wir, dass die Währungserfahrungen der Union und der Konföderation stark von ihren jeweiligen vorherigen Steuerkapazitäten geprägt waren. Das Erbe der Union aus der Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg ermöglichte ihr einen massiven Ausbau und eine tiefgreifende Umgestaltung ihres Steuersystems; die Konföderation hingegen nicht. Hier erweist sich der verfassungsrechtliche Ansatz als relevant, da er die Untersuchung von Preisbewegungen auf die zugrundeliegende monetäre Architektur ausweitet, in der sich die Faktoren der quantitativen Steuerung (QT) und der relativen Ausgaben (RE) herausbildeten. Dies lenkt unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf die langfristigen institutionellen Entwicklungen, die Einhorns (2006) vergleichende Studie der Steuersysteme des Nordens und Südens von der Kolonialzeit bis zur Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg aufzeigt.Einhorns Konzeption der Steuerkapazität lässt sich in zwei unterschiedliche, aber miteinander verbundene Kompetenzen unterteilen: eine sachkundige Steuerverwaltung und eine deliberative Steuerpolitik. Dies bedeutet, dass zumindest in den Vereinigten Staaten mehr Demokratie tendenziell zu einer besseren Besteuerung öffentlicher Zwecke geführt hat, die den Wünschen der Wähler entsprach.⁴ Umgekehrt führte das Misstrauen der Sklavenhalter gegenüber demokratischen Institutionen – genährt durch ihr philosophisches Festhalten an der sozialen Hierarchie und ihre pragmatische Befürchtung, die Wähler könnten die Sklaverei durch Steuern abschaffen wollen – zu Kolonial- und Staatsregierungen, die „aristokratischer, schwächer und weniger kompetent waren, wo die Sklaverei eine zentrale Institution in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft darstellte“, verglichen mit ihren freieren nördlichen Pendants (Einhorn 2006, S. 7).⁵ Aus der gemeinsamen Perspektive von Desan und Einhorn erscheinen die Geld- und Steuerpolitik des Bürgerkriegs untrennbar miteinander verbunden und prägten die jeweiligen Finanzsysteme der Union und der Konföderation, die grundlegend ihre jeweiligen Staatsbildungsprojekte widerspiegelten. Diese Finanzsysteme prägten maßgeblich die Art und Weise, wie der Staat Ansprüche an die Gesellschaft erhob und wie deren Mitglieder in ihren privaten Interaktionen bindende Ansprüche untereinander geltend machten. Es überrascht daher kaum, dass sich eine Sklavenhaltergesellschaft selbst in ihrem Geldwesen wesentlich, vielleicht sogar zwangsläufig, von einer relativ freien und demokratischen Gesellschaft unterschied. Da der Bürgerkrieg ein Gemeinwesen und eine Gesellschaft spaltete, die vieles gemeinsam hatten – ein englisch-protestantisches Kulturerbe, Common Law und eine konstitutionelle Rechtstradition, ein kapitalistisches und siedlerkoloniales Ethos und vieles mehr –, bietet er gewissermaßen ein natürliches Experiment, das zu umfassenderen Erkenntnissen über Kredittheorien des Geldes beitragen kann.⁶ Wir betonen die langfristige Bedeutung der Staatsbildung und der institutionellen Geschichte der Steuerhoheit, um staatlich gestützten Kredittheorien des Geldes ein realistischeres Verständnis der Funktionsweise und Entwicklung von Staaten zu vermitteln. Obwohl es oft sinnvoll und angemessen ist, analytische Unterscheidungen zwischen dem rechtlichen, politischen und wirtschaftlichen Bereich zu treffen, sind solche Kategoriengrenzen im Falle von Kredittheorien des Geldes künstlich und irreführend. Im chartalistischen Ansatz ist Geld steuergetrieben und somit untrennbar mit den historisch bedingten Kapazitäten des Staates verbunden. Folglich müssen die Kapazitäten und Schwächen der Finanzbehörden, d. h. die Determinanten fiskalpolitischer Zeithorizonte, berücksichtigt werden, um die Transformation der Währungsarchitektur, wie sie während des US-amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs stattfand, überzeugend darzustellen. In diesem Beitrag skizzieren wir unsere Argumentation anhand einer Synthese und Kritik der bestehenden Literatur zu den amerikanischen Fiskal- und Währungssystemen vor und während des Bürgerkriegs. Unser Ansatz ist notwendigerweise narrativ, um die wesentliche Dynamik des Problems zu erfassen. Zukünftig werden wir Elemente der Argumentation möglicherweise durch zusätzliche Archivrecherchen und empirische Daten einer strengeren Überprüfung unterziehen.DAS ERBE DER KOLONIALEN UND REVOLUTIONÄREN ZEIT Die Politik der Union, Papiergeld auszugeben und gleichzeitig die Steuern deutlich zu erhöhen, knüpfte an die Praxis der „Währungsfinanzierung“ der britischen Kolonien in Nordamerika im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert an (Spaulding, 1869, S. 39–40). In diesen früheren Phasen finanzierten die Kolonialregierungen Kriegsausgaben, indem sie vorübergehend Papiergeld ausgaben und gleichzeitig entsprechende Steuererhöhungen beschlossen, die die Banknoten später einlösen sollten. Diese Kombination verlieh den Banknoten einen fiskalischen Wert und verschaffte der Regierung Kaufkraft, die zukünftige Steuereinnahmen effektiv antizipierte. Angesichts der chronischen Knappheit an Edelmetallen aufgrund der strukturellen Handelsdefizite der Kolonien neigte die Bevölkerung auch dazu, Banknoten für alltägliche Geschäftstransaktionen zu verlangen. Desans zwei Schlüsselelemente, der fiskalische Wert und die Barprämie, waren somit fest etabliert (Ferguson, 1961; Perkins, 1997; Newell, 1998; Grubb, 2006; Goldberg, 2014). Zu Beginn des Bürgerkriegs schlugen sowohl die politischen Entscheidungsträger des Nordens als auch des Südens etwas Ähnliches vor. Interessanterweise scheint ihr Hauptbezugspunkt nicht das koloniale Erbe gewesen zu sein, sondern vielmehr die britische Verwendung nicht konvertierbarer Kreditbriefe während der Französischen Revolutions- und Napoleonischen Kriege, die sie als erfolgreiches Mittel zur Erhaltung von Englands „gefährdeter Existenz“ ansahen (Spaulding, 1869, S. 39).&lt;sup&gt;7&lt;/sup&gt; Der Grund für dieses Vergessen lag vermutlich in den verheerenden Erfahrungen mit den sogenannten „Continentals“ (Banknoten) während der Amerikanischen Revolution. Der rasche Wertverfall der Continentals resultierte aus der Unfähigkeit des Nationalstaats, Steuern zu erheben. Unter den Konföderationsartikeln fehlte dem Kontinentalkongress diese entscheidende Finanzhoheit, doch selbst wenn ihm eine solche Befugnis eingeräumt worden wäre, hätte er sie in der Praxis kaum ausüben können, da die Schaffung einer kontinentalen Steuerbehörde die politischen und administrativen Kapazitäten eines jungen postkolonialen Staates überstieg (Einhorn, 2008, S. 127–128). Folglich gab es keinen Mechanismus, um die Nachfrage nach den Kontinentalanleihen zu steigern oder sie außer Kurs zu setzen (Calomiris, 1988A; Grubb, 2006, S. 46–47; Goldberg, 2014, S. 481). Anstatt direkt Steuern zu erheben, verließ sich der Kongress darauf, dass die einzelnen Bundesstaaten den ihnen zustehenden Mittelanforderungen, den sogenannten Requisitionen, nachkamen. Die Bundesstaaten zogen es jedoch vor, die Einnahmen für ihre eigenen Bedürfnisse zu sparen, darunter auch zur Unterstützung ihrer eigenen Geldscheine, die aufgrund der kriegsbedingten Störungen ihrer Finanzsysteme dennoch an Wert verloren. Das allgemeine Fiasko veranlasste nachfolgende US-Beamte, die Währungsfinanzierungspolitik abzulehnen und sie praktisch aus dem öffentlichen Gedächtnis zu tilgen.&lt;sup&gt;8&lt;/sup&gt; Die Geschichte der Revolution unterstreicht, dass die erfolgreiche Umsetzung der Währungsfinanzierung nicht nur von der Abstimmung der Geldausgaben auf Steuererhöhungen, sondern auch von der Durchführung der Steuereintreibung abhing. Im Bürgerkrieg gelang es der Union, beides zu leisten, während die Konföderation keines von beidem schaffte.Obwohl die Kämpfe größtenteils auf südlichem Boden stattfanden und die Seeblockade der Union die Konföderation daran hinderte, nennenswerte Zolleinnahmen zu erzielen, lag das Problem der Sklavenhalter nicht primär in den kriegsbedingten Umwälzungen. Die Unionstruppen drangen erst spät im Krieg in das riesige südliche Hinterland vor, und große Gebiete blieben nach Kriegsende unberührt (Downs, 2015). Zudem übernahm die Konföderation die bestehende bundesstaatliche Präsenz im Süden, einschließlich Gebäude und Personal, im Wesentlichen unverändert. Die amerikanischen Revolutionäre hingegen bildeten ein fragiles Bündnis aus Kolonialparlamenten und Ad-hoc-Komitees, die darum kämpften, die Bevölkerung im Hinterland zu regieren und die zuvor von königlichen Gouverneuren wahrgenommenen Verwaltungsfunktionen zu übernehmen. Der Unterschied zwischen der Steuerpolitik der Union und der Konföderation lässt sich daher am besten als Ergebnis langfristiger institutioneller Entwicklungen verstehen, die den nördlichen Freistaaten eine starke Steuerhoheit verliehen, die den südlichen Sklavenstaaten fehlte. An dieser Stelle wenden wir uns Einhorns vergleichender Studie zu den Steuertraditionen des Nordens und Südens zu, die bis in die Kolonialzeit zurückreicht. Einhorns Erkenntnis, dass die Steuerhoheit im frühen Amerika eng mit demokratischen Institutionen verknüpft war – mehr Demokratie bedeutete mehr Steuerhoheit –, mag zunächst kontraintuitiv erscheinen. Man geht oft vom umgekehrten Verhältnis aus. Die Menschen mögen keine Steuern, so die gängige Annahme. Wenn sie also ein Mitspracherecht in der Regierung erhalten, werden sie versuchen, ihre Belastungen so weit wie möglich zu reduzieren. War die Amerikanische Revolution nicht letztendlich ein großer Steueraufstand? Nicht ganz. Der revolutionäre Slogan „Keine Besteuerung ohne Vertretung“ wandte sich nicht gegen Steuern an sich, sondern knüpfte sie an politische Mitbestimmung. Tatsächlich forderten die Amerikaner, nachdem sie die Möglichkeit zur Selbstverwaltung erlangt hatten, mitunter höhere statt niedrigere Steuern, wenn sie der Ansicht waren, dass diese einem öffentlichen Zweck dienten. Wie Lincoln es bekanntlich formulierte: „Die legitime Aufgabe der Regierung ist es, für eine Gemeinschaft von Menschen das zu tun, was sie tun müssen, aber nicht oder nicht so gut selbst tun können – in ihrer individuellen und getrennten Fähigkeit“ (Lincoln, 1953, 2:220–222, Hervorhebung im Original). Tatsächlich nutzten einige Konföderierte den Revolutionsslogan, um die finanzielle Schwäche der Konföderation zu kritisieren, indem sie gegen „Repräsentation ohne Besteuerung“ protestierten (zitiert in Todd, 1954, S. 138). Es gab erhebliche Unterschiede im Ausmaß der Demokratie, die die Amerikaner vor dem Bürgerkrieg genossen. Geschlechts- und rassenbasierte Ausgrenzung war landesweit verbreitet, doch überall dort, wo die Sklaverei vorherrschte, litten die demokratischen Institutionen am stärksten. Sklavenhalter waren mächtige Menschen, die in dem geschult waren, was Thomas Jefferson als „unerbittlichsten Despotismus“ bezeichnete (Jefferson, 1998, S. 168).&lt;sup&gt;9&lt;/sup&gt; Im Gegensatz dazu waren die nördlichen Kolonien und späteren Staaten tendenziell egalitärer und demokratischer als ihre südlichen Nachbarn. Sie neigten auch dazu, sich selbst stärker zu besteuern, beispielsweise für Straßen und Schulen.Die Ungleichheit zwischen Nord und Süd wird beispielsweise beim Blick auf das Kanalnetz der Vorkriegszeit deutlich, das größtenteils mit staatlichen Mitteln errichtet wurde (Larson, 2001; Taylor, 1951, S. 35). Vergleichende Messungen der öffentlichen Bildung und der Forschungsförderung zeigen eine ähnliche regionale Ungleichverteilung, selbst wenn Bodentyp und andere Umweltbedingungen identisch waren (Majewski, 2016; Ron, 2020). Dieses Muster – das demokratischere Regierungen mit höheren Steuern und mitunter geringerer Ungleichheit in Verbindung bringt – wurde allgemein für Amerika sowie für das moderne und antike Europa beobachtet (Sokoloff und Zolt, 2007; Tilly, 2009; Van Zanden und Prak, 2006; Tan, 2017). Wie Findlay und O’Rourke es formulierten, „konnten Staaten, die auf Staatsbürgerschaft statt auf Zwang basierten, tatsächlich mehr, nicht weniger Steuern erheben“ (Findlay und O’Rourke 2007, S. 350). Die nördlichen Freistaaten verfügten somit über eine deutlich höhere Steuerkapazität als ihre südlichen Pendants mit Sklaverei. Diese Kapazität lässt sich unter zwei Aspekten betrachten: Verwaltung und Politik. Administrativ setzten die nördlichen Staaten komplexere Steuersysteme ein, die sowohl Einnahmen- als auch Gerechtigkeitsfragen berücksichtigten. Insbesondere waren die nördlichen Staaten wesentlich besser in der Lage, Immobilienwerte zu Marktpreisen zu bewerten, die Werte standortübergreifend anzugleichen, um zu verhindern, dass Steuerbeamte ihre Freunde und Nachbarn unterbesteuerten, und Steuern in einem relativ fairen Verhältnis zu den Mitteln und dem Nutzen der Steuerzahler zu erheben. Diese Fähigkeit wiederum leitete sich von den Gewohnheiten einer demokratischen Gesellschaft ab, die an „lokale Entscheidungsfindung“ und „fortlaufende, alltägliche politische Verhandlungen zwischen Steuerzahlern und gewählten lokalen Beamten“ gewöhnt war (Einhorn, 2006, S. 29; 2008, S. 202). Die Bedeutung demokratischer Praxis für die Leistungsfähigkeit des Staates lag darin, dass sie Legitimität und die Einhaltung von Vorschriften schuf, wodurch die Steuerbehörden ihre Aufgaben erfüllen konnten. Sie führte tendenziell auch zu reaktionsfähigeren und umfassender angelegten Wirtschaftsförderungsmaßnahmen, die das Steueraufkommen erhöhten (Brownlee 2016, S. 54–57). Demokratie bedeutete sowohl sinnbildliche als auch tatsächliche Zustimmung. Die Regierungen der Südstaaten lernten schließlich von ihren nördlichen Pendants und begannen in den 1840er und 1850er Jahren, die Steuerlücke zu schließen (Thornton, 1982). Sie führten außerdem sogenannte „Uniformitätsklauseln“ ein, die vorschrieben, dass alle Arten von Eigentum zum gleichen Satz bewertet und besteuert werden mussten (Einhorn, 2006, S. 201–202). Da die weiße Mehrheit der nicht sklavenhaltenden Bevölkerung dadurch daran gehindert wurde, diskriminierende Steuern auf das Vermögen der Sklaven zu erheben, bevorzugten Sklavenhalter neue Einnahmen zur Finanzierung des Eisenbahnbaus und sogar der öffentlichen Bildung (für Weiße). Doch am Vorabend des Bürgerkriegs lagen die Südstaaten bei den Pro-Kopf-Steuern und den Steuern pro BIP-Einheit immer noch hinter den Nordstaaten zurück (Abbildung 4). 3. STEUERN UND GELD IN DER UNION Die Finanzsysteme der Union und der Konföderation nahmen Gestalt an, als langfristige institutionelle Entwicklungen auf die Erfordernisse des Krieges trafen. Beide Seiten beabsichtigten zunächst, sich auf Anleihen zu stützen, wie die USA es bereits in früheren großen Kriegen getan hatten (Edling, 2014).Der immense Militärbedarf überstieg rasch die Kreditaufnahmemöglichkeiten beider Regierungen. Die Konföderation konnte diese Schwierigkeit nie überwinden, während die Union schließlich neue und sehr erfolgreiche Finanzierungsquellen erschloss. Laut einer konservativen Schätzung finanzierten die Konföderierten Staaten lediglich 21,3 % ihrer Kriegsanstrengungen über Anleihen, während der entsprechende Wert der Union bei 64,5 % lag (Godfrey, 1978, S. 14). Kurzfristig benötigte jedoch auch die Union andere Mittel. Beide Regierungen griffen auf die Ausgabe von Staatsanleihen zurück. Die daraus resultierenden Maßnahmen wiesen einige wesentliche Ähnlichkeiten auf. Sowohl die Union-„Greenbacks“ als auch die Konföderations-„Graybacks“, wie die Banknoten später genannt wurden, waren gegen verzinsliche Anleihen ihrer jeweiligen ausstellenden Regierungen einlösbar – eine Maßnahme, die die Kreditvergabe und die Akzeptanz der Banknoten in der Bevölkerung fördern sollte.&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt; Beide Währungen waren zudem mit dem Versprechen verbunden, die Steuern zu erhöhen, um ihren Wert zu erhalten. Doch nur die Union war in der Lage, neue Steuern effektiv einzuführen (Brownlee, 2016, S. 60–68; Edling, 2014, S. 206–212; Bank et al., 2008, S. 23–47).¹¹ „Bei ihrer finanziellen Mobilisierung für den Krieg“, schreibt der Steuerhistoriker W. Elliot Brownlee, „hatte die Union gegenüber der Konföderation einen Vorteil aufgrund der umfangreichen fiskalischen Experimente der Nordstaaten“ in der Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg (Brownlee, 2016, S. 65). Zusätzlich zur Erhöhung der Zölle begannen die Beamten der Union bereits im Juli 1861 mit der Planung einer hohen Binnenbesteuerung und führten einen Monat später die erste Einkommensteuer des Landes ein. Anschließend investierten sie große Anstrengungen in die Ausarbeitung eines Systems, das sich durch seine Breite und Reichweite auszeichnete. Das Ergebnis war im Juli 1862 ein „hunderte Seiten langes“ Gesetz, das „fast alles besteuerte, außer der Luft, die die Nordstaatler atmeten“ (Edling, 2014, S. 206; McPherson, 1988, S. 447). Weitere Gesetzesrunden erweiterten die Steuerbasis und erhöhten die Steuersätze weiter. Dennoch, so Brownlee (2016, S. 60), „sahen die republikanischen Führer keinen nennenswerten Widerstand gegen die enormen neuen Steuern auf und mussten bei deren Eintreibung nicht auf Zwang zurückgreifen“. Dies sei ihrer „breiten Wählerpopularität“ zu verdanken. Max Edling (2014, S. 208) ergänzt in seiner jüngsten Studie zur frühen amerikanischen Kriegsfinanzierung, dass die Debatten im Kongress über das erste große Steuergesetz „vor allem wegen der Bereitschaft der Abgeordneten, den Krieg zu unterstützen, bemerkenswert“ seien. Die London Times meinte, „ein Zehntel dieser Steuern würde jede amerikanische Gemeinde innerhalb eines Monats an den Rand des Zusammenbruchs bringen“, doch Historiker wie Zeitgenossen staunten immer wieder über die Bereitschaft der einfachen Nordstaatler, ihren Teil der gemeinsamen Last zu tragen (zitiert in Ball, 1991, S. 221). „Ich habe noch nie ein Land gesehen, in dem die Bevölkerung so lautstark nach Steuern verlangte“, bemerkte ein ungläubiger ausländischer Beobachter 1862 (Bank et al., 2008, S. 37).¹² Wenn dieses Steuersystem demokratische Legitimität genoss, so zeichnete es sich auch durch geschicktes politisches und administratives Management aus.Der Finanzausschuss des Repräsentantenhauses ließ sich bei der Ausarbeitung des Gesetzesentwurfs Zeit, doch der Kongress hatte sich bereits sechs Monate zuvor öffentlich zu Steuererhöhungen verpflichtet, um „die Gläubiger der Öffentlichkeit zu beruhigen“ (Edling, 2014, S. 205). Das Gesetz vom Juli 1862 erhöhte die Steuersätze und die Progressivität der Einkommensteuer und führte erstmals eine bundesweite Erbschaftsteuer ein, um die Regressivität der erhöhten Zölle und Verbrauchssteuern auszugleichen. Der Kongress übernahm auch gezielt Erfahrungen aus dem Ausland. So führte er die britische Verwaltungspraxis des Steuerabzugs („Steuerstopp an der Quelle“) zur Erhebung von Einkommensteuern auf Unternehmensdividenden und Gehälter von Staatsbediensteten ein (Brownlee, 2016, S. 67). Doch „anstatt wie Großbritannien hohe Zölle auf wenige Güter zu erheben, entschied sich der Finanzausschuss für niedrige Zölle auf eine breite Palette von Produkten“, um die Steuerlast zu verteilen (Edling, 2014, S. 206). Auch auf Grundsteuern verzichtete der Kongress und beließ die traditionelle Einnahmequelle der Bundesstaaten. Auf diese Weise wurden sowohl die administrativen als auch die politischen Anforderungen eines effektiven und nachhaltigen Steuersystems erfüllt. Natürlich gab es Probleme. Finanzminister Salmon Chase ergriff zunächst keine direkten Maßnahmen zur Eintreibung von Einkommen- und Umsatzsteuern (Studenski und Krooss, 1963, S. 141), und später erwies sich die Steuerhinterziehung bei Alkohol- und Einkommensteuern als erheblich (S. 151). Trotz dieser Schwierigkeiten genoss das Steuersystem der Union jedoch ein hohes Maß an Legitimität und Steuerehrlichkeit – insbesondere im Vergleich zur Konföderation, wie wir im nächsten Abschnitt zeigen werden. Demnach verlief die Erhebung der Bundessteuern nach den meisten Berichten bemerkenswert reibungslos und entwickelte sich zu einer wahren Einnahmequelle. Ende 1863 generierte sie für die Regierung „erhebliche Einnahmen“ und finanzierte direkt ein Drittel oder mehr der Ausgaben. Bis 1865 dominierten die Binnensteuern die Bundeseinnahmen, die jedes Quartal die Vorkriegseinnahmen ganzer Jahre übertrafen und sogar verdoppelten (Edling, 2014, S. 183, 195, 210–212; Brownlee, 2016, S. 68). Von Anfang an war der Zusammenhang zwischen Besteuerung und der Aufrechterhaltung einer staatlichen Fiatwährung offensichtlich. Er wurde in der privaten Korrespondenz der politischen Entscheidungsträger, im Kongress und in der Presse immer wieder betont. „Nun also, erheben Sie eine Kriegssteuer von 200.000.000 Dollar und geben Sie 150.000.000 Dollar in Form von Demand Notes aus“, schrieb ein Korrespondent an Elbridge Spaulding, den Hauptautor des Greenback-Gesetzes. „Das Steuergesetz wird eine allgemeine Nachfrage nach den Treasury Notes schaffen und ihren Kurs auf oder nahe dem Nennwert halten“, schrieb ein anderer. Der Finanzminister wies ebenfalls darauf hin, dass ein „umsichtiges System angemessener Besteuerung“ eine Nachfrage nach den Banknoten schaffen würde (Spaulding, 1869, S. 23–25, S. 46). Als später im Krieg die Ausgabe weiterer Banknoten notwendig wurde, forderte die New York Times, „in einem Umfang besteuert zu werden, der dem enormen Volumen des im Umlauf befindlichen Schuldscheins angemessen entspricht“ (zitiert in Bank et al., 2008, S. 40). Der Kongress reagierte darauf mit einer erneuten Aufstockung des Steuersystems.Diese kurzen Ausführungen mögen die Funktionsweise des Fiatgeldkreislaufs vage erscheinen lassen. Doch ein Blick auf die Schriften eines einflussreichen Befürworters des US-Dollars aus der Vorkriegszeit lässt erahnen, was viele andere wohl dachten. In einer umfassenden Studie über Geld, Kredit und Bankwesen, die nur zwei Jahre vor dem Krieg veröffentlicht wurde, kam der gut vernetzte Anwalt und Eisenfabrikant Stephen Colwell aus Philadelphia zu dem Schluss, dass für den Werterhalt des Papiergeldes dessen Akzeptanz, nicht die Konvertierbarkeit in Edelmetalle, entscheidend war (Colwell, 1859, S. 235, S. 244). Die Akzeptanz wiederum hing vom Vertrauen der Bevölkerung ab, dass die Währung es ihnen zuverlässig ermöglichen würde, ihren Verpflichtungen nachzukommen. Colwell empfahl daher, dass die Regierungen „die gesamten Staatsausgaben“ mit gesetzlichen Zahlungsmitteln begleichen sollten, die „zur Begleichung aller Abgaben in ihren Staatskassen“ akzeptiert würden. Die einzige Einschränkung bestand darin, „nur so viel auszugeben, wie im normalen Geschäftsverlauf wieder eingeht“. Dies implizierte eine Methode zur Berechnung einer sicheren Ausgabemenge: Man begann mit einem Bruchteil der erwarteten Steuereinnahmen und erhöhte den Betrag schrittweise im Laufe der Zeit. „Aufgrund der gesammelten Erfahrungen“, so Colwells Überzeugung, „könnten die mit dieser Aufgabe betrauten Beamten eine solche Ausgabe ohne Gefahr einer Überproduktion bewältigen“ (Colwell, 1859, S. 22). Diese Argumentation erklärt auch die kürzeren Äußerungen von Colwells Mitstreitern, die sich für die Einführung der Greenbacks einsetzten. Als beispielsweise der New Yorker Republikaner Moses Grinnell schrieb: „Erhebt eine direkte Steuer von 150 oder 200 Millionen und gebt dann 150 Millionen Schatzanweisungen als gesetzliches Zahlungsmittel aus“ (Spaulding, 1869, S. 23), scheint er eine ähnliche Logik wie Colwell angewendet zu haben.&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt; Es geht hier nicht darum, dass solche Ansichten allgemein verbreitet waren – es gab vor, während und nach der Ausgabe der Greenbacks zahlreiche Skeptiker –, sondern vielmehr darum, dass deren Funktionsweise gut verstanden und leicht zu erklären war. Spaulding legte die Argumente ausführlich dar, als er Ende Januar 1862 vor dem Repräsentantenhaus für die ersten Emissionen plädierte. Das neue Steuergesetz lag zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch einige Monate in der Zukunft, die tatsächlichen Einnahmen noch weiter entfernt, doch der Kongress hatte seine Absicht bereits erklärt, und ein Unterausschuss des Finanzausschusses arbeitete intensiv daran. Spaulding versicherte daher, dass seine vorgeschlagenen Schatzanweisungen durch „angemessene Steuern, die durch neue Gesetze erhoben werden sollten“, gedeckt würden. Er betonte anschließend die Wichtigkeit der Umsetzung. „Das ist es, was die Bevölkerung wissen will“, beharrte er. „Wenn sie diese Schuldscheine annehmen, wollen sie die Gewissheit haben, ob Sie den Anspruch der Regierung auf das Eigentum des Landes in vollem Umfang durchsetzen werden, um die Schatzanweisungen einzulösen“ (Spaulding, 1869, S. 33–34). Die Greenbacks wurden somit in der allgemeinen Annahme ausgegeben, dass hohe Steuern folgen würden. Und so kam es auch. Wie Hugh Rockoff bemerkt: „Die Republikaner meinten es ernst mit den Steuern“ (Rockoff, 2015, S. 26).Dass der Kongress ein glaubwürdiges Versprechen abgeben konnte, „den Anspruch der Regierung auf das Eigentum des Landes durchzusetzen“, verdeutlicht den Nutzen unseres „verfassungsrechtlichen Ansatzes“. Es ging hier nicht darum, ob die Steuern perfekt auf die gesamte Menge der ausgegebenen Dollar-Scheine abgestimmt wären. Spauldings Forderung nach einer Verpflichtung zur „Einlösung der Schatzanweisungen“ meinte dies nicht. Dror Goldberg weist darauf hin, dass „eine Regierung, die zu viel Papiergeld ausgibt, damit eine Zeit lang durchkommt“, „weil Geld den Alltag aller Menschen bestimmt“ (Goldberg, 2014, S. 472). Die entscheidende Frage war, ob die Regierung die Legitimität besaß, ihre Versprechen in dem Maße einzulösen, wie es nötig war, um diese Kontrolle zu erhalten. 14 Eine effektive fiskalische und monetäre Leistungsfähigkeit dient hier als Indikator für politische Legitimität und gibt Aufschluss über das Vertrauen der Bürger in das vergleichsweise demokratische „Regierungsprojekt“ der Union. Der „Fiat-Kreislauf“ ist daher keine Frage der mechanischen Kontrolle der Geldmenge oder gar der Erwartungen an die Geldmenge, sondern der Schaffung eines breiten öffentlichen Vertrauens, das die „Geldprämie“ generieren kann, um den Wert der Recheneinheit zu erhalten. Genau hier scheiterte die Konföderation. Ihr monetärer Einfluss auf die Bevölkerung des Südens lockerte sich, schwand und brach schließlich vollständig zusammen. 4. STEUERN UND GELD IN DER KONFÖDERATION Die Konföderation hoffte, den Krieg mit Krediten finanzieren zu können, und schob ernsthafte Steuererhöhungen so lange hinaus, bis es zu spät war. Die Finanzpolitik der Konföderation war voller Widersprüche, angefangen bei der Absurdität ihrer Pläne, sich angesichts einer Seeblockade der Union auf die Besteuerung des internationalen Handels zu stützen. Der erste Schritt des Konföderationskongresses bestand kurioserweise darin, die Kosten der beschlagnahmten Bundeszollämter um „mindestens fünfzig Prozent“ zu senken (Todd, 1954, S. 121). Dies bedeutete Entlassungen und gefährdete potenziell die Einnahmen, auf die man sich verlassen wollte. Der Plan scheint nicht umgesetzt worden zu sein, doch das spielte kaum eine Rolle, da die verschärfte Blockade nur wenige Waren ins Land ließ. Obwohl der konföderierte Finanzminister Christopher H. Memminger Mitte 1861 prognostizierte, dass die Zolleinnahmen innerhalb eines Jahres 25 Millionen Dollar betragen würden, blieben die Einnahmen für den gesamten Krieg bei lediglich 3,5 Millionen Dollar. Die Konföderation erwog daraufhin Exportsteuern, offenbar immer noch unfähig, die Auswirkungen der Blockade zu begreifen. Memminger glaubte, dass durch Exportsteuern besicherte Anleihen ihren Marktwert besser hielten als andere Kredite. Es ist jedoch schwer vorstellbar, wie dies der Fall gewesen sein soll, da die Einnahmen aus Exportsteuern mit weniger als 40.000 Dollar für den Krieg äußerst gering waren (Todd, 1954, S. 121–127; Ball, 1991, S. 203–210; zu Kennzahlen der Blockadeeffektivität siehe Thornton und Ekelund, 2004, S. 35–36). Der Konföderiertenkongress verabschiedete im August 1861 eine „Kriegssteuer“, die einen pauschalen Steuersatz von einem halben Prozent auf Immobilien und bewegliches Vermögen erhob. Die Bewertung von Eigentum war genau das, womit die Südstaaten wenig Erfahrung hatten.Insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Sklaverei. In der Zeit vor dem Bürgerkrieg stellten einige Staaten von den einfacheren, auf der Kopfzahl basierenden Sklavensteuern (einem Pauschalbetrag pro Kopf) auf die administrativ aufwändigeren Wertsteuern (basierend auf dem geschätzten Wert) um. Diese Umstellungen stießen stets auf immensen Widerstand der Plantagenbesitzer, und das Ergebnis war oft keine tatsächliche Bewertung, sondern lediglich eine vereinfachte Zählung von Gruppen nach Alter und Geschlecht, entsprechend der gängigen Praxis der Sklavenhändler (Einhorn 2006; Thornton 1982; Rosenthal 2018). Infolgedessen führten die unterschiedlichen Bewertungsmethoden für Sklaven in den einzelnen Staaten während des Bürgerkriegs zu erheblichen Verzögerungen bei der Gesamtbewertung des Eigentums. Die vorliegende Forschung geht nicht näher auf die genauen Probleme ein, doch ist es möglich, dass inkompatible Sklavenlisten den Ausgleich zwischen den Bundesstaaten erschwerten oder zu Streitigkeiten führten (Todd, 1954, S. 133; Ball, 1991, S. 220, 224).15 Jedenfalls oblag die Erhebung der Steuern nach der Festsetzung fast ausschließlich den Bundesstaaten, von denen die meisten keine Steuern erhoben, sondern ihre Quoten durch die Aufnahme von Krediten (sogenannten „Graybacks“) beglichen, die mit ihren eigenen, nicht konvertierbaren Papiergeldemissionen finanziert wurden. Fast drei Viertel der bis Ende 1862 eingenommenen 17 Millionen Dollar waren in Wirklichkeit gar keine Steuereinnahmen (Todd 1954, S. 133–136; siehe Tabelle 2).¹⁶ Laut Burdekin und Langdana (1993, S. 357) „machte die Kriegssteuer erst 1864 auch nur 10 % der Gesamteinnahmen aus. Im ersten Jahr ihrer Einführung, 1862, stammten weniger als 5 % der Einnahmen aus dieser Steuer.“ Die „Graybacks“ erhielten weniger Unterstützung, als ihnen sonst zugestanden hätte, und das Währungssystem des Südens wurde weiter verkompliziert und unsicher. Es folgten fast zwei Jahre „verhängnisvoller Untätigkeit“, in denen keine zusätzlichen Steuern erhoben wurden, während sich die Währung und die Kreditwürdigkeit der Regierung verschlechterten (Ball, 1991, S. 227). Schließlich verabschiedete der Konföderiertenkongress im April 1863 ein wichtiges Steuergesetz, das jedoch in vielerlei Hinsicht grundlegend unzureichend war. Obwohl das Gesetz eine Einkommensteuer, Zölle auf Gewinne aus dem Handel mit wichtigen Rohstoffen, zahlreiche Gebühren für Berufslizenzen und eine Naturalsteuer auf Landwirtschaft umfasste, fehlte eine „direkte Steuer“ auf Eigentum, einschließlich des Eigentums von Sklaven.&lt;sup&gt;17&lt;/sup&gt; Obwohl die Erträge aus dem Anbau von Sklavenprodukten grundsätzlich der Einkommensteuer unterlagen, konnten Sklavenhalter größtenteils „ihre Beiträge zu einer neuen, eigens zu ihrem Vorteil gegründeten Nation umgehen“ (ebd., S. 234). Tatsächlich scheint Steuerhinterziehung weit verbreitet gewesen zu sein, da „zahlreiche Hindernisse das reibungslose Funktionieren des Steuersystems behinderten“ (Todd 1954, S. 145). So begann die Einkommensveranlagung beispielsweise mit einer Schätzung des Steuerzahlers selbst, die, falls vom Finanzamt angefochten, von einem Schiedsrichtergremium entschieden wurde, dessen Zusammensetzung der Steuerzahler mitbestimmt hatte (Mathews, 1863, S. 121–122). Ein solches Vorgehen begünstigte vermutlich die Sklavenhalter, die auf lokaler Ebene enorme Macht ausübten.18 Das eigentliche Problem des Steuergesetzes bestand jedoch darin, dass die Geldsteuer schlichtweg nicht ausreichte, um die steigenden Ausgaben und die rasant steigenden Preise zu decken. Die Sachsteuer funktionierte besser. „In den ersten neun Monaten des Jahres 1863 … machte sie mehr als die Hälfte der durchschnittlichen monatlichen Steuereinnahmen aus“, rief aber heftige Proteste hervor (Burdekin und Langdana, 1993, S. 357–358). Mit zehn Prozent der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion nach Abzug der Kosten, die ausreichten, um die Familien der Bauern zu ernähren, „erscheinte sie im Vergleich zur zweiprozentigen Währungssteuer auf Gehälter über 1.500 Dollar hoch und diskriminierend“ (Todd, 1954, S. 142; siehe auch Bank et al., 2008, S. 33; Hurt 2015, S. 132–134, 160). Da eine Naturalsteuer den Barwert der alten Veteranen nicht erhöhte, wurden diese dadurch nicht attraktiver, und die Inflation geriet immer weiter außer Kontrolle. Einige Südstaatler, die die Ursachen der Inflation nicht verstanden, wetterten gegen gierige Händler und Fabrikanten (McPherson, 1988, S. 441; Wilson, 2002, S. 60; Rockoff, 2015, S. 8). Andere einflussreiche Konföderierte hingegen durchschauten die Situation und äußerten ihre Meinung. Der „Richmond Enquirer“ wies wiederholt darauf hin, dass eine Fiatwährung ohne angemessene fiskalische Maßnahmen dasselbe Schicksal erleiden würde wie die Kontinentalwährungen der Revolutionszeit – und zwar aus demselben Grund: fehlende Besteuerung zur Werterhaltung. Der Herausgeber der führenden Wirtschaftszeitschrift des Südens, J. D. B. DeBow, bekräftigte diese Warnung, ebenso wie der einflussreiche Politiker Robert Toombs aus Georgia (zitiert in Phillips, 1913, S. 622–627). Kein Geringerer als John C. Calhoun hatte die Mechanismen bereits in den 1810er Jahren und erneut nach der Panik von 1837 akribisch erläutert und festgestellt, dass die Finanzpolitik der Bundesregierung „die gesamte Gesellschaft durchdringt … und natürlich eine allgemeine Nachfrage nach allem erzeugt, was sie als Geld einnimmt und ausgibt“ (Calhoun 1959, Bd. 14, S. 299; Todd 1954, S. 138; Ball 1991, S. 37–39, 50–51, 222–223). Das grundlegende Problem der Konföderation war, in den Worten von Memmingers Biografen, schlichtweg eine „Abneigung gegen interne Besteuerung“ (Capers 1893, S. 341). Laut McPherson verfügte die Konföderation über keine Mechanismen zur Erhebung interner Steuern, und ihre Bürger hatten keine Tradition, diese zu zahlen (McPherson, 1988, S. 38). Die umfassendste Darstellung dieses Sachverhalts, Balls treffend betiteltes Werk „Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat“, betont sowohl die administrativen als auch die politischen Schwächen, die diesen Einschätzungen zugrunde liegen. Ball (1991, S. 32, 42) merkt an, dass die südlichen Kolonien direkte Steuern so weit wie möglich mieden, selbst auf Kosten eines beklagenswerten Niveaus öffentlicher Dienstleistungen, und er macht den Mangel an einer effektiven demokratischen Regierung für die erstarrte Kriegspolitik der Konföderation verantwortlich. „Um ein Personal von Steuereinnehmern und -bewertern zu mobilisieren, das in der Lage war, direkte Steuern zu schätzen und zu erheben“, schlussfolgert er, „erforderte weit mehr Willen und, in geringerem Maße, mehr Geschick, als die Konföderation besaß“ (ebd., S. 226). Robert Toombs stimmte dem offenbar zu.In einem Brief an einen Kollegen vom Juni 1863 schrieb er: „Der Yankee-Kongress hat uns in Finanzfragen eindeutig schwer geschlagen“ (zitiert in Phillips, 1913, S. 619–20). Eine vollständige Aufklärung der Finanzpolitik der Konföderation wird wohl nie möglich sein, da viele der wichtigsten Beratungen des Kongresses in geheimer Sitzung stattfanden. Dies allein deutet auf ein Demokratiedefizit im Vergleich zur Union hin. Im Norden sandte Spaulding den ersten Entwurf seiner Fiatgeld-Initiative zur Veröffentlichung und Kommentierung an die New York Tribune (Spaulding, 1869, S. 13). Angesichts dessen und der täglichen Berichterstattung über die Finanzberatungen des Kongresses in der Presse mussten er und andere Mitglieder des Haushaltsausschusses des Repräsentantenhauses eine Reihe von Meinungen in privater Korrespondenz und in der Öffentlichkeit äußern. Die politischen Entscheidungsträger der Konföderation hielten ihre Karten deutlich geheimer. Sie schafften es nicht, „das Vertrauen des Volkes zu gewinnen“, wie Ball es ausdrückte, weil sie wenig Vertrauen in das Volk hatten (Ball, 1991, S. 209). Wie Drew Faust und Stephanie McCurry gezeigt haben, war das Projekt der Konföderation zutiefst antidemokratisch, einschließlich der Versuche, den Besitz als Voraussetzung für das Wahlrecht wieder einzuführen (Faust, 1988, S. 33–39; McCurry, 2010, S. 11–37). Einige Südstaatler beklagten sich insbesondere über die undemokratische Finanzpolitik. Eine öffentliche Versammlung in North Carolina erklärte die Naturalsteuer für „ungerecht und tyrannisch“, da sie „in geheimer Sitzung verabschiedet wurde … und den hart arbeitenden Menschen der Konföderation ein Zehntel ihres Lebensunterhalts nahm, anstatt ihnen ihre eigene Währung in Form von Steuern zurückzugeben“ (zitiert nach Schwab, 1901, S. 295). Aufschlussreich ist auch die Tatsache, dass in der Konföderation nicht der Kongress, sondern der Finanzminister die Steuern vorantrieb, während in der Union das Repräsentantenhaus – das demokratischste Organ der Bundesregierung – die gemeinsame Geld- und Steueragenda vorantrieb. Zumindest in diesem Fall scheint Einhorns positive Korrelation zwischen Demokratie und Besteuerung zuzutreffen. Die finanzielle Unfähigkeit der Konföderation sollte nicht mit fanatischem Einsatz für die Rechte der Einzelstaaten oder mangelndem Etatismus verwechselt werden. Tatsächlich gründeten die Parlamente der Südstaaten vor dem Bürgerkrieg viel häufiger Banken und Eisenbahnen als staatliche Unternehmen und verwendeten die Gewinne, zumindest teilweise, für den Ausbau staatlicher Dienstleistungen mit dem Ziel einer steuerfreien Regierung (Wallenstein, 1987; Murphy, 2017, S. 115–116; Quintana, 2018; Hall, 2019). Diese Politik war nur möglich, weil die Regierungen der Südstaaten von sklavenhaltenden Plantagenbesitzern dominiert wurden. Solange der Staat in Unternehmen investierte, die der Plantagenwirtschaft dienten, anstatt mit ihr zu konkurrieren, war staatliches Eigentum eine attraktive Option. Diese Erfahrung kam während des Krieges bei der umfassenden Übernahme der Industrie durch die Konföderation zum Tragen, was ihr unter anderem bemerkenswerte Erfolge im Bereich der Industrialisierung aus eigener Kraft ermöglichte (Morgan, 2005). Vor dem Krieg jedoch…Die Pflanzer zeigten sich entschieden uninteressiert an staatlichen Investitionen, die den Herstellern zugutekamen, wie etwa dem Bau von Transportwegen zu den Kohlevorkommen Virginias (Adams, 2004; Majewski, 2000). Die Unfähigkeit, den Agrarsektor während des Krieges zu disziplinieren, der trotz städtischer Nahrungsmittelknappheit weiterhin unverhältnismäßig große Flächen für Tabak und Baumwolle nutzte, unterstreicht die Bindung der Konföderation an die Pflanzerklasse (z. B. Hurt, 2015, S. 118–125; Schwab, 1901, S. 278–279). 5. VERGLEICHE Ohne eine solide Finanzbasis erwies sich der konföderierte Etatismus als chaotisch und weitgehend selbstzerstörerisch. Dies muss beim Vergleich der Konföderation und der Union hinsichtlich der Leistungsfähigkeit der Bundesstaaten berücksichtigt werden. In einer der einflussreichsten Darstellungen des konföderierten Staatsapparats argumentiert Richard Franklin Bensel, dass das konföderierte Steuersystem, gemessen an den gesetzlichen Steuersätzen, der Abdeckung und den erzielten Einnahmen, mehr Reichtum abschöpfte als das von der Union errichtete (Bensel, 1990, S. 170–171). Bensel zeigt, dass die Konföderation im ersten Jahr ihres wichtigsten Steuergesetzes (des Gesetzes von 1863) 82 Millionen Dollar sowie Sachleistungen im Wert von 40 Millionen Dollar einnahm, während die Union im selben Zeitraum lediglich 39 Millionen Dollar vereinnahmte. Unter Verweis auf den früheren Start der Union und die Abwertung der Steuergelder kommt er letztlich zu dem Schluss, dass die beiden Seiten in Bezug auf die Steuereinnahmen „annähernd gleichwertig“ waren (Bensel, 1990, S. 172). Bereinigt man die Zahlen jedoch um die Inflation, zeigt sich, dass Bensel die Schwere der Schwierigkeiten der Konföderation deutlich unterschätzt. Als das Steuergesetz der Konföderierten im April 1863 verabschiedet wurde, lag der Großhandelspreisindex bereits bei etwa 1.100 und erreichte im Januar 1864 fast 2.800 (im Vergleich zu den ersten vier Monaten des Jahres 1861; Lerner, 1955, S. 24, 29). Er stieg in den ersten Monaten des Jahres 1864 weiter an, als der Großteil der neuen Steuern eingenommen wurde (Todd, 1954, S. 145; Godfrey, 1978, S. 23; Ransom, 2001). Es ist durchaus sinnvoll anzunehmen, dass der durchschnittliche Preisindex während der Steuererhebung bei etwa 2.500 lag. Das bedeutet, dass die von Bensel erwähnten 82 Millionen Dollar real nur etwa 3,3 Millionen Dollar wert waren. Im Gegensatz dazu läge der konservative Durchschnittswert des Großhandelspreisindex der Union im ersten Jahr ihres internen Steuersystems bei 150. Dies entspräche real 26 Millionen US-Dollar, was einem fast achtfachen Vorteil gegenüber den Konföderierten Staaten von Amerika (CSA) entspräche. Ein realistischerer Preisindex von 130, so Mitchell, würde die Einnahmen der Union auf 30 Millionen US-Dollar erhöhen (Mitchell, 1908, S. 279). Selbst wenn man die Sachsteuer zu den Gesamteinnahmen der Konföderierten hinzurechnet (40 Millionen US-Dollar nominal = 1,7 Millionen US-Dollar real), ergibt sich ein Verhältnis von 6:1 zugunsten der Union – und das ein ganzes Jahr früher, als wichtige Schlachtfeldoperationen und Materialkäufe finanziert werden mussten. Zudem trug die Sachsteuer nicht zur Stützung der Währung bei, sondern verschärfte die Lage sogar, indem sie die Menge der verkaufbaren Güter verringerte (Lerner, 1954, S. 513). Die Gesamtsituation wird in Abbildung 5 dargestellt.Die Grafik zeigt die inflationsbereinigten Steuereinnahmen der Union und der Konföderation im Zeitverlauf. Die unregelmäßige Berichterstattung der Konföderation macht diese Visualisierung hilfreich. Das Ausmaß der fiskalischen Inkompetenz der Konföderation wird nun deutlich. Besonders die ersten drei Quartale des Jahres 1863 stechen hervor – eine Phase entscheidender Wendepunkte auf dem Schlachtfeld, in der die Einnahmenmaschinerie der Union auf Hochtouren lief, während der Gegner praktisch nichts einnahm. Es scheint daher, dass dem konföderierten Staatsapparat die grundlegende Eigenschaft eines modernen Staates fehlte: die Fähigkeit, Steuern in einer Weise zu erheben, die mit der Führung eines totalen Krieges vereinbar ist.&lt;sup&gt;19&lt;/sup&gt; Das Bild ist letztlich ähnlich, wenn Steuern und Banknotenausgaben den Staatsausgaben gegenübergestellt werden. Die unregelmäßige Berichterstattung des konföderierten Finanzministeriums erschwert erneut einen Vergleich mit der der Union, doch die Berichtszeiträume decken sich Ende 1862 und ermöglichen so eine vergleichende Momentaufnahme des Haushalts zu einem entscheidenden Zeitpunkt des Krieges. Wie Tabelle 3 zeigt, waren die Gesamtausgaben für die Jahre 1861 und 1862 nominell ähnlich, doch real waren die Ausgaben der Union fast doppelt so hoch wie die der Konföderation. Das BIP der Union war ähnlich hoch, etwa 2,5- bis 3,5-mal so hoch.&lt;sup&gt;20&lt;/sup&gt; Diese Verhältnisse decken sich weitgehend mit gängigen Vorstellungen über die taktischen Gegebenheiten des Krieges, wonach Angreifer (in der Regel die Union) eine zwei- bis dreifach überlegene Mannstärke benötigten, um die Vorteile der Verteidiger auszugleichen (z. B. Freehling 2001, S. 14; Knudsen 2022, S. 142). Tatsächlich rekrutierte die Union im Laufe des Krieges etwa 2,2 Millionen Soldaten, verglichen mit 800.000 bis 900.000 der Konföderation (Gallagher und Waugh 2015, S. 30), ein Verhältnis von 2,6:1,21. Insgesamt erscheint es daher plausibel anzunehmen, dass beide Regierungen bis Ende 1862 annähernd proportionale Forderungen an ihre jeweilige Wirtschaft gestellt hatten. Beide Regierungen finanzierten etwa drei Viertel ihrer Ausgaben durch die Ausgabe von Banknoten, wobei die Union die Differenz hauptsächlich durch Steuern, die Konföderation hingegen durch Kredite ausgleichte. Was hätte ein rationaler Beobachter zu diesem Zeitpunkt schließen können? Die Kriegslage war uneindeutig. Im September 1862 wehrte die Union in der Schlacht von Antietam einen großangelegten Angriff der Konföderierten auf ihr Territorium ab. Obwohl dies kein überwältigender Sieg der Union war, reichte er Lincoln, um die Vorläufige Emanzipationsproklamation zu erlassen – eine Maßnahme, die einen Krieg der nationalen Wiedervereinigung in einen Kampf um die Existenz der Sklaverei verwandelte. Doch die Aussichten der Union schienen Ende des Jahres zweifelhaft, da ihre Ostarmee in der Schlacht von Fredericksburg eine verheerende Niederlage erlitt und ihre Westarmee, im Schlamm des Mississippi festgefahren, gezwungen war, einen Angriff auf die Konföderiertenfestung Vicksburg abzubrechen. „Dies waren dunkle Tage in Washington“, schreibt McPherson (1988, S. 574). Die militärischen Enttäuschungen in Verbindung mit der politisch umstrittenen Hinwendung zur Emanzipationspolitik stärkten die Position der sogenannten „Friedensdemokraten“, die ein Verhandlungsende des Krieges befürworteten.Ein solches Szenario hätte die Finanzen der Union schwer belastet, da eine unabhängige Konföderation Freihandel betrieben und vermutlich den Handelsverkehr von New York nach New Orleans umgeleitet hätte. Dies hätte die Zolleinnahmen der Union, eine wichtige Goldquelle, erheblich geschmälert. Zudem war das Haushaltsdefizit der Union (Ausgaben abzüglich Steuereinnahmen) im Laufe des Jahres sprunghaft angestiegen, von 25 Millionen Dollar Ende 1861 auf 423 Millionen Dollar Ende 1862 – ein Anstieg um fast 1.588 Prozent (siehe Abbildung 6). Kurz gesagt: Obwohl die größere Wirtschaftskraft der Union ihr höhere Kriegsausgaben ermöglichte, hätten ihr größerer Bedarf als Angreifer in einem Krieg, der die Verteidigung begünstigte, ihr beträchtliches Haushaltsdefizit, das größtenteils durch Fiatgeld finanziert wurde (siehe Tabelle 3), und ihre unsichere Kriegslage Finanzexperten Anlass zur Sorge geben können. Angesichts der ungewissen und fernen Aussichten auf eine Rückkehr zur Konvertibilität des US-Dollars hielten sich die Kurse jedoch recht gut. Der Warren-Pearson-Großhandelspreisindex für Januar 1863 zeigt, dass der Greenback im Vergleich zum Januar 1861 36,9 % des Wertes eines Vorkriegs-Golddollars verloren hatte. Demgegenüber weist Lerners allgemeiner Preisindex der Konföderation einen Wertverlust des Graybacks von 654 % bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt im Vergleich zum Januar 1861 aus (Lerner, 1955, S. 24). Ein ähnlicher Vergleich der Goldpreise der Union und der Konföderation ergibt ein vergleichbares Bild. Der durchschnittliche Goldpreis in Greenbacks stieg im Vergleich zum Januar 1862 um 41,5 %, während der Preis eines Golddollars in Richmond im gleichen Zeitraum um 136,4 % zunahm (Mitchell, 1908, S. 5; Burdekin und Weidenmier, 2001, S. 1629). Diese Zahlen legen nahe, dass die Zusagen der Union zur drastischen Erhöhung der internen Steuereinnahmen als glaubwürdig wahrgenommen wurden – ein Umstand, der der Konföderation eindeutig fehlte. Diese Glaubwürdigkeitslücke wiederum rührte von einem allgemeineren Mangel an demokratischer Legitimität her. Das Bild lässt sich anhand der Dynamik von Hyperinflation in anderen Kontexten verdeutlichen. In einer Untersuchung von Hyperinflationsphasen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg hebt Velde (2016) hervor, dass deren Ende von der Fähigkeit der einzelnen Staaten abhing, ihre Staatshaushalte auszugleichen, unter anderem durch ausreichende Steuern oder glaubwürdige Ankündigungen zukünftiger Einnahmen. Überträgt man Veldes Analyse auf den Bürgerkrieg, so wäre zu erwarten, dass die Union ein ähnliches Inflationsniveau wie die Konföderation aufweisen würde, da ihr Haushaltsdefizit Ende 1862 etwas höher war (Abbildung 6 und Tabelle 3). Doch zu diesem Zeitpunkt war die Inflation in der Konföderation achtzehnmal höher (siehe Abbildungen 2 und 3). Übertragen wir hingegen die hier durchgeführte Analyse des Bürgerkriegs auf das Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit, so möchten wir darauf hinweisen, dass alle fünf untersuchten Länder – Österreich, Ungarn, Deutschland, Polen und Russland – von revolutionären oder beinahe revolutionären Situationen geprägt waren. Solche Umstände können die staatlichen Funktionen unterbrechen und dadurch den Kreislauf der Dekrete schwächen oder gar durchbrechen.Veldes eigene Anerkennung der französischen Revolutionsassaztaten und der amerikanischen Revolutionskontinentalstaaten als vergleichbare Fälle belegt zudem, dass Hyperinflation ebenso sehr Folge wie Ursache des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenbruchs ist. Was sich an den Haushaltsdefiziten dieser Regierungen messen lässt, hängt somit vom vorangegangenen Zusammenbruch der staatlichen Legitimität ab. Die Situation der Konföderation war historisch spezifisch. Ihre Sezession war zutiefst konservativ, eine dezidiert konterrevolutionäre Bewegung. Sie bewahrte die US-Verfassung nahezu intakt und stärkte lediglich den Schutz der Sklaverei. Die versklavte Bevölkerung hegte zweifellos revolutionäre Bestrebungen, konnte aber nur in unmittelbarer Nähe von Unionstruppen massenhaft agieren. Die Konföderation war in der Lage, sich selbst mit Nahrungsmitteln und Ressourcen zu versorgen und fand ausreichend Mittel, um Waffen im Ausland zu kaufen. Das Scheitern der Konföderation wurzelte vielmehr in einem Staatsapparat, dessen administrative und politische Kapazitäten für die Bedürfnisse eines modernen Krieges zu archaisch waren. Er war nicht in der Lage, die notwendigen Finanzmechanismen aufzubauen, um reale Ressourcen in dem erforderlichen Umfang zu mobilisieren. In diesem Zusammenhang kann die Bedeutung der langen Verzögerung bei der Einführung des internen Steuersystems der Konföderation nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden. Dies belegt die begrenzte Legitimität des Regierungsprojekts der Konföderation, das durch das Versäumnis, eine offensichtliche Notwendigkeit zu erfüllen, die unvermeidliche Inflation der Kriegszeit in eine Hyperinflation umschlagen ließ. Dies führte zu einer Kaskade von Problemen, deren Auswirkungen mit jedem Schritt nach unten zunahmen. All diese Probleme rührten daher, dass die konföderierten Führer, indem sie die Geldausgabe nicht in angemessenem Maße an die Steuererhöhungen anpassten, die Fähigkeit des Geldes, soziale Ansprüche auf allgemein als gerecht empfundene Weise zu verteilen, zunichtemachten. Dies schwächte den Einfluss des Geldes auf das tägliche Leben der Bevölkerung fatal (Goldberg, 2014, S. 472). Die Inflation schürte die Unzufriedenheit in der Bevölkerung, die sich am deutlichsten in den zahlreichen Lebensmittelunruhen von 1863 manifestierte. Diese wurden mit einer Kombination aus Unterdrückung und ineffektiver Preiskontrolle bekämpft (Hurt 2015; Cashin 2011; Abb. 4). In manchen Regionen führte die Hyperinflation zu einer Tauschwirtschaft oder zur Verwendung von Weizen oder Goldbarren als Zahlungsmittel, was einen vollständigen Wertverlust für die Greenbacks bedeutete (Schwab, 1901, S. 163–164; Pecquet, 1987; Hurt, 2015, S. 134, 138; Carpenter, 2020, S. 170–175; Seward, 1863). Tatsächlich wurden die Greenbacks der Union, die Währung des Feindes, selbst in den „führenden Zentren der Konföderation“ bevorzugt (Schwab, 1901, S. 161). Die Hyperinflation beeinträchtigte zudem die Produktion, sodass nach der Einführung des Steuersystems weniger zu besteuern war. Die Produktion wurde zusätzlich gehemmt, als die Regierung auf Zwangsrekrutierung zu unter dem Marktpreis liegenden Preisen zurückgriff (Hurt, 2015, S. 120–127, 161–162; Schwab, 1901, S. 203–205). „Nachdem sie unter der Zwangsrekrutierung gelitten hatten“, berichten mehrere Wissenschaftler, „stellten die Bauern den Anbau neuer Feldfrüchte einfach ein“ (Bank et al., 2008, S. 29–30).Die Verzögerung der Konföderation schwächte die Finanzkraft zusätzlich, da sie die Möglichkeit verpasste, in Gebieten Steuern zu erheben, die von Unionstruppen besetzt werden sollten. Kurz gesagt, es ist schwer nachzuvollziehen, wie die Einnahmenpolitik der Konföderation als Maßstab für staatliche Leistungsfähigkeit mit der der Union gleichgesetzt werden kann. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es potenziell irreführend, von der „Abschöpfung“ von Steuern zu sprechen – ein Ausdruck, der dem „kriegerischen“ oder „fiskalisch-militärischen Modell“ der Staatsentwicklung entstammt.&lt;sup&gt;22&lt;/sup&gt; Bensels Ansicht kommt vielleicht Charles Tillys verallgemeinerter Version dieses Modells am nächsten, die die Staatsmacht nicht nur von der reinen Finanzkraft, sondern auch vom Entwicklungsstand der Gesellschaft abhängig macht, aus der sie stammt (Tilly, 1992). Das Problem einer solchen Formulierung besteht darin, dass sie zu scharf zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft/Wirtschaft unterscheidet, sodass der Staat völlig außerhalb der Gesellschaft/Wirtschaft zu stehen scheint und daher in einem permanenten Bestreben nach „Abschöpfung“ von Reichtum gefangen ist. 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Steuern und Sklaverei im Süden der Vorkriegszeit, Journal of Southern History, Bd. 26, Nr. 2, S. 180–200. Wray, LR 1998. Modernes Geld verstehen: Der Schlüssel zu Vollbeschäftigung und Preisstabilität, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing.</div>

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<p>Administrator: Die Seite wurde neu angelegt: „Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar History Faculty Publications History 3-2023 The Mone The Money War: Democr ar: Democracy, Taxes and Inflation in the U.S. Civil es and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War Ariel Ron aron@smu.edu Sofia Valeonti American University of Paris, svaleonti@aup.edu Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_history_research Recommended Citation Ron, Ariel, and Sofia Valeonti. 2023. “The Money…“</p> <hr /> <div>Southern Methodist University SMU Scholar History Faculty Publications History 3-2023 The Mone The Money War: <br /> Democr ar: <br /> Democracy, Taxes and Inflation in the U.S. Civil es and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War <br /> Ariel Ron aron@smu.edu <br /> Sofia Valeonti American University of Paris, svaleonti@aup.edu Follow this and additional works at: <br /> https://scholar.smu.edu/hum_sci_history_research Recommended Citation Ron, Ariel, and Sofia Valeonti. 2023. <br /> “The Money War: Democracy, Taxes and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 47: 263–88. doi:10.1093/cje/bead006. <br /> This document is brought to you for free and open access by the History at SMU Scholar.<br /> It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. <br /> For more information, please visit <br /> http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.<br />  <br /> THE MONEY WAR <br /> Democracy, Taxes, and Inflation in the U.S. Civil War <br /> (accepted version) <br /> <br /> Ariel Ron / Southern Methodist University / aron@smu.edu <br /> Sofia Valeonti / The American University of Paris &amp; Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University / svaleonti@aup.edu (corresponding author) <br /> <br /> Abstract <br /> Both sides in the U.S. Civil War financed military spending by issuing new fiat currencies. The Union “greenback” underwent moderate inflation (by wartime standards), but the Confederate “grayback” suffered hyperinflation. Existing explanations for these price movements typically treat only one of the two cases and adopt either a quantity-theory or rational-expectations approach. We compare Union and Confederate policies directly and highlight the importance of taxation for assuring the value of inconvertible money. Combining monetary and fiscal history literatures, we find that tax policies were determined by long-term development of democratic governing institutions. Higher levels of democracy in the North, as compared to the slaveholding South, meant greater tax policy legitimacy and administrative competence. The Union drew on this legacy to back its money effectively, while the Confederacy failed to do so. We contribute to credit-money theories by drawing attention to the political determinants of effective fiscal policy. <br /> Keywords hyperinflation, fiat currency, Confederate States of America, U.S. Civil War, taxation <br /> JEL Classifications B52, E52, N110 <br /> Acknowledgments <br /> We wish to thank the participants of the 2019 European Historical Economics Society Conference, the Early American Money Symposium at Brown University, the Colorado State PhD seminar, the H2M seminar of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, and the Paris School of Economics Economic History Seminar, as well as Jeff Althouse, Nicolas Barreyre, Ghislain Deleplace, Claire Federspiel, Laurent Le Maux, Noam Magor, John Majewski, and Romain Svartzman for their comments and suggestions. All errors remaining are our responsibility.<br />  <br /> 1. INTRODUCTION In the spring of 1864, the U.S. Civil War still had a year of hard fighting ahead, but the outcome already seemed clear to some observers. The situation was expressed by a political cartoon l (figure 1) showing the Union president, Abraham Lincoln, and his Confederate counterpart, Jefferson Davis, slugging it out with sacks of cash. “Better give in Jeff,” Lincoln boasts, “you haven’t a chance! don’t you see I’ve the LONGEST PURSE.” Piled boxes lie at the feet of the combatants, the ones beside Lincoln marked “gold bars,” the ones beside Davis, “uncurrent money.” The caption declares a “Final Issue of the War”—a double entendre that evokes Union victory and the last emission of worthless Confederate paper. But the cartoon goes awry in suggesting that the health of the Union’s treasury notes rested on its gold inventories, for both sides had abandoned gold-backed currencies early in the conflict. Something else, then, supported the Union’s monetary superiority, which enabled it to convert a substantial advantage in raw economic capacity at the start of the war into the much larger edge in the mobilization of real resources needed to conquer the vast geographic expanse of Confederate America. The Union and the Confederacy each issued huge quantities of inconvertible paper money to pay for unprecedented wartime expenses. Both experienced price changes, but in completely different proportions (figures 2 and 3). Whether measured in gold, wholesale or consumer indices, Union prices rose by roughly a factor of two over the course of the war. This was a rate of inflation similar to the American experience in the First and Second World Wars and one wholly adequate to sustaining a relatively booming wartime economy (McPherson, 1988, p. 447; David and Solar, 1977, pp. 16-17; Warren et al.1932, pp. 6-10; Mitchell 1908, p. 279). The Confederacy, however, suffered hyperinflation, with both wholesale and gold prices rising nearly sixtyfold by the start of 1865, a situation that left its economy in chaos (Lerner,<br />  <br /> 1955, p. 24; Todd, 1954, p. 189). If the cartoon is wrong to suggest that gold accounted for the difference, what did? Most scholars attribute Civil War price movements either to the amount of money issued (the quantity theory, or QT) or to rational expectations regarding money’s future value (RE). For the Confederate case, Lerner (1954, 1955, 1956) emphasizes the rise in the stock and velocity of money, as well as the southern economy’s declining output. Godfrey (1978) similarly highlights the importance of changes in the money supply. By contrast, several scholars adopt the rational-expectations approach and correlate price movements with news items. Burdekin and Langdana (1993), McCadless (1996), and Weidenmier (2002) each adopt the rational expectations approach and show that price movements tracked news about military, fiscal and monetary events. 1 The Union’s price history is also typically explained within the QT and RE traditions. For Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 59, ft. 1964), and Studenski and Krooss (1963, p. 147), the determining factor was the quantity of money in circulation. They argue that inflation would have been limited if a greater part of the war had been funded with taxes rather than money issues. Alternatively, Calomiris (1988B) demonstrates that the Union’s price level was not determined by the current money supply but rather by rational expectations about its future supply, which, in turn, depended on fiscal news.2 For Calomiris, any policy concerning the political will to resume specie payments in the future was a form of fiscal news. Two other approaches of note, though distinct, can be grouped together as especially concerned with historically specific interactions between policies and institutions. Wray (1998, pp. 65-69) deploys modern monetary theory (MMT) to attribute the Confederacy’s hyperinflation to insufficient taxation, which caused a shortfall of demand for its note issues. From an older institutionalist perspective, Mitchell (1903, p. 198) argues that the value of the greenbacks “depended upon the credit of the issuer,” which refersto the confidence that holders<br />  <br /> of greenbacks accorded to the “government’s ability to ultimately redeem its notes.” Confidence in the government’s ability depended on both structural and contingent factors, including the quantity of paper money issued (the more money, the more difficult the repayment) and the occurrence of “financial, military, political, and diplomatic events” (p. 201), such as reports from the Secretary of the Treasury and news about the government’s ability to borrow or the military’s battlefield advances and reverses. Each of these accounts has its merits, yet while all accord fiscal policy a prominent role in controlling either the current or expected money supply, none consider how fiscal policy was actually made and implemented. Nor do any of these accounts attempt a consistent comparison of the Union and Confederate cases. We aim to remedy these deficiencies by arguing for systemic differences between Union and Confederate fiscal capacities that resulted from larger historical divergences in governing philosophy and practice. We differ from QT and RE scholars not only in method but in what we seek to explain. Rather than examine precise price movements, we ask why the Union currency succeeded where the Confederate currency failed. It is surely instructive to ascertain the reasons for short-term price changes, but it is at least as important to understand why one policy achieved its basic aims—facilitating a winning war strategy—while the other did not. Our approach is closer to Mitchell’s and Wray’s, each of which regards state action as decisive. Yet we pay far more attention to the actual taxation measures that in one case reinforced monetary design and in the other case undermined it. A comparative investigation of Union and Confederate money creation requires a theoretical framework that can account for the political and administrative capacities of the state. We begin with Christine Desan’s “constitutional approach to money.” Contrary to the standard economic interpretation of money that sees it as the spontaneous result of private exchange, Desan regards money as a “governance project” (Desan 2014, p. 1, 7, 12; see also Desan, 2017). Money, in her view, is a product of institutions and state designs that make it<br />  <br /> possible for certain materialized practices—the coining of silver, the printing of paper notes, the coding of magnetic strips mounted on plastic cards—to take on the attributes of money. The successful implementation of such projects depends on the state’s fiscal actions and legal norms. The state creates money, in the first instance, by making purchases with designated tokens that it will subsequently accept for the discharge of the tax obligations it imposes. This “fiat loop,” by which the state issues payments and takes them back, confers on money what Desan calls “fiscal value.” In other words, tax obligations generate the demand for state monies that endow them with worth. The state can also make its designated tokens transferable among private parties by agreeing to accept them from anyone (not just the original payee) and by enforcing a legal order that recognizes money as lawful clearance of private contractual obligations (legal tender). Monetary tokens’ resulting general acceptance—“the capacity to travel from hand to hand as carriers of value recognized by all participants”—adds what Desan calls a “cash premium,” enhancing their value further.3 These basic criteria can be operationalized in many ways, each with its own social and political implications. The constitutional approach to money is particularly apposite for comparing the Union and the Confederate monetary experiences. Public acceptability of the new currencies could not be taken for granted, for while Americans were well acquainted with paper money in the form of bank notes, which were backed in principle by gold convertibility, they had little experience with inconvertible government notes. The essential difference in monetary designs lay in diverging tax capacities: the Union was able to implement an operative taxing system, while the Confederacy largely failed to do so. In Desan’s terms, the Confederacy failed to close the fiat loop. It was therefore unable to confer fiscal value on its paper emissions, nor a cash premium, leaving its citizens without adequate means to carry on ordinary business transactions. The result was a badly malfunctioning economy even in the vast areas of the South<br />  <br /> where Union armies remained distant and the slave system continued to function relatively undisturbed. As a practical matter, it is easier for governments to put money out than to call it back in (e.g. Rockoff, 2015, p. 8). The taxing part of Desan’s equation requires not only a willingness to impose obligations but an ability to collect on them. This ability cannot be realized overnight. At one level, there is the administrative challenge of setting up a competent taxing authority. At a deeper level, there is the political challenge of fostering a reasonable degree of popular compliance. Because, therefore, designing a sound monetary system in theory is not the same thing as implementing a functional one in reality, we argue that Union and Confederate monetary experiences were strongly conditioned by their respective prior taxing capacities. The Union’s antebellum legacy allowed it to massively scale up and significantly transform its revenue system; the Confederacy’s did not. It is here that the constitutional approach proves its relevance, because it expands the study of price movements to encompass the underlying monetary architecture within which QT and RE factors took shape. This draws our attention to the long-term institutional trajectories revealed by Einhorn’s (2006) comparative study of northern and southern tax regimes from the colonial era to the antebellum periods. Einhorn’s conception of taxing capacity can be decomposed into two distinct but correlated competencies: skilled tax administration and deliberative tax politics. This means that, at least in the United States, more democracy has tended to generate better taxation for public purposes desired by the electorate.4 Conversely, slaveholders’ distrust of democratic institutions—engendered by their philosophical commitment to social hierarchy and their pragmatic fear that ordinary voters might want to tax slavery out of existence—led to colonial and state governments that were “more aristocratic, weaker, and less competent where slavery was a major institution in the economy and society,” as compared to their freer northern peers (Einhorn 2006, p. 7).5<br />  <br /> Taking the joint perspective of Desan and Einhorn, Civil War monetary and tax policies appear intrinsically linked, forming distinctive Union and Confederate fiscal regimes fundamentally reflective of their respective state-making projects. These fiscal regimes profoundly structured the manner in which the state made claims on its society and even on how society’s members made binding claims upon one another in their private interactions. It is little surprise, then, that a slave society should differ substantially, perhaps inevitably, from a relatively free and democratic one even in its money. Because the Civil War split a polity and society that shared many things in common— an English Protestant cultural heritage, common law and constitutionalist legal tradition, capitalist and settler-colonial ethos, and more—it offers something like a natural experiment able to contribute broader insights to credit theories of money.6 We stress the long-run significance of state formation and the institutional history of taxing capacity to provide statebacked credit-money theories with a more realistic conception of how states operate and develop. While it is often useful and appropriate to make analytical distinctions between the legal, political, and economic spheres, in the case of credit theories of money such categorical boundaries are artificial and misleading. For the chartalist approach, money is tax-driven and thus inextricably bound up with the historically determined capacities of the state. Consequently, it is necessary to account for the capacities and debilities of the fiscal authority, that is, the determinants of fiscal policy horizons, if one is to give a convincing account of transformation in the monetary architecture, such as occurred during the US Civil War. In this paper, we sketch our proposed argument by way of a synthesis and critique of the existing literatures on American fiscal and monetary regimes before and during the Civil War. Our approach is necessarily narrative in order to capture the essential dynamics of the problem. In future, we may subject elements of the argument to more rigorous testing with additional archival research and empirical detail.<br />  <br /> 2. THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY LEGACIES The Union’s policy of paper money issuance coupled with robust tax increases harked back to the “currency finance” practices of the British North American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Spaulding, 1869, pp. 39-40). In these earlier episodes, colonial governments financed wartime expenditures by issuing paper money on a temporary basis and simultaneously passing commensurate tax increases that would eventually call the notes back. This combination endowed the notes with fiscal value, giving the government purchasing power that effectively anticipated future tax receipts. Given the chronic scarcity of specie associated with the colonies’ structural trade deficits, the public also tended to demand notes for ordinary business transactions. Desan’s two key elements, fiscal value and the cash premium, were thus firmly in place (Ferguson, 1961; Perkins, 1997; Newell, 1998; Grubb, 2006; Goldberg, 2014). At the outbreak of the Civil War, both northern and southern policymakers proposed something similar. Interestingly, their primary point of reference seems not to have been the colonial legacy but rather the British use of inconvertible bills of credit during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, which they saw as a successful means for preserving England’s “imperilled existence” (Spaulding, 1869, p. 39).7 The reason for this amnesia was probably the disastrous experience with paper note issues, known as “continentals,” during the American Revolution. The continentals’ rapid depreciation resulted from the national state’s inability to tax. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress lacked this crucial fiscal power, but even had it been granted such a power, it could scarcely have executed it in practice, because the creation of a continental taxing authority was beyond both the political and administrative capacities of a nascent postcolonial state (Einhorn, 2008, pp. 127- 28). Consequently, there was no mechanism to generate demand for the continentals or to retire<br />  <br /> them (Calomiris, 1988A; Grubb, 2006, pp. 46-47; Goldberg, 2014, p. 481). Instead of taxing directly, Congress depended on the individual states to do so in compliance with requests for funds, known as requisitions. But the states preferred to save revenues for their own needs, including support for their own paper issues, which nevertheless suffered depreciation because of wartime disruptions to their fiscal apparatuses. The general fiasco led subsequent US officials to repudiate the policy of currency finance and virtually to erase it from public memory.8 The Revolutionary story underscores the fact that successful implementation of currency finance depended not only on calibrating money issues to tax increases, but also on executing tax collections. In the Civil War, the Union was able to do both while the Confederacy was able to do neither. Although most of the fighting occurred on southern soil and the Union’s naval blockade prevented the Confederacy from receiving significant customs duties, the slaveholders’ problem was not fundamentally about wartime disruptions. Union armies did not penetrate the enormous southern interior until late in the war and large areas remained undisturbed when hostilities concluded (Downs, 2015). Moreover, the Confederacy inherited the existing federal governmental presence in the South, including buildings and personnel, basically intact. The American revolutionaries, by contrast, comprised a tenuous alliance of colonial legislatures and ad hoc committees that struggled to govern their backcountry populations and take hold of administrative functions previously handled by royal governors. The difference between Union and Confederate taxing policies is therefore best understood as an outgrowth of long-term institutional developments that bequeathed to the northern free states robust taxing capacity absent from the southern slave states. Here we turn to Einhorn’s comparative study of northern and southern taxing traditions stretching back to the colonial period. Einhorn’s finding that taxing capacity in early America was closely related to democratic institutions—that more democracy meant more taxing<br />  <br /> power—might seem counterintuitive. The relationship is often thought to be the reverse. People dislike taxes, the thinking goes, so if they obtain a voice in government they will seek to reduce their burdens as much as possible. Was not the American Revolution, after all, a great tax revolt? Not exactly. The revolutionary slogan “no taxation without representation” did not oppose taxes per se but rather conditioned them on political voice. In point of fact, once Americans gained the ability to govern themselves they sometimes asked for more rather than less taxes, when they believed those taxes served a public purpose. As Lincoln famously put it, “the legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and individual capacities” (Lincoln, 1953, 2:220-222, emphasis in original). Indeed, some Confederates played on the revolutionary slogan to criticize Confederate fiscal debility by objecting to “representation without taxation” (quoted in Todd, 1954, p. 138). There were major differences in the amount of democracy that antebellum Americans enjoyed. Gender- and race-based exclusions were national, but wherever slavery was dominant, democratic institutions suffered more. Slaveholders were powerful people schooled in what Thomas Jefferson called “the most unremitting despotism” (Jefferson, 1998, p. 168).9 By contrast, the northern colonies and later states tended to be more egalitarian and more democratic than their southern neighbors. They also tended to tax themselves more for things like roads and schools. The disparity between North and South is instantly evident, for example, by looking at the antebellum canal network, which was built largely with state funds (Larson, 2001; Taylor, 1951, p. 35). Comparative measures of public education and scientific funding display a similar sectional skew, even when soil type and other environmental conditions were indistinguishable (Majewski, 2016; Ron, 2020). This kind of pattern—linking more democratic governments with greater taxation and, sometimes, lower inequality—has been observed for the Americas generally and for Europe, modern and ancient (Sokoloff and<br />  <br /> Zolt, 2007; Tilly, 2009; Van Zanden and Prak, 2006; Tan 2017). As Findlay and O’Rourke put it, “states based on citizenship rather than coercion could actually levy more taxes, not fewer” (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007, p. 350). The northern free states thus had a substantially greater taxing capacity than their southern slave counterparts. This capacity can be regarded in two aspects: administration and politics. Administratively, northern states implemented more complex tax systems that addressed both revenue and equity issues. In particular, northern states had much greater ability to assess property values at market rates, to equalize values across locales lest tax officials try to under-assess their friends and neighbors, and to levy taxes in relatively fair proportion to taxpayers’ means and benefits. This ability, in turn, derived from the habits of a democratic society accustomed to “local decision making” and “ongoing, everyday political negotiation between taxpayers and elected local officials” (Einhorn, 2006, p. 29; 2008, p. 202). The significance of democratic practice for state capacity was that it generated legitimacy and compliance that allowed tax administrators to do their jobs. It also tended to generate more responsive and broadly conceived economic development policies that grew the taxable pie (Brownlee 2016, pp. 54-57). Democracy meant figurative and literal buy-in. Southern state governments eventually learned from their northern counterparts and began to close the taxation gap in the 1840s and 1850s (Thornton, 1982). They also innovated by introducing “uniformity clauses” requiring all forms of property to be assessed and taxed at the same rate (Einhorn, 2006, pp. 201-202). With the nonslaveholding white majority thus restrained from imposing discriminatory taxes on enslaved wealth, slaveholders favored new revenues to finance railroad construction and even public education (for whites). Yet on the eve of the Civil War southern states still lagged northern states in taxes per capita and per unit of GDP (Figure 4).<br />  <br /> 3. TAXES AND MONEY IN THE UNION Union and Confederate fiscal regimes took shape when long-term institutional trajectories intersected with wartime exigencies. Both sides initially intended to rely on bond issues, as the US had done in earlier major wars (Edling, 2014). However, the scale of military needs quickly overwhelmed both governments’ ability to borrow. The Confederacy never surmounted this difficulty, whereas the Union eventually created new and very successful borrowing channels. According to one conservative measure, the Confederate States financed only 21,3% of their war effort via bond issues, while the Union’s corresponding figure was 64,5% (Godfrey, 1978, p. 14). In the short term, however, the Union, too, required other means. Both governments turned to emissions of paper treasury notes. The resulting policies shared some broad similarities. Both the Union “greenbacks” and the Confederate “graybacks,” as the notes came to be known, were exchangeable for interestbearing bonds of their respective issuing governments, a policy intended to encourage lending and public acceptance of the notes.10 Both currencies were also accompanied by promises to raise taxes in order to uphold their values. But only the Union was able to implement new taxes effectively (Brownlee, 2016, pp. 60-68; Edling, 2014, pp. 206-212; Bank et al., 2008, pp. 23-47).11 “In its financial mobilization for war,” writes the tax historian, W. Elliot Brownlee, “the Union had an advantage over the Confederacy because of the extended fiscal experimentation by Northern state governments” in the antebellum era (Brownlee, 2016, p. 65). In addition to raising tariff rates, Union officials began planning for heavy internal taxation as early as July 1861 and a month later imposed the nation’s first-ever income tax. They subsequently invested great effort in elaborating a system remarkable for its breadth and reach. The result, in July 1862, was a law “running hundreds of pages” that “taxed almost everything but the air northerners breathed” (Edling, 2014, p. 206; McPherson, 1988, p. 447). Additional rounds of legislation expanded the tax base and raised<br />  <br /> rates further. Yet “Republican leaders did not face significant resistance to the huge new taxes or need to rely on coercion for their collection,” Brownlee (2016, p. 60) observes, thanks to their “broad electoral popularity.” Max Edling (2014, p. 208) adds, in his recent study of early American war finance, that congressional debates over the first major internal revenue act are “noteworthy most of all for the willingness of the lawmakers to support the war.” The London Times opined that “one tenth of these taxes would bring any American community to the resistance point in a month,” but historians and contemporaries alike have repeatedly marveled at ordinary northerners’ eagerness to bear their share of the joint burden (cited in Ball, 1991, p. 221). “I have never before seen a country where the people were clamorous for taxation,” remarked one incredulous foreign observer in 1862 (Bank et al., 2008, p. 37).12 If this was a fiscal system that enjoyed democratic legitimacy, it was one that also enjoyed adroit political and administrative management. The House Ways and Means Committee took its time drafting legislation, but Congress publicly committed itself six months earlier to raising taxes as “a statement of intent meant to reassure public creditors” (Edling, 2014, p. 205). The July 1862 law raised the rates and progressivity of the income tax and added a first-ever federal inheritance tax to balance the regressivity of stepped-up customs and excises. Congress also selectively took lessons from abroad. It adopted the British administrative innovation of tax withholding (“stoppage at the source”) for collecting income taxes on corporate dividends and government employee salaries (Brownlee, 2016, p. 67). But “rather than impose high duties on a few items, like Britain did, the Ways and Means Committee opted for low duties on a wide range of manufactures” to spread the burden around (Edling, 2014, p. 206). Congress also stayed away from property taxes, leaving the states their traditional revenue base. In these ways, it addressed both the administrative and political requirements of an effective and sustainable tax regime. To be sure, there were problems. Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase initially took no direct action to collect income and revenue<br />  <br /> taxes (Studenski and Krooss, 1963, p. 141) and, later, evasion of liquor and income taxes proved significant (p. 151). Yet notwithstanding these trouble spots, the Union’s taxing system benefited from a high degree of legitimacy and compliance—especially when compared with the Confederacy, as we show in the next section. Thus, by most accounts, federal tax collection proceeded remarkably smoothly and turned out a revenue juggernaut. By the end of 1863, it was providing the government with “substantial income,” directly funding a third or more of spending. By 1865, internal taxes were dominating a federal revenue haul that, each quarter, exceeded and even doubled prewar collections for entire years (Edling, 2014, pp. 183, 195, 210-212; Brownlee, 2016, p. 68). From the outset, the connection between taxation and the maintenance of a federal fiat currency was evident to all. It was repeatedly stressed in policymakers’ private correspondence, on the floors of Congress, and in the press. “Now, then, put on a war tax of $200,000,000, issue $150,0000,000 demand notes,” wrote one correspondent to Elbridge Spaulding, the primary author of the greenback legislation. “The tax bill will create a general demand for the Treasury notes and keep them at or near par,” wrote another. The Treasury Secretary likewise pointed out that “a judicious system of adequate taxation” would “create a demand for the notes” (Spaulding, 1869, pp. 23-25, p. 46). When, later in the war, it became necessary to issue additional notes, the New York Times demanded “to be taxed to a degree which shall fairly correspond with the vast amount of promissory money afloat” (cited in Bank et al., 2008, p. 40). Congress responded by augmenting the internal revenue system yet again. These brief statements may seem vague about the mechanics of the fiat loop. But a look at the pre-war writing of one influential greenback advocate suggests what many others may have been thinking. In a comprehensive survey of money, credit, and banking published just two years before the war, the well-connected Philadelphia attorney and ironmaster, Stephen Colwell, concluded that what mattered for maintaining the value of paper money was ist<br />  <br /> acceptability, not specie convertibility (Colwell, 1859, p. 235, p. 244). Acceptability, in turn, depended on people’s confidence that the currency would reliably allow them to meet their obligations. Colwell therefore recommended that governments pay “the entire national expenditure” with legal-tender notes acceptable “in payment of all dues at their public treasuries.” The only limitation was to “issue only so much as will return in the regular course of the business.” This implied a method for calculating a safe issuance quantity: start with a fraction of expected tax receipts and gradually increase the amount over time. “By the experience gained,” Colwell believed, “the officers entrusted with this duty could manage such emission without danger of over-issue” (Colwell, 1859, p. 22). This reasoning illuminates the briefer statements by Colwell’s fellow greenback-supporters. When, for instance, the New York Republican Moses Grinnell wrote, “Go a direct tax for one hundred and fifty or two hundred millions, and then issue one hundred and fifty millions Treasury notes legal tender” (Spaulding, 1869, p. 23), he seems to have been invoking a logic similar to Colwell’s.13 The point here is not that such views were universal—there were plenty of greenback skeptics before, during, and after the notes were issued—but rather that the mechanism of their operation was well understood and straightforward to articulate. Spaulding presented the case fully when he spoke before the House in late January 1862 in favor of the first emissions. The new tax law was still several months away at this point, the actual revenue still further in the future, but Congress had already declared its intent and a subcommittee of Ways and Means was hard at work. Spaulding therefore asserted that his proposed treasury notes would be supported by “adequate taxation, to be imposed by new bills.” He then pressed the importance of following through. “This is what the people . . . want to know,” he insisted. “If they take these notes, they want to know positively whether you will enforce the claim of the Government upon the property of the country, to the full extent necessary to redeem the Treasury notes” (Spaulding, 1869, pp. 33-34). The greenbacks were thus issued on the strength<br />  <br /> of a general understanding that heavy taxes would follow. And they did. As Hugh Rockoff observes, “the Republicans were serious about taxes” (Rockoff, 2015, p. 26). That Congress could make a credible promise “to enforce the claim of the Government upon the property of the country” nicely illustrates the utility of our “constitutional approach.” At issue here was not whether taxes would be perfectly proportioned to absorb the whole quantity of greenbacks issued. Spaulding’s call for a commitment “to redeem the Treasury notes” did not mean this. Indeed, Dror Goldberg points out that “a government that issues too much paper money can get away with it” for some time, “because money has a grip on everyone’s daily activities” (Goldberg, 2014, p. 472). The essential question was whether the government enjoyed the legitimacy to make good on its promises to the extent necessary to retain that grip. 14 Effective fiscal and monetary capacity serves here as a proxy for political legitimacy and provides a measure of citizen confidence in the Union’s relatively democratic “governance project.” The “fiat loop” is not, therefore, a matter of mechanically controlling the quantity of money, or even expectations about the quantity of money, but of establishing broad public confidence that can generate the “cash premium” to maintain the value of the unit of account. This was precisely where the Confederacy failed. Its monetary grip on the southern public loosened, slipped and ultimately gave way entirely. 4. TAXES AND MONEY IN THE CONFEDERACY The Confederacy hoped to manage the war on the basis of loans and it put off serious taxation until it was too late. Confederate fiscal policy was a mass of incongruities, beginning with the absurdity of its plans to rely on taxing international trade in the face of a Union naval blockade. The Confederate Congress’s first move, bizarrely, was to order costs reduced by “at least fifty percent” at the federal customs houses it had seized (Todd, 1954, p. 121). This meant layoffs, potentially crippling the revenue service it intended to count on. The plan seems not to<br />  <br /> have been carried through, but it hardly mattered because the tightening blockade let few cargoes in. Although the Confederate Treasury Secretary, Christopher H. Memminger, predicted in mid-1861 that customs duties would raise $25 million within a year, returns for the entire war fell short of $3.5 million. The Confederacy next looked to export taxes, apparently still unable to comprehend the effects of the blockade. Memminger believed that bond issues secured by export taxes sustained their market value better than other loans, but it is hard to imagine how this could have been the case when export tax collections were utterly marginal, totaling less than $40,000 for the war (Todd, 1954, pp. 121-127; Ball, 1991, pp. 203- 10; for measures of blockade effectiveness, see Thornton and Ekelund, 2004, pp. 35-36). The Confederate Congress next passed a “war tax” in August 1861, levying a flat halfpercent rate on real and personal property. Valuing property was precisely what the southern states had little experience doing, particularly when it came to slavery. In the antebellum era, some states did move from the simpler poll-based slave taxes (a flat rate per capita) to more administratively demanding ad valorem taxes (based on assessed values). These moves always came in the face of immense planter resistance and the result was often not a true valuation but rather a simpler enumeration of tranches defined by age and sex, following common practice on the part of slave traders (Einhorn 2006; Thornton 1982; Rosenthal, 2018). Consequently, during the Civil War, varying assessments of slave values in the different states generated major delays in the overall property assessment. The existing scholarship does not specify the precise problems but it is possible that incompatible slave schedules made equalization across the states difficult or contentious (Todd, 1954, p. 133; Ball, 1991, p. 220, 224).15 At any rate, after the assessment was done, collections were left almost entirely to the states, most of which proceeded to collect no taxes and instead paid their quotas by borrowing graybacks financed with their own inconvertible paper issuances. Almost three-quarters of the $17 million raised by the end of 1862 was not really tax revenue at all (Todd 1954, p. 133-136; see Table 2).16<br />  <br /> According to Burdekin and Langdana (1993, p. 357) “not until 1864 did the War Tax account for even 10% of total revenue. In 1862, its first year of implementation, less than 5% of revenues were realized from this tax.” The graybacks received less support than they otherwise might have gotten and the southern monetary system was made further complicated and uncertain. Nearly two years of “disastrous inertia” followed, with no additional taxation as the currency and the government’s credit deteriorated (Ball, 1991, p. 227). Finally, in April 1863, the Confederate Congress passed a serious tax law that was nevertheless fundamentally inadequate on several counts. Although it included an income tax, duties on profits from trade in major commodities, numerous professional licensing fees, and a tax-in-kind on agriculture, the law omitted a “direct tax” on property, including enslaved property. 17 Hence, although earnings on slave-grown crops were in principle subject to the income tax, for the most part “slaveholders were enabled to evade contributing to a new nation established for their special benefit” (ibid., p. 234). Indeed, evasion seems to have been rampant because “numerous obstacles blocked the satisfactory operation of the tax machinery” (Todd 1954, p. 145). For instance, income assessment began with an estimate made by the tax payer themself which, if challenged by the assessor, would be adjudicated by a panel of referees that the tax payer helped to appoint (Mathews, 1863, p. 121-122). Such a procedure presumably favored slaveholders, who exercised tremendous power at the local level. 18 But the deeper problem with the tax law was that the money tax was simply insufficient to meet rising expenses and spiraling prices. The tax-in-kind worked better. “In the first 9 months of 1863 . . . [it] accounted for more than half of the average monthly tax revenues,” but it provoked sharp protest (Burdekin and Langdana, 1993, pp. 357-8). At ten percent of agricultural output after deductions sufficient to feed farmers’ families, it “looked large and discriminatory in comparison with the 2% currency tax on salaries over $1,500” (Todd, 1954, p. 142; also see Bank et al., 2008, p. 33; Hurt 2015,<br />  <br /> pp. 132-134, 160). And since a tax-in-kind did not enhance the graybacks’ cash premium, it made them no more desirable and inflation continued to spiral out of control. Unable to grasp the causes of inflation, some southerners lashed out at greedy merchants and manufacturers (McPherson, 1988, p. 441; Wilson, 2002, p. 60; Rockoff, 2015, p. 8). But other well-placed Confederates understood exactly what was happening and said so. The Richmond Enquirer pointed out repeatedly that a fiat currency without adequate fiscal measures would suffer the same fate as the Revolutionary continentals and for the same reason: lack of taxation to uphold their value. The editor of the South’s leading economic journal, J. D. B. DeBow, reiterated the warning, as did the powerful Georgia politician, Robert Toombs (cited in Phillips, 1913, pp. 622-27). No less a figure than John C. Calhoun had explained the mechanics in painstaking detail as early as the 1810s and again after the Panic of 1837, observing that the federal government’s “fiscal action pervades the whole community . . . and it must, of course, create a general demand for whatever it receives and disburses as money” (Calhoun 1959, vol. 14, p. 299; Todd, 1954, p. 138; Ball, 1991, pp. 37-39, 50-51, 222-23). The Confederacy’s fundamental problem, in the words of Memminger’s biographer, was simply an “aversion to internal taxation” (Capers, 1893, p. 341). According to McPherson, “the Confederate government possessed no machinery for levying internal taxes and its constituents had no tradition of paying them” (McPherson, 1988, p. 38). The most comprehensive history of the matter, Ball’s aptly titled, Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat, stresses both the administrative and political weaknesses implied by these judgments. Ball (1991, p. 32, 42) notes that “southern colonies shunned direct taxes as much as possible, even at the cost of a lamentable level of public services,” and he blames a lack of “effective democratic government” for the Confederacy’s sclerotic wartime politics. “To mobilize a staff of collectors and assessors capable of appraising and levying direct taxes,” he concludes, “required far more will and, to a lesser degree, more skill than the Confederacy possessed”<br />  <br /> (ibid., p. 226). Robert Toombs apparently agreed, writing to a colleague in June 1863 that “the Yankee Congress have certainly beat us badly in finance” (quoted in Phillips, 1913, pp. 619- 20). A full accounting for Confederate fiscal policy may never be possible because many of Congress’s key deliberations were conducted in secret session. This, in itself, signals its democracy deficit relative to the Union. In the North, Spaulding sent the very first draft of his fiat currency measure to the New York Tribune for public dissemination and comment (Spaulding, 1869, p.13). In response to this and daily reporting on congressional financial deliberations in the press, he and others members of the House Ways and Means Committee fielded a range of views expressed in both private correspondence and public print. Confederate policymakers held their cards much closer to the vest. They failed to “take the people into their confidence,” in Ball’s words, because they did not have much confidence in the people (Ball, 1991, p. 209). As Drew Faust and Stephanie McCurry have shown, the Confederate project was profoundly anti-democratic, including attempts to reintroduce property qualifications for the franchise (Faust, 1988, pp. 33-39; McCurry, 2010, pp. 11-37). Some southerners complained specifically about the undemocratic conduct of fiscal policy. A public meeting in North Carolina declared the tax-in-kind “unjust and tyrannical” because it was passed “in secret session . . . taking from the hard laborers of the Confederacy one-tenth of the people’s living, instead of taking back their own currency in tax” (quoted in Schwab, 1901, p. 295). Also revealing is the fact that whereas in the Confederacy it was the Treasury Secretary rather than Congress that pushed for taxes, in the Union it was the House, the most democratic element of the federal government, that advanced the conjoined money-and-tax agenda. In this case, at least, Einhorn’s positive correlation between democracy and taxation seems to hold. Confederate fiscal incapacity should not be mistaken for states’ rights fanaticism or a lack of statist ambition. In fact, antebellum southern state legislatures were much more likely<br />  <br /> to charter banks and railroads as state-run enterprises and, at least in some cases, to apply the profits to expanding governmental services with the goal of establishing tax-free government (Wallenstein, 1987; Murphy, 2017, pp. 115-16; Quintana, 2018; Hall, 2019). This kind of policy was only possible because southern state governments were dominated by slave-owning planters. As long as the state invested in businesses that served the plantation economy instead of competing with it, government ownership was an attractive option. The experience was put to good effect during the war in the Confederacy’s vast takeover of industry, which, among other things, allowed it to manage some remarkable feats of bootstrap industrialization (Morgan, 2005). Before the war, however, planters proved decisively uninterested in backing state investment of benefit to manufacturers, such as construction of transportation access to Virginia’s coal beds (Adams, 2004; Majewski, 2000). The inability to discipline the wartime agricultural sector, which continued to devote inordinate acreage to tobacco and cotton in the face of urban food shortages, underscores the Confederacy’s commitment to the planter class (e.g., Hurt, 2015, pp. 118-125; Schwab, 1901, pp. 278-279). 5. COMPARISONS Without a solid fiscal base, Confederate statism proved chaotic and, to a large extent, self-cannibalizing. This must be kept in mind when comparing the Confederacy and the Union on measures of state capacity. In one of the most influential accounts of Confederate statism, Richard Franklin Bensel argues that, “measured by statutory rates, coverage, and revenues collected the Confederate internal revenue system extracted more wealth from that erected by the Union” (Bensel, 1990, pp. 170-71). The former, he shows, collected $82 million plus $40 million worth of in-kind goods in the first year of operation of its major tax law (the 1863 Act), while the latter collected $39 million during its first year. Citing the Union’s earlier start and the graybacks’ depreciation, he ultimately concludes that the two sides were “approximately<br />  <br /> equivalent” in the matter of internal revenue (Bensel, 1990, p. 172). Adjusting the figures for inflation, however, shows that Bensel seriously underestimates the severity of Confederate difficulties. When the Confederate tax bill was passed in April 1863, the wholesale price index was already about 1,100 and by January 1864 it was at nearly 2,800 (as compared to a base of the first four months of 1861; Lerner, 1955, p. 24, 29). It continued to rise in the opening months of 1864, when most of the new taxes were collected (Todd, 1954, p. 145; Godfrey, 1978, p. 23; Ransom, 2001). It is reasonably conservative to suppose that the average price index during tax collections stood at about 2,500, which means that the $82 million that Bensel highlights was only worth about $3.3 million in real terms. By contrast, a conservative average for the Union wholesale price index in the first year of its internal tax system would be 150, meaning its $39 million equaled $26 million in real terms, a nearly eightfold advantage compared to the CSA. A more realistic price index of 130, per Mitchell, would raise the Union takings to $30 million (Mitchell, 1908, p. 279). Even adding the tax-in-kind to the Confederate total (at $40 million nominal = $1.7 million real), the ratio is 6:1 in favor of the Union and a full year earlier, when crucial battlefield operations and materiél purchases had to be financed. In addition, the tax-in-kind did nothing to support the currency and, in fact, made the situation worse by reducing salable goods (Lerner, 1954, p. 513). The overall situation is indicated by Figure 5, which shows Union and Confederate tax revenues over time, adjusted for inflation. Irregular Confederate reporting makes this kind of visualization helpful. The magnitude of Confederate fiscal ineptitude now comes into clear view. The first three quarters of 1863 particularly stand out, a period of key battlefield turning points when the Union’s revenue machine was fully in gear while its opponent collected essentially nothing. It thus appears that Confederate statism lacked the fundamental attribute of a modern state: the capacity to tax in a manner compatible with waging a total war.19<br />  <br /> The picture is ultimately similar when taxes and note issues are measured against government expenditures. The Confederate Treasury’s irregular reporting makes it again difficult to compare its position with the Union’s, but reporting periods line up at the end of 1862, providing a comparative budgetary snapshot at a key point in the war. As shown in Table 3, total expenditures for the years 1861 and 1862 were nominally similar, but in real terms Union spending was nearly twice that of the Confederacy. Union GDP was similarly something like 2.5 to 3.5 times larger. 20 These ratios roughly correspond with common ideas about the war’s tactical realties, in which attackers (usually the Union) are thought to have required a two- or three-to-one superiority in manpower to overcome defenders’ advantages (e.g., Freehling 2001, p. 14; Knudsen 2022, p. 142). Indeed, the Union enrolled approximately 2.2 million soldiers to the Confederacy’s 800-900,000 over the course of the war (Gallagher and Waugh 2015, p. 30), a ratio of 2.6:1.21 Altogether, then, it seems reasonable to suppose that by the close of 1862 each government had made roughly proportional demands on its respective economy. Each government had also financed about three quarters of its spending with note issues, although the Union made up the difference primarily with taxation, the Confederacy with borrowing. What might a rational observer have concluded at this point? The war situation was equivocal. In September of 1862, the Union blunted a largescale Confederate raid into its territory at the Battle of Antietam. Though far from a resounding Union victory, it was enough for Lincoln to issue the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, a policy that transformed a war of national reunification into a struggle over the existence of slavery. Yet the Union’s prospects looked doubtful by the end of the year, as its eastern army suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg and its western army, bogged down in the Mississippi mud, was forced to call off an assault on the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg. “These were dark days in Washington,” writes McPherson (1988, p. 574). The military disappointments<br />  <br /> combined with the politically controversial shift toward emancipation policy strengthened the position of so-called “Peace Democrats,” who favored a negotiated end to the war. Such a scenario would have seriously hampered Union finances, because an independent Confederacy would have pursued free trade, probably siphoning commercial traffic from New York to New Orleans and thereby cutting sharply into the Union’s customs revenues, a key source of gold. Moreover, the Union’s budget deficit (expenditures minus tax revenues only) had exploded during the year, rising from $25 million at end of 1861 to $423 million at the end of 1862, an increase of nearly 1,588 percent (see figure 6). In short, while the Union’s larger economy gave it greater war spending capacity, its greater needs as the attacker in a war that favored defense, its important budget deficit financed largely with fiat notes (see table 3), and its uncertain battlefield position might have given pause to financial observers. And yet, with uncertain and distant prospects for a return to convertibility, greenback prices held out quite well. The Warren-Pearson wholesale price index for January of 1863 shows that the greenback had lost 36,9% of the value of a prewar gold dollar as compared to January 1861. By contrast, Lerner’s general Confederate price index shows that the grayback had depreciated 654% by this point as compared to January 1861 (Lerner, 1955, p. 24). If we compare the Union’s and Confederacy’s gold prices, the picture is similar. The average price of gold in greenbacks increased by 41,5% as compared to January 1862, while the grayback note price of a gold dollar in Richmond increased by 136,4% as compared to January 1862 (Mitchell, 1908, p. 5; Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2001, p. 1629). These figures suggest that the Union’s commitments to dramatically raise internal tax collections were perceived to be credible, a circumstance plainly lacking in the Confederacy. This credibility gap, in turn, stemmed from a more general gap in democratic legitimacy. The picture may be clarified by reference to hyperinflationary dynamics in other contexts. In a survey of hyperinflationary episodes that followed the First World War, Velde<br />  <br /> (2016) highlights that the end of those episodes depended on the capacity of each state to balance governmental budgets via, in part, sufficient taxation or credible announcements of future revenue collections. If we transpose Velde’s analysis to the Civil War, we would expect the Union to experience similar levels of inflation to the Confederacy because, at the end of 1862, its budget deficit was slightly greater (figure 6 and table 3). Yet, at this point the Confederacy’s level of inflation was eighteen times higher (see figures 2 and 3). If, on the other hand, we transpose the Civil War analysis we conduct here to the case of interwar Europe, we would want to point out that each of the five countries discussed —Austria, Hungary, Germany, Poland and Russia—were characterized by revolutionary or near-revolutionary situations. Such circumstances are likely to interrupt state functions and thereby to weaker or break the fiat loop. Velde’s own recognition of the French revolutionary assignats and the American revolutionary continentals as comparable cases further attests that hyperinflation is as much a consequence of social breakdown as its cause. What may be measured by those governments’ budget deficits then turns on the prior breakdown of state legitimacy. The Confederacy’s situation was historically specific. Its secession was deeply conservative, a distinctly counterrevolutionary movement. It preserved the US Constitution almost intact, merely strengthening protections for slavery. The enslaved population certainly harbored revolutionary impulses, but could not act en masse except in the near vicinity of Union troops. The Confederacy was capable of being self-sufficient in food and resources and found adequate funds to purchase weapons abroad. The Confederate failure originated instead with a state apparatus whose administrative and political capacities were too archaic to the needs of a modern war. It could not forge the fiscal machinery to mobilize real resources on the necessary scale. In this regard, the significance of the lengthy delay in implementing the Confederate internal tax system cannot be overstated. It testifies to the limited legitimacy of the<br />  <br /> Confederacy’s governance project, which, by failing to undertake an obvious imperative, allowed inevitable wartime inflation to turn into hyperinflation, leading to a cascade of problems whose impact grew wider at each downward step. All of them stemmed from the circumstance that, having failed to calibrate note issues to tax increases in a reasonable degree, Confederate leaders had upended money’s ability to distribute social claims in a manner generally perceived as fair. This fatally weakened money’s “grip on everyone’s daily activities” (Goldberg, 2014, p. 472). Inflation stoked popular discontent that manifested most clearly in the many food riots of 1863, which were met by a combination of suppression and ineffective price controls (Hurt 2015; Cashin 2011; figure 4). In some places, hyperinflation resulted in a barter economy or the use of wheat or bullion as means of payment, implying a complete loss of value for the grayback (Schwab, 1901, pp. 163-64; Pecquet 1987; Hurt 2015, pp. 134, 138; Carpenter, 2020, pp. 170-175; Seward, 1863). Indeed, enemy currency, Union greenbacks, were preferred even in “leading centers of the Confederacy” (Schwab, 1901, p. 161). Hyperinflation also disrupted production so that when the tax system was finally implemented, there was less to tax. It disincentivized production further when the government resorted to impressing what it needed at below-market rates (Hurt, 2015, pp. 120-127, 161- 162; Schwab, 1901, pp. 203-205). “After suffering under impressment,” several scholars report, “farmers simply stopped planting new crops” (Bank et al., 2008, pp. 29-30). Confederate delay further undermined fiscal capacity by missing the opportunity to tax in areas that would be occupied by Union armies. In short, it is difficult to see how Confederate revenue policy can possibly be put on a par with the Union’s as a measure of state capacity. It is potentially misleading, in this context, to speak of “extracting” taxes, a locution that comes from the “bellicist” or “fiscal-military model” of state development.22 Bensel’s view is perhaps closest to Charles Tilly’s generalized version of the model, which regards state power as crucially dependent not only on raw fiscal capacity but on the level of economic<br />  <br /> development of the society from which it draws (Tilly, 1992). The problem with such a formulation is that it distinguishes too sharply between the state and society/economy, so that the former seems entirely outside the latter and therefore engaged in a perpetual effort to “extract” wealth. But if, as Desan argues, an economy operating on the basis of money does not simply emerge spontaneously from market exchanges, but is rather a form of governance implemented by state officials, then one would have to acknowledge that money and taxes are ways in which the state cultivates the economy rather than merely extracts from it—that, in fact, state and economy are significantly endogenous to one another and cannot be easily disentangled even for analytic purposes. 6. CONCLUSION For political leaders charged with managing a war—or any existential threat requiring near total social mobilization—the standards by which to judge financial policy are narrowed to the stark options of success or failure. The actual mix of fiscal and monetary policies require a careful “balancing act,” as Rockoff puts it, attuned to both political and economic implications. Institutional endowments will make a big difference in deciding how such a balancing act can be managed and what it can achieve. This is the lesson we draw from our comparison of Union and Confederate financial mobilizations during the US Civil War. Synthesizing the existing scholarship with the help of Desan’s and Einhorn’s insights, we show that differential taxing policies explain differential currency outcomes. Whereas the Union greenbacks experienced only moderate and manageable inflation, the Confederate graybacks suffered catastrophic hyperinflation. In 1864 the Confederate government was even obliged to partially repudiate its own paper money. We further show that taxing policies were determined by institutional capacities resulting from long-run historical developments. In particular, we highlight the way that democratic<br />  <br /> governance enhanced two essential facets of taxing capacity: political legitimacy and administrative competence. Our analysis suggests that historical state capacity must form an integral part of any credit theory of money. It is not at all obvious that a government will be able to effectively sustain a currency via the “fiat loop,” even if its officials understand the mechanism perfectly clearly. This may also imply that a successful fiat loop is contingent on people’s broader range of commitments to the state’s “governance project.” Although we have highlighted the importance of relatively democratic governance in the northern colonies of British North America and, later, the free states of the United States, it is likely that other arrangements can function effectively so long as they link the state with key classes of social actors. In other words, both money and taxes, which together establish a pervasive structure for ordering social claims and obligations, depend on a still broader set of governing arrangements and practices. 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American Public Finance and Financial Services, 1700-1815, Columbus, Ohio State University Press. Phillips, U. B. (ed). 1913. Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Vol. II: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, Washington, Government Printing Office. Quintana, R. A. 2018. Making a Slave State: Political Development in Early South Carolina, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press. Ransom, R. L. 2001. “Economics of the Civil War,” in EH.Net Encyclopedia, ed. Roger Whaples, 24/8/2001, https://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economics-of-the-civil-war/. Ransom, R. L. 2006A. Confederate government revenues and expenditures: 1861– 1864. Table Eh194-215 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R. and Wright, R. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Eh194-22810.1017/ISBN9780511132971.Eh194-228 Ransom, R. L. 2006B. Prices and Wage Indexes for the Eastern Confederacy: 1861– 1865. Table Eh128-130 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R. and Wright, R. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. Ransom, Roger L. 2006C , “Monthly index of Richmond wholesale commodity prices: 1861– 1865.” Table Eh131 in Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, edited by Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN9780511132971.Eh111-193<br />  <br /> Rockoff, H. 2015. War and Inflation in the United States from the Revolution to the First Iraq War. NBER Working Paper, No. 21221. https://doi.org/10.3386/w21221. Roll, R. 1972. Interest Rates and Price Expectations During the Civil War, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 32, no. 2, 476–98. Ron, A. 2020. Grassroots Leviathan: Agricultural Reform and the Rural North in the Slaveholding Republic, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. Rosenthal, C. 2018. Accounting for Slavery: Masters and Management, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. Sawyer, S. W. 2016. A Fiscal Revolution: Statecraft in France’s Early Third Republic, The American Historical Review, vo. 121, no. 4, 1141-1166. Schumpeter, J. A. 1954. The Crisis of the Tax State, pp. 5-38 in Peacock, A. T., Stolper, W. F., Turvey, R., and Henderson, E. (eds.), International Economic Papers, No. 4, London, Macmillan and Company Limited. Schwab, J. C. 1901. The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865: A Financial and Industrial History of the South During the Civil War, New York, C. Scribner’s Sons. Seward, W. H. 1863. Mr. Seward to Mr. Pike, No. 118, Department of State, Washington, September 5, 1863. Available at: Department of State https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1863p2/d237 [Accessed Aug. 5, 2021]. Sokoloff, K. L., and Zolt, E. M. 2007. Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation: Evidence from the Economic History of the Americas, pp. 83–136 in Edwards, S., Esquivel, G., and Márquez, G. (eds.), The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. Spaulding, E. G. 1869. History of the Legal Tender Paper Money Issued During the Great Rebellion, Buffalo, Express Printing Company.<br />  <br /> Studenski, P. and Krooss, H. E. 1963. Financial History of the United States: Fiscal, Monetary, Banking, and Tariff, Including Financial Administration and State and Local Finance. 2nd. ed. New York, McGraw-Hill. Taylor, G. R. 1951. The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860, New York, Rinehart. Tan, James. 2017. Power and Public Finance at Rome, 264-49 BCE. New York: Oxford University Press. Thornton, J. M. 1978. Politics and Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1860, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press. Thornton, J. M. 1982. Fiscal Policy and the Failure of Radical Reconstruction in the Lower South, pp. 349-94 in Kousser, J. M. and McPherson, J. (eds.), Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward, New York, Oxford University Press. Thornton, M and Ekelund, R. D., Jr. 2004. Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The Economics of the Civil War, Wilmington, Del., SR Books. Tilly, C. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, Cambridge, MA, Blackwell. Tilly, C. 2009. Extraction and Democracy, pp. 173–82 in Martin, I. W., Mehrotra, A. K., and Prasad, M. (eds.), The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative and Historical Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Todd, R. C. 1954. Confederate Finance, Athens, University of Georgia Press. Tymoigne, E. 2019. Law, Sovereignty and the Monetization of the European economies: A Review of Making Money and Money in the Western Legal Tradition, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 43, no. 2, 317-340. United States Census Office. 1990. Statistics of the United States (including Mortality, Property, &amp;c.,) in 1860: Compiled from the Original Returns and Being the Final<br />  <br /> Exhibit of the Eighth Census, Under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior. New York: Norman Ross Publishing, 1990. Van Zanden, J. L. and Prak, M. 2006. Towards an Economic Interpretation of Citizenship: The Dutch Republic Between Medieval Communes and Modern Nation-States, European Review of Economic History, vol. 10, no. 2, 111–45. Velde, F. R. 2016. Hyperinflations of the Early Twentieth Century, pp. 653–87 in Fox, D. and Ernst, W. (eds.), Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle Ages to Bretton Woods, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Wallenstein, P. 1985. “More Unequally Taxed than Any People in the Civilized World”: The Origins of Georgia’s Ad Valorem Tax System, Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 4, 459–87. Wallenstein, P. 1987. From Slave South to New South: Public Policy in Nineteenth-Century Georgia, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. Wallis, J. J. 2006A. Federal government expenditure, by major function: 1789–1970 . Table Ea636-643 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R. and Wright, G. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Ea584-67810.1017/ISBN9780511132971.Ea584-678 Wallis, J. J. 2006B. Federal government revenue, by source: 1789–1939 . Table Ea588-593 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R. and Wright, G. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Ea584-67810.1017/ISBN9780511132971.Ea584-678<br />  <br /> Wallis, J. J. 2006C. Federal government finances – revenue, expenditure, and debt: 1789– 1939 . Table Ea584-587 in Carter, S. B., Gartner, S. S., Haines, M. R., Olmstead, A. L., Sutch, R. and Wright, G. (eds.), Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, New York, Cambridge University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Ea584-67810.1017/ISBN9780511132971.Ea584-678 Warren, G. F., Pearson, F. A., and Stoker, H. M. 1932. Wholesale Prices for 213 Years, 1720 to 1932, Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station Memoir 142, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University. Weidenmier, M. D. 2000. The Market for Confederate Cotton Bonds, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 37, no. 1, 76–97. doi: 10.1006/exeh.2000.0732. Weidenmier, M. D. 2002. Turning Points in the U. S. Civil War: Views from the Grayback Market, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 68, no. 4, 875–890. doi: 10.2307/1061497. Wilson, H. S. 2002. Confederate Industry: Manufacturers and Quartermasters in the Civil War, Jackson, University Press of Mississippi. Woolfolk, G. R. 1960. Taxes and Slavery in the Ante Bellum South, Journal of Southern History, vol. 26, no. 2, 180-200. Wray, L. R. 1998. Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and Price Stability, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar Publishing.</div>

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<p>Administrator: Created page with &quot;*Ausstellungsreglement VSPhV https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/1_Ausstellungsreglement_VSPhV_01-01-2025_signed.pdf Gültig ab: 01.01.2025, aktualisiert am 14.07.2025 *Teilnahmebedingungen des VSPhV für Aussteller an Multilateralen und Internationalen Ausstellungen FIP https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Reglemente-Teilnahmebedingungen-2019-06-18-DT.pdf Gültig ab: 18.06.2019 *Patronat des VSPhV für lokale und regionale Briefmarkenausstel...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>*Ausstellungsreglement VSPhV https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/1_Ausstellungsreglement_VSPhV_01-01-2025_signed.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 01.01.2025, aktualisiert am 14.07.2025<br /> <br /> *Teilnahmebedingungen des VSPhV für Aussteller an Multilateralen und Internationalen Ausstellungen FIP https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Reglemente-Teilnahmebedingungen-2019-06-18-DT.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 18.06.2019<br /> <br /> *Patronat des VSPhV für lokale und regionale Briefmarkenausstellungen https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/VSPhV-Patronat-neu-DE.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 01.07.2018<br /> <br /> *Börsenreglement https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/B%C3%B6rsenreglement-2019-06-18-DE.pdf<br /> Aktualisiert am: 18.06.2019<br /> <br /> *Ausstellungsvertrag für Ausstellungen Rang II und III des Verbandes https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-01-19-Ausstellungsvertrag-deutsch.pdf<br /> Aktualisiert am: 19.01.2018<br /> <br /> *Beiträge der Stiftung an Ausstellungen https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Beitr%C3%A4ge-Stiftung-an-Ausstellungen_01-01-2020.pdf<br /> Aktualisiert am: 13.11.2020<br /> <br /> *Versicherung https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-01-19-Versicherung-deutsch.pdf<br /> Aktualisiert am: 19.01.2018<br /> <br /> *Reglement über die Einladung von Vertretern des Zentralvorstandes und der Stiftung zur Förderung der Philatelie https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024_Reglement-Einladungen-DE_final.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 01.07.2024<br /> <br /> *Richtlinien zur Bewertung von Einrahmenexponaten für Einsteiger (Klasse 31) https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/5_Richtlinien-Bewertung-Exp-Kl-31_Einsteiger_01-01-2025_signed.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 01.01.2025, aktualisiert am 14.07.2025<br /> <br /> *Reglement für Ansichts- und Motivkarten (Klasse 40) https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Reglemt_de_11_spezialBewertung.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 01.01.2011<br /> <br /> *Rahmengebühren https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Rahmengebuhren_01-01-2024_DE.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 01.01.2024<br /> <br /> *Verrechnung von Rahmentransportkosten für Ausstellungen https://www.vsphv.ch/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Rahmentransportkosten-fur-Ausstellungen_22-07-2021_D.pdf<br /> Gültig ab: 22.07.2021</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=V%C3%96Ph&diff=88 2026-01-23T22:59:24Z

<p>Administrator: Created page with &quot;Österreichische Reglements -------------- *Allgemeines Austellungsreglement (2024) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/a._Allgemeines_Ausstellungsreglement_2024_web.pdf *Richtlinien Philatelistischer Salon (2014) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/b._Philatelistischer_Salon.pdf *Richtlinien 1-Rahmenexponate (2021) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSST...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>Österreichische Reglements<br /> --------------<br /> *Allgemeines Austellungsreglement (2024) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/a._Allgemeines_Ausstellungsreglement_2024_web.pdf<br /> *Richtlinien Philatelistischer Salon (2014) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/b._Philatelistischer_Salon.pdf<br /> *Richtlinien 1-Rahmenexponate (2021) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/c._Richtlinien_1-Rahmen-Exponate.pdf<br /> *Richtlinien Austria-Cup (2018) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/d._Richtlinien_Austria-Cup_Stand_2018.pdf<br /> *Richtlinien Austria-Junior-Cup (2008) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/e._Richtlinien_Austria_Junior-Cup_2008.pdf<br /> *Richtlinien Offene Klasse (2006) https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/f._Richtlinien_Offene_Klasse.pdf<br /> <br /> <br /> Reglements der Wettbewerbsklassen<br /> --------------<br /> *Traditionelle Philatelie https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/g._TraditionellePhilatelie.pdf<br /> *Postgeschichte https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/h._Postgeschichte.pdf<br /> *Ganzsachen https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/i._Ganzsachen.pdf<br /> *Aerophilatelie https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/j._Aerophilatelie.pdf<br /> *Astrophilatelie https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/k._Astrophilatelie_2022.pdf<br /> *Thematik https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements/l._Thematik.pdf <br /> **Anhang Thematik Richtlinien https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/l.2_Anhang_Thematik_Richtlinien.pdf<br /> *Maximaphilie https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/m._Maximaphilie.pdf<br /> *Fiskalphilatelie https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/n._Fiskalphilatelie.pdf<br /> *Ansichts- und Motivkarten https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/o__Ansichts-_und_Motivkarten_2016.pdf<br /> *Literatur https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/p._Literatur.pdf<br /> *Jugend https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/q._Jugendreglement2018.pdf<br /> *1-Rahmen Einstiegsklasse https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/r._1-Rahmen-Einstiegsklasse.pdf<br /> *Open Philately https://voeph.at/fileadmin/1_VOEPh_KEEP/INTERNE_BEREICHE/__AUSSTELLER/Reglements_WK/Richtlinien_Open_Philately.pdf</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=BDPh&diff=87 2026-01-23T20:06:00Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Bewertungsmerkmale und Reglements für die einzelnen Klassen<br /> ---------<br /> *Leitfaden Bewertungsmerkmale https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Einleitung_Leitfaden_Bewertungsmerkmale.pdf<br /> Aerophilatelie (Stand 13.8.2025) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-*Veranstalter/Reglements/Spezialreglement_und_Richtlinien_fuer_die_Bewertung_von_Aeroexponaten-20250813.pdf<br /> Ansichts- und Motivkarten (Stand 17.5.2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/AK-Reglement._20240517.pdf<br /> *Astrophilatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Astrophilatelie_neu.pdf<br /> *Fiskal-Philatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Fiskal-Philatelie.pdf<br /> *Ganzsachen https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Ganzsachen-Exponate._neupdf.pdf<br /> *Literatur - neues Reglement https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Spezialreglement_Philatelistische_Literatur._2024.pdf<br /> *Maximalphilatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Maximaphilie_2015.pdf<br /> *Open Philately https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Richtlinien_OPEN_PHILATELY.pdf<br /> *Postgeschichte https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/2023_Richtlinie_PO.pdf<br /> *Thematische Philatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/2023_Richtlinien_Thematik_BDPh_und_FIP.pdf<br /> *Traditionell https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/2023_Richtlinien_fuer_die_Bewertung_von_Exponaten_der_traditionellen_Philatelie_HM.pdf<br /> *1-Rahmen https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/1-Rahmenneu.pdf<br /> <br /> Organisation von Veranstaltungen<br /> ------<br /> *Formular Anmeldung einer Veranstaltung - (Stand: 4.12.2020) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldung_einer_Veranstaltung_2022-09-01.pdf<br /> *Leitfaden Datenschutz bei Ausstellungen (Stand 30.1.2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Leitfaden_zum_Datenschutz_im_Ausstellungswesen_2023.pdf<br /> *Merkblatt für Wettbewerbsausstellungen mit Beteiligung Junger Philatelisten (Stand: 1.9.2010) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Merkblatt_fuer_Wettbewerbsausstellungen_mit_Beteiligung_Junger_Philatelisten.pdf<br /> *Antrag auf Anerkennung der Förderungswürdigkeit einer philatelistischen Veranstaltung - Kopiervorlage (Stand: 7.10.2020) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Antrag_auf_Foerderungswuerdigkeit_einer_phil_Veranstaltung_online_2020.pdf<br /> *Einwilligungserklärung zum Antrag auf Förderungswürdigkeit (Stand 17.12.2018) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/2019/Einwilligungserklaerung_zum_Antrag_auf_Foerderungswuerdigkeit_2019.doc<br /> *Merkblatt zur Gestaltung eines Ausstellungskataloges (Stand: 1.9.2010) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Merkblatt_zur_Gestaltung_eines_Ausstellungskataloges.pdf<br /> *Muster-Formular Anmeldung zur Ausstellung (Stand: 17.12.2018) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/2019/Muster-Formular_Anmeldung_zur_Ausstellung_2019.doc<br /> *Muster-Formular Kurzbeschreibung des Exponats (Stand 17.12.2018) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Kurzbeschreibung_Exponat_Vorlage_ausfuellbar.pdf<br /> *Muster-Formular Anmeldung Literatur-Exponat (Stand: 1.9.2010) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldung_fuer_Literatur-Exponate.pdf<br /> *Muster-Formular Anmeldung Literatur Printmedien (Stand: 1.7.2014) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldeformular_Literaturexponate_Printmedien_NEU.pdf<br /> *Formularvorlage Anmeldung Literatur Printmedien - Word Datei (Stand: 1.7.2014) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldeformular_Literaturexponate_Printmedien_NEU.doc<br /> *Muster-Formular Anmeldung Elektronische Literatur (Stand: 1.7.2014) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldeformular_Elektronische_Literatur_NEU.doc<br /> *Formularvorlage Anmeldung Elektronische Literatur - Word Datei (Stand: 1.7.2014) <br /> philatelistische Stempel im Kundenauftrag (Stand 07.2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Orga/SoSt_Kunde_Beauftragungsformular_2023_07_final.pdf<br /> *Bestellformular für Sonderstempel „Event-Team-Philatelie&quot; https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Orga/Stempel_Bestellformular_Philatelie-Team_2024.pdf<br /> Anfrage Event-Team Philatelie 2024/25 https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Orga/Anfrageformular_Eventteam_Philatelie24-25.pdf<br /> <br /> Bewertungsbögen<br /> -------<br /> *Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_AK_03-2021.pdf <br /> *Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_AK_03-2021.docx <br /> *Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.pdf <br /> *Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.docx <br /> *Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für TH PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_TH_03-2021.pdf<br /> *Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für TH Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_TH_03-2021.docx <br /> *Bewertungsbogen AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_AK_03-2021.pdf<br /> *Bewertungsbogen AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_AK_03-2021.docx <br /> *Bewertungsbögen für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.pdf<br /> *Bewertungsbögen für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.docx<br /> *Bewertungsbogen Open Philatelie PDF (Stand 11-2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_OP_11-2023.pdf<br /> *Bewertungsbogen Open Philatelie Word-Dokument (Stand 11-2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_OP_03-2021.docx <br /> *Bewertungsbogen Print &amp; elekktronische Literatur PDF (Stand 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LI_alle_Klassen_02-2024.pdf <br /> *Bewertungsbogen Print &amp; elekktronische Literatur Word-Dokument (Stand 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LI_alle_Klassen_02-2024.docx<br /> *Bewertungsbogen TH PDF (Stand 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_TH_03-2021.pdf<br /> *Bewertungsbogen TH Word-Dokument (Stand 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_TH_03-2021.docx<br /> <br /> Jury-Arbeitsbögen<br /> -----<br /> *Jury-Arbeitsbogen Ansichtskarten PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_AK_Mehr_u_Einrahmen_03-2021.pdf<br /> *Jury-Arbeitsbogen LÄ, PO, GA, LU, AS, MA, Fi. - auch 1-Rahmen PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_LAE__PO__GA__LU__AS__MA__Fi._-_auch_1-Rahmen_03-2021.pdf<br /> *Jury-Arbeitsbogen Literatur ELEKTRONISCHE LITERATUR PDF (Stand: 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_ELEKTRONISCHE_Literatur_02-2024.pdf<br /> *Jury-Arbeitsbogen Literatur PRINTMEDIEN PDF (Stand: 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_Literatur_PRINTMEDIEN_02-2024.pdf <br /> *Jury-Arbeitsbogen Open Philatelie PDF (Stand: 11-2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_OP_11-2023.pdf <br /> *Jury-Arbeitsbogen Thematik - auch 1-Rahmen PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_Thematik_-_auch_1-Rahmen_03-2021.pdf</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=BDPh&diff=86 2026-01-23T20:02:39Z

<p>Administrator: Created page with &quot;Bewertungsmerkmale und Reglements für die einzelnen Klassen --------- Leitfaden Bewertungsmerkmale https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Einleitung_Leitfaden_Bewertungsmerkmale.pdf Aerophilatelie (Stand 13.8.2025) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Spezialreglement_und_Richtlinien_fuer_die_Bewertung_von_Aeroexponaten-20250813.pdf Ansichts- und Motivkarte...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>Bewertungsmerkmale und Reglements für die einzelnen Klassen<br /> ---------<br /> Leitfaden Bewertungsmerkmale https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Einleitung_Leitfaden_Bewertungsmerkmale.pdf<br /> Aerophilatelie (Stand 13.8.2025) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Spezialreglement_und_Richtlinien_fuer_die_Bewertung_von_Aeroexponaten-20250813.pdf<br /> Ansichts- und Motivkarten (Stand 17.5.2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/AK-Reglement._20240517.pdf<br /> Astrophilatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Astrophilatelie_neu.pdf<br /> Fiskal-Philatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Fiskal-Philatelie.pdf<br /> Ganzsachen h ttps://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Ganzsachen-Exponate._neupdf.pdf<br /> Literatur - neues Reglement https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Spezialreglement_Philatelistische_Literatur._2024.pdf<br /> Maximalphilatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Maximaphilie_2015.pdf<br /> Open Philately https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/Richtlinien_OPEN_PHILATELY.pdf<br /> Postgeschichte https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/2023_Richtlinie_PO.pdf<br /> Thematische Philatelie https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/2023_Richtlinien_Thematik_BDPh_und_FIP.pdf<br /> Traditionell https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/2023_Richtlinien_fuer_die_Bewertung_von_Exponaten_der_traditionellen_Philatelie_HM.pdf<br /> 1-Rahmen https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Reglements/1-Rahmenneu.pdf<br /> <br /> Organisation von Veranstaltungen<br /> ------<br /> Formular Anmeldung einer Veranstaltung - (Stand: 4.12.2020) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldung_einer_Veranstaltung_2022-09-01.pdf<br /> Leitfaden Datenschutz bei Ausstellungen (Stand 30.1.2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Leitfaden_zum_Datenschutz_im_Ausstellungswesen_2023.pdf<br /> Merkblatt für Wettbewerbsausstellungen mit Beteiligung Junger Philatelisten (Stand: 1.9.2010) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Merkblatt_fuer_Wettbewerbsausstellungen_mit_Beteiligung_Junger_Philatelisten.pdf<br /> Antrag auf Anerkennung der Förderungswürdigkeit einer philatelistischen Veranstaltung - Kopiervorlage (Stand: 7.10.2020) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Antrag_auf_Foerderungswuerdigkeit_einer_phil_Veranstaltung_online_2020.pdf<br /> Einwilligungserklärung zum Antrag auf Förderungswürdigkeit (Stand 17.12.2018) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/2019/Einwilligungserklaerung_zum_Antrag_auf_Foerderungswuerdigkeit_2019.doc<br /> Merkblatt zur Gestaltung eines Ausstellungskataloges (Stand: 1.9.2010) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Merkblatt_zur_Gestaltung_eines_Ausstellungskataloges.pdf<br /> Muster-Formular Anmeldung zur Ausstellung (Stand: 17.12.2018) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/2019/Muster-Formular_Anmeldung_zur_Ausstellung_2019.doc<br /> Muster-Formular Kurzbeschreibung des Exponats (Stand 17.12.2018) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Kurzbeschreibung_Exponat_Vorlage_ausfuellbar.pdf<br /> Muster-Formular Anmeldung Literatur-Exponat (Stand: 1.9.2010) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldung_fuer_Literatur-Exponate.pdf<br /> Muster-Formular Anmeldung Literatur Printmedien (Stand: 1.7.2014) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldeformular_Literaturexponate_Printmedien_NEU.pdf<br /> Formularvorlage Anmeldung Literatur Printmedien - Word Datei (Stand: 1.7.2014) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldeformular_Literaturexponate_Printmedien_NEU.doc<br /> Muster-Formular Anmeldung Elektronische Literatur (Stand: 1.7.2014) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Organisation_von_Veranstaltungen/Anmeldeformular_Elektronische_Literatur_NEU.doc<br /> Formularvorlage Anmeldung Elektronische Literatur - Word Datei (Stand: 1.7.2014) <br /> philatelistische Stempel im Kundenauftrag (Stand 07.2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Orga/SoSt_Kunde_Beauftragungsformular_2023_07_final.pdf<br /> Bestellformular für Sonderstempel „Event-Team-Philatelie&quot; https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Orga/Stempel_Bestellformular_Philatelie-Team_2024.pdf<br /> Anfrage Event-Team Philatelie 2024/25 https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Orga/Anfrageformular_Eventteam_Philatelie24-25.pdf<br /> <br /> Bewertungsbögen<br /> -------<br /> Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_AK_03-2021.pdf <br /> Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_AK_03-2021.docx <br /> Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.pdf <br /> Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.docx <br /> Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für TH PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_TH_03-2021.pdf<br /> Bewertungsbogen 1-Rahmen-Exponate für TH Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_1-Rahmen_TH_03-2021.docx <br /> Bewertungsbogen AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_AK_03-2021.pdf<br /> Bewertungsbogen AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_AK_03-2021.docx <br /> Bewertungsbögen für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.pdf<br /> Bewertungsbögen für LÄ PO GA LU AS MA FI OP AK Word-Dokument (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LAE_PO_GA_LU_AS_MA_FI_03-2021.docx<br /> Bewertungsbogen Open Philatelie PDF (Stand 11-2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_OP_11-2023.pdf<br /> Bewertungsbogen Open Philatelie Word-Dokument (Stand 11-2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_OP_03-2021.docx <br /> Bewertungsbogen Print &amp; elekktronische Literatur PDF (Stand 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LI_alle_Klassen_02-2024.pdf <br /> Bewertungsbogen Print &amp; elekktronische Literatur Word-Dokument (Stand 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_LI_alle_Klassen_02-2024.docx<br /> Bewertungsbogen TH PDF (Stand 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_TH_03-2021.pdf<br /> Bewertungsbogen TH Word-Dokument (Stand 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Bewertungsboegen/Bewertungsbogen_TH_03-2021.docx<br /> <br /> Jury-Arbeitsbögen<br /> -----<br /> Jury-Arbeitsbogen Ansichtskarten PDF (Stand: 3-2021) v<br /> Jury-Arbeitsbogen LÄ, PO, GA, LU, AS, MA, Fi. - auch 1-Rahmen PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_LAE__PO__GA__LU__AS__MA__Fi._-_auch_1-Rahmen_03-2021.pdf<br /> Jury-Arbeitsbogen Literatur ELEKTRONISCHE LITERATUR PDF (Stand: 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_ELEKTRONISCHE_Literatur_02-2024.pdf<br /> Jury-Arbeitsbogen Literatur PRINTMEDIEN PDF (Stand: 2-2024) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_Literatur_PRINTMEDIEN_02-2024.pdf <br /> Jury-Arbeitsbogen Open Philatelie PDF (Stand: 11-2023) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_OP_11-2023.pdf <br /> Jury-Arbeitsbogen Thematik - auch 1-Rahmen PDF (Stand: 3-2021) https://www.bdph.de/fileadmin/Dateien/Downloadbereich/Fuer_Aussteller-Veranstalter/Jury-Arbeitsboegen/Jury-Arbeitsbogen_Thematik_-_auch_1-Rahmen_03-2021.pdf</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=85 2026-01-18T23:54:04Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch <br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes English | Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX English | GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV English | GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [['''SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily''' | SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=84 2026-01-18T23:53:23Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch <br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes English | Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX English | GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV English | GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[&quot;SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily&quot;]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=83 2026-01-18T23:51:50Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch <br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes English | Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX English | GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV English | GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=82 2026-01-18T23:51:01Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch <br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes English | Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=New_Guidelines&diff=81 2026-01-18T23:28:50Z

<p>Administrator: Created page with &quot;Postal History: Introduction and Purpose These Guidelines are issued by the FIP Postal History Commission to provide practical advice on how to apply the General Regulations for Evaluation of Exhibits (GREV) (1.1 – 1.4) and Special Regulations for Evaluation of Postal History Exhibits (SREV) as approved by the 70th Congress at Bucharest, Romania. Where a dispute arises between the level of authority of the GREV, SREV for Postal History exhibits, and these Guidelines,...&quot;</p> <hr /> <div>Postal History: Introduction and Purpose<br /> <br /> These Guidelines are issued by the FIP Postal History Commission to provide practical advice on how to<br /> apply the General Regulations for Evaluation of Exhibits (GREV) (1.1 – 1.4) and Special Regulations for<br /> Evaluation of Postal History Exhibits (SREV) as approved by the 70th Congress at Bucharest, Romania.<br /> Where a dispute arises between the level of authority of the GREV, SREV for Postal History exhibits, and<br /> these Guidelines, the GREV has the highest order of authority; the SREV for Postal History exhibits the<br /> second order of authority and these Guidelines rate below all decisions made by the FIP Congress.<br /> The guidelines have been developed to assist exhibitors in the preparation and judges in the evaluation of<br /> postal history exhibits. They provide guidance and practical advice regarding:<br /> <br /> 1. The Definition and Nature of Postal History Exhibits and the three Sub-classes of Postal History Exhibits<br /> <br /> 2. The Principles of Exhibit Composition<br /> <br /> 3. The Judging Criteria for Judging Postal History Exhibits and their Application<br /> <br /> 4. Concluding Provisions<br /> <br /> '''1. The Definition and Nature of Postal History Exhibits and the three Sub-classes of Postal History Exhibits'''<br /> <br /> 1.1 A Postal History exhibit comprises used covers and letters, used postal stationery, used postage stamps and other postal documents selected, described and arranged according to a balanced plan aimed to develop any aspect of postal history. Such exhibits generally emphasise rates, routes, regulations, markings, usages, and other postal aspects, services, functions, and activities related to the history of the development of Postal Services.<br /> <br /> 1.2 A Postal History exhibit, by analysis of the philatelic objects within it, shows and explains the development or operation of one or more postal services; the practical application of postal rates, rules and regulations, and the study and classification of the use of philatelic material and/or postal markings to illustrate the main subject of the exhibit. It applies to exhibits covering the start of organized postal services to those of the present day. Historical, social and special study exhibits (class 2C, see below) show the interaction of the postal system with society, events, commerce or the historical geography of an area and the effects that the postal system has on humanity, and/or humanity on the postal system.<br /> <br /> 1.3 It is, for instance, possible to show the development of mails between two or more areas, nations or continents, to show the development of postal services in one country, one district or one single geographical locality. Alternatively, the development of one special postal service can be shown - either world-wide, in a country or groups of countries or more locally.<br /> <br /> <br /> 1.4 Exhibits may be planned chronologically, geographically (e.g. by local or national districts), by mode of transport/service, by type of mail, by rate, by postal markings, or by any other way that the exhibitor may feel appropriate to adopt. To gain high points in treatment, the structure should be logical and consistent throughout the exhibit. In some cases where it makes sense, the sub-structure might vary between chapters.<br /> <br /> <br /> 1.5 The most effective postal history exhibits avoid duplication of similar items and wide chronological gaps where possible and avoid the inclusion of items that are not directly relevant to the subject shown. With rareexceptions, essays and proofs, unused stamps, and unused postal stationery are irrelevant. If they are shown,their inclusion must be justified.<br /> <br /> <br /> 1.6 Generally, a Postal History exhibit should show interesting items (philatelic and where appropriate nonphilatelic) to the best advantage of the material and exhibit theme. It should not have the appearance of a manuscript for a monograph where the text dominates the material.<br /> <br /> <br /> 1.7 It is recognised that significant postal history exhibits can be prepared for any time period within the<br /> history of the post from early postal services through to postal mechanisation of recent times and that<br /> important postal developments occurred and should be appreciated in any time period.<br /> <br /> <br /> 1.8 Three classes of postal history exhibits are recognized.<br /> <br /> 1.8.1 '''Class 2A''' - Postal History exhibits relating to postal services and systems Examples of postal history class 2A subjects include (but are not limited to):<br /> <br /> A. The development or operation of one or more postal services and systems within a country, district or region or between countries and continents<br /> <br /> B. the practical application of postal acts, rules and regulations and/or specific postal services<br /> <br /> C. Pre-adhesive postal services<br /> <br /> D. Postal rates<br /> <br /> E. Routes for transportation of mails<br /> <br /> F. Military mail, field post, siege mail, POW, civil and military internee camp mail<br /> <br /> G. Maritime mail, railway mail and/or inland waterway mail<br /> <br /> H. All kinds of travelling post offices<br /> <br /> I. Disaster mail<br /> <br /> J. Disinfected mail<br /> <br /> K. Censorship mail<br /> <br /> L. Postage due mail<br /> <br /> M. Automation of the mails<br /> <br /> N. Forwarding agent’s markings<br /> <br /> O. Official mail, free frank mail<br /> <br /> In class 2A, maps, decrees, proclamations etc. should be used only if relevant to the development and documentation of the chosen subject and should be restricted in number. An exhibit of any of these subjects will often include postal markings related to those subjects. A study structured and treated primarily according to those markings is usually considered a class 2B subject (see below).<br /> <br /> 1.8.2 '''Class 2B''' - Marcophily exhibits- relates to the study and classification of postal markings Such an exhibit may cover any period of postal history from the pre-stamp period to the present day. It includes all types of cancellations and obliterations, including manuscript markings, applied by official and private postal services. The study may cover the function, the period of use, place of use, colour, state or other changes over the course of time, or other aspects of postal markings. The subjects can include marks of office or of services such as registration, maritime, traveling post offices, disinfection and instructional marks.<br /> <br /> Marcophily exhibits may include the study of repaired date stamps and methods of showing distances used by postal administrations. A study of the different types of automatic postal coding marks used would be a Marcophily exhibit; the introduction of postal automation by a Postal Administration is, however, Postal History (class 2A).<br /> <br /> Demonstration of knowledge and personal study of postal markings should include the earliest and latest recorded dates of use, the ink colours used, the identification of place of use, where this is not apparent from the wording or particular types (e.g. identifying the place of use of mute or numeral cancellations), etc.<br /> <br /> Markings should be as clear as possible with all essential wording complete. Where Marcophily exhibits are based on obliterating marks, they should be complete and preferably on cover. Generally partial strikes should be avoided; as should unnecessary duplication of the same marking other than early and late dates to demonstrate the period of use.<br /> <br /> Any attempt to improve the appearance of a postal marking, subsequent to its being applied by the postal authorities, shall be treated as being faked material. (See GREX Article 41.2)<br /> <br /> Postage stamps displayed in a Marcophily exhibit are irrelevant except that they should be in reasonable condition. If used postage stamps are included in a Marcophily exhibit, the evaluation will primarily be based on the classification, study, quality, and rarity of the postal markings and obliterations on the stamps.<br /> <br /> <br /> 1.8.3 '''Class 2C''' - Historical, Social and Special Study exhibits - relates to postal history studies in the broadest sense<br /> <br /> Such exhibits examine the interaction of the postal system with history, society, events, commerce, or the historical geography of an area; and the effect the postal system has had on humanity, and humanity on the postal system.<br /> <br /> <br /> Examples of postal history class 2C subjects include (but are not limited to):<br /> <br /> 1. Telegram services<br /> <br /> 2. Greeting cards (including Valentines)<br /> <br /> 3. Illustrated, Pictorial, commercial envelopes used in the postal system<br /> <br /> 4. Studies of the effect of a postal system on commerce, society and industry and the adaptation by commerce and industry of materials for use in the postal system<br /> <br /> 5. Historical studies<br /> <br /> 6. Studies relating to an event or historical landmark<br /> <br /> Postal history class 2C subjects usually include material developed by commerce and society for use in the postal system and may include non-philatelic material where relevant to the subject of the exhibit. Use of such non-philatelic material is encouraged in class 2C if it is directly relevant to the subject of the exhibit and if it benefits the treatment. The non-philatelic material should, however, not overwhelm the philatelic material. All exhibits under sub-class 2C must be capable of being exhibited in standard exhibition frames.<br /> <br /> <br /> 2. The Principles of Exhibit Composition<br /> <br /> <br /> 2.1 The Exhibit Composition<br /> <br /> An exhibit of postal history should comprise a logical and coherent assembly of material (as defined in 1.1-1.8.3) to illustrate one or more aspects of postal history.<br /> <br /> In a postal history exhibit, the exhibitor tells a story with the exhibit. Normally, it is a story about the development of one or more aspects of the operation of postal services (for details and exceptions, see under 1.8.1-1.8.3 above). A postal history exhibit has a clearly defined beginning and end. The beginning and end (scope) should be logically connected to the postal history subject treated. Postal history exhibits in which the scope and/or structure is defined primarily by traditional philately aspects such as one or more stamp or stationery issues are unlikely to attain the highest scores. The exhibits should rather be structured by rate, route, regulations, type of mail, chronologically, geographically (e.g. by local/national districts), by mode of transport/service, or by any other postal history related way that the exhibitor may feel appropriate to employ. For more details and specific suggestions, see under 1.1-1.8.3 above. The subject chosen needs to be appropriate in scope for both the initial and also the potential size of the exhibit.<br /> <br /> <br /> 2.2 One Frame Exhibits<br /> <br /> A One Frame exhibit of postal history is intended to be an exhibit within the categories mentioned in 1.8.1-1.8.3 with a very narrow theme that fits into one frame. If a theme can be shown in more than one frame, or if duplication of material is needed to fill one frame, it is not suitable as a theme for a one frame exhibit. All aspects of the chosen subject should be fully treated in the single frame. <br /> <br /> A selection of items from a multi-frame exhibit may be suitable only if the selection can completely treat a natural sub-theme of the exhibit within one frame. In such cases, the exhibit would need a narrower title and, in most cases, a modified plan and treatment. An exhibit showing only the best items (&quot;cherry picking&quot;) from a multi-frame exhibit is not appropriate as a one frame exhibit, because all aspects of the complete subject would not be treated appropriately in the one frame only.<br /> <br /> <br /> 2.3 The Introductory Sheet (or the Title Page)<br /> <br /> All postal history exhibits must include an introductory sheet. This introductory sheet should include:<br /> <br /> *The title of the exhibit<br /> *A description of the purpose of the exhibit (What is included in the exhibit and what is omitted)<br /> *A description of the scope of the exhibit (The beginning and end and why those limits were chosen)<br /> *A plan of the structure of the exhibit in the form of chapters or sections etc. A listing of the exhibit<br /> content &quot;frame by frame&quot; or &quot;page by page&quot; does not convey the intention of the exhibitor to its best<br /> advantage.<br /> *A list of personal research by the exhibitor within the subject (with references to articles or literature)<br /> *A list of the most important - and preferably reasonably accessible - literature references<br /> <br /> If space permits, the introductory sheet could also include:<br /> <br /> *Short, precise and relevant general postal history information on the subject<br /> *If the exhibitor decides/chooses to use a hierarchy of text and/or paragraph styles to indicate different levels of information presented then this structure should be explained in the introductory page<br /> *Anything else that the exhibitor might feel would help the judges prepare for judging the exhibit.<br /> <br /> <br /> 3. The Judging Criteria for Judging Postal History Exhibits and their Application<br /> <br /> In judging a postal history exhibit, the jury will use the following general criteria (ref. GREV, Article 4.2):<br /> <br /> A. Treatment - ref. GREV, Article 4.5: 20 points<br /> B. Philatelic Importance - ref. GREV, Article 4.6: 10 points<br /> C. Philatelic and related Knowledge, Personal Study and Research - ref. GREV, Article 4.7: 35 points<br /> D. Condition - ref. GREV, Article 4.8: 10 points<br /> E. Rarity - ref. GREV, Article 4.8: 20 points<br /> F. Presentation - ref. GREV, Article 4.9: 5 points<br /> Total: 100 points.<br /> Exhibitors should be aware of the need to consider carefully the various aspects which combine together to<br /> maximise the award an exhibit can attract. Some indications are given below of the basic elements<br /> underlying each individual criterion.<br /> <br /> <br /> 3.1 Treatment (20 points)<br /> <br /> Treatment of the exhibit reflects the degree to which the exhibitor is able to create a balanced exhibit characteristic of the chosen subject. A logical progression that is easy to follow and a clear concise write up will help the jurors to appreciate the exhibit. In assessing treatment, jurors will check that the statements made in the introductory sheet and plan are adequately represented in the exhibit.<br /> <br /> <br /> The judges will evaluate:<br /> <br /> *How well the introduction Sheet (or the Title Page) of the exhibit shows the purpose of the exhibit, defines the scope and explains the plan and structure, and whether it guides the juror to the most important literature/references for the subject chosen<br /> *Whether the subject and scope has been chosen to enable a properly balanced exhibit to be shown in the space available<br /> *Whether there is a natural postal-history-based start and ending point of the exhibit<br /> *Whether the title of the exhibit corresponds to the purpose, scope and plan<br /> *Whether the content reflects the title, purpose, scope and plan<br /> *Whether there is a logical storyline shown created with text and material with a good balance between the different parts of the exhibit<br /> *Whether the primary focus is on the postal history (or e.g. history in class 2C) and only secondly on other things such as traditional philately aspects of the items like e.g. printings, shades, and varieties<br /> *Whether the material shown completely covers the scope of the exhibit<br /> *Whether the headlines and other texts on each page support the understanding of the treatment<br /> *Whether there is unnecessary duplicated material. Text at each item should document the reason for showing it<br /> *Whether all the material exhibited is relevant to the scope of the exhibit.<br /> *The relevance, balance and importance of non-philatelic material shown in Historical, Social and Special Studies exhibits (class 2C) shall be evaluated by the judges under treatment.<br /> <br /> <br /> The selection of material for a postal history exhibit involves a compromise between the many pages of<br /> material the exhibitor may wish to show and the number of pages that will fit in the frames allotted by the<br /> exhibition management.<br /> <br /> <br /> This selection of material is an important factor not only in assessing treatment, but also knowledge. The<br /> exhibitor may omit material that is of lesser significance. In general, the common aspects of the subject<br /> presented may be represented by a token showing, while the difficult aspects of the subject should be shown<br /> in depth. The judges will appreciate that this treatment shows the exhibitor's knowledge of the material.<br /> <br /> <br /> Exhibitors should ensure that their exhibit is cohesive and avoid combining largely unrelated subjects; such<br /> exhibits are likely to lose marks under the treatment and importance criteria.<br /> <br /> <br /> An exhibit (e.g. of postal rates) which spans the pre-adhesive and postage stamp periods, but omits reference<br /> to the first postage stamp issues, will inevitably be downgraded under importance and rarity. This is equally<br /> applicable to exhibits of all periods which omit the most difficult sections.<br /> <br /> <br /> 3.2 Philatelic Importance (10 points)<br /> <br /> The &quot;importance&quot; of an exhibit is determined by both the significance of the actual exhibit in relation to the<br /> subject chosen and the overall significance of that subject.<br /> In assessing the importance of the exhibit, consideration is given to:<br /> *• How difficult is the selected area to collect?<br /> *• What is the significance of the material shown in the exhibit relative to the selected area?<br /> *• What is the significance of the selected area and the material shown relative to the national philately of the country?<br /> *• What is the significance of the selected area and the material shown relative to world philately?<br /> *• Under class 2C, half of the points available will be given for the exhibited subject's importance to history, mankind, and/or geographic area.<br /> <br /> It will usually be easier to adequately treat and provide completeness to unimportant (narrower) subjects than<br /> to important ones in the space available. For example:<br /> <br /> The postal history of a capital city may generally be more important than that of a provincial town or a rural<br /> area. When evaluating the importance of local area exhibits, it should be considered, how much of the<br /> material shown from the chosen geographical area would be desirable for exhibitors of broader defined<br /> subjects, such as the postal history of a whole country.<br /> <br /> A postal rate study of postal agreements between two or more states would generally be more important than<br /> the domestic internal rates of an individual state over the same period. Likewise, a postal rate study covering<br /> all types of mail would generally be more important than a study of a single type of mail or service.<br /> <br /> <br /> 3.3 Philatelic and Related Knowledge, Personal Study and Research (35 points).<br /> Philatelic and Related Knowledge is demonstrated by the items chosen for display and their explanatory<br /> comments. Personal Study is demonstrated by the proper analysis of the items chosen for display. Personal<br /> Research is presentation of new facts related to the chosen subject.<br /> <br /> <br /> Philatelic and Related Knowledge is demonstrated by:<br /> *The choice of items reflecting knowledge of the chosen area<br /> *The items being well described<br /> *Using and correctly interpreting the existing literature within the area<br /> *Demonstrating a full and accurate understanding of the subject chosen<br /> *Showing correctly franked, correctly used items, which show the most important philatelic element the exhibitor wants to illustrate <br /> <br /> <br /> Personal Study is documented by:<br /> *That the primary postal history aspects that guide the structure of the exhibit and the story being told is fully analysed and accurately described.<br /> *That all postal history aspects such as rates, routes, regulations, and markings are described when significant. A proper rate description includes (a) what is being sent, (b) the price of sending the item, (c) the exact period (precise start and end dates) the rate was in effect.<br /> *A short mentioning of traditional aspects of the stamps and stationery used at the end of the item descriptions will be appreciated if space permits and all the more important postal history aspects have already been appropriately described <br /> <br /> <br /> Personal Research and new discoveries by the exhibitor<br /> *Should be given full coverage in accordance with their importance.<br /> *Major discoveries deserve important coverage and recognition and should be identified by the exhibitor, while minor discoveries should not overpower the main exhibit.<br /> *For exhibits where obviously a great deal of real research (presentation of new facts related to the chosen subject) has been done, a very large proportion of the total points may be given for this research.<br /> *Where appropriate, references could be given to the exhibitor's own or other previously published information. Where the exhibitor has extended such information, a reference can be placed either in the introductory statement or on the exhibit page to which the research refers.<br /> <br /> <br /> Only the Philatelic and Related knowledge, Personal Study, and Research documented by the items in the<br /> exhibit and their relevant descriptions can be judged.<br /> <br /> With regard to historical, social and special studies exhibits (class 2C), the related historical and general nonphilatelic knowledge and research will be considered in assessing all aspects of these criteria.<br /> <br /> The importance of understanding a postal history exhibit can mean that more text is included or that nonpostal history or non-philatelic material is included as supporting documentation. However, all text must be concise and clear and the inclusion of related non-postal history or non-philatelic material must improve the<br /> understanding of the postal history subject and the attractiveness of the exhibit. In all cases, exhibitors should bear in mind that the information given should not overwhelm the philatelic material shown. A well-thoughtout plan (see 2.3. above) may avoid otherwise lengthy descriptions later in the exhibit.<br /> <br /> It must be remembered that some postal history subjects have been very heavily researched over a long period of time and the results of these studies have been published. To gauge knowledge, the jury will consider how well the exhibitor has made use of these resources. It is unrealistic to require a collector to develop new findings in a heavily studied and researched area. For this reason, such exhibits will not be penalised for a lack of personal research.<br /> <br /> If an exhibitor can make fact-based rarity statements relying on extensive recordings of known material, this will also be considered positively under Personal Study and/or Research (for more details on rarity statements, see below under 3.5)<br /> <br /> <br /> 3.4 Condition (10 points).<br /> <br /> When judging condition in postal history exhibits, many aspects need to be considered:<br /> *Material in good condition is strongly appreciated in a postal history exhibit. As condition may vary<br /> considerably for postal history material depending on country, period, and transportation conditions,<br /> judges should, however, always bear in mind the quality obtainable.<br /> *Good condition, clean, legible postmarks and other postal markings as well as the general appearance of the objects, should be rewarded, while poor quality will attract a lower assessment.<br /> *When possible, covers and other objects bearing postage stamps should show the stamps in good condition. In most exhibits, clean covers without stains and missing corners on the stamps etc. are appreciated.<br /> *There are some notable exceptions however. For instance, in an exhibit of wreck/air crash covers, while the condition of the covers will by definition be poor, the postal markings applied upon salvage should be as clear as possible.<br /> *The condition of common material should be impeccable and the best available.<br /> *Exhibitors are encouraged to show unique or very rare material that does not occur in fine condition, but are cautioned from including other items in a condition that may reduce the perceived overall condition of the exhibit.<br /> *Commercially used items are to be preferred to collector-produced ones.<br /> *If an item has been restored or manipulated, it must be described as such.<br /> <br /> <br /> 3.5 Rarity (20 points)<br /> <br /> Rarity is directly related to the philatelic items shown and to the relative scarcity of this material (however,<br /> not the value). Thus, rarity is primarily related to how many examples exist and from how broad a<br /> perspective the items are rare, but not directly to the price of the item.<br /> <br /> <br /> The jurors will primarily be looking for:<br /> *How difficult is it to obtain the relevant and interesting material in the exhibit<br /> *How difficult is it to duplicate the exhibit<br /> *How important the rare items are seen from a broader perspective; e.g. a postal marking of a small town showing the only example known, but of a standard type used throughout the country, may be of less significance than a special type used only at that town.<br /> * Has the exhibitor avoided philatelically produced material where possible?<br /> <br /> Rarity in Postal History exhibits should primarily be considered from the postal history aspect of the item. Thus, a rare rate, route, or postal marking is usually more important when considering rarity in Postal History exhibits than a common postal history item franked with a rare stamp. If many of the key postal history rarities within the subject are present, traditionally important items such as rare postal stationery and stamps on postal items, largest known franking, earliest recorded usage, mixed frankings, condition rarities, etc. will also be appreciated in postal history exhibits.<br /> <br /> <br /> If an exhibit contains very rare material, the exhibitor should draw attention to this fact in the descriptions of the items. If rarity statements (e.g. &quot;One of X recorded&quot;) are used, it will be positively regarded if the statement is corroborated by mention of the source and personal research put into generating the relevant rarity assessment. This should preferably be in the introductory statement. It should also be described exactly what makes the item &quot;One of X recorded&quot;. At a detailed level almost every postal history item becomes unique so the relative level of rarity will be considered. A statement saying &quot;One of X recorded&quot; without any specification is therefore not helpful to the judges or viewers. For the same reason, simple expressions like &quot;Unique&quot; or &quot;Very rare&quot; without further explanation should be avoided.<br /> <br /> <br /> 3.6 Presentation (5 points)<br /> <br /> Presentation should assist the treatment of the exhibit by its general layout and clarity. The method of presentation should show the material to the best effect and in a balanced way both on the individual sheet, in the frame, and throughout the whole exhibit.<br /> <br /> <br /> The judges will evaluate:<br /> *The work put into the presentation from the point of view of how it facilitates the understanding and attraction of the exhibit to judges and viewers alike.<br /> *The overall appearance of the pages and frames.<br /> *Some variation in the mounting between the pages is appreciated (all the pages should not be almost identical).<br /> *Careful mounting<br /> *Good use of the page – with not too much white space on the pages<br /> *Whether the write-up is clear and relevant to the material shown and to the subject chosen for the exhibit. Detailed write-up can be necessary and thus acceptable in Postal History exhibits as long as it does not overwhelm the material.<br /> *Illustrations should not be too dominating and coloured photographs or reproductions should be at least 25% different in size from the original. Full size reproductions of single cancellations or part of a cover are permitted.<br /> *Illustrations of relevant postal markings are necessary only when the originals are not clear enough to the onlooker. When it is desirable to illustrate significant markings on the reverse side of a cover, such markings can be either drawn or illustrated with a reproduction, such as a photograph or photocopy, as long as the reproduction is clearly seen as a reproduction to onlookers.<br /> *All illustrative material whether non-postal history or non-philatelic material should be original where possible.<br /> <br /> No advantage or disadvantage shall apply as to whether the text is handwritten, typewritten or printed. Brightly coloured inks and coloured album pages should be avoided. Likewise, the colour of the pages should be consistent throughout the exhibit.<br /> <br /> <br /> 4. Concluding Provisions<br /> <br /> 4.1 These guidelines do not answer every question an exhibitor or a judge may raise. Each exhibit will have to be evaluated on its own merits.<br /> <br /> 4.2 In the event of any discrepancies in the text arising from translation, the English text shall prevail.<br /> <br /> 4.3 These guidelines were approved by the FIP Postal History Commission’s delegates in Lugano on 22 May 2022 and by the FIP Board during the 144th FIP Board meeting in Lugano on 22 May 2022</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=80 2026-01-18T13:27:51Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch <br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=79 2026-01-18T13:27:03Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch mit Chrom Browser übersetzbar<br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;text-align:left&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=78 2026-01-18T13:25:25Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch mit Chrom Browser übersetzbar<br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}<br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=77 2026-01-18T13:23:35Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+FIP Reglemente in Englisch mit Chrom Browser übersetzbar<br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |+SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |+Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |+FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=76 2026-01-18T13:22:37Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+ FIP Reglemente in Englisch mit Chrom Browser übersetzbar<br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+ GREX<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+ GREV<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |+ SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |+ Postal History<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ SRECS &amp; Guidlines II<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ FIP Commissions<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ FIP Jurors<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ Commissioners<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=75 2026-01-18T13:21:41Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+ FIP Reglemente in Englisch mit Chrom Browser übersetzbar<br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''GREX'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''GREV'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |+ '''Postal History'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''SRECS &amp; Guidlines II'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''Commissioners'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=74 2026-01-18T13:20:06Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> '''Statutes''' <br /> <br /> [[Statutes English]] / Zürich: Oktober 2016<br /> <br /> <br /> '''GREX'''<br /> <br /> [[GREX English]] as approved by 77th FIP / Zürich Dez. 2024<br /> <br /> --CongressGENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE FIP FOR EXHIBITIONS <br /> <br /> <br /> '''GREV'''<br /> <br /> [[GREV English]]/ Updated 22 May 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> <br /> [[Astrophilately]](New) / Lugano 22.5.2022<br /> <br /> [[Aerophilately]] (New) / Indonesia 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Literature]] (New) / Indonesia 10 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Maximaphily]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> [['''SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily''']] / Indonesia 9. August<br /> <br /> Postal History - [[SREVS]] &amp; [[New Guidelines May 2022]]<br /> <br /> [[Postal Stationery]] / Ganzsachen / no date<br /> <br /> [[Revenues]] (New SREVs and Guidelines) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Thematic Philately]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Traditional Philately]](New) / Bucharest 28 June 2008 <br /> <br /> [[Youth Philately]] (SREVs) / LISBON, 10 October 2010<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] (New) / ....8 August 2020<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] (New) ... 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (II)'''<br /> <br /> [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] August 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards]] Special Regulations 2018<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] / no date<br /> <br /> <br /> '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> [[Commissions Guidelines]] 2025 updated<br /> <br /> '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> [[Jury guidelines]] 2024<br /> <br /> '''Commissioners'''<br /> [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] updated Oct 2025<br /> <br /> {| class=&quot;wikitable&quot; style=&quot;margin:auto&quot;<br /> |+ '''FIP Reglemente in Englisch mit Chrom Browser übersetzbar'''<br /> |-<br /> ! Titel !! Bemerkung !! DDMMYY !! Ort<br /> |-<br /> | [[Statutes]] || - || 10.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''GREX'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREX]] || as approved by 77th FIP || 12.2024 || Zürich<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''GREV'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[GREV]] || updated || - || 22.5.2022<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''SREV &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[Astrophilately]] || - || 22.5.2022 || Lugano<br /> |-<br /> | [[Aerophilately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Literature]] || - || 10.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily]] || - || 9.8.... || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Postal Stationery]] || Ganzsachen || .... || -<br /> |-<br /> | [[Revenues]] || New SREVs and Guidelines || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Thematic Philately]] || - || 9.8.2022 || Indonesia<br /> |-<br /> | [[Traditional Philately]] || -n || 28.6.2008 || Bucharest<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Philately]] || - || 10.10.2010 || Lisbon<br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] || - || 8.8.2020 || <br /> |-<br /> | [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] || - || 9.8.2022 || <br /> |-<br /> |+ '''Postal History'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[SREVS]] || [[New Guidelines]] || 5.2022 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''SRECS &amp; Guidlines II'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 8.2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards]] || Special Regulations || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || - || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] || updating by Working Group in progress || 2018 || ..<br /> |-<br /> | [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] || - || -|| ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[Commissions Guidelines]] || updated || 2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[Jury guidelines]] || - || 2024 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |+ '''Commissioners'''<br /> |-<br /> | [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] || updated || 10.2025 || ..<br /> |-<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=73 2026-01-18T12:44:53Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> '''Statutes''' <br /> <br /> [[Statutes English]] / Zürich: Oktober 2016<br /> <br /> <br /> '''GREX'''<br /> <br /> [[GREX English]] as approved by 77th FIP / Zürich Dez. 2024<br /> <br /> --CongressGENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE FIP FOR EXHIBITIONS <br /> <br /> <br /> '''GREV'''<br /> <br /> [[GREV English]]/ Updated 22 May 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> <br /> [[Astrophilately]](New) / Lugano 22.5.2022<br /> <br /> [[Aerophilately]] (New) / Indonesia 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Literature]] (New) / Indonesia 10 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Maximaphily]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> [['''SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily''']] / Indonesia 9. August<br /> <br /> Postal History - [[SREVS]] &amp; [[New Guidelines May 2022]]<br /> <br /> [[Postal Stationery]] / Ganzsachen / no date<br /> <br /> [[Revenues]] (New SREVs and Guidelines) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Thematic Philately]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Traditional Philately]](New) / Bucharest 28 June 2008 <br /> <br /> [[Youth Philately]] (SREVs) / LISBON, 10 October 2010<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] (New) / ....8 August 2020<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] (New) ... 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (II)'''<br /> <br /> [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] August 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards]] Special Regulations 2018<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] / no date<br /> <br /> <br /> '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> [[Commissions Guidelines]] 2025 updated<br /> <br /> '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> [[Jury guidelines]] 2024<br /> <br /> '''Commissioners'''<br /> [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] updated Oct 2025<br /> <br /> {|<br /> |+ <br /> |- | | | | | |<br /> |}</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=72 2026-01-18T11:34:01Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> '''Statutes''' <br /> <br /> [[Statutes English]] / Zürich: Oktober 2016<br /> <br /> <br /> '''GREX'''<br /> <br /> [[GREX English]] as approved by 77th FIP / Zürich Dez. 2024<br /> <br /> --CongressGENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE FIP FOR EXHIBITIONS <br /> <br /> <br /> '''GREV'''<br /> <br /> [[GREV English]]/ Updated 22 May 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> <br /> [[Astrophilately]](New) / Lugano 22.5.2022<br /> <br /> [[Aerophilately]] (New) / Indonesia 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Literature]] (New) / Indonesia 10 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Maximaphily]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> [['''SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily''']] / Indonesia 9. August<br /> <br /> Postal History - [[SREVS]] &amp; [[New Guidelines May 2022]]<br /> <br /> [[Postal Stationery]] / Ganzsachen / no date<br /> <br /> [[Revenues]] (New SREVs and Guidelines) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Thematic Philately]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Traditional Philately]](New) / Bucharest 28 June 2008 <br /> <br /> [[Youth Philately]] (SREVs) / LISBON, 10 October 2010<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] (New) / ....8 August 2020<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] (New) ... 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (II)'''<br /> <br /> [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] August 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards]] Special Regulations 2018<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] / no date<br /> <br /> <br /> '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> [[Commissions Guidelines]] 2025 updated<br /> <br /> '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> [[Jury guidelines]] 2024<br /> <br /> '''Commissioners'''<br /> [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] updated Oct 2025</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=71 2026-01-18T11:33:11Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> '''Statutes''' <br /> <br /> [[Statutes English]] / Zürich: Oktober 2016<br /> <br /> '''GREX'''<br /> <br /> [[GREX English]] as approved by 77th FIP / Zürich Dez. 2024<br /> <br /> --CongressGENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE FIP FOR EXHIBITIONS <br /> <br /> '''GREV'''<br /> <br /> [[GREV English]]/ Updated 22 May 2022<br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> <br /> [[Astrophilately]](New) / Lugano 22.5.2022<br /> <br /> [[Aerophilately]] (New) / Indonesia 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Literature]] (New) / Indonesia 10 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Maximaphily]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [['''SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily''']] / Indonesia 9. August<br /> <br /> Postal History - [[SREVS]] &amp; [[New Guidelines May 2022]]<br /> <br /> [[Postal Stationery]] / Ganzsachen / no date<br /> <br /> [[Revenues]] (New SREVs and Guidelines) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Thematic Philately]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Traditional Philately]](New) / Bucharest 28 June 2008 <br /> <br /> [[Youth Philately]] (SREVs) / LISBON, 10 October 2010<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] (New) / ....8 August 2020<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] (New) ... 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (II)'''<br /> <br /> [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] August 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards]] Special Regulations 2018<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] / no date<br /> <br /> '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> [[Commissions Guidelines]] 2025 updated<br /> <br /> '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> [[Jury guidelines]] 2024<br /> <br /> '''Commissioners'''<br /> [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] updated Oct 2025</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP&diff=70 2026-01-18T11:32:15Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>Die originale und die neusten finden Sie hier. [FIP Homepage https://www.f-i-p.ch/regulations/]<br /> '''Statutes''' <br /> <br /> [[Statutes English]] / Zürich: Oktober 2016<br /> <br /> '''GREX'''<br /> <br /> [[GREX English]] as approved by 77th FIP / Zürich Dez. 2024<br /> --CongressGENERAL REGULATIONS OF THE FIP FOR EXHIBITIONS <br /> <br /> '''GREV'''<br /> <br /> [[GREV English]]/ Updated 22 May 2022<br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (I)'''<br /> <br /> [[Astrophilately]](New) / Lugano 22.5.2022<br /> <br /> [[Aerophilately]] (New) / Indonesia 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Literature]] (New) / Indonesia 10 August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Maximaphily]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [['''SREVs for Aerophilately &amp; Maximaphily''']] / Indonesia 9. August<br /> <br /> Postal History - [[SREVS]] &amp; [[New Guidelines May 2022]]<br /> <br /> [[Postal Stationery]] / Ganzsachen / no date<br /> <br /> [[Revenues]] (New SREVs and Guidelines) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Thematic Philately]] (New) / Indonesia 9. August 2022<br /> <br /> [[Traditional Philately]](New) / Bucharest 28 June 2008 <br /> <br /> [[Youth Philately]] (SREVs) / LISBON, 10 October 2010<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Trad]] (New) / ....8 August 2020<br /> <br /> [[Youth Guidelines Thematic]] (New) ... 9 August 2022<br /> <br /> '''SREVs &amp; Guidelines (II)'''<br /> <br /> [[OPEN-PHILATELY-Guidelines]] August 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards]] Special Regulations 2018<br /> <br /> [[FIP Picture Postcards Guidelines]] 2018<br /> <br /> (updating by Working Group in progress)<br /> <br /> [[Modern Philately Guidelines]] / no date<br /> <br /> '''FIP Commissions'''<br /> [[Commissions Guidelines]] 2025 updated<br /> <br /> '''FIP Jurors'''<br /> [[Jury guidelines]] 2024<br /> <br /> '''Commissioners'''<br /> [[FIP Commissioners Guidelines]] updated Oct 2025</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=Main_Page&diff=69 2026-01-18T11:18:43Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>* Liste der Jury [[Reglemente]]<br /> <br /> * Liste der Briefmarken-[[Verbände]]<br /> &lt;strong&gt;MediaWiki has been installed.&lt;/strong&gt;<br /> <br /> Consult the [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Special:MyLanguage/Help:Contents User's Guide] for information on using the wiki software.<br /> <br /> == Getting started ==<br /> * [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Special:MyLanguage/Manual:Configuration_settings Configuration settings list]<br /> * [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Special:MyLanguage/Manual:FAQ MediaWiki FAQ]<br /> * [https://lists.wikimedia.org/postorius/lists/mediawiki-announce.lists.wikimedia.org/ MediaWiki release mailing list]<br /> * [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Special:MyLanguage/Localisation#Translation_resources Localise MediaWiki for your language]<br /> * [https://www.mediawiki.org/wiki/Special:MyLanguage/Manual:Combating_spam Learn how to combat spam on your wiki]</div>

Administrator http://10.10.10.70/index.php?title=FIP_Commissioners_Guidelines&diff=68 2026-01-18T07:48:17Z

<p>Administrator: </p> <hr /> <div>'''GUIDELINES FOR DUTIES AND ACCREDITATION OF NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS'''<br /> <br /> '''INTRODUCTION'''<br /> <br /> These Guidelines set out the position, rights and duties of Commissioners nominated by the National<br /> Federations (hereafter described as FIP Members). They focus on the problems that may be faced by<br /> Commissioners at FIP exhibitions and provide guidance on how to handle them smoothly and efficiently.<br /> <br /> The functions, rights and duties of the Commissioner are specified in the General Regulations of the<br /> FIP for Exhibitions (GREX) in Section IV &quot;Commissioners&quot;, Article 21 to 29. In these Guidelines<br /> National Commissioners are referred to as &quot;Commissioners&quot;.<br /> <br /> Some details of the Commissioner's duties may vary from exhibition to exhibition, but the basic rules<br /> do not change.<br /> <br /> In these Guidelines FIP has taken steps to define the job more comprehensively in recognition of the<br /> important services provided by Commissioners and to explain to the Exhibition Organizers that without<br /> the services of the Commissioners, no exhibitions can be held. It is they who bring the attractive exhibits<br /> from all over the world to the exhibition.<br /> <br /> The following articles cover:<br /> * Position, Appointment and Qualification <br /> * Second Commissioner and Replacement of Commissioner<br /> * Commissioners' work<br /> * Responsibilities of the Exhibition<br /> * Management<br /> * Personal arrangements<br /> * Privileges and Rights<br /> * Breach of Commissioner's Responsibilities<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER I'''<br /> <br /> '''THE COMMISSIONER'''<br /> <br /> ''1. Position''<br /> <br /> 1.1 A Commissioner is appointed by the National Federation (hereafter described as FIP Member) to function as the intermediary between the Exhibition Management of FIP General World and Specialized World Exhibitions on behalf of the exhibitors from this country.<br /> <br /> 1.2 A Commissioner operates under the rules specified in the GREX<br /> <br /> ''2. Appointment''<br /> <br /> 2.1 Commissioners will be appointed for the purpose of promoting and supporting all exhibitions granted FIP Patronage or Recognition to take care of the interests of the Exhibitors and to help them.<br /> <br /> 2.2 When a FIP Member organizes a World or International Exhibition under the patronage of FIP, one Commissioner is appointed by each FIP Member according to GREX Article 21.1.<br /> <br /> 2.3 The Exhibition Management will request FIP Members to appoint a Commissioner prior to the publication of the first publicity brochure for the exhibition.<br /> <br /> 2.3.1 The Exhibition Management may request an individual be appointed as Commissioner, but the nomination is at the sole discretion of the FIP Member.<br /> <br /> 2.3.2 The Commissioner will be required to carry exhibits to the exhibition or arrange their dispatch, look after them at all times and return them safely to the owners with any awards won by them.<br /> <br /> 2.4 Every FIP Member has the right to entrust the Commissioner's duties to the Commissioner of another country, subject to the approval of and in co-ordination with the FIP Member of that country. (GREX Article 21.3)<br /> <br /> 2.4.1 Failure to appoint a Commissioner in due time will be interpreted as the intention of the FIP<br /> Member not to appoint a Commissioner for the exhibition in question. If no Commissioner is<br /> appointed, then the National Federation should act as Commissioner (see GREX Article 21.4.).<br /> <br /> 2.5 Only Commissioners representing FIP Members may be appointed other than as provided in 2.6.<br /> <br /> 2.6 Commissioners may be appointed by non-FIP Members to FIP Exhibitions, when the National Federation is affiliated to a Continental Federation if the Exhibition is held in that Continent.<br /> <br /> 2.7 The list of proposed Commissioners must be submitted to the FIP Consultant for approval prior to any publication thereof. The FIP Board may reject the nomination of a Commissioner. <br /> <br /> ''3. Qualification''<br /> <br /> 3.1 Essential<br /> <br /> The Commissioner must have or be:<br /> <br /> 3.1.1 A philatelist<br /> <br /> 3.1.2 Attended at least one overseas FIP Exhibition as an exhibitor or juror or have served as a<br /> Commissioner at an exhibition organized by a Continental Federation.<br /> <br /> 3.1.3 Conversant with FIP Statutes, GREX, GREV's and SREVs and Guidelines.<br /> <br /> 3.1.4 Reasonably fluent in one of FIP languages, preferably English, because it is the normal<br /> language used by the philatelic community.<br /> <br /> 3.1.5 Most important of all, the Commissioner should command the respect and confidence of the<br /> exhibitors in handling their exhibits.<br /> <br /> 3.2 Desirable.<br /> The Commissioner must have or be: <br /> <br /> 3.2.1 Able and willing to communicate promptly with the Exhibition Management.<br /> <br /> 3.2.2 Even tempered and ready to solve problems.<br /> <br /> 3.2.3 Willing to travel, devote time and convey the exhibits to the exhibition.<br /> <br /> 3.2.4 Physically fit.<br /> <br /> 3.2.5 Able to spare time to attend the exhibition for the entire duration.<br /> <br /> 3.2.6 Prepared to incur out of pocket expenses if these are not reimbursed by the FIP Member.<br /> <br /> 3.2.7 Live in a place easily accessible to overseas flights and with facilities for temporary storage of exhibits in a secure location. <br /> <br /> ''4. Second Commissioner and Replacement of Commissioners''<br /> <br /> 4.1 Second Commissioner<br /> <br /> 4.1.1 An FIP Member whose Commissioner is hand-carrying more than 150 frames of competitive<br /> exhibits, not including literature, may request a second Commissioner who will receive the<br /> same privileges as the principal Commissioner. (GREX article 21.2.)<br /> <br /> 4.2 Replacement of appointed Commissioners<br /> <br /> 4.2.1 If for any reason the Commissioner is unable to continue, he must inform his Federation and<br /> the Exhibition Management immediately, so that either a new Commissioner is appointed or<br /> alternative arrangements are made for the accepted exhibits to be present at the exhibition.<br /> <br /> 4.2.2 A replacement Commissioner shall have all the privileges and duties as described in these<br /> Guidelines as granted to the original appointee.<br /> <br /> 5. Publication of the Lists of Commissioners<br /> <br /> 5.1 The List of Commissioners shall be published by the Exhibition Management in bulletins, the exhibition catalogue and / or in relevant brochures.<br /> <br /> 5.2 This listing shall contain the name, postal address, contact number, E-mail address and a<br /> photograph. If the Member Federation acts as Commissioner, a member of the Federation<br /> secretariat should be nominated as the contact point.<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER II'''<br /> <br /> '''COMMISSIONER'S WORK'''<br /> <br /> 6. Duties of a Commissioner prior to the opening of the exhibition<br /> <br /> 6.1 The Commissioner must:<br /> <br /> 6.1.1 Promptly accept or decline the invitation to serve as Commissioner.<br /> <br /> 6.1.2 Provide contact details and an address for reception of all publicity material including Bulletins, entry forms and other publications.<br /> <br /> 6.1.3 Create maximum interest among prospective exhibitors by publicizing the exhibition as widely as possible.<br /> <br /> 6.1.4 Procure latest version of FIP Statutes, GREX, SREVs and Guidelines issued by FIP. <br /> <br /> 6.1.5 On receipt of bulletins, carefully study the Individual Regulations (IREX) and note particularly size of frames, number of pages per frame, frame charges and final date of sending provisional Entry Forms and any other special regulations.<br /> <br /> 6.1.6 Check recent national and international catalogues for potential participants; past Palmares booklets or digital online results are excellent sources for this.<br /> <br /> 6.1.7 Make photocopies if short of entry forms,<br /> <br /> 6.1.8 Contact prospective participants by providing a set of entry forms and other material drawing attention to the exhibition, including the deadline for entries. In particular, contact exhibitors who have recently qualified at their national exhibition.<br /> <br /> 6.1.9 Make a personal approach to collectors whenever possible.<br /> <br /> 6.1.10 With the requirement of 20 % new exhibits at exhibitions, qualified new exhibitors should be encouraged to enter.<br /> <br /> 6.1.11 Advise the Exhibition Management in advance if more than 25 applications are expected from the FIP Member's exhibitors.<br /> <br /> 6.1.12 Advise the National airline, Embassy or Consulate of host country that exhibitors from the FIP Member may be participating in the exhibition. Obtain information about Visa, health and customs requirements.<br /> <br /> 6.1.13 Act as sole correspondent with Exhibition Management as agent of the exhibitors. <br /> <br /> <br /> ''7. Publicity''<br /> <br /> 7.1 The Commissioner must:<br /> <br /> 7.1.1 Publicize the exhibition as widely as possible in philatelic magazines, newspapers etc. giving<br /> full details including name, place, date and type of the exhibition, number of frames, frame<br /> charges and the Commissioner's contact address.<br /> <br /> 7.1.2 Issue further press releases to update information about the exhibition.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''8. Processing of the Application''<br /> <br /> 8.1 Competition classes<br /> On receipt of application forms, clarify any shortcoming immediately; check that applications<br /> are completed in clear capital letters. The Commissioner must verify all the information<br /> required from exhibitors and about the exhibits, as indicated below:<br /> <br /> 8.1.1 Is the exhibitor a member of the National Federation?<br /> <br /> 8.1.2 No applications shall be accepted from exhibitors from other FIP Members unless the<br /> Commissioner has been appointed to represent that FIP Member.<br /> <br /> 8.1.3 If the application is from an exhibitor affiliated to an Associate Member, ensure that the<br /> exhibitor is a member of the appropriate National Federation (Statutes Article 48.2).<br /> <br /> 8.1.4 A Pseudonym may be used by an exhibitor however the Exhibition Management and the jury<br /> must be informed of the actual owner. Check that these details have been provided. <br /> <br /> 8.1.5 A substantial portion of the exhibit has been owned for more than two years by the exhibitor. Change of ownership even from husband to wife and vice versa will be treated as a new exhibit and has to re-qualify.<br /> <br /> 8.1.6 According to GREX Article 10.2 a new exhibit (not the exhibitor) must have received a minimum of 75 points or a Vermeil medal at a National Exhibition within the last 5 years. Once an exhibit has been exhibited in an International Exhibition and won an award, it is not necessary to re-qualify unless it has not been exhibited during the preceding ten years. For exhibits in the Youth class the qualification is a national 70 points or a Large Silver medal in<br /> Age Group A (10 to 15 years) and a national 75 points or a Vermeil medal in Age Groups B (16 to 18 years) and C (19 to 21 years). (GREX Article 10.4).<br /> In the Literature Class, books must have been published within the preceding five years and all<br /> other entries within the preceding two years, no previous award is necessary. (GREX Art. 10.3)<br /> <br /> 8.1.7 If an exhibit has not been exhibited in a National Exhibition and obtained qualification, it is<br /> ineligible to participate in an International Exhibition, except when the country has not held a<br /> National Exhibition during the previous five years. In such case the National Federation must<br /> provide a certificate stating that the exhibit is of Vermeil or equivalent standard. (GREX Article 10.6)<br /> <br /> 8.1.8 If the Vermeil medal (75 points) has been attained in another FIP Member country, then the<br /> National Federation must provide a certificate accepting such qualification and this must be<br /> attached to the application (Art. 10.5 GREX).<br /> <br /> 8.1.9 No more than 2 entries per exhibitor, or four per family, may be submitted for any exhibition.<br /> However, such applications are likely to be cut down if the Exhibition is oversubscribed. This<br /> does not apply to exhibits in the Championship or Literature Classes where no restrictions apply.<br /> <br /> 8.1.10 Check that all columns in the application forms are correctly filled in including the exhibitor's<br /> FIP number (if any). Special care should be taken to authenticate previous awards won by the<br /> exhibit. Exhibitors need only quote their FIP Exhibitor number and their qualifying national<br /> and most recent FIP recognized international awards. Any false information may lead to<br /> disqualification of the exhibitor. Commissioners must take care in differentiating between<br /> International and FIP Exhibitions, only the latter should be quoted as qualifying international<br /> exhibitions, the others may be quoted as qualifying national exhibitions subject to article 8.1.7<br /> above.<br /> <br /> 8.1.11 Ensure that a draft introductory / title page is attached. A synopsis page can be attached if so desired by the Exhibitor.<br /> <br /> 8.1.12 Check the number of frames requested and that the exhibitor is qualified for that number, furthermore whether they correspond to the number of frames to be allotted for the class.<br /> <br /> 8.1.13 Check the frame size and number of pages that can be accommodated in each frame in relation to the size of pages. Special mention of odd size pages in an exhibit must be identified.<br /> <br /> 8.1.14 Check that the age requirements for Youth exhibits have been met.<br /> <br /> 8.1.15 Check that the publication requirements for the Literature class have been met.<br /> <br /> 8.1.16 Carefully check applications from first time exhibitors and provide them with assistance should there be any mistakes in the application.<br /> <br /> 8.1.17 Remind exhibitors that they should include originals of certificates with their exhibits and indicate against the item that it has a certificate. <br /> <br /> <br /> 8.2 FIP Championship Class<br /> The Commissioner must read carefully Article 9 of GREX concerning eligibility for<br /> participation in the Championship Class and should especially note:<br /> <br /> 8.2.1 The qualification for entry in this Class is three Large Gold Medals in three separate years.<br /> <br /> 8.2.2 The exhibitor is eligible to show for any five calendar years of his choice within the span of ten<br /> years after it becomes eligible. A qualified exhibit enters the Championship Class on January<br /> 1st in the year following eligibility. Once an exhibit is eligible for the FIP Championship Class,<br /> should the exhibitor wish to continue to show the exhibit in the Competitive class, the exhibit<br /> would then be allowed to show in competitive class within a span of 36 months from the date<br /> of eligibility to participate in FIP Championship class. After which it may not be exhibited in<br /> any other Competitive Class at FIP Exhibitions. Once the exhibit is shown in the FIP<br /> Championship Class, it can no longer be eligible to compete in the Competitive class. (Grex 9.4).<br /> <br /> 8.2.3 An exhibitor can show in all the exhibitions in any one year but this will still be treated as one<br /> calendar year.<br /> <br /> <br /> 8.3 General<br /> All applications for any class and correspondence must be routed through the Commissioner.<br /> Exhibitors shall be advised that this is the only route and that direct communication with the<br /> Exhibition Management will be referred back to the Commissioner.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''9. Acceptance of Application''<br /> <br /> 9.1 A list of all accepted exhibits will be sent by the Exhibition Management to the Commissioner<br /> indicating the number of frames allotted to each. At the same time the Exhibition Management<br /> will send a list of rejected exhibits (and any on a reserve list).<br /> <br /> 9.2 The Commissioner may request reconsideration of rejected exhibits.<br /> <br /> 9.3 Number of frames<br /> <br /> 9.3.1 If an exhibit has been allotted a lower number of frames than that to which it is entitled and for<br /> which an application has been made, the Commissioner shall bring this to the attention of the<br /> Exhibition Management for explanation.<br /> <br /> 9.3.2 Exhibits which qualify for 8 frames at an exhibition have to show 8 frames in the immediate<br /> next exhibition. For valid reasons such as limited philatelic material available in the market etc,<br /> the exhibit concerned could not be expanded to 8 frames, it would then be allowed to show 5<br /> to 7 frames for a maximum of 2 more times, within a span of 36 months from date of receiving<br /> the qualifying medal. (see GREX Article 6.4).<br /> <br /> 9.4 The Commissioner shall remind exhibitors that signing for the final acceptance includes<br /> acceptance of all GREX, GREV's and other FIP Regulations and Guidelines. Frame fees are<br /> not refundable.<br /> <br /> 9.5 The collection of all Frame Fees is the Commissioner’s responsibility and he shall forward<br /> these to the Exhibition Management. If the Commissioner envisages any delay in completing<br /> the formalities due to exchange control considerations, agree with the Exhibition Management<br /> to pay the fees on arrival. Exhibitors may not pay their frame fees directly.<br /> <br /> 9.6 Once the Commissioner receives the list of accepted exhibits from the Exhibition Management<br /> and has accepted and confirmed in writing with the Organizing Committee, it means a full<br /> commitment to participate in the exhibition with the said exhibits. Should the exhibits not turn<br /> up during the exhibition, the frame fees would still have to be paid, even if the Commissioner<br /> has informed the Exhibition Management of his withdrawal at a later date.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''10. Number of Exhibits''<br /> <br /> 10.1 It is in the interest of the exhibitors that the Exhibition Management and the Commissioner<br /> reach a mutual agreement in advance on the number of frames that are available to be allotted<br /> to the Member Federation's exhibitors.<br /> <br /> 10.2 The Commissioner must obtain a minimum required number of accepted exhibits to be entitled<br /> to the privileges set out in Article 27 of GREX. This qualifying number of exhibits (literature<br /> not included) for each FIP Member is based on the number of exhibits for such FIP Member<br /> appearing in the List maintained by FIP. The FIP Board will determine the qualifying number<br /> of exhibits for each FIP Member, and all FIP Members and Exhibition Managements will be<br /> informed annually. However, the minimum qualifying number of any FIP Member for an<br /> exhibition with all competitive classes will not be less than three, of which not more than one<br /> third may be in the youth class. (GREX Article 26)<br /> <br /> 10.3 The Commissioner must accept that exhibitions are likely to be oversubscribed and is unlikely<br /> to be qualified if only the minimum applications are submitted. Further if the applications do<br /> not include the minimum of 20 % of first time exhibitors the Exhibition Management may reject<br /> more applications than strictly based on a percentage of applications received due to their<br /> requirement to achieve this percentage. Duplicate or family exhibits are likely to be the first to<br /> be rejected or reduced due to the need to ensure as many potential exhibitors as possible can<br /> show at the exhibition.<br /> <br /> 10.4 Commissioners who had submitted the minimum required number of qualified exhibits shall<br /> also be entitled to the privileges, except the per diem, even though the Exhibition Management<br /> had accepted a number of exhibits less than the minimum number of qualified exhibits to be<br /> entitled to the privileges: a hotel room and breakfast, for the period of the exhibition as well as<br /> an agreed time for mounting and dismounting exhibits.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''11. Relations with the Exhibition Management''<br /> <br /> 11.1 The Commissioner is the representative of the Member Federation in all relations between the Exhibition Management and the exhibitors (see Article 8.3 above).<br /> <br /> 11.2 The Exhibition Management must inform the Commissioner of all invitations to members of the National Federation to show non-competitively. This information shall be provided when the invitation is sent.<br /> <br /> 11.3 The Exhibition Management may wish to send all material concerning the exhibition, including Bulletins, Catalogues, Palmares and prizes either to the Commissioners or direct to the exhibitors. This must be subject to the Commissioner's prior advice.<br /> <br /> 11.4 A Commissioner shall maintain contact with the Exhibition Management so that any action needed can be taken promptly. <br /> <br /> 11.5 The Commissioner must inform the Exhibition Management without delay if for any reason an<br /> exhibit must be withdrawn after it has been accepted. The Commissioner may offer a<br /> replacement from the rejected exhibits, if possible in the same class. The Exhibition<br /> Management has absolute discretion to accept or reject such replacement exhibit.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''12. Transport of Exhibits''<br /> <br /> 12.1 Means of transportation<br /> It is imperative that the intended means of transportation of exhibits be established and agreed<br /> by the Commissioner well in advance of the show.<br /> <br /> 12.2 Literature exhibits<br /> Literature exhibits must be dispatched to reach the Exhibition Management at least one month<br /> in advance and a letter must be sent to the Exhibition Management to advise that such exhibit<br /> has been dispatched to allow them to check its safe delivery.<br /> <br /> 12.3 Carried Personally by Exhibitor:<br /> Some exhibitors may wish to carry their exhibits personally or by means of friends. However,<br /> those exhibitors who opt to do so must be informed of any special procedures required by the<br /> exhibition. No costs for transportation and customs clearance of such exhibits shall fall on the<br /> Exhibition Management. Exhibition Management may forbid personal transportation of<br /> exhibits in their IREX for Customs or other reasons.<br /> <br /> 12.4 Carried by Commissioner:<br /> This is the preferred method even though the exhibitors may have to pay a small fee.<br /> <br /> 12.5 General<br /> It is essential at an early stage to inform the Exhibition Management how the exhibits are being<br /> brought to the exhibition.<br /> <br /> 12.6 Target Date:<br /> The Exhibition Management shall set target dates for the arrival of exhibits and shall agree this<br /> with the Commissioner. This allows the Commissioner to advise all exhibitors well in advance<br /> of his departure. The Commissioner must check that all relevant documentation has been<br /> received.<br /> <br /> 12.7 Freight and Transport Charges:<br /> The exhibitors will bear the charges for sending and returning the exhibits to the host country,<br /> but any transport charges of exhibits within the host country are to be borne by the Exhibition<br /> Management. (Art. 50.1 GREX)<br /> <br /> <br /> ''13. Customs''<br /> <br /> 13.1 There are two types of documentation needed to clear through the Customs on departure and<br /> return and in the Exhibition's and Exhibitor's countries. The Commissioner may need special<br /> documentation if the exhibits are being hand carried and there is need to transfer baggage in a<br /> third country. <br /> <br /> 13.2 Commissioner’s own Country:<br /> Familiarize yourself with Customs procedures in the Exhibition country as these vary between<br /> countries, if permissible obtain a single clearance covering all exhibits. Prepare a checklist of<br /> Customs requirements for exhibitors to complete and return to you. Check the return<br /> requirements in advance and ensure that you have a complete set of forms and other<br /> documentation with you. Do not detach any Customs seals as this will expedite clearance on<br /> return to your home country. Travel out to the Airport as early as practicable and follow any<br /> arrival times set by the Exhibition Management.<br /> <br /> 13.3 In the country where the exhibition is being held:<br /> <br /> 13.3.1 The Exhibition Management will be sending detailed instructions about their requirements and<br /> the necessary forms for Customs clearance. They are generally inventory forms, special<br /> customs identification labels and usually declaration forms. Study them carefully and in case<br /> of any doubt get immediate clarification. Inform all exhibitors of the requirements and which<br /> forms are to be sent with the exhibits. Keep one set of forms with your travel papers, pack the<br /> duplicate forms with the exhibits.<br /> <br /> 13.3.2 Notify the Exhibition Management about date, time, flight, train number etc. of arrival to enable<br /> them to meet the Commissioner and render assistance at the point of arrival. This will help with<br /> Customs and Immigration clearance.<br /> <br /> 13.3.3 The Commissioner needs to be patient while dealing with Customs Officers. The Exhibition<br /> Management will provide advice in advance information about the customs regulations of the<br /> country. Each country has different regulations. Alternatives are:<br /> Just walk through the 'nothing to declare' channel, or<br /> undergo inspection of documentation and a casual or thorough check of the exhibits.<br /> Customs will retain a copy of inventory and put a seal on the copy and the packages to be<br /> presented again to the Customs at exhibition site. Note that Customs may retain the exhibits for<br /> delivery to the Exhibition Management. In this case the Commissioner must obtain a receipt<br /> for them. If a Bond is required, make sure it is cancelled on departure.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''14. Packing and re-packing''<br /> <br /> 14.1 Decide how to carry the exhibits, in a big trunk, box or small suitcase as most convenient. If<br /> the exhibits are to be air freighted then a strong aluminum trunk should be used.<br /> <br /> 14.2 Advise the exhibitors that the exhibits may be repacked or tell them how they should be packed.<br /> Keep the original containers received from exhibitors for return to them.<br /> <br /> 14.3 Obtain a release from any liabilities for handling the exhibits from each exhibitor.<br /> <br /> 14.4 Obtain from each exhibitor instructions as to how the exhibit should be returned.<br /> <br /> 14.5 Keep records of receipts, vouchers and expenditures. The total expenses are usually shared<br /> between the exhibitors. Check with Airlines the cost of the freight for the excess baggage and<br /> obtain an advance from the exhibitors. This is usually included with the frame fees. Render<br /> accounts to the National Federation on return.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''15. On arrival''<br /> <br /> 15.1 Commissioners must arrive with the complete documentation according to the specification and guidance given in advance by the Exhibition Management.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''16. Obligations of the Commissioner during the exhibition''<br /> <br /> 16.1 Commissioners in attendance at exhibitions must:<br /> <br /> 16.1.1 accept full responsibility for the display of the exhibits,<br /> <br /> 16.1.2 check the correct initial mounting of the exhibits and arrange for correction of any irregularity<br /> by the Exhibition Management,<br /> <br /> 16.1.3 attend all daily Commissioners' meetings as arranged by the Exhibition Management,<br /> <br /> 16.1.4 check the exhibits in the frames regularly,<br /> <br /> 16.1.5 be available during the exhibition in the Commissioners' room on request of the Jury or of the<br /> Expert Group to answer questions, should the need arise,<br /> <br /> 16.1.6 if requested be present at the opening of their exhibitors’ frames by the Expert Group and check<br /> that all pages have been correctly replaced,<br /> <br /> 16.1.7 be present at all functions arranged by the Exhibition Management to which they are invited.<br /> <br /> 16.2 Bring an emergency stock of photo corners, glue, scissors, twine, strapping tape, mounts, stamp<br /> hinges, rubber bands and paper clips.<br /> <br /> 16.3 The Commissioner shall record comments and suggestions from jurors and other exhibition<br /> participants which could be passed to exhibitors.<br /> <br /> 16.4 A Commissioner at the exhibition should preferably not serve as a jury at the same exhibition.<br /> It is difficult for the Commissioner to attend both the Commissioners’ meetings and judge at<br /> the same time.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''17. Departure from exhibition''<br /> <br /> 17.1 Commissioners must allow adequate time to complete departure formalities before leaving the<br /> country. They shall take the earliest opportunity for dismounting after the show is over and<br /> must fix up time with the Exhibition Management prior to arrival. No commissioner, however,<br /> can expect to travel before the afternoon following the close of an exhibition.<br /> <br /> 17.2 The Exhibition Management should produce a schedule for dismounting and handing back<br /> exhibits which the Commissioner must follow. The Exhibition Management shall advise the<br /> Commissioners prior to their arranging flights of the earliest time at which they can arrange<br /> return flights.<br /> <br /> 17.3 Each exhibit must be checked in detail before it is packed for return. The Commissioner's<br /> signature absolves the Exhibition Management for any discrepancies which may be found by<br /> the Exhibitor when the exhibit is received back.<br /> <br /> 17.4 Commissioners shall collect awards and evaluation sheets with point breakdown, on behalf of<br /> their exhibitors as well as Palmarès, Catalogues and Souvenirs and communicate as early as<br /> possible the awards to exhibitors back at home. However, the Commissioner may refuse to<br /> carry special prizes which are too heavy, too fragile or too unwieldy to carry. In such cases the<br /> Exhibition Management is responsible for sending the special prize to the exhibitor. <br /> <br /> <br /> ''18. Return of exhibits to exhibitors''<br /> <br /> 18.1 On return the Commissioner shall keep the exhibits in a secure place prior to returning them to<br /> the exhibitors together with the mark sheets, along with Catalogues and other souvenirs.<br /> <br /> 18.2 The Commissioner should report to the National Federation on the Commissioners<br /> arrangements at the exhibition. This will serve as guidance for Commissioners who serve at<br /> future exhibitions.<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER III'''<br /> <br /> '''DUTIES OF THE EXHIBITION MANAGEMENT'''<br /> <br /> <br /> ''19. Assistance to Commissioner at arrival and departure''<br /> <br /> 19.1 Documentation<br /> The Exhibition Management shall provide the Commissioner with comprehensive<br /> documentation and guidance prior to his arrival. This is vital to ensure the acceptance, clearance<br /> and return of the exhibits.<br /> <br /> 19.2 Assistance at arrival<br /> Commissioners who transport their exhibits personally to the exhibition must be met by<br /> representatives of the Exhibition Management at the local airport or railway station.<br /> <br /> 19.3 Assistance at customs<br /> Assistance also must be rendered with customs formalities and in transporting the<br /> Commissioners to the security area for the exhibition for delivery of exhibits and also to their<br /> hotel.<br /> <br /> 19.4 Security<br /> On arrival the Commissioner shall take the exhibits as arranged by the Exhibition Management<br /> to the bin room. It should be noted that it is not safe or possible for an hotel to provide temporary<br /> security. This may also breach insurance coverage.<br /> <br /> 19.5 Assistance at departure<br /> The same assistance is to be rendered when the Commissioners return the exhibits personally<br /> to their home countries provided they leave within 72 hours of the close of the Exhibition.<br /> <br /> 19.6 Travel by Car<br /> Where Commissioners travel by car, the Exhibition Management must be advised so that<br /> suitable arrangements can be made for their reception.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''20. Mounting''<br /> <br /> <br /> 20.1 The Exhibition Management must allow the Commissioner to be present during the mounting<br /> and dismounting of the exhibits. In addition, the Exhibition Management must give<br /> Commissioners who do not attend the mounting of the exhibits access to the exhibit area to<br /> check that the exhibits have been correctly mounted. Exhibitors will not normally be permitted<br /> to mount their exhibits themselves and this must be made clear to them when submitting their<br /> application. <br /> <br /> 20.2 The FIP Consultant should be contacted to deal with any other problems which cannot be<br /> resolved between the Commissioner and the Exhibition Management.<br /> <br /> 20.3 The exhibits, once mounted and locked in the frames, are not permitted to be withdrawn or<br /> dismantled prior to the final closing hours on the last day of the exhibition.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''21. Meeting Room for Commissioners''<br /> <br /> 21.1 The Exhibition Management shall provide a suitable meeting room at the disposal for the<br /> Commissioners during the exhibition. Cold and hot drinks should be provided and also pigeon<br /> holes for the delivery of messages.<br /> <br /> 21.2 Meetings shall take place according to a prior arranged schedule during the exhibition,<br /> particularly while judging is underway and to arrange hand-back of exhibits. Such meetings<br /> will be presided by an authorized person agreed between the FIP Consultant and the Exhibition<br /> Management.<br /> <br /> <br /> ''22. Dismounting''<br /> <br /> 22.1 The Exhibition Management shall produce a schedule for dismounting and handing back<br /> exhibits which Commissioners must follow.<br /> <br /> 22.2 The Exhibition Management has to assist the Commissioner during the hand-back of the exhibits and their re-packing.<br /> <br /> 22.3 Should a Commissioner wish to stay in the country for more than 72 hours following the close<br /> of an exhibition, unless there are no suitable flights to the home country during this period, the<br /> Commissioner shall be responsible for arranging secure storage of the exhibits and any charges<br /> incurred.<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER IV'''<br /> <br /> '''PERSONAL ARRANGEMENTS'''<br /> <br /> ''23. In this Chapter some instructions are given which the Commissioner should fulfill prior to the trip''<br /> <br /> 23.1 Visa:<br /> It is very important to check Visa requirements and to obtain a Visa, if required, well in advance<br /> of travel.<br /> <br /> 23.2 Currency:<br /> A Commissioner should check currency regulations both in their own country and where the<br /> exhibition is taking place. A Commissioner should have a certain amount of the respective<br /> national currency. Retain all conversion receipts to facilitate conversion on return. Avoid any<br /> black market in exchange rates. <br /> <br /> 23.3 Travel:<br /> Use the official carrier, if any, appointed by the Exhibition Management if there are direct<br /> flights. Get in touch with the airline well in advance and let them know the space requirements<br /> if the exhibits are to be carried in the cabin and, if possible, get the arrangements in writing and<br /> establish a contact person for the time of boarding. Try for early boarding in order to store the<br /> packages. If the Commissioner has to check the exhibits in the hold make prior arrangements<br /> for a secure hold as well as secure manner of transshipment.<br /> <br /> 23.4 Try to organize your flight to travel with exhibitors visiting the exhibition who can then assist<br /> with transportation of the exhibits.<br /> <br /> 23.5 Exhibitors visiting the exhibition:<br /> Commissioners should brief exhibitors intending to visit the exhibition, particularly any first<br /> time exhibitors, and provide as full information about the Exhibition and entry procedures as<br /> practicable.<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER V'''<br /> <br /> '''COMMISSIONER'S PRIVILEGES AND RIGHTS'''<br /> <br /> <br /> ''24. Privileges and Rights of Commissioners''<br /> The Exhibition Management has to provide the following to qualified Commissioners:<br /> <br /> 24.1 Accommodation<br /> A hotel room in the official Hotel of international standard with bath or shower for up to two<br /> persons, for the period of the exhibition as well as a reasonable time of one or two days agreed<br /> in advance with the Exhibition Management for mounting and dismounting the exhibits. The<br /> room rate shall include breakfast.<br /> <br /> 24.2 Allowance<br /> There is a daily allowance for the length of the actual stay at the exhibition. The amount shall<br /> be agreed between the Exhibition Management and the FIP Consultant. The allowance will be<br /> paid after all frame fees have been paid by the Commissioner and should be paid at the first<br /> Commissioners' meeting. Such allowance will be in local currency. A Commissioner may not<br /> receive a second per diem while also serving as a juror.<br /> <br /> 24.3 All commissioners are entitled to the following free of charge:<br /> <br /> 24.3.1 free transport between the airport and the official hotel and return and to and from the exhibition<br /> site.<br /> <br /> 24.3.2 up to two admission tickets or passes for the entire length of the exhibition and of the mounting<br /> / dismounting period, one for an assisting person or family member<br /> <br /> 24.3.3 an exhibition catalogue<br /> <br /> 24.3.4 a copy of the Palmarès<br /> <br /> 24.3.5 up to two invitations to the Palmarès Banquet and to all official exhibition events, one for a<br /> family member or an assisting person, if they have been nominated prior to arrival and if they<br /> occupy the same hotel room. <br /> <br /> 24.4 A Commissioner shall stay in the official hotel provided by the Exhibition Management so that<br /> permanent contact may be maintained at all times. Commissioners not staying in the official<br /> hotel are not entitled to reimbursement of the cost of accommodation.<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER VI'''<br /> '''BREACH OF COMMISSIONER'S RESPONSIBILITIES'''<br /> <br /> <br /> ''25. Consequences of Breach of Responsibilities''<br /> <br /> <br /> 25.1 Where Commissioners do not fulfil their task correctly prior, during and after the Exhibition as<br /> stipulated in the GREX and these Guidelines, the FIP Board of Directors can take the following<br /> action:<br /> <br /> 25.1.1 The Commissioner may be barred by the FIP Board from serving at future exhibitions. This<br /> decision will be taken after the Commissioner and the National Federation have been given the<br /> opportunity to present a defense in connection with any alleged breach of responsibility by the<br /> Commissioner.<br /> <br /> 25.1.2 According to article 16.1.3 of these Guidelines the Commissioner must attend the Roll Call and<br /> be present at the Commissioners' Meetings directed by the person appointed by FIP according<br /> to the prearranged schedule (see 21.2).<br /> <br /> 25.1.3 If a Commissioner is absent more than once without reasonable excuse a warning will be given<br /> by the FIP Consultant and the National Federation will be advised.<br /> <br /> 25.1.4 If the same commissioner repeats this absence also during a subsequent exhibition, the daily<br /> allowance will be charged to the National Federation for the days of absence. The FIP Board<br /> will ask the National Federation to take action for the future.<br /> <br /> <br /> '''CHAPTER VII'''<br /> '''FINAL PROVISIONS'''<br /> <br /> <br /> ''26. Formalities''<br /> <br /> 26.1 In the event of any discrepancies in the text arising from translation, the English text shall<br /> prevail.<br /> <br /> 26.2 Once adopted these Guidelines will replace any other regulations previously in force.<br /> <br /> 26.3 Where no ruling is provided in these Guidelines, the FIP Board will determine any action as<br /> provided in Article 31 of the Statutes.<br /> <br /> 26.4 Exception to the provisions of the present Guidelines may only be made by the FIP Board.<br /> <br /> 26.5 These Guidelines for the Duties and Accreditation of National Commissioners in FIP World<br /> and Specialized Exhibition were updated and approved during the 188th Conference Meeting<br /> of the FIP Board on October 7, 2025.</div>

Administrator